The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise

Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) as a mode of liability in internationalcriminal law is a concept widely upheld by international caselaw. It has, however, been harshly attacked by commentators,particularly with regard to what has come to be known as the‘third category’ of the notion, that of liabilitybased on foreseeability and the voluntary taking of the riskthat a crime outside the common plan or enterprise be perpetrated.This author considers that while most criticisms are off themark, at least two are pertinent: (i) that the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamberin Tadi (1999) was wrong in indiscriminately using terminologytypical of both the civil law and common law tradition, and(ii) that the foreseeability standard, being somewhat looseas a penal law category of culpability and causation, needssome qualification or precision. Generally speaking, the notionof JCE needs some tightening up. For instance, in Kvoka, anICTY Trial Chamber rightly stressed that the contribution ofa participant in a common criminal plan must be ‘substantial’(the Appeals Chamber, however, disagreed to some extent in thesame case). Furthermore, with specific regard to the third categoryof JCE, the author, after setting out the social and legal foundationsof the foreseeability standard and the motivations behind itsacceptance in international criminal law, suggests various waysof qualifying and straightening it out. One of them could liein assigning to the ‘primary offender’ (i.e. theperson who, in addition to committing the concerted crimes,also perpetrates a crime not part of the common plan or purpose)liability for all the crimes involved, while charging the ‘secondaryoffender’ with liability for a lesser crime, wheneverthis is legally possible. The author then suggests, contraryto a 2004 decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Branin, thatthe third category of JCE may not be admissible when the crimeother than that agreed upon requires special intent (this appliesto genocide, persecution as a crime against humanity, and aggression).In such cases, the other participants in JCE could only be chargedwith aiding and abetting the crimes committed by the ‘primaryoffender’ if the requisite conditions for aiding and abettingdo exist. The author then suggests that the view propoundedin 2004 by an ICTY Trial Chamber in Branin is sound, namelythat the general notion of JCE may not be resorted to when thephysical perpetrators of the crimes charged were not part ofthe criminal plan or agreement, but rather committed the crimesunaware that a plan or agreement had been entered into by anothergroup of persons. In conclusion, he contends that this qualifiednotion of JCE, in addition to being provided for in customaryinternational law, does not appear to be inconsistent with abroad interpretation of the provision of the ICC Statute governingindividual criminal responsibility, that is, Article 25, inparticular 25(3)(d).     

The Requirement of an 'Express Agreement' for Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability: A Critique of Brdanin

The mode of liability known as joint criminal enterprise (JCE)has emerged in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a means of assigning criminalliability to individuals for activities carried out by a collective.As a result, the doctrine must be carefully defined so as notto allow it to extend a defendant's liability beyond the appropriatelimits of individual criminal responsibility. In this regard,a recent ICTY Trial Chamber decision in Branin held that, wherea defendant is not alleged to have participated in the physicalperpetration of the crimes charged but to have contributed insome other way to the commission of the crimes by a group, theprosecution must demonstrate that the defendant entered intoan express agreement with the physical perpetrators to committhe crimes charged. The author argues that this ‘expressagreement requirement’ is both conceptually unsound andpractically unhelpful. Conceptually, it would be inconsistentwith core principles of JCE liability to require an expressagreement between a defendant and the physical perpetratorsof crimes, at least in circumstances in which it is allegedthat there existed a structure of two or more overlapping JCEs.Moreover, because this structure allows the accused and thephysical perpetrators to be operating in two separate JCEs,they need not even share a common criminal purpose. On a practicallevel, arguably in a ‘system-criminality’ contextsuch as the one that developed in the former Yugoslavia duringthe time period in question, the organizers of criminal activityare unlikely to enter into express criminal agreements withthose who physically carry out crimes, because existing organizedhierarchies provide much more efficient mechanisms by whichleaders are able to ensure the realization of their criminalplans.     

The Concept of a Joint Criminal Enterprise and Domestic Modes of Liability for Parties to a Crime: A Comparison of German and English Law

The concept of a Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) has becomea useful tool in international criminal law. It allows courtsto hold individuals criminally liable for group activities towhich they have contributed in a criminally relevant way. Theconcept allows for an attribution of criminal responsibilityof unforeseen consequences of such group activities, and itseems to enable the prosecution and the courts to extend criminalliability to high-level perpetrators that use subordinated personsfor their criminal aims. The advantages of such a tool are obvioussince the crimes under international criminal law are mostlyof a systematic, large-scale and collective character, whiledomestic criminal law mainly deals with less complex crimesthat are normally committed by individuals who can easily belinked to the crime. Due to this empirical or criminologicalfact, it seems logical that the normal modes of liability forparties to a crime used in domestic criminal law need to beadapted, and that a rather extensive assignment of criminalliability for secondary parties is justified in internationalcriminal law. This article seeks to question this assumptionby undertaking a comparative analysis of domestic modes of liability.The author aims to show, on the one hand, to what extent theconcept of JCE is in line with the general concept of partiesto a crime in domestic criminal law. On the other hand, theauthor argues that abandoning the idea of JCE as an independentmode of liability may lead to better compliance with the principlesof legality and individual criminal responsibility and therebyincrease the legitimacy of international criminal law.     

Biological factors and crime: implications for forensic psychiatry

To summarize, we can say that (1) Criminal behavior, especially chronic criminal behavior, seems to be partly genetically predisposed; (2) An important task at this point is to attempt to determine the biological factors which predispose people to crime; and (3) We have related some tentative initial steps being taken in the study of the autonomic nervous system as one possible heritable, biological basis for the failure of normal social learning forces in inhibiting criminal behavior. Early in this paper we discussed the tenability of asserting criminal responsibility on individuals whose criminal behavior has a partly genetic etiology. But this special consideration seems to set biological factors apart as being in some unique causal category. In fact, genetic, physiological, and biochemical factors are causal agents in the same sense as family, social class, or neighborhood factors. Of course, criminal behavior (like all other behavior) must be caused; one class of causal variables is the biological category. The legal doctrine of responsibility is not challenged by identifying biological factors as partially determining crime any more than it is by findings of social causation. Only in cases in which abnormal biological factors are exceptionally powerful influences might responsibility be challenged. Such cases will be quite rare.     

Holding Organized Crime Leaders Accountable for the Crimes of their Subordinates

Criminal law doctrine fails to provide an adequate solution for imputing responsibility to organized crime leaders for the offenses committed by their subordinates. This undesirable state of affairs is made possible because criminal organizations adopt complex organizational structures that leave their superiors beyond the reach of the law. These structures are characterized by features such as the isolation of the leadership from junior ranks, decentralized management, and mechanisms encouraging initiative from below. They are found in criminal organizations such as the American Mafia, the Japanese Yakuza, and even outlaw motorcycle gangs. The paper offers a doctrine that may transcend this shortcoming. Referred to as “leaders’ liability,” this doctrine will be assessed and appraised through a comparison with competing theories such as accomplice liability, Organisationsherrschaft, and conspiracy.     

The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime

In many cases of criminality within large corporations, senior management does not commit the operative offense—or conspire or assist in it—but nonetheless bears serious responsibility for the crime. That responsibility can derive from, among other things, management’s role in cultivating corporate culture, in failing to police effectively within the firm, and in accepting lavish compensation for taking the firm’s reins. Criminal law does not include any doctrinal means for transposing that form of responsibility into punishment. Arguments for expanding doctrine—including broadening of the presently narrow “responsible corporate officer” doctrine—so as to authorize such punishment do not fare well under the justificatory demands of criminal law theory. The principal obstacle to such arguments is the large industrial corporation itself, which necessarily entails kinds and degrees of delegation and risk-taking that do not fit well with settled concepts about mens rea and omission liability. Even the most egregious and harmful management failures must be addressed through design and regulation of the corporation rather than imposition of individual criminal liability.     

关于“教唆不满十八周岁的人犯罪的,应当从重处罚”的理解与适用

我国通说的刑法理论认为犯罪主体必须具有刑事责任能力,无刑事责任能力之人实施的危害行为不构成犯罪;同时,教唆不具有刑事责任能力之人实施"犯罪"构成间接正犯,对其也可以适用刑法第二十九条第一款的规定即从重处罚。这种观点一方面认为无刑事责任能力之人实施的危害行为不构成犯罪,另一方在他人教唆的情况下,无刑事责任能力之人却又可以实施"犯罪,"这种解释显然无法成立。     

浅谈刑法有无明文规定的判断标准--兼论刑法没有规定为单位犯罪的单位危害行为的处理

一个危害行为在刑法中有无明文规定的判断标准是什么,这是罪刑法定原则司法化的核心问题之一.实践中,应以有无完全相符合的犯罪构成,作为某一危害行为在刑法中有无明文规定的判断标准.     

单位犯罪之恒定与代罚制之检讨

97《刑法》明确规定了单位犯罪,但是对于单位犯罪的理论争议并未消解于立法的＂一锤定音＂。单位犯罪的立法化使社会存在转化为法律存在,其乃社会发展之必然结果。单位犯罪之肯定首先在于民法上肯定单位的权利能力与行为能力以及法律对这种实在的拟制。但是,单位犯罪单罚制中代罚制所带来的不当后果,乃我们无法回避的现实与理论问题。对此,应当进行深入检讨。     

共犯人关系的再思考

刑法总则规定了哪些参与人,刑法对共犯人如何分类(参与类型),是两个不同的问题。我国刑法总则虽然规定了主犯、从犯、胁从犯与教唆犯四种情形,但不能据此认为这四种情形就是对共犯人的分类。刑法理论必须以罪刑法定原则为根据,确定刑法总则应当规定哪些参与类型。由于刑法分则规定的是正犯,所以,只有当刑法总则规定了教唆犯、帮助犯时,才能扩张地处罚教唆犯与帮助犯,否则便违反罪刑法定原则。由于共同正犯不以实施构成要件行为为前提,所以,如果对共同正犯按照正犯处罚,就必须有刑法总则的明文规定。主张刑法第26条规定的主犯与正犯是交叉关系、递进关系或者等同关系以及双层次区分说的观点,都存在缺陷。刑法第26条是关于共同正犯的规定,该规定贯彻了“部分行为全部责任”的原理。教唆他人犯罪的,如果在共同犯罪中起主要作用,就属于(共谋)共同正犯,按正犯处罚;如果起次要作用,则是狭义共犯中的教唆犯,应当按从犯量刑。基于实质标准,对起次要作用的实行者,也只能按从犯处罚。     

令状主义的例外及其限制

我国刑事诉讼法并未明文将令状主义确立为一项基本原则。令状主义背后所体现的司法审查精神、对公权力的制约思想以及人权保障的理念值得在诉讼程序尤其是侦查程序中贯彻。在侦查程序的构建中,应将令状主义作为解释的指针之一。对于令状主义的例外情形应当进行限缩解释,否则将导致令状主义的空洞化,紧急处分说可以作为这种限缩解释的基本依据。作为先行拘留与扭送对象之一的现行犯,在刑事诉讼法上应做统一理解。从紧急处分说出发,预备犯原则上不得作为现行犯处理;对于"正在实行犯罪"这一要件的解释,必须同时具备现行性、明白性、急迫性,对于明白性的判断应坚持事前判断与事后判断的对应原则;对于"犯罪后即时被发觉的"这一要素的解释,应同时具备时间与空间上的接近性。     

对《刑法修正案（八）》新增的“拒不支付劳动报酬罪”若干问题探讨

“拒不支付劳动报酬罪”是刑法修正案（八）的新增罪名。这对规范劳资关系、稳定社会公共秩序将起到一定的作用。但仍有一些问题如本罪罪名的确立,其客观方面的模糊性等等需要探讨。建议将本罪罪名确定为“拒不支付劳动报酬罪”,明确其客观方面的规定,将“数额较大”的标准规定为5000元,将“经有关政府部门责令支付而不支付”改为“应付款项2个月期限届满时不予支付”等。建议将本罪改为亲告罪,并期望通过增设本罪能够促进我国劳动保障制度的完善。     

继承的共同正犯研究

继承的共同正犯,是指对某一个犯罪,先行行为者着手实行后,在行为尚未全部实行终了阶段,他人(后行行为者)与先行者之间产生了共同实施犯罪的意思,此后共同实施犯罪的实行行为的情形。是否应当承认继承的共同正犯概念,后行者是否应当对先行者行为所造成的结果承担责任,对此,刑法理论界存在着肯定说、否定说与限定的肯定说等多种观点。应当认为继承的共同正犯概念有其存在的合理性,而限定的肯定说则更有利于准确界定各行为人的刑事责任。     

刑法条文理解与适用的证据法学向度

刑法条文的解释不能仅仅局限于单纯刑法学范畴,对有些刑法条文的理解需要结合证据法学的相关内容来思考其含义和适用规则。基于此,认为在犯罪之间设立界限和区分标准不利于犯罪认定的观点,是对证据法裁判原则存在误解的表现。污染环境罪、滥用职权罪与玩忽职守罪等犯罪的主观罪过形式应同时包含故意和过失,其目的是为了解决主观要件的证明困难问题。不能依据犯罪论体系的推定机能将正当防卫的证明责任交由被告方承担,证明责任的分配应主要依据刑事诉讼法的相关内容来确定。对于《刑法》第238、247、289、292条等存在法律拟制和注意规定之争的法条,如果从证据法学角度将其理解为刑事推定,可以克服法律拟制说和注意规定说的缺陷。     

The Problem with Entrapment

In R v Looseley; Attorney General’s Reference (No. 3 of2000) the House of Lords articulated a legal framework to govern‘entrapment’ in criminal cases. Their Lordshipsregarded the need for judicial intervention to assist entrappeddefendants as uncontroversial. This article argues that thedoctrine they set out, in fact, necessitates substantial, andlargely unarticulated, departures from principles the courtsordinarily stress as fundamental to the criminal law. In particular,entrapment doctrine determines liability for criminal acts byreference to the kind of environment inhabited by their perpetrators,a perspective the law ordinarily attempts to exclude. This articlesuggests that the anomalous treatment of entrapment can be understoodas a device to prevent the police from relocating the temptationto commit crime to environments in which they are not ordinarilyconfronted and to ensure that those from backgrounds in whichserious criminality is not usually a plausible option will escapepunishment if tempted to commit crime by the police.     

关于对现行犯适用先行拘留的思考

现行犯是指正在预备犯罪、实行犯罪或者犯罪后即时被发觉的人。刑事诉讼法规定对现行犯可以适用先行拘留。对刑诉法所规定的"先行拘留",理论和实践中众说纷纭,诸如立案前拘留、逮捕前拘留、无证拘留和有证拘留等等。这些观点均有违立法精神,造成了司法实践中对拘留的适用无所适从。先行拘留和拘留是有区别的,对现行犯可以先行拘留,应当理解为"先抓获后拘留"。     

Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals for Genocide

This article discusses one of the most controversial yet importantmodes of liability in international criminal law: joint criminalenterprise (JCE). One such controversy is whether Third CategoryJCE can serve as a basis for genocide convictions. To answerthis question one needs to uncover the nature and origins ofJCE. It is submitted that convictions for genocide based uponthe application of Third Category JCE are justifiable. Thiscontention stems from the premise that JCE is a form of criminalparticipation to which principles of derivative liability apply.However, such an approach is only valid when JCE is strippedto its core and applied as a small-scale group crime, whichrequires proof of a direct link between co-perpetrators. Moreover,in the case of Third Category JCE, a participant should be convictedof participating in genocide, which would carry a lower sentencethan committing genocide as a participant in a First or SecondCategory JCE.     

“机关”不宜规定为单位犯罪的主体

机关应否规定为单位犯罪的主体,在1996年修订《刑法》时即存在争论。我国1997年《刑法》第30条明文规定"机关"可以作为单位犯罪的主体,但争论并未因此而停止。通过对"机关应否规定为单位犯罪主体的争论"和"机关规定为单位犯罪主体的得失"的评析,可以看出将国家机关规定为单位犯罪的主体弊大于利,因而虽有规定,却没有执行,实际成为置而不用。据此,"机关"不宜规定为单位犯罪的主体,《刑法》第30条中的"机关"一词还是取消为好。     

我国罪数理论之基本问题研究

我国的罪数理论对大陆法系理论中的行为说、犯意说、法益说、构成要件说所进行的评判存在重大误读;在罪数的判断标准上没有很好地坚持犯罪构成说;对一罪类型所做的划分存在不少问题,突出表现为对犯罪构成类型和犯罪构成要素复杂性缺乏应有的思考,我们应当将一罪划分为单纯一罪与复杂一罪;将继续犯、集合犯、吸收犯、结合犯纳入其中不符合罪数论的研究宗旨.