An experimental test of the pivotal voter model under plurality and PR elections

This paper examines the decision to vote or not vote in experimental elections. We replicate the important findings of Duffy and Tavits (2008), though with a different design. Our results support their finding, that is, turnout is affected by the belief that one's vote counts and that overestimation in the perception that one's vote counts does not disappear completely over time. Going beyond previous research, we also find that turnout is not higher under a proportional system than under a plurality system, as well as that beliefs about being in a pivotal position have a greater impact on turnout among the risk averse.     

Reaching for profit in the welfare state: Patrimonial economic voting in Denmark

Economic voting has been well-studied in a number of advanced industrial democracies, including Denmark. However, that work has been almost entirely on the valence dimension, i.e., rewarding or punishing government according to whether the overall economy prospers. Recent work has looked at other economic voting dimensions, including patrimony, i.e., the impact of property ownership on the vote. A patrimonial effect has been found in the UK, the US, and France. However, it seems to differ somewhat depending on the welfare-character of the state, with the US at one end and France at the other. Here we examine patrimonial economic voting in a still more extreme welfare state - Denmark. In our analysis of voting in the 2011 parliamentary election, we establish two new findings: 1. patrimonial economic voting exists in Denmark and, 2. its effect is stronger than that for other countries studied thus far.     

Models of Voter Behavior

Abstract

This article reports on a test of a predictive model of voter behavior in Slovenia. The study is based on Slovenian parliamentary elections held on 15 October 2000. A survey was made in an electoral unit (“Vrhnika”). This is one of the tests that were simultaneously done in three countries-Poland, the US and Slovenia. The purpose of the test reported in this study was to test the model in a different cultural and political setting from the one in which it was designed, and also in a different electoral setting-in a proportional instead of majority system of voting. The model proved itself as working in Slovenia.     

Race and ethnicity: Voters’ party preference in South African elections

Abstract

Genuine, periodic, free and fair elections are one of the key defining features of a vibrant multi-party democracy. They provide a public mechanism for regular peaceful institutional competition for power and the opportunity for people to change, review or legitimise government through their freely expressed will. This article interrogates the behaviour of South African voters using a qualitative analysis of available studies covering the national and provincial elections held in 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009, and the municipal election of 2011. One of the notable trends is that while the number of registered voters keeps increasing, voter turnout is on the decrease. There are other salient observable tends but they are not the focus of the article. For the purposes of the article the first conclusion is that among the various competing variables influencing voters’ choice of a particular political party in South African public elections, the race issue, however weak some might suggest it is, still looms large and is a dominant factor despite denials by some researchers. Second, in contrast to what obtains in many other African countries, ethnic identity happily has only a marginal influence on South African voters. This second conclusion should however not be regarded as cast in stone, given the ever-changing dynamic nature of people's identity and behaviour as well as the election campaign strategies of participating political parties and the role of the media. Given that there is a complex interrelatedness of ethnic and racial identity and interests, the electorate might well be more sophisticated than many realise.     

论协同性辩护理论

在对独立辩护人理论进行反思的基础上,在将被告人辩护能力加以激活的前提下,有必要提出一种旨在对辩护律师与委托人关系进行重新调整的协同性辩护理论。根据这一理论,辩护律师作为委托人辩护权的协助行使者,不应垄断这一诉讼权利的行使,而应在激活委托人辩护权的前提下,与其经过充分协商和讨论,形成协调一致的辩护思路,并确立各自在刑事辩护中的分工角色,最大限度地形成刑事辩护的合力,从而追求较为理想的辩护效果。假如我们接受了这一新的理论,那么,诸如被告人的阅卷权、辩护律师的告知和沟通义务、法庭上被告人与辩护律师席位的布局、辩护律师无效辩护的后果等一系列制度安排,都应被纳入辩护制度改革的议程。     

Legislative voting in the pork-dominant parliament: evidence from the Philippine House of Representatives

In this paper I investigate how legislators behave in extremely pork-oriented, or pork-dominant, systems where virtually no party-line voting takes place and politicians strive to deliver individual/local benefits instead of national public policies. I argue that, in the pork-dominant context, most legislators vote with the president, who controls access to the pork pipeline, irrespective of their party affiliations. Thus, the president’s party legislators should have little incentive to vote against the president, regardless of voter demands for pork or policy; however, sometimes opposition-party legislators elected particularly from more-developed districts (where voters often desire policy over pork) should have strong incentives to vote against the president. These arguments are supported with quantitative studies of the post-authoritarian Philippine House of Representatives. It is found that, in the highly homogeneous legislature dominated by pork-seeking politicians, (1) most bills are passed with unanimous or near-unanimous consent, (2) governing-party legislators almost always vote with the majority of the members of the parliament, regardless of voters’ socio-economic conditions, and (3) opposition-party legislators, especially in more-developed areas, tend to vote against the parliamentary majority. These findings indicate that voters’ high socio-economic status promotes programmatic accountability, leading their representatives to undermine voting unity within the extremely cohesive pork-dominant legislature.     

When the election rains out and how bad weather excludes marginal voters from turning out

Ostensibly random and trivial experiences of everyday life, e.g., local weather, can have significant political consequences. First, we present a comprehensive meta-analysis of 34 studies of electoral turnout and rainfall – the vast majority demonstrating a negative association. Secondly, we present a new analysis of a voter panel with validated turnout for a complete electorate merged with fine-grained meteorological observations to show that Election Day rainfall reduces turnout by 0.95 percentage points per centimeter, while more sunshine increases turnout. Marginal voters (young voters) are up to six times more susceptible to bad weather and respond more positively to pleasant weather. Thus, bad weather exacerbates unequal democratic participation by pushing low-propensity voters to abstain. Efforts to include marginal voters therefore ought to be intensified during poor weather, and elections could even be moved to seasons with more pleasant weather to improve participatory equality.     

The Limits of Mobilization: Turnout Evidence from State House Primaries

Many analysts have lamented the decline of political mobilization efforts. They suggest that the cause of worsening voter turnout may be traceable to the failure of political candidates and political parties to target and activate nonvoters. This research explores the effects of face-to-face mobilization efforts in a sample of September 5, 2000, Florida state house primary races. Controlling for their voting history, the face-to-face mobilization effort did increase turnout by about 8% among those contacted. However, the effects were weakest among those who voted least regularly. The results suggest that implementing more face-to-face mobilization efforts would increase turnout—mostly by encouraging occasional voters to go to the polls. However, those same mobilization efforts would not substantially affect the turnout of chronic nonvoters.     

Ideology and strategic party disloyalty in the US house of representatives

We offer a theory of strategic party disloyalty to explain roll call voting in the US House. Our theory suggests that ideologically extreme legislators become markedly less loyal to their party when it controls the majority. They stake out positions that align with the views of their extreme constituents when policy is likely to move in their direction. In contrast, ideological moderates become noticeably more loyal when they transition to the majority. Examining 35 years of ideal point estimates and measures of party unity on roll calls, we find clear evidence that member strategy, ideology, and legislative agenda setting interact to structure the frequency of defections. Further, we find evidence that defection and ideology interact to influence subsequent electoral outcomes.     

代表与选民的关系

代议制民主是由选民选出的代表行使权力的间接民主。因此，代表与选民的关系就成为代议制民主不能回避的一个问题。本文通过对代表与选民关系的各种学说的分析与评价，提出委托说更符合代议制民主机理的观点，并认为委托说同样适用于我国人民代表大会制度。