Grappling with the “real politics” of systemic corruption: Theoretical debates versus “real‐world” functions

A growing body of research argues that anticorruption efforts fail because of a flawed theoretical foundation, where collective action theory is said to be a better lens for understanding corruption than the dominant principal–agent theory. We unpack this critique and advance several new arguments. First, the application of collective action theory to the issue of corruption has been, thus far, incomplete. Second, a collective action theory‐based approach to corruption is in fact complementary to a principal–agent approach, rather than contradictory as is claimed. Third, applications of both theories have failed to recognize that corruption persists because it functions to provide solutions to problems. We conclude by arguing that anticorruption effectiveness is difficult to achieve because it requires insights from all three perspectives—principal–agent theory, collective action theory, and corruption as serving functions—which allows us to better understand how to harness the political will needed to fight corruption.     

Corruption as Resource Transfer: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis

Despite significant investment in anticorruption instruments in the past decades, confusion about their effectiveness remains. While a growing body of scholarship claims that anticorruption reforms have generally failed, other scholars have shown that particular anticorruption tools may actually work. A likely explanation for these puzzling outcomes is that public administration research holds a mistaken view of corruption, and improperly selected anticorruption strategies often target the wrong type of corruption. To overcome this problem, this article proposes a four‐cell typology of corruption, reflecting two critical dimensions along which most corrupt behaviors occur: the resource transfer and the primary beneficiary. Synthesizing recent research developments, this article introduces a new conceptualization of corruption that integrates perspectives from several disciplines. It also offers a series of propositions concerning how each corruption type could be fought. The article concludes with implications for research and practice.     

Getting the basic nature of systemic corruption right: A reply to Marquette and Peiffer

In reply to Marquette and Peiffer's article “Grappling With the ‘Real Politics’ of Systemic Corruption: Theoretical Debates Versus ‘Real‐World’ Functions,” this article employs three criticisms: Marquette and Peiffer's call to grapple with the “real politics of corruption” does not bring much new to the table, is conceptually flawed, and risks serving as an excuse for corrupt elites to pursue “business as usual.” In response, we reaffirm three insights gained from collective action‐based approaches toward corruption. Although corruption might solve individual‐level problems in the short term, it is still a de facto problem at the aggregate level, the tools derived from principal–agent theory will not solve the collective action problem of systemic corruption, and elites will be the least likely to implement reform. We conclude by calling for the continued fight against corruption—a fight informed by empirical and theoretical knowledge.     

Conditions for effective large‐scale anticorruption efforts and the role of external actors: What does the Slovak experience tell us?

The article looks at what policy‐makers can do to decrease corruption in developing and transition countries, based on an in‐depth examination of effectiveness of actual anticorruption measures in Slovakia. The research presents a synthesis of 12 case studies where measures in the sectors most associated with corruption as well as horizontal measures were analysed. The research shows that corruption can be decreased significantly within several years and external actors can play a substantial role in the process. An overall decrease in corruption can be based on aggregation of individual sectoral changes in areas most suffering from graft. In particular, the Slovak strategy was based on a sector‐by‐sector economic approach to resolve supply–demand imbalances based on either liberalisation/privatisation, limitations on discretion or managing supply and/or demand. Horizontal reforms complemented by sectoral reforms with their strong focus on increasing transparency. Concerning the role of external actors, we conclude that even when there is a domestically driven anticorruption effort, the external actors can still help significantly by serving as sources of inspiration, legitimacy, know‐how and funding for reform design and implementation. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate Governance and Corruption: A Cross-Country Analysis

Because the empirical literature on the causes of corruption has focused primarily on the demand side of corruption, that is, the corrupt officials who receive bribe payments, the role of the private sector as the supply side of corruption has not been examined thoroughly in this literature. In this article, it is argued that corporate governance is among the important factors determining the level of corruption. Using a cross-country data set, hypotheses that explicitly link various measures of corporate governance to the level of corruption are tested. The results show that corporate governance standards can have profound impacts on the effectiveness of the global anticorruption campaign.     

(Un)principled principals, (un)principled agents: The differential effects of managerial civil service reforms on corruption in developing and OECD countries

Do management practices have similar anticorruption effects in OECD and developing countries? Despite prominent cautions against “New Zealand” reforms which enhance managerial discretion in developing countries, scholars have not assessed this question statistically. Our article addresses this gap through a conjoint experiment with 6,500 public servants in three developing countries and one OECD country. Our experiment assesses Weberian relative to managerial approaches to recruitment, job stability, and pay. We argue that in developing countries with institutionalized corruption and weak rule of law—yet not OECD countries without such features—“unprincipled” principals use managerial discretion over hiring, firing, and pay to favor “unprincipled” bureaucratic agents who engage in corruption. Our results support this argument: managerial practices are associated with greater bureaucratic corruption in our surveyed developing countries, yet have little effect in our OECD country. Alleged “best practices” in public management in OECD countries may thus be “worst practices” in developing countries.     

State‐Building and the European Union's Fight against Corruption in the Southern Caucasus: Why Legitimacy Matters

This article asks under which conditions the state‐building efforts of external actors in areas of limited statehood are likely to be effective. We argue that the legitimacy of the specific norms promoted by external actors among local actors is crucial for their success in strengthening state capacities. International efforts need to resonate with prevalent social norms. To substantiate this argument, we focus on the European Union's (EU) anticorruption programs and their implementation in one of the most corrupt regions in the world, the Southern Caucasus. We show that legitimacy can explain why the EU's fight against corruption helped reduce corruption in Georgia but not in Armenia. In both countries, political elites could selectively use anticorruption programs as an instrument against political opponents, using enhanced state capacities to stabilize the incumbent regime. Only in Georgia, however, was the fight against corruption facilitated by sustained domestic mobilization for anticorruption policies that added pressure on political elites “from below.”     

When do middlemen matter? Evidence from variation in corruption in India

Corruption is a persistent problem in developing countries, and recent scholarship suggests that middlemen play an important role in corrupt acts. Yet, while intermediaries can reduce transaction costs in illicit exchange, they also increase agency costs and reduce benefits to others. The involvement of middlemen may thus vary. I argue that middlemen are most likely to engage in, and benefit from, the subset of corruption transactions that are repeated frequently, but not by the same parties. I test the implications of this argument using survey experiments administered to a large sample of politicians and bureaucrats at multiple levels of government in India. I show that middlemen are critical, but far from ubiquitous. Intermediaries are more relevant where corrupt deals are frequent but involve unfamiliar potential principals. My results suggest that anticorruption efforts must pay greater attention to the type of corruption and the incentives of middlemen.     

How Policy Entrepreneurs Reduce Corruption in Israel

This article suggests a new perspective for analyzing anticorruption policies by emphasizing the important role of policy entrepreneurs. We maintain that these entrepreneurs combat corruption in three ways: (1) by initiating attempts to reduce corrupt practices, whether through legislation or judicial decisions; (2) by being recognized as honest brokers for informants and insiders; and (3) by providing reliable information from these sources to promote scandals. Even when they are unsuccessful in getting legislation passed, anticorruption entrepreneurs reduce corruption because they raise the level of scrutiny into corrupt practices. In addition, they foment uncertainty, deterring those considering abusing their power. We test our theoretical framework on several anticorruption entrepreneurs in Israel, demonstrating that their existence increases the potential cost of corruption. By creating networks, sharing information with others, and building reputations of honesty and courage, they encourage those involved in or considering illegal activities to refrain from such actions.     

Indignation or Resignation: The Implications of Transparency for Societal Accountability

International organizations, policy experts, and nongovernmental organizations promote greater governmental transparency as a crucial reform to enhance accountability and curb corruption. Transparency is predicted to deter corruption in part by expanding the possibilities for public or societal accountability, that is, for citizens and citizens associations to monitor, scrutinize, and act to hold public office holders to account. Although the societal accountability mechanism linking transparency and good government is often implied, it builds on a number of assumptions seldom examined empirically. This article unpacks the assumptions of principal‐agent theories of accountability and suggests that the logic of collective action can be used to understand why exposure of egregious and endemic corruption may instead demobilize the demos (i.e., resignation) rather than enhance accountability (i.e., indignation). We explore these theoretical contentions and examine how transparency affects three indicators of indignations versus resignation—institutional trust, political involvement, and political interest—given different levels of corruption. The empirical analyses confirm that an increase in transparency in highly corrupt countries tends to breed resignation rather than indignation.     

Fighting corruption in developing countries: Some aspects of policy from lessons from the field

Corruption persists in developing countries despite the proliferation of legal, institutional, and other measures that have been put in place to fight said corruption. The cancer of corruption has therefore spread exponentially in most developing countries with devastating socioeconomic and governance consequences. This practitioner perspective draws on the author's field experience and backed up by the research literature. It identifies, outlines, and discusses some aspects of policy in 3 areas—institution strengthening, the development and implementation of national anticorruption plans/strategies, and political will and leadership—and the conclusions that can be drawn from them for policy development and implementation in the ongoing quest to fight corruption in developing countries.     

Public sector innovation,e-government,and anticorruption in China and India: Insights from civil servants

Both China and India are adopting information and communication technologies to facilitate openness and transparency in their governments, and hence reduce corruption. Distinctive from their traditional anticorruption approaches, is the innovative e-government approach an effective solution to corruption in these two large developing countries? This paper addresses the question through comparative in-depth interviews with 44 mid- or senior-level officials in the public sector in these two countries. The first study of its kind, our research shows that civil servants in both countries overall think positively about transparency and technology in reducing corruption. However, to what extent these innovative measures will be effective is conditional on various factors, such as political willingness, income inequality, and infrastructure readiness. What is worth noting is that the Chinese respondents were more positive regarding the role of transparency, whereas the Indian respondents were more positive about the role of technology, which may reflect the different facilitators of corruption and the constraints of anticorruption in China and India.     

The political economy of accountability in Timor‐Leste: Implications for public policy

With a view to establishing the likelihood of the occurrence of state capture and different forms of corruption and the feasibility of their management and prevention, important aspects of the historical, social, economic, political and governance context of Timor‐Leste are examined. This context is found to be conducive to various forms of state capture and systemic grand and petty corruption, and to be resistant to conventional short‐term technocratic anticorruption remedies. While the latter are likely to have public relations benefits that may be helpful to the maintenance of political stability in the short run, it is argued that significant anticorruption progress is a long‐term endeavour, achievable principally through: sustained impartial service delivery that undermines beliefs in patronage; hastening—through general education and the creation of a conducive legal environment for business—the emergence of leaders of integrity and the growth of a middle class; and the establishment of the rule of law. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corruption and women in cabinets: Informal barriers to recruitment in the executive

Research on corruption and women in politics has mainly focused on legislatures, generally finding that corruption decreases the election of women. This article turns the spotlight to the executive branch—an arena where selection is less transparent than recruitment to legislative seats—and examines if corruption decrease the share of ministers who are women. Drawing on feminist institutionalist theories, we posit that in an environment of high political corruption, (male) elites involved in cabinet formation will tend to appoint ministers whom they can trust with secretive tasks. In systems with corrupt networks, relative newcomers, such as women, should face obstacles to career advancement. The article tests this reasoning empirically on a global sample of countries across time. Using a new indicator measuring corruption in executive bodies, we find support for our argument; corruption tends to hinder women's presence in cabinets, albeit only in democracies and not autocracies.     

Getting to Sweden,Part II: Breaking with Corruption in the Nineteenth Century

Issues about corruption and other forms of ‘bad government’ have become central in large parts of the social sciences. An unresolved question, however, is how countries can solve the issue of systemic corruption. In this article, based on Elinor Ostrom's theory of common pool resource appropriation, a new theoretical model for explaining this type of institutional change is developed. Sweden during the nineteenth century is used as an illustration of the model by showing how the country made a transition from being largely patrimonial, nepotistic and corrupt to a modern, Weberian, efficient and impartial state structure. Building upon a companion article about the importance of losing a war as a precondition for breaking systematic corruption, this article stresses the importance of three additional factors in Sweden: previous changes in courts and the legal system; recognition of the problem by the main contemporary political actors as shown in debates in the Diet; and the new liberal ideology that made an important impact on the Swedish political scene during this period.     

Fighting fiscal corruption: lessons from the Tanzania Revenue Authority

Over the last decade, several African countries have undertaken comprehensive reforms of their tax administrations to increase revenue and curb corruption. This article examines recent experiences in the fight against corruption in the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA). Two lessons of broader relevance are highlighted. Firstly, even with relatively high wages and good working conditions, corruption may continue to thrive. In a situation where there is high demand for corrupt services, it is unrealistic to provide tax officers with pay rates that can compensate for the amount gained through bribery. Without extensive and effective monitoring, wage increases may produce not only a highly paid, but also a highly corrupt tax administration. Secondly, hiring and firing procedures may lead to more corruption. Corrupt tax officers often operate in networks, which also include external actors. These corruption networks seem to have been strengthened because many of those fired were recruited to the private sector as ‘tax experts’. This partly explains why the positive process experienced in the initial phase of the new revenue authority was later reversed. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Do Intrinsic Motivations,Work‐Related Opportunities,and Well‐Being Shape Bureaucratic Corruptibility?

A large body of research focuses on the institutional factors that shape country‐level corruption and the effectiveness of macro‐level anticorruption measures; however, corruption at the individual level remains understudied and thus poorly understood. This article examines the underlying causes of and mechanisms through which individual government bureaucrats engage in corruption. The researchers develop a framework that incorporates intrinsic motivations, work‐related opportunities, and work‐related well‐being to test the ways in which these micro‐level factors shape bureaucrats' propensity to engage in corrupt behaviors (or corruptibility). Using survey data from more than 1,300 Chinese public employees, the authors identify direct and indirect effects on corruptibility and discuss theoretical and practical implications.     

Who Will Be the “Principled‐Principals”? Perceptions of Corruption and Willingness to Engage in Anticorruption Activism

Many anticorruption campaigns aim to encourage citizens to demand better control over corruption. Recent literature suggests that perceived high levels of corruption and government effectiveness in controlling corruption will limit citizens' willingness to actively oppose corruption. Using Transparency International's 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, we test these ideas across a 71‐country sample. We find that perceived government effectiveness tends to encourage anticorruption civic action, while perceptions of corruption being widespread tend to have the opposite impact in non‐OECD countries. Our analyses also suggest that the interaction between these perceptions is important; we find that, especially among those who perceive that the level of corruption is high, when confidence in the government's efforts grows, so does their willingness fight corruption.     

Who protests? An exploration of the class dimensions of anticorruption mobilization

This article examines the role of economic class in mobilizing against corruption. Across several countries, recent anticorruption movements have been attributed to the growing urban middle class. Yet, existing studies have not examined how citizens view their own agency and how their views may be affected by their class position. We use Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer survey and a case study of India to critically examine the class dimensions of anticorruption mobilization. We find that citizens in middle‐income countries are most concerned with corruption. At the same time, those who identify as middle class are only slightly more likely than low‐income individuals to indicate a willingness to mobilize. In contrast, people who identify as high income are much less willing to engage with the issue. Our findings suggest that successful and sustained mobilization against corruption might require a coalition of middle‐and lower‐income groups.     

Setting a Good Example? The Effect of Leader and Peer Behavior on Corruption among Indonesian Senior Civil Servants

Standard anticorruption interventions consist of intensified monitoring and sanctioning. Rooted in principal‐agent theory, these interventions are based on the assumption that corrupt acts follow a rational cost‐benefit calculation by gain‐seeking individuals. Given their mixed results, however, these interventions require closer scrutiny. Building on goal‐framing theory, the authors argue that rule compliance requires a salient normative goal frame, since monitoring can never be perfect. Being inherently brittle, it needs constant reinforcement through external cues operating alongside formal monitoring and sanctioning. Leaders and peers setting a good example can provide such cues. In line with this hypothesis, analysis of multilevel repeated measures data from a vignette study of 580 Indonesian senior civil servants shows that the perceived likelihood of a hypothetical civil servant accepting a bribe is lowest when monitoring and sanctioning are strong and when leaders and peers are known to have refused bribes in the past.