Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem

With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development, strategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles. Yet, in countries ridden with systemic corruption, few successes have resulted from the investment. On the basis of an interview study conducted in Kenya and Uganda—two arguably typically thoroughly corrupt countries—we argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal–agent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather resembles a collective action problem. This, in turn, leads to a breakdown of any anticorruption reform that builds on the principal–agent framework, taking the existence of noncorruptible so‐called principals for granted.     

Transparency and corruption: Measuring real transparency by a new index

Despite the salience of transparency in policy and democracy debates a global measurement of transparency has always been missing. In its absence, measuring the impact of transparency on accountability and corruption for a large number of countries has been difficult, with scholars using more or less adequate proxies. This paper introduces a new measurement of real transparency—the T-index—using 14 de facto components, based on direct observations of official websites in 129 countries and five de jure components, based on the transparency laws and conventions adopted. The resulting index is a measurement with very good internal and external validity and moderate precision. The paper argues that de facto transparency must be considered alongside de jure (legal) transparency if we are to judge the impact (or lack of) transparency against accountability and corruption, as a large implementation gap exists, in particular in poor countries, between legal commitments and real transparency. The T-index has significant impact on both perception and objective indicators of corruption, including perceived change in corruption over time as measured by the Global Corruption Barometer. An analysis of outliers shows that high transparency alone is not sufficient to achieve control of corruption, especially in countries with low human development and poor rule of law, although transparency is a robust predictor of corruption with GDP controls. The data with all sources is available for download as T-index 2022 dataset: DOI 10.5281/zenodo.7225627 and an interactive webpage developed for updates is available at www.corruptionrisk.org/transparency .     

(Un)principled principals, (un)principled agents: The differential effects of managerial civil service reforms on corruption in developing and OECD countries

Do management practices have similar anticorruption effects in OECD and developing countries? Despite prominent cautions against “New Zealand” reforms which enhance managerial discretion in developing countries, scholars have not assessed this question statistically. Our article addresses this gap through a conjoint experiment with 6,500 public servants in three developing countries and one OECD country. Our experiment assesses Weberian relative to managerial approaches to recruitment, job stability, and pay. We argue that in developing countries with institutionalized corruption and weak rule of law—yet not OECD countries without such features—“unprincipled” principals use managerial discretion over hiring, firing, and pay to favor “unprincipled” bureaucratic agents who engage in corruption. Our results support this argument: managerial practices are associated with greater bureaucratic corruption in our surveyed developing countries, yet have little effect in our OECD country. Alleged “best practices” in public management in OECD countries may thus be “worst practices” in developing countries.     

Corruption and Anti-Money-Laundering Systems: Putting a Luxury Good to Work

Systems of laws, regulations, and institutions developed to counter money laundering provide powerful tools for fighting corruption. Currently, however, the potential benefits anti‐money‐laundering (AML) systems can provide in fighting corruption go largely unrealized, especially in developing countries. This mismatch poses a puzzle: Why are developing countries failing to best capitalize on their expensive AML systems by using them to fight corruption? The article is built on three core claims. The first claim is that it is logical to use AML systems for anti‐corruption purposes because of a pronounced overlap in the standards required for each and the rising costs of the former. The second section demonstrates specifically how AML systems could significantly augment anti‐corruption efforts, focusing on the importance of financial intelligence, asset confiscation, and international cooperation. Finally, although powerful outsiders have successfully diffused AML systems among developing countries, a lack of “ownership” in the latter explains why these systems are often established only as tokens to enhance international legitimacy and reputations.     

The Differential Empowering Effects of Europeanization on the Autonomy of National Agencies

This article examines the influence of Europeanization on the relationship between ministries and agencies at the national level. The core argument is that the differentiated nature of the international environment (with policy development often transferred to the international level and policy implementation left at the national level) transforms national agencies into policy‐developing actors that shape policies without being directly influenced by their national political principals. The increasingly common involvement of national agencies in European policymaking processes thereby increases these agencies' policy‐development autonomy but does not change their role in policy implementation. We examine this argument by testing an innovative hypothesis—the differentiation hypothesis—on a combined data set of German and Dutch national agencies. Our empirical findings support the hypothesis in both countries, suggesting that similar effects can be expected in other contexts in which semiautonomous agencies are involved in transnational policymaking.     

State‐Building and the European Union's Fight against Corruption in the Southern Caucasus: Why Legitimacy Matters

This article asks under which conditions the state‐building efforts of external actors in areas of limited statehood are likely to be effective. We argue that the legitimacy of the specific norms promoted by external actors among local actors is crucial for their success in strengthening state capacities. International efforts need to resonate with prevalent social norms. To substantiate this argument, we focus on the European Union's (EU) anticorruption programs and their implementation in one of the most corrupt regions in the world, the Southern Caucasus. We show that legitimacy can explain why the EU's fight against corruption helped reduce corruption in Georgia but not in Armenia. In both countries, political elites could selectively use anticorruption programs as an instrument against political opponents, using enhanced state capacities to stabilize the incumbent regime. Only in Georgia, however, was the fight against corruption facilitated by sustained domestic mobilization for anticorruption policies that added pressure on political elites “from below.”     

Managing the fight against corruption: A case study

Corruption is one of the foremost problems facing policy-makers and managers in developing countries, but it is a remarkably difficult one to study. This case study—an actual episode that has been disguised to preserve confidentiality—provides a vehicle for illustrating both the application of analytical tools to corruption and the importance of practical issues of implementation and politics. The case suggests that anti-corruption policies should carefully assess (1) the relative severity of various kinds of illicit activities, including who gains and loses; (2) the relative susceptibility of the various activities to feasible changes in policies and procedures; and (3) the strategic importance of politics, in the narrow sense of bureaucratic politics as well as the wider political realities.     

Reassessing the Impact of Civil Society: Nonprofit Sector,Press Freedom,and Corruption

The notion that a strong civil society helps to fight corruption has become a cornerstone of governance policy. Yet, a continuing dearth of empirical research, which tests this general proposition and probes the relevant causal mechanisms, feeds rising skepticism of current policy initiatives. This study theorizes the relationship between civil society and corruption, arguing that civil society's impact depends to a large extent on its ability to generate sufficient public pressure which, in turn, depends on the press being free. Analysis of cross‐national and longitudinal data shows that civil society strength is indeed inversely linked to the level of corruption, but the impact is highly dependent on press freedom. This conditioning effect affirms the importance of the public pressure mechanism. These results explain the need for policy to target both civil society and press freedom in promoting accountable governance and sustainable development.     

金砖国家在透明国际清廉指数中的排名变化及其原因探究

“金砖国家”概念的提出,是“金砖五国”等新兴经济体实力不断壮大并伴随全球经济格局深刻演变的产物。包括中国在内的五个新兴国家无论是在经济发展还是社会进步方面都受到了前所未有的瞩目,五国的反腐败及廉政建设亦是备受外界关注。近二十年来,金砖国家在反腐倡廉建设方面付出了诸多努力。但是,清廉指数3．4分左右的平均分仍然时刻提醒着各国腐败形势依旧严峻,反腐败工作还有很长的路要走。     

The Politics of Perception: Use and Abuse of Transparency International's Approach to Measuring Corruption

The annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), published by Transparency International (TI), has had a pivotal role in focusing attention on corruption. Despite recent critiques of the CPI, it remains highly influential on research into the causes of corruption and is also extensively used to galvanise support for measures to fight corruption. In this article we explore the CPI in more depth in order to highlight how the index has been used for political ends which may not always turn out to be supportive of anti-corruption efforts. The argument is developed in four sections: in the first, we focus on Transparency International's definition of corruption, highlighting some conceptual difficulties with the approach adopted and its relationship to the promotion of 'good governance' as the principal means of combating corruption. In the second section, we outline some methodological difficulties in the design of the Corruption Perceptions Index. Although the CPI has been much criticised, we demonstrate in the third section that the index continues to exercise great influence both in academic research and in the politics of anti-corruption efforts, particularly as exercised by Transparency International itself. In the final section we argue that the CPI contributes to the risk of creating a 'corruption trap' in countries where corruption is deeply embedded, as development aid is increasingly made conditional on the implementation of reforms which are impossible to achieve without that aid.     

The challenges and opportunities of implementing the integrity pact as a strategy for combating corruption in Nigeria's oil rich Niger Delta region

In recent years, significant local and transnational concerted initiatives have been instituted to curb the incidence of corruption that has undermined socio‐economic development in Nigeria. Drawing on the critiques of such initiatives, and the experience from the process of implementing the Integrity Pact in the Niger Delta Development Commission, this article suggests that the Integrity Pact in principle offers real opportunities that can both reinforce and complement existing anti‐corruption initiatives in Nigeria's public sector. However, political instability, lack of continuity in civil service leadership and limited capacity are core challenges that confront the successful implementation and institutionalisation of the Integrity Pact as a means of fighting corruption and meeting sustainable development objectives in the Niger Delta. The article concludes by considering the implications of the findings for the fight against corruption in Nigeria. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Independent Professional Bureaucracies and Street-Level Bribery: Comparing Changes in Civil Service Law and Implementation in Latin America

Using cross-sectional data, studies of the relation between merit-based bureaucracies and corruption usually find that nations with more professional and politically independent bureaucracies have lower corruption. However, cross-section designs cannot test this policy claim. This study adopts a pre-test?post-test design using lagged data comparing changes in civil service laws and implementation in eight Latin American countries from 2004 to 2012 and data reporting subsequent change in bribe requests by the bureaucrats that the laws are intended to affect. Raising questions about the validity of previous results, it is found that improved laws and implementation were associated with no or increased bribe requests.     

Political will and government anti‐corruption efforts: What does the evidence say?

“Political will” is oft‐cited as the major obstacle to government's anti‐corruption efforts. Notwithstanding, there is remarkably little systematic analysis of the concept, with some scholars describing it as the “slipperiest concept in the policy lexicon,” whereas others are calling for its empirical relevance. This paper tries to unpack the “black box” of political will by making it an empirically relevant concept drawing on evidence from two Asian countries; Singapore and Bangladesh. Four key indicators based on the works of earlier scholars are used including origin of the initiative; comprehension and extent of analysis; credible sanctions; and resource dedication and sustenance are used. The paper also uses Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, World Bank's World Governance Indicators (Control of Corruption and Government Effectiveness), and Political, Economic and Risk Consultancy's annual survey in Asia, as outcome measures. Based on the empirical evidence from the two countries, the paper shows that political will indeed has a positive influence on government's anti‐corruption efforts. Although political will may not be sufficient, it is a necessary condition to fight corruption, and that the difference between the positions of Singapore and Bangladesh on various global corruption league tables may be attributed to political will.     

Grappling with the “real politics” of systemic corruption: Theoretical debates versus “real‐world” functions

A growing body of research argues that anticorruption efforts fail because of a flawed theoretical foundation, where collective action theory is said to be a better lens for understanding corruption than the dominant principal–agent theory. We unpack this critique and advance several new arguments. First, the application of collective action theory to the issue of corruption has been, thus far, incomplete. Second, a collective action theory‐based approach to corruption is in fact complementary to a principal–agent approach, rather than contradictory as is claimed. Third, applications of both theories have failed to recognize that corruption persists because it functions to provide solutions to problems. We conclude by arguing that anticorruption effectiveness is difficult to achieve because it requires insights from all three perspectives—principal–agent theory, collective action theory, and corruption as serving functions—which allows us to better understand how to harness the political will needed to fight corruption.     

Conditions for effective large‐scale anticorruption efforts and the role of external actors: What does the Slovak experience tell us?

The article looks at what policy‐makers can do to decrease corruption in developing and transition countries, based on an in‐depth examination of effectiveness of actual anticorruption measures in Slovakia. The research presents a synthesis of 12 case studies where measures in the sectors most associated with corruption as well as horizontal measures were analysed. The research shows that corruption can be decreased significantly within several years and external actors can play a substantial role in the process. An overall decrease in corruption can be based on aggregation of individual sectoral changes in areas most suffering from graft. In particular, the Slovak strategy was based on a sector‐by‐sector economic approach to resolve supply–demand imbalances based on either liberalisation/privatisation, limitations on discretion or managing supply and/or demand. Horizontal reforms complemented by sectoral reforms with their strong focus on increasing transparency. Concerning the role of external actors, we conclude that even when there is a domestically driven anticorruption effort, the external actors can still help significantly by serving as sources of inspiration, legitimacy, know‐how and funding for reform design and implementation. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of the Institutional Design of the Civil Service: Evidence from Corruption

ABSTRACT

This research tests the direct effects of civil service structure on perceptions of corruption. Numerous studies suggest a relationship between civil service structure and corruption, but few test this link. It is hypothesized that corruption depends on the presence or absence of civil service policies, including job duties, tenure and security provisions, discipline policy, and rules on rewards and bargaining rights; the impact of government wages, per capita GDP, and democratization on corruption is also assessed. These hypotheses are tested using World Bank data for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and central and eastern European countries. No statistically significant relationships between civil service structure and corruption are found; however, occasional evidence that corruption is higher in countries with higher total government wage bills was obtained. Results additionally indicate that corruption is lower in countries with higher GDP. While the conclusions presented here are largely exploratory, there is a distinct lack of evidence indicating a relationship between civil service systems and public perceptions of corruption.     

China: Administrative Corruption — Experience in a Comparative Context

As a new world economy emerges what is being learned about the accompanying phenomenon of administrative corruption? To probe this question we combine study of current developments in China with prevailing theories of corruption. The administrative corruption experience, as it has unfolded during the economic development thrust of the Deng reform era, is described and analysed in a comparative context. In specifically interjecting the American experience we suggest that a balanced control response to corruption —rather than an elimination focus—could be a fruitful avenue for policy and research, and that informal, social approaches to corruption control are pregnant with possibilities. China's experience offers a significant opportunity to push the margin of wisdom on these issues as they relate to economic and political development.     

Impact of natural disaster on public sector corruption

This paper uses inter-country panel data from 1990 through 2010 to examine how the occurrence of natural disasters affects corruption within the public sector. For a closer analysis, disaster is classified into various categories, including general floods, other floods, tropical storms, other storms, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and landslides. Furthermore, this paper explores whether natural disasters have different impacts on corruption levels in developed and developing countries. The study reveals a number of novel findings. (1) Natural disasters that cause substantial damage increase public sector corruption in both developing and developed countries. (2) Natural disasters have a greater impact on public sector corruption in developed countries than in developing countries. (3) In developed countries, natural disaster frequency has a significant impact on the level of corruption. Hence, foreseeable disasters increase corruption in general. In developed countries, an incentive may exist to live within disaster-prone areas because of the potential for disaster compensation payments.     

Getting the basic nature of systemic corruption right: A reply to Marquette and Peiffer

In reply to Marquette and Peiffer's article “Grappling With the ‘Real Politics’ of Systemic Corruption: Theoretical Debates Versus ‘Real‐World’ Functions,” this article employs three criticisms: Marquette and Peiffer's call to grapple with the “real politics of corruption” does not bring much new to the table, is conceptually flawed, and risks serving as an excuse for corrupt elites to pursue “business as usual.” In response, we reaffirm three insights gained from collective action‐based approaches toward corruption. Although corruption might solve individual‐level problems in the short term, it is still a de facto problem at the aggregate level, the tools derived from principal–agent theory will not solve the collective action problem of systemic corruption, and elites will be the least likely to implement reform. We conclude by calling for the continued fight against corruption—a fight informed by empirical and theoretical knowledge.     

从国民性看中国的政治腐败问题

当前腐败问题成为国家和人民关注的热点话题,虽然出台了很多政策措施,但贪污腐败案却愈演愈烈,据调查我国每年因腐败造成的损失至少有数千亿元。可见,腐败如不及时治理必将祸国殃民。国民性是一个国家民族最主要的内在特征。它与腐败现象的产生有着一定的联系,所以,从国民性的角度,试图分析腐败现象的表现形式以及原因,探寻通过改造国民性来解决政治腐败问题。