Difficult Europeans: NATO and Tactical/Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War

This analysis examines NATO’s tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Cold War both for their perceived deterrent value against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and as potential war fighting weapons. Within this debate lay questions related to extended deterrence, security guarantees, regional or theatre conflict, and escalatory potential. A central tenet that emerged in Europe was that nuclear weapons needed emplacement on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members to make deterrence more tangible. It raised huge questions of consultation. Once the Soviet Union had intercontinental missiles, the credibility of American readiness to use nuclear weapons in defence of its allies came into question. European alternatives and different consultation mechanisms to facilitate nuclear use became central to intra-NATO relations. Actively debated across NATO, they directly concerned above all the United States, Britain, and France—the nuclear weapons states in the NATO area—and West Germany, the potential main battleground in a Warsaw Pact invasion. Although dormant in NATO since the end of the Cold War, these issues will likely see revisiting in both Europe and other regional trouble spots.     

A Dutch revolt? The salience of the nonstrategic nuclear weapons issue in Dutch politics

Transparency, international credibility, democratic accountability, a new realism in defense expenditures – these basic policy goals fit awkwardly with the current deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) on Dutch territory. Most parties in the Netherlands want the NSNW removed. Some are even willing to challenge the idea that only consensus among all 28 NATO Allies can lead to the removal of the NSNW. The new Dutch minister of foreign affairs for example, Frans Timmermans, has a long track record of calling for an end to the deployment of US nuclear weapons on Dutch territory. Without NATO consent if necessary. His appointment fits with the political shift that we have seen over the past few years in Dutch politics. This article looks at the political rationale behind that shift: who are the main political actors involved? How have domestic and international pressures influenced party positions? The article also looks at the possibilities a new Dutch Government has were it to challenge the NATO consensus on NSNW. Would the USA refuse to take the NSNW away? How would NATO react and what could mitigate Allied concerns?     

U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reductions: Nonlinear Challenges,Practical Opportunities

The Obama Administration's desire to push forward with strategic nuclear arms reductions during the President's second term requires the navigation of numerous shoals and reefs. U.S. and Russian negotiators will have to overcome both political and military obstacles to accomplish post-New START reductions in long-range nuclear weapons. For example, efforts to reduce offensive nuclear weapons are complicated by U.S. and NATO plans for missile defenses deployed in Europe and by exigencies in U.S. and Russian domestic politics. In addition, the military-technical aspects of cyber war and nuclear deterrence can no longer be treated, analytically or practically, as isolated compartments. This article considers several aspects of the relationships among possible post-START offensive force reductions, advanced conventional weapons including missile defenses, and emerging cyber capabilities.     

Nato Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidence and Expectations

The second enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since the end of the cold war fueled an ongoing debate over whether the alliance contributes to democratization in Europe. In the 1990s, critics warned that the 1999 NATO enlargement would cultivate a new cold war and prove irrelevant to democratic consolidation in central Europe. Events have not borne out these forecasts, however. In Poland, not only did NATO build a civilian consensus in favor of democratic control over the armed forces corresponding to NATO norms, but it also delegitimized Polish arguments for defense self-sufficiency that had derived their credibility from Poland's experience of military vulnerability and foreign domination. Such democratizing and denationalizing trends have contributed to stability in postcommunist Europe. An assessment of the seven states that joined in 2004 similarly reveals some scope for NATO's influence in all cases. The alliance's access to domestic reform processes, however, will be uneven across cases in ways largely consistent with the predictions of the theoretical framework in this article.

     

On Extended Nuclear Deterrence

This analysis discusses the central challenges that countries face when they practice extended nuclear deterrence. One key problem has to do with credibility: potential aggressors may not believe that a country would fight to defend an ally, particularly if doing so risks a nuclear attack against its homeland. Countries might be able to address this issue by forging formal alliances with protégés or by stationing nuclear forces on the protégé’s territory. Do these measures discourage third-party aggression? Defence pacts involving nuclear-armed states effectively bolster extended deterrence. One risk of extending nuclear protection from the American perspective, however, is that it might pull the United States into unwanted wars by risk-acceptant protégés. Yet, in a nuclear context, the risk of alliance entrapment is generally overblown. Placing nuclear weapons on an ally’s territory does much less to bolster extended deterrence than one might initially think. Although foreign nuclear deployments may reassure allies and promote non-proliferation to some degree, their value for extended deterrence is fairly minimal. The United States continues to deploy nuclear weapons in five European countries, but the case for maintaining these deployments is decidedly weak.     

NATO,ballistic missile defense and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

Abstract

Within the next few years, NATO will need to make a collective decision about the future of US tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Europe. While opinion about the value of these weapons is not as split as conventional wisdom might suggest, and while NATO will remain a nuclear alliance irrespective of this decision, balancing politics and strategy looks likely to be a difficult task. This decision is made far more complex by the determination of NATO officials to link the withdrawal of these weapons to reciprocal reductions in Russian TNW in Europe, and by the possibility of substituting the key strategic and political link they provide with a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. This article shows how we have arrived at this position, highlights the potential benefits to NATO Europe of BMD, and considers the key questions that the Alliance will face in achieving this. Ultimately, this article shows how the future of TNW in Europe is likely to be linked to whether NATO values arms cuts with Russia, or the deployment of missile defenses, as its central priority.     

NATO's nuclear addiction – 12 steps to ‘kick the habit’

The article argues that NATO is a nuclear-addicted alliance. It focuses on how the addiction developed, the damage caused by the addiction and ways in which it may be overcome. After outlining the origins to NATO's nuclear addiction, the article turns to the recent defence and deterrence posture review (DDPR), which is seen as a classic example of ‘addict behaviour’ spoiling the best chance NATO has had for overcoming its addiction. The article offers an assessment of the DDPR, portraying the outcome of the process as not only a lost opportunity, but unfortunately also as a position that limits the possibilities for reaching a constructive agreement on the important question of the remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe. The article ends by suggesting 12 steps for NATO to overcome its addiction, although it is acknowledged that the DDPR has severely restricted NATO's room for maneuver leaving only a slim chance for ‘complete recovery’.     

Weapons as political symbolism: the role of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

This study evaluates the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) for NATO today. Historically, TNWs fulfill five objectives. First, they provide a deterrent by denial capability. Second, TNWs serve to deter TNWs by other countries. Third, as the most ‘useable’ of nuclear weapons, they offer militaries solutions to a small target set of hardened targets. Fourth, they bridge the interface between nuclear and conventional forces, maintaining linkage up the ladder of escalation. Fifth, they serve as a powerful political symbol of an extended deterrent commitment. While the perception is that their utility for NATO in plausible European contingencies is low, we argue that there is variation in the political and military roles of TNWs. We submit that, in general, the first role has lost its significance but the other objectives remain relevant to NATO's present political circumstances, especially as a symbol of the transatlantic relationship and as a safeguard against Russian belligerence. Accordingly, TNWs remain a significant part of NATO's capabilities and should remain deployed in Europe.     

The rise and fall of Spain's ‘nuclear exceptionalism’

The present article looks at the evolution of Spanish views on deterrence and non-proliferation. Like every member state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Spain is covered by the US nuclear umbrella and has accepted the logic of deterrence, while at the same time maintaining a denuclearised status and committing to the goal of disarmament enshrined in the non-proliferation treaty. This article explores the background of Spain's apparently contradictory situation as a denuclearised member of NATO and how it positions itself in regard to the nuclear question in the current security context. It concludes that while Spanish nuclear ‘exceptionalism’ originally rested on the reluctance of the political elites to alter the precarious compromise that once allowed for Spain's accession to NATO as a denuclearised member, it gradually withered away to give way to a close alignment with Alliance policies driven by a desire to preserve strong security links with its partners.     

Killing the MLFfithe Wilson government and nuclear sharing in Europe, 1964-66

This article investigates the claim of Britain's Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, to have 'killed' the Multilateral Force, an attempt to bring about nuclear sharing within NATO and answer the supposed German desire for equality of status. Earlier accounts have often seen the Multilateral Force as being abandoned, largely thanks to shifts in American policy, in late 1964. The case argued here is that the proposal continued to tax the alliance well into 1966, that important elements in the American and German governments continued to support it and that the British do deserve some credit for bringing the whole idea to an end. In particular the launch of an alternative proposal (the 'Atlantic Nuclear Force'), Wilson's readiness to argue with Washington and Bonn, and the exploitation of French withdrawal from NATO in 1966 proved important, even if British opposition was only one of several factors working against nuclear sharing. In the process he was also able to neutralise the dangers posed to him in the domestic political sphere by the debate over nuclear weapons.     

The construction of NATO's medium term defence plan and the diplomacy of conventional strategy, 1949-50

This article examines NATO's first strategic project, the Medium Term Defence Plan (MTDP) of 1950, and the plan that led to the 1952 Lisbon Force Goals, a landmark in the evolution of NATO's strategic thinking because the failure to reach the Lisbon goals allegedly drove NATO into its subsequent dependence on nuclear weapons from which it has never been weaned. The article disputes this interpretation by showing that the MTDP was conditioned by the desire of the United States to maintain its autonomy over the use of atomic weapons, and its freedom from the constraints of the new alliance. The MTDP was a paradox: a conventional strategy designed to mask the rules governing the balance of decision-making power within NATO which maintained American peripheralism against the integrative pressures of the alliance. Lisbon was actually part of a deepening nuclear commitment on the part of the United States, sustained by the willingness of the Europeans to endorse the rearmament plan in exchange for promises of further economic assistance.     

Reluctant disarmer: Italy's ambiguous attitude toward NATO's nuclear weapons policy

Of the five North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) European countries of US nuclear forward deployment, Italy is the least-known and studied case, even though the country hosts the largest number of US nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) and still has two bases of deployment. The paper aims at filling this gap by analyzing Italy's current view on the presence, value, and future of NSNWs hosted on its territory. The analysis begins with the examination of the process of profound devaluation that has minimized, starting from the end of the cold war, Italy's original interest in this category of weapons. It then examines the reasons why Rome continues to pursue conservative nuclear weapon policies and distances itself significantly from the progressive camp of NATO members, particularly Germany, that explicitly call for the withdrawal of US NSNWs from Europe. Through the study of the Italian domestic politics and security culture, the article explains Italy's opposition to any radical change in the NATO nuclear status quo, and its reluctance to pursue policies that are consistent with the process of nuclear devaluation that the country has experienced over the past two decades.     

Why do they want American Nukes? Central and Eastern European positions regarding US nonstrategic nuclear weapons

This article analyses the potential motivations behind the opposition of a number of Central and Eastern European States (CESs) to the withdrawal of US deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) from Europe. It shows why CES governments obtain no military benefits from the deployed NSNW; it argues CES are unlikely to truly see them as a promising bargaining chip; it suggests CES can derive only limited prestige from US-deployed weapons and the contrasting norm of ‘nuclear disarmament’ likely offers a more attractive option; and it assesses potential bureaucratic interests as improbable to play a decisive role. In contrast, the article proposes a more nuanced elaboration of the transatlantic ‘linkage’ argument. It maintains CES have significant motives to keep the United States involved in Europe, shows how they are likely to mistrust US commitment pledges, and argues they are prone to use the NSNW debate as a convenient instrument (within a limited toolbox) towards locking in the US foothold on the continent.     

NATO's Response Force: finally getting it right?

Abstract

At the Riga Summit in November 2006, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) declared the NATO Response Force (NRF) a fully operational capability. Yet only 8 months later – and behind closed doors – the Alliance's military authorities rescinded the declaration as it became increasingly clear that member states were unwilling to make the necessary commitments to the force. To this day, the force has been a qualified failure: while many allies have benefited from participating in the NRF, lack of concrete troop commitments and disagreement as to the force's operational role have largely eroded its credibility. This could change with the allies' recent adoption of a revised NRF-construct. However, as NATO is still in a state of strategic confusion, the NRF is likely to continue to be different things to different nations.     

The Balkans and the enlargement of NATO: A sceptical view

Throughout the Cold War, NATO and the USA worked hard to consolidate their strategic presence in Europe, while at the same time containing the Soviet threat. But the road taken by NATO in its effort to reform itself after the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, has not been a royal path, smooth and free of risk. NATO's geopolitical and selective way of eastward expansion encourages the creation of new ‘enemy blocs’ with Russia at their epicentre. The clash between NATO and the European Union over defence and security issues becomes all the more obvious. The humanitarian war over Kosovo was a risky affair whose spillover effects are badly felt today with the uprising of Albanian Macedonians; The Kosovo war, moreover, created a unique precedent in the conduct of foreign policy and clearly bordered on ‘double standard’ politics. Last but not least, the wider implications of Turkey's entry into the European Union may not be, in the long run, as positive for NATO as initially thought they would be.

This article offers a critical overview of NATO's reform process in the 1990s and argues that its transformation from a military defence pact into a political organisation upholding and selectively implementing liberal‐democratic principles may lead the alliance into serious political deadlocks in the years to come.     

A western cold war: the crisis in Iceland's relations with Britain,the United States,and NATO, 1971–74

The article explores the crisis in Iceland's relations with the Western Alliance following a left-wing government's decisions, in 1971, to expand Iceland's fishery limits and to demand the withdrawal of US military forces. This sparked a cod war with Britain and a diplomatic stand-off with the United States, with NATO in the middle. It analyzes the motives behind Iceland's behaviour – especially the tension between a pro Western foreign policy course and a domestic anti Western nationalism – the Western response within the context of alliance politics and the democratic peace theory, and the role of international mediation and domestic political realignments in diffusing the crisis.     

Shifting locus of governance? The case of NATO's connected forces initiative

In early 2012, NATO's then-Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, unveiled the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), an effort designed to increase allied interoperability and readiness. Through three lines of effort – training and education, exercises, and better use of technology – the CFI is intended to help the alliance maintain the operational and tactical interoperability it developed in Afghanistan. At first glance, the CFI appears to represent an example of the claims of some neo-institutionalist scholars that there is a shift in the locus of governance from member states to NATO. However, this article takes a deeper look and concludes that in fact the locus of security governance is not shifting, at least not in this instance. Member states of the alliance retain several means of controlling and influencing NATO, thereby preventing it from developing a significant degree of autonomy, in contrast to the European Union or United Nations.     

One Plus Four: What NATO’s New Strategic Concept Should Say and How to Achieve It

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) must pivot to address a new era of persistent threats and disruptive challenges unbounded by geography. Reaffirming NATO’s cohesion as an alliance of democracies will be paramount. Each of NATO’s core tasks—defense and deterrence, crisis management, and cooperative security—must evolve to meet new dangers. The Alliance should add a fourth core task of comprehensive resilience: the ability to anticipate, prevent, and, if necessary, protect against and move forward from disruptions to critical functions of allied societies. A more capable Europe is essential to each of these tasks.     

Alliance Proximity and Effectiveness of Extended Deterrence

This article examines whether geographical proximity between defensive allies and a protégé increases the likelihood of successful extended general deterrence. I argue that proximate allies are better at making a credible deterrent threat because proximate allies are more willing and able to help alliance partners in times of crisis than distant ones. This claim is theorized by examining how geographical distance influences the international and domestic costs of alliance commitments. The empirical tests reveal that a potential aggressor is less likely to initiate a militarized dispute against a target with proximate defensive allies. Furthermore, I find that the power of proximate defensive allies is a more significant determinant of successful extended general deterrence than that of distance allies. Interestingly, I also find that the constraining effects of geographical distance on the effectiveness of extended general deterrence have been alleviated by advancements in military technologies throughout history.     

Regional collective security in Europe: Past patterns and future prospects

NATO's entry into the Balkan war raised salient questions about the alliance's broader mission and, more generally, about Europe's security architecture. This article confronts these questions by revisiting the debate about collective defense versus collective security as organizing principles for alliances. NATO is viewed as serving a hybrid role of promoting collective defense and regional collective security. This latter, under‐valued function relates to NATO's role in promoting internal cohesion among its members and is crucial to understanding the alliance's evolution and its persistance long after the Cold War.