Forever young: START and aftermath

Abstract

The New Strategic arms reduction treaty nuclear arms control agreement signed by US President, Barack Obama, and Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, in 2010 is likely to achieve ratification in both Washington and Moscow, but it is too early to break out the champagne or vodka. Even successful ratification of this agreement is, at best, an important but incremental part of the US–Russian policy ‘reset’ and the larger agenda for both states with respect to arms reduction and nonproliferation. Further reductions in both states’ inventories of strategic nuclear weapons are a necessary preface toward credible leadership in stopping the spread of nuclear arms – especially in the looming test cases of Iran and North Korea. In addition, both states have to decipher a policy-strategy nexus for emerging missile defense technologies: in particular, whether missile defenses should be seen as possible means of cooperative security, as between NATO and Russia, or whether they are firewalls in the way of further progress in offensive nuclear arms reductions.     

NATO,ballistic missile defense and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

Abstract

Within the next few years, NATO will need to make a collective decision about the future of US tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Europe. While opinion about the value of these weapons is not as split as conventional wisdom might suggest, and while NATO will remain a nuclear alliance irrespective of this decision, balancing politics and strategy looks likely to be a difficult task. This decision is made far more complex by the determination of NATO officials to link the withdrawal of these weapons to reciprocal reductions in Russian TNW in Europe, and by the possibility of substituting the key strategic and political link they provide with a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. This article shows how we have arrived at this position, highlights the potential benefits to NATO Europe of BMD, and considers the key questions that the Alliance will face in achieving this. Ultimately, this article shows how the future of TNW in Europe is likely to be linked to whether NATO values arms cuts with Russia, or the deployment of missile defenses, as its central priority.     

Generals in Cyberspace: Military Insights for Defending Cyberspace

Recently, there have been calls for the United States to unleash the offensive power of cyber space. Advocates contend that offense has the advantage in cyberspace. This article argues that cyberspace does not favor the offensive at either the tactical or the strategic level. In fact, a defensive doctrine has clear advantages over an offensive one. Support for this argument can be found in two unexpected sources: official statements of U.S. Army doctrine and Carl von Clausewitz's On War. This is surprising, given that scholars consider both the U.S. Army and Clausewitz diehard apostles of the cult of the offensive. This essay seeks to import their insights about the advantages of the defense into the virtual realm. When read carefully, U.S. Army doctrine and Clausewitz's classic text support the claim that defense is the stronger approach in the cyber realm.     

US–Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Forward and Retro after 2008?

Abstract

The arrival of a new US administration in 2009 is a swinging door with respect to opportunities for Russian–American cooperation in strategic nuclear arms reductions and nonproliferation. Both US presidential candidates in 2008 supported nuclear abolition as a theoretically desirable goal, and the Obama administration will certainly pursue nuclear arms reductions consistent with already agreed, or lower, levels. Missile defenses complicate US–Russian relations on this issue, but they pose negotiable, not insurmountable, barriers to further arms reductions and strategic stability.     

International Convention for the Peaceful Use of Cyberspace

Cyber weapons now are an extension of state power. In hopes of gaining a strategic advantage, many countries including the United States, Russia and China are developing offensive cyber capabilities to disrupt political, economic, and social institutions in competitor nations. These activities have led to a cyber arms race that is spiraling out of control. This imminent global threat challenges the international community to be proactive. The purpose of this article is to propose an international convention to throttle the development, proliferation and use of cyber weapons before they cause electronic Armageddon. We begin by examining three successful efforts in arms control and use the lessons learned to draft a convention that can serve as a starting point for formal multilateral negotiations.     

Triad of terror: post-START reductions in broader context

Abstract

This paper considers the present condition and future prospects for post-Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (post-START) nuclear arms reductions in the following sequence. First, we review the essential features of the agreement between Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in July 2009, for a START follow-on agreement. Second, we discuss the larger political and military-strategic contexts within which these post-START negotiations will play out. Third, we perform an analysis to determine whether the START follow-on guidelines would meet prospective requirements for mutual deterrence and, in addition, whether US–Russian reductions could safely go even lower. Fourth, we take a specific look at the estimated impact of defenses on deterrence stability under post-START reductions. Fifth, pertinent conclusions are summarized.     

美国《网络空间国际战略》评析

在信息化时代,网络空间承载着国家政治、经济、文化和军事发展与安全的重荷。网络空间存在的黑客攻击、网络犯罪和网络恐怖主义事件层出不穷,因此网络空间安全已上升到国家安全战略的层面,美国政府于2011年5月16日发布的《网络空间国际战略》引起世界各国瞩目。美国《网络空间国际战略》以"共同创造繁荣、安全、开放的网络世界"为基本宗旨,以"基本自由、隐私和信息流动自由"为核心原则,从经济、网络安全、司法、军事、网络管理、国际发展、网络自由等诸方面为美国未来网络安全战略的发展指明了方向。《网络空间国际战略》的出台表明美国政府已将网络安全提升到国际战略的新高度,它隐含着美国谋求网络空间霸权的战略目标,具有引领国际战略新变革和引发网络空间价值观冲突的现实战略效能,它对中美关系的影响和中国的应对之策也是值得认真分析和思考的。     

俄罗斯安全战略全面转向“以攻为守”

美国推动北约东扩、决意在东欧部署导弹防御系统以及挑起新一轮军备竞赛等一系列举措，使俄罗斯战略安全环境持续恶化。为应对美国和北约咄咄逼人的攻势，俄罗斯将“以攻为守”作为安全战略的核心，加快军事改革以迎接未来挑战。     

U.S.Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy and China's Coping Strategy

Deterrence and coercion are two kinds of strategies,the latter being more aggressive than the former.The U.S.Asia-Pacific Rebalancing strategy is an important diplomatic legacy of Obama's administration.For the issues involving the Diaoyu Islands,the South China Sea,cyber security,DPRK's nuclear program,and Iran's nuclear program,the U.S.has carded out military deterrence and non-force coercion against China.But generally,these are low-level coercive measures and distinct from the severe economic sanction and diplomatic isolation imposed by the U.S.on Russia,Syria,DPRK and Iran in recent years.Concerning issues where the U.S.and China hold distinct views,there would be less strategic leeway for the two countries.If the U.S.is to strengthen deterrence and coercion towards China,China can respond more actively and effectively,but it will be more difficult to build a new model of China-U.S.major-country relationship.     

Weapons as political symbolism: the role of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

This study evaluates the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) for NATO today. Historically, TNWs fulfill five objectives. First, they provide a deterrent by denial capability. Second, TNWs serve to deter TNWs by other countries. Third, as the most ‘useable’ of nuclear weapons, they offer militaries solutions to a small target set of hardened targets. Fourth, they bridge the interface between nuclear and conventional forces, maintaining linkage up the ladder of escalation. Fifth, they serve as a powerful political symbol of an extended deterrent commitment. While the perception is that their utility for NATO in plausible European contingencies is low, we argue that there is variation in the political and military roles of TNWs. We submit that, in general, the first role has lost its significance but the other objectives remain relevant to NATO's present political circumstances, especially as a symbol of the transatlantic relationship and as a safeguard against Russian belligerence. Accordingly, TNWs remain a significant part of NATO's capabilities and should remain deployed in Europe.     

Security, nationalism and the pursuit of nuclear weapons and missiles: The South Korean case, 1970-82

South Korea decided to develop nuclear weapons and surface-to-surface missiles in the early 1970s. The Park Chung-hee administration made the decision because of its concern about a complete withdrawal of US forces from Korea following the Nixon Doctrine. Simultaneously, increasing nationalism within the administration, caused by its tumultuous relations with the United States, further strengthened such pursuits. Later, when faced with the US threat to withdraw security and economic assistance, the administration slowed down active development of nuclear weapons in 1976, but it continued missile development. However, the Chun Doo-hwan administration, inaugurated in 1980 after military coup and massacre, froze all weapons-related nuclear research and the missile programme. The Chun regime made such a change because it needed the support of the US to make up for its weakness in legitimacy and because the Reagan administration provided a solid defence commitment to South Korea.     

Missile Defenses and Mother Russia: Scarecrow or Showstopper?

Abstract

Missile defenses will neither derail the post-Cold War political relationship between the US and Russia nor repeal the existence of mutual deterrence as between their respective nuclear arsenals. Because politics rules strategy and strategy must pay homage to the realities of physics, missile defenses will emerge into arsenals gradually, if at all. Whether missile defenses exacerbate political tensions, or can be deployed cooperatively by the United States and/or NATO and Russia, is not a technological given, but a political decision point that will require care taking by the current and prospective administrations in Washington and Moscow.     

Russian Grand Strategy and the United States in the 21st Century

Despite the initially cordial relationship between the United States and Russia following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Iraq War became a turning point in what evolved into the worst relationship between Moscow and Washington since the Cold War. From that point onwards, Russia persistently has exhibited aggressive behavior toward the United States, resulting in numerous crises. This article argues that this Russian assertiveness is deliberate, arising from a mixture of domestic and international factors. In light of recent developments in U.S.-Russian relations, especially the decision of American President Barack Obama to abandon the Bush Administration's scheme to deploy national missile defense (NMD) system in Eastern Europe, it is important to understand that Russia's grand strategy is aimed at promoting multipolarity and that Moscow is willing to apply limited military force to achieve its goals. The Obama Administration should engage Russia, but be prepared to confront it if necessary.     

Bush: The Sequel

This article examines the likely foreign policy initiatives of the U.S. under the leadership of George W. Bush. The new president has outlined a fairly thorough critique of America's international behavior in the 1990s. Because a leader's public statements arguably serve to persuade various audiences and to build support for policy change, the article takes Bush's words quite seriously—along with those spoken or written by his closest foreign affairs advisors. Bush intends to abandon the so-called Clinton Doctrine and deploy national missile defenses. He is critical of American policies toward China and Russia, but has not presented bold new initiatives toward those powers. Under the rubric of "compassionate conservatism," Bush may alter U.S. relations toward the Global South in some interesting ways. The president and his advisors often purport to be realists, but the article demonstrates that their own words belie this claim as they often justify policies based on ideals rather than the pursuit of power.     

Military reform and strategic nuclear forces of the Russian federation

Russian Minister of Defense Marshal Igor Sergeyev has proposed merging the Strategic Rocket Forces and strategic nuclear components of the Navy and Air Force. Advocates of the proposed reform invoke Russia's need to increase its reliance on nuclear weapons in view of the decline in its conventional forces, as well as the potential savings from the merger. Critics of the plan view it as favoring the Strategic Rocket Forces at the expense of the rest of the military, and as prohibitively expensive. The NATO campaign in Kosovo has made Marshal Sergey ev vulnerable to criticism for emphasizing nuclear forces over conventional ones, and the plan has been put on hold.     

Pre-emption,Deterrence, and Self-Defence: A Legal and Historical Assessment

The policy of the United States, outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy, whereby the US claims a right under international law to engage in pre-emptive use of force to prevent a rogue state's development of nuclear weapons, or any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), is unnecessary and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. This conclusion is reached through a comprehensive and intensive assessment of the normative reactions of politically effective actors to China's development of nuclear weapons during a two-year period between the Cuban Missile Crisis and China's first test in October 1964. While pre-emptive use of force against China, a rogue state, was considered by both the United States and most likely by the Soviet Union, neither used force to prevent it developing nuclear weapons. Since a policy of pre-emptive use of force was unnecessary for either state's self-defence, it would have been unlawful under customary international law. Given that the current strategic scenario of states vis-à-vis rogue states is the same under most circumstances, notwithstanding the existence of international terrorist networks, the article concludes that the proposed claim of the United States is, prima facie, unnecessary to its self-defence, and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. It shifts the burden of proof to policymakers claiming that all rogue states can be lawfully prevented through pre-emptive use of force from acquiring nuclear weapons, to establish that a particular state cannot be deterred from the use of nuclear weapons. Though the preventive war claim of the US National Security Strategy 2002 may turn out to be an effective strategic bluff in limiting WMD proliferation, the wisdom of the threat should not be confused with the illogic of preventive war.     

论当前中美俄三边关系新特征和新趋舅

国际金融危机以来,中美俄三边关系进入以合作为主的新阶段。在普京重新出任总统后,美俄能否在欧洲反导问题上形成共识,将成为影响美俄关系发展的重要因素。未来,中美俄三边关系将会是各国在争取自身战略利益的过程中不断寻求妥协,将彼此间的竞争控制在规则允许的范围内。基于美国实力相对衰弱、俄中实力上升、解决全球性和地区问题上需要合作等因素,三国关系仍可能以继续保持建设性合作的基本态势向前发展。     

美国东北亚政策的进攻性现实主义解读

以米尔斯海默为代表的进攻性现实主义是现实主义理论的最新发展,其从历史分析与理论论证的角度为美国的东北亚政策提出了"离岸平衡手"的解读与构想。然而朝核危机爆发后,美国的东北亚政策正朝着建立多边安全机制的方向发展,进攻性现实主义提出的"中国威胁论"也不攻自破。     

The ‘Demand-Side’: Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran

This article examines the historical record of “nuclear rollback” and the motivations for Iran's apparent pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability in order to identify the broad principles that should guide U.S. and international efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis with Iran.¹ The author argues that Iran, like all states, seeks security and respect. For many Iranians, the past three decades provide proof that such security and respect can only be attained with a strategic nuclear deterrent. In 2009, if the United States can show Tehran a genuine path to security and prestige that does not require nuclear weapons, Tehran might give it serious consideration. However, if the United States and the international community fail to address Iran's legitimate need for security or its desire for international respect, Bowman believes it may only be a matter of time until Iran obtains a nuclear weapons capability.