“布什主义”四处碰壁

布什政府提出的“布什主义”在推行中四处碰壁。主要表现为：发动“先发制人”战争，深陷伊拉克泥潭；坚持单边主义，自己孤立自己；以反恐为名行称霸之实，越反麻烦越多；全球推销“民主”，受到多方抵抗。     

布什政府中东战略的得失

布什政府执政8年来，一改克林顿时期的中东战略，推行先发制人的主动进攻战略，导致美国深陷伊拉克战争泥潭难以自拔，还使整个中东及阿富汗局势动荡，伊朗核问题更将成为美国下届政府的负面遗产。然而，美国内的石油及军工利益集团却从布什政府中东战略中获得了巨大的经济利益，这也是布什政府对其中东战略始终不作调整的根本原因。     

美国社会对反恐政策认识的变化及其原因

正在经历反恐战争的美国人继续在忧虑中前行。“9·11”事件五年多来，反恐毫无疑问成为美国国家政治生活的中心。但时至今日，恐怖主义非但没有被有效遏制，反而呈现出“越反越恐”的态势。实际上，反恐战争究竟何去何从一直是美国政界、学者、民众争论的焦点，伊拉克乱局更让布什政府内外交困，美国国内逐步开始反思反恐历程，审视现实。伴随着伊拉克局势呈现“内战化”和美国在伊拉克进退维谷的窘境，要求布什政府重新调整反恐政策的呼声越来越强烈。美国的反恐政策遭遇到前所未有的挑战。     

略论布什政府对土耳其的政策

9·11事件后，布仲政府对土耳其外交政策有所调整，从各个方面表现出对盟国土耳其倍加重视的倾向，具体表现在大力支持土耳其的经济和政治改革；大力帮助土耳其渡过金融风波；支持土耳其争夺里海油气输送管道；帮助土耳其扩大在中东、中亚的影响；通过反恐怖活动巩固美土同盟关系。布什政府对土耳其外交政策的调整是多种因素所使然，其中包括历史原因、土耳其的重要地缘战略地位以及美国称霸全球战略的需要。布什政府对土耳其政策的调整进一步密切了美土关系，对美国称霸全球战略提供了支持，同时亦有利于土耳其进一步适应全球化，对中东、中亚的局势也具有重要影响。     

美国中东政策的困境

布什政府发动伊拉克战争、推行大中东民主计划、对中东和平进程的忽视和错误处置等一系列错误政策,使原本异常复杂的中东局势变得更加难以驾驭。老问题没解决,又增添了伊朗核问题的挑战。美国力图摆脱中东政策失误导致的困境,将不仅是布什政府,而且是后布什政府所面临的一项主要的外交和战略问题。     

宗教保守主义对布什政府外交的影响

后冷战时期,以基督教右翼为核心的美国宗教保守主义因政治共性而与共和党走向联合。宗教保守主义在美国政坛的崛起强化了布什政府外交中的“使命感”;强化了美国定义反恐战争的二元论;同时也强化了布什政府新保守主义的外交理念。     

布什连任与朝核问题

2005年2月10日，朝鲜突然宣布拥有核武器并无限期中止参加六方会谈。朝鲜此举不仅是因受到布什政府的言论刺激；同时，朝鲜意在得到更多的关注，试图提高谈判地位，促成美朝双边谈判，并试探其他各方的态度。布什政府第二届任期将坚持六方会谈模式解决朝核问题，其原因是：当前形势所迫：确保美国在朝核问题上的主导权；“倒金”企图难以实现；阻止朝鲜越过“核门槛”；中韩俄日四国态度制约。而六方会谈作为解决朝核问题的模式已成为有关各方的共识，通过六方会谈解决朝鲜经济发展所需要的外部环境是朝鲜的既定目标，因此，朝鲜不可能脱离六方会谈这一解决问题的基本框架。     

对伊拉克战争的几点思考

伊拉克战争已结束 ,它对世界格局和世界未来发展趋势的影响逐渐显现 ,而战争本身也给人们留下了许多思索。为什么美国民众对布什政府发动伊拉克战争的支持率居高不下 ,为什么美国对伊拉克战争志在必得 ?文章对这些问题进行了剖析。     

布什政府单边主义外交政策的困境

布什政府的单边主义外交政策导致美国与其传统盟友之间的离心并影响“美国领导”的合法性。布什的反恐战争和反恐战略没有给美国民众带来心理上的安宁,反而使美国财政负担日益加重。白宫内部的外交政策分歧和党派政治将使布什政府第二任期难以摆脱困境。     

美国"先发制人"战略初探

为适应不断深入的反恐战争的需要,布什政府正在加紧炮制以"恐怖分子"和"邪恶政权"为主要打击对象的"先发制人"战略.该战略的出台标志着美安全战略和军事战略将更富进攻性、侵略性和冒险性,将对国际和平与安全造成严重的不利影响.     

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN RUSSIA AFTER 9–11

Can military reform in Russia become a reality, or is it doomed forever to the status of oxymoron? The answer to this question will have as much to do with US-Russian relations as with internal Russian politics and finance. Despite a warm personal friendship between Presidents Putin and Bush, polls show the Russian people remain highly ambivalent about US policies and intentions toward Russia and the CIS. Many inside and outside the military believe the United States will use the war in Afghanistan and its foothold in Central Asia to encircle and weaken Russia. This thinking has spilled over into attacks on Putin for his attempts at military reform, particularly his decision to de-emphasize the strategic nuclear forces. While Putin has made some courageous moves to stem corruption and bring the military to heel, in other cases he has been forced to back off in order to avoid a political backlash. As a result, military reform continues to proceed in fits and starts, still more oxymoron than reality.     

Yitzhak Rabin: An Appreciation

The author wrote that “the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in his seventy-third year ended the life of another ‘son of the founders’ of the state of Israel. He belonged to the generation of 1948—the young men whose military prowess gave Israel a fighting start. Unlike some of his early mentors, such as Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan, Rabin was to achieve supreme power twice. And more than any other of his generation he will be recalled as the general who waged both war and peace.”     

发心中所感 斥战争之罪——论大江健三郎随笔的反战观

大江健三郎在文学创作活动中 ,是把小说和随笔视为“文学生活中的车之两轮” ,他通过文学中“两轮”的“随笔”之轮对侵略战争进行总清算。即日本对中国和亚洲各国发动战争的目的是灭亡中国、征服亚洲 ,战争的性质是侵略战争 ,战争的责任由日本承担。日本必须向中国及亚洲各被害国赎罪、道歉、赔偿 ,才能得到中国及亚洲各国人民的谅解和信任。     

《莱特战记》与大冈升平的战争观

大冈升平的《莱特战记》在详细记录太平洋战争末期日美两国军队在菲律宾莱特岛的攻防战的同时,也表达了作家本人对这场战争的看法。他一方面描写了战争的残酷,触及了日军的加害事实,批判了军队机构的冷酷,表明了反对战争的态度。另一方面,他又混淆战争性质,片面强调美国的战争责任,为日军的侵略罪行辩解,从狭隘的民族主义立场出发赞颂日军在战争中的抵抗。他虽然剖析了日军失败的原因,指出了日本军部在战争进程中的失误,但是并没有追究他们发动侵略战争责任的动机。     

Ambassador David Bruce and “LBJ's War”: Vietnam Viewed from London, 1963–1968

Recent decades have seen growing historical interest in “second rank” officials who, whilst they do not play a leading role in government or political movements, can influence the way decisions are shaped and executed. At the same time, the interest of scholars in American policy during the Vietnam War shows no signs of abating. This article investigates the experience of one second rank official during the war, David Bruce, who was Ambassador to London during 1961–1969. Making particular use of Bruce's extensive diaries, it traces his shifting views on the war, looks at the extent to which he shared the outlook of other official,s and asks what influence, if any, he had on events. It argues that, whilst he always remained loyal to his own government and often mirrored the outlook of the Johnson Administration, Bruce had his own perspective on events, was consistently critical of American tactics on the ground, and, in Spring 1967, influenced by Robert McNamara, became an early advocate of retrenchment.     

Eisenhower's disarmament dilemma: From chance for peace to open skies proposal

President Eisenhower's image as a promoter of 'peace and nuclear disarmament' was established through speeches he made such as 'Atoms for Peace' (December 1953) and 'Open Skies' proposal (July 1955). However, Eisenhower's approach to the subject cannot be grasped without an understanding of his attitude towards the relationship between arms, war and disarmament. As he saw it, not only would the mere existence of nuclear weapons not trigger a war, they were actually the best guarantee against the eruption of a global conflagration. The real threat to world security was the repressive, closed, totalitarian and expansionist Soviet regime. War could be prevented only by a dramatic change in the competing - and threatening - ideology and social structure embedded in the Soviet system. Until then, the existence of nuclear weapons would ensure the free world's safety.     

Eisenhower's disarmament dilemma: From chance for peace to open skies proposal

President Eisenhower's image as a promoter of ‘peace and nuclear disarmament’ was established through speeches he made such as ‘Atoms for Peace’ (December 1953) and ‘Open Skies’ proposal (July 1955). However, Eisenhower's approach to the subject cannot be grasped without an understanding of his attitude towards the relationship between arms, war and disarmament. As he saw it, not only would the mere existence of nuclear weapons not trigger a war, they were actually the best guarantee against the eruption of a global conflagration. The real threat to world security was the repressive, closed, totalitarian and expansionist Soviet regime. War could be prevented only by a dramatic change in the competing ‐ and threatening ‐ ideology and social structure embedded in the Soviet system. Until then, the existence of nuclear weapons would ensure the free world's safety.     

Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining

The "audience cost" literature argues that highly-resolved leaders can use public threats to credibly signal their resolve in incomplete-information crisis bargaining, thereby overcoming informational asymmetries that lead to war. If democracies are better able to generate audience costs, then audience costs help explain the democratic peace. We use a game-theoretic model to show how public commitments can be used coercively as a source of bargaining leverage, even in a complete-information setting in which they have no signaling role. When both sides use public commitments for bargaining leverage, war becomes an equilibrium outcome. The results provide a rationale for secret negotiations as well as hypotheses about when leaders will claim that the disputed good is indivisible, recognized as a rationalist explanation for war. Claims of indivisibility may just be bargaining tactics to get the other side to make big concessions, and compromise is still possible in equilibrium.     

乔森潘拒绝替红色高棉背黑锅

柬埔寨传统新年除夕,74岁的乔森潘在他的拜林住所对笔者说,他对自己参加红色高棉30多年的经历“既不遗憾又有些遗憾”。不遗憾的是他为祖国的民族解放,国家主权和领土完整奋斗了一辈子。遗憾是至今不能给家人一个放心的未来。说到这里他声音几近哽咽。柬埔寨共产党(柬共)副书记农谢表示对自己的过去没有遗憾;乔森潘透露柬共书记波尔布特死前也表示没有任何遗憾。与他们俩人相比,乔对家人多了几分亲情和眷恋。乔原本与农谢是邻居,住在柬泰边界上。一年前,乔在20公里外的拜林小镇盖了间房,从此离开农谢。乔的新家在10号公路边上,转个弯就到了…