The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy,Process, and Great Power Politics

Abstract

This article examines the process through which India and the United States made their bilateral civilian nuclear energy cooperation pact a reality. Using the levels of analysis approach, this article examines the factors that were instrumental in shaping up the nuclear agreement as well as the negotiating process as it evolved in the United States and India with a special focus on how political leaderships in the two states managed domestic opposition to the pact. Subsequently, this article locates the US-India nuclear agreement in the context of the broader theoretical debate in international relations over the role of international institutions in global politics and argues that the successful conclusion of the agreement highlights the importance of strategic considerations in driving the nonproliferation priorities of great powers.     

U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy in the Northeast Asian region during the cold war: The South Korean case

In over forty years of relations with the United States, South Korean decision-makers have had plenty of time to estimate the costs and benefits of acquiring nuclear weapons. The puzzle becomes why South Korea did not develop an operational nuclear capability, given the North Korea threat, the weakening of the U.S. guarantee, a vibrant economy, and an advanced nuclear manufacturing base. This case provides proof that U.S. rewards and threats significantly affect Third World states' nuclear decision-making and that the United States has greater influence with smaller and more vulnerable states than with larger and more technologically advanced states.     

Career Paths in the PLA Rocket Force: What They Tell Us

ABSTRACT

This article applies a form of organizational analysis to the military institution responsible for China’s nuclear weapons, the PLA Rocket Force and its predecessor, the Second Artillery. Analyzing the ways in which this military institution manages and allocates its human capital can offer potential insights into both China’s operational practices and the institutional and strategic priorities of the country’s missile forces. Specifically, the article examines career paths of PLA officers in the Rocket Force, with a particular focus on those officers who eventually rise to the ranks of senior leadership. The analysis yields evidence that senior leaders are more likely to have served in the Rocket Force’s premier conventionally-armed missile base, that there is an informal institutional hierarchy among the missile bases, and that, at least at the personnel level, there is some separation between conventional and nuclear units. These findings have important implications for assessing potential escalation dynamics in a possible conflict between China and the United States and for forecasting the future development of China’s missile forces.     

Review Essay: Stabilizing Nuclear Southern Asia

ABSTRACT

This review article considers three significant volumes recently published in the field of Southern Asian security studies. These consist of Not War, Not Peace? Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism, by Toby Dalton and George Perkovich; Sameer Lalwani and Hannah Haegeland (eds.), Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories; and Mooed Yusuf, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments: U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia. In the wake of the 2019 India–Pakistan Pulwama militarized crisis, each book focuses on a distinct element of the Southern Asian security milieu that is crucial to understanding drivers of regional insecurity and potential pathways toward greater stability. However, collectively, they leave room for greater exploration for the effects of emerging trends in this regional strategic competition. These include the evolving regional preferences and actions of China, the potential for Pakistan-based terrorist groups to become independent actors throughout a Southern Asian crisis, and the growing prominence of precision-strike standoff weapons in the strategic planning of China, India, and Pakistan. Still, these three volumes prove indispensable for understanding the contemporary political and security dynamics of Southern Asia.     

A SURVEY OF INDIA’S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

This paper examines India’s strategic environment in the round. ‘Strategic’ refers here to politico-military aspects of international relations, particularly those with implications for the use or potential use of force in the future. Thus economic factors are considered secondarily, and only insofar as they have diplomatic and military ramifications – as in the case of Chinese infrastructure projects in South Asia, or Indian port-development in Iran. This approach also sets aside what we might call ‘structural’ factors, such as large-scale multilateral trade deals, such as the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and sociological-demographic trends, such as relative population growth rates, also such issues necessarily influence the real and perceived balance of power over the long-run. The paper begins by considering India’s most salient adversary, Pakistan, before looking at the connected issue of Afghanistan and Central Asia. It then turns east to examine another rival, China, followed by the United States, the smaller states of South Asia, and finally the Middle East.     

Peter Gowan's “American grand strategy”

While this article broadly agrees with Peter Gowan's concern about the new militarism of the United States and the appalling consequences that have emerged as a result of U.S. preemption in Iraq, it questions the extent to which his portrait of U.S. hegemony addresses all the relevant issues as they affect the Asian region. Given the numerical dominance of Asia in world population and the rising power of China and India, how Gowan's “American Grand Strategy” applies to this part of the world is of fundamental importance to the relevance and sustainability of his argument. Part 1 on U.S. economic hegemony argues that U.S. capital has not been an unmitigated evil for India and where U.S. interests have been damaging they are not uniquely so: the European Union's economic policies have also been deeply damaging even though Europe is not a hegemon. Part 2 on U.S. political hegemony argues that bringing Pakistan and India into the U.S. alliance system has been beneficial for regional security and domestic political-ethnic stability. Part 3 considers responses to U.S. hegemony, arguing that this supremacy is more fragile than Gowan assumes because new powers, such as China and India, have long-term strategies to reduce their dependency. The conclusion suggests that despite widespread criticism and dissatisfaction with the nature of U.S. engagement in Asia, the dominant view in the region is one that sees the United States as a useful wedge between the emerging interests of China, India, and Japan. In short, the “American Grand Strategy” is not as negative, overwhelming, or as unpopular as Gowan suggests.     

Peril and promise: a survey of India's strategic relationship with Central Asia

This article outlines the growing importance of India's relations with the Central Asian region. In particular, it explores security, economic, and cultural dimensions of the relationship. Important considerations for India in dealing with Central Asia include terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, energy security, and new export markets. Of equal gravity, however, is the nature of great power competition in the heart of Asia. The argument presented here is that India's relations with Central Asia are calculated to gain strategic depth in the region. However, relationships with Pakistan, the United States, and the Asian great powers tend to constrain these ambitions. The future direction of India's strategic relationships with Central Asia remains fluid.     

THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO PAKISTANI AND IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: A STUDY IN PARADOX

This article explores the paradox in the reaction of the United States to the two different proliferation cases: Pakistan's proliferation and Iran's weaponization effort. The article tries to find answer to the following key question; why the United States, as one of the guardians of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) which would prefer to see a region that is entirely free of weapons of mass destruction, ultimately has accepted Pakistan's proliferation, while imposed considerable amount of pressure to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The paper posits that number of factors explain such differences; first, and at the theoretical level, Pakistan was never considered an “irrational” and “messianic” state like Iran, but regarded as a country with a certain degree of cold-war type nuclear rationality. Second and at the applied level, while Pakistan was a US ally with not having a history of challenging the United States, Iran has been considered enemy and a threat toward the US interest.

Third, while Pakistan's nuclear arsenal was viewed as a defensive mean against overwhelming strength of India, Iran's possible nuclear arsenal considered to be for offensive uses against the United States and Israel. The fourth factor pertains to the consequences of proliferation, which is what happens when Iran's neighboring countries may feel threatened by Iranian nuclear weapon and proceed to develop their own arsenal. Fifth factor deals with the possible Iran's temptation to give some nuclear material to a terror group in which made the United States serious in preventing Iran's weaponization. Last but not least, Israel was not involved to pressure and agitate against Pakistan, while it was applied a tremendous pressure against Iran to prevent it from achieving nuclear weapons.     

Economic Interdependence and Security on the Korean Peninsula: The Impact of North Korean Special Economic Zones

Abstract

Given North Korea’s desire to maintain nuclear weapons—and barring its unexpected collapse—how can the US and its allies establish and maintain a peaceful Northeast Asia? Current US policy alternatives do not offer an effective means for removing North Korean nuclear weapons without creating many more serious problems that jeopardize a stable future for Northeast Asia. However, by engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI) through North Korea’s special economic zones, the United States and other nations can engage North Koreans at all levels of society and build a future environment of cooperation and stability. Such a long-term engagement policy will prove more successful than isolation, sanctions, or military force, and will bolster regional actors’ efforts to develop additional stability-inducing policies.     

Do Nuclear Weapons Stabilize South Asian Militarized Crises? Evidence from the 1990 Case

Abstract

Scholars have claimed that nuclear weapons help to stabilize South Asia by preventing Indo-Pakistani militarized crises from escalating to the level of all-out conventional war. This article argues that while nuclear weapons have had cautionary effects on Indian and Pakistani decision makers, proliferation also has played a role in fomenting some of the very crises that scholars credit nuclear weapons with defusing. Moreover, nuclear deterrence was not always essential to preventing these crises from escalating to the level of outright war. The article illustrates its argument with evidence from the Indo-Pakistani militarized crisis of 1990.

Leading scholars and analysts have argued that nuclear weapons help to prevent South Asian militarized crises from escalating to the level of all-out conventional war. ¹ 1. See, e.g., Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 109–110; Devin Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 133–170; Kenneth N. Waltz, “For Better,” in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton, 2003), pp. 109–124; K. Subrahmanyam, “India and the International Nuclear Order,” in D. R. SarDesai and G. C. Raju Thomas, eds., Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), pp. 63–84, at pp. 82–83; Raja Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), pp. 197–198. A considerable literature exists regarding nuclear weapons’ general effects on the South Asian security environment. Scholars optimistic that nuclear weapons will help to pacify South Asia include Waltz, “For Better”; Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation; John J. Mearsheimer, “Here We Go Again,” New York Times, May 17, 1998; Subrahmanyam, “India and the International Nuclear Order”; Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan India, 2002). Scholars pessimistic as to nuclear weapons’ likely effects on the regional security environment include Scott D. Sagan, “For the Worse: Till Death Do Us Part,” in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; P. R. Chari, “Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the Security–Insecurity Paradox in South Asia,” in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagné, eds., The Stability–Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2001), pp. 15–36; Kanti Bajpai, “The Fallacy of an Indian Deterrent,” in Amitabh Mattoo, ed., India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi: HarAnand, 1999); Samina Ahmed, “Security Dilemmas of Nuclear-Armed Pakistan,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 21, No. 5 (October 2000), pp. 781–793; S. R. Valluri, “Lest We Forget: The Futility and Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons for India,” in Raju G.C. Thomas and Amit Gupta, eds., India’s Nuclear Security (United States: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 263–273. This claim has important implications for the regional security environment and beyond. Given the volatile nature of Indo-Pakistani relations, reducing the likelihood of crisis escalation would make the subcontinent significantly safer. The claim also suggests that nuclear weapons could lower the probability of war in crisis-prone conflict dyads elsewhere in the world.

This article takes a less sanguine view of nuclear weapons’ impact on South Asian militarized crises. It argues that while nuclear weapons have at times had important cautionary effects on Indian and Pakistani decision makers, proliferation has played a role in fomenting a number of the very crises that scholars credit nuclear weapons with defusing. Moreover, it is not clear that nuclear deterrence was essential to preventing some of these crises from escalating to the level of outright war. I illustrate my argument with evidence from the period when India and Pakistan were acquiring nascent nuclear weapons capabilities. I show that during the late 1980s, Pakistan’s emerging nuclear capacity emboldened Pakistani decision makers to provide extensive support to the emerging insurgency against Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir. In early 1990, India responded with large-scale force deployments along the Line of Control and International Border, in an attempt to stem militant infiltration into Indian territory, and potentially to intimidate Pakistan into abandoning its Kashmir policy. Pakistan countered with large deployments of its own, and the result was a major Indo-Pakistani militarized standoff. Although scholars have credited Pakistani nuclear weapons with deterring India from attacking Pakistan during this crisis, the preponderance of available evidence suggests that Indian leaders never seriously considered striking Pakistan, and therefore were not in fact deterred from launching a war in 1990. Thus nuclear weapons played an important role in fomenting a major Indo-Pakistani crisis during this period, but probably were not instrumental in preventing the crisis from escalating to the level of outright war.

Below, I briefly describe the emergence of the Kashmir insurgency. I then explain how Pakistan’s nuclear capacity encouraged it to support the uprising. Next, I show how conflict between Pakistan-supported guerillas and Indian security forces in Kashmir drove a spiral of tension between the two countries, which led to a stand-off between Indian and Pakistani armed forces in early 1990. Finally, I discuss the end of the 1990 crisis, and address the role that nuclear weapons played in its peaceful deescalation.     

Editors’ Introduction

Abstract

This article explains why the United States has not fought a preventive war against North Korea despite that country’s moves to arm itself with nuclear weapons. I argue that the absence of war is mainly attributable to military strategies that the US military has with regard to North Korea. With only attrition strategies available, the United States neither expects to lose a precious military opportunity nor anticipates grave future vulnerabilities vis-à-vis North Korea. The prospect of a costly attritional campaign deters both Washington and Pyongyang from resorting to military force. Straightforward attrition strategies also allow little chance for miscalculation, thereby making inadvertent escalation to war unlikely. The research finds sufficient evidence for my argument, whereas conventional explanations offered by international relations theory fall short when applied to this case.     

Changing Global Landscape and Enhanced US Engagement with Asia—Challenges and Emerging Trends

United States President Barack Obama's announcement of significant shifts in US polices towards the Middle East and East Asia in 2009 has affected the global strategic landscape. President Obama's announcement of enhanced US engagement with Asia has posed certain challenges to the prevailing regional architecture of ASEAN centric institutions and ASEAN centrality which has fostered peace and stability, and prosperity in the region. The rise of China and its growing political and economic influence in the region and its military modernisation have aroused US concern that a rising China could in the future challenge its primacy in the Asia region. President Obama's announcement of a web of military alliances of treaty allies and strategic partners with the stationing of US marines in Darwin in November 2011 was perceived by China as an attempt by the US to contain China or constrain its rise. ASEAN is uneasy about any emergence of big power rivalry in the region.     

Economic Engagement and Nuclear Security in Asia

Abstract

Economic engagement and nuclear security are two key contemporary issues on the Asian security landscape. The development of US economic and strategic ties with India is symbolic of Washington's general pivot towards Asia, and the US-India nuclear pact, which combined economic and strategic aspects, and also highlights the potentially growing interest in nuclear energy. This review essay examines these economic and nuclear aspects of Asian security, points out problems and prospects concerning the governance of nuclear weapon programs, and the commercial industry's role in managing nuclear proliferation.     

美国与巴基斯坦关系的改善及其制约因素

冷战后,巴基斯坦在美国外交中的战略地位明显下降,特朗普上台后更是重印轻巴,推出了高度重视印度的南亚战略和印太战略,对巴基斯坦则实行极限施压政策以逼其加大反恐力度。美国的政策变化引起了巴基斯坦政府和民众的不满与抵制,两国间出现激烈的外交纷争,美巴关系陷入僵局。然而,巴基斯坦在美国的阿富汗战争和外交战略中处于不可忽视的地位,并且巴基斯坦是具有一定的对美反制能力的地区强国,特朗普政府在更为重要的阿富汗和谈问题上需要得到巴基斯坦的帮助。在权衡利弊后,特朗普政府调整对巴基斯坦政策,从以压促变调整为拉拢利用,美巴关系随之从高度紧张走向逐渐缓和。然而,美巴在短期利益和长远战略上都存在难以弥合的矛盾和分歧,双边关系发展缺乏坚实的合作基础和长远计划,两国在主要的共同利益——阿富汗政治和解方面存在目标和利益差异。此外,美印关系不断提升,使美巴双边关系的进一步发展困难重重。美国不愿放弃在巴基斯坦及邻近地区的战略利益,短期内会维持美巴合作,但从长远看,众多挑战和制约因素使两国关系存在较大的不确定性。美巴关系的走向不仅影响到南亚局势,还会冲击到我国的周边安全、中巴关系的发展以及"一带一路"倡议的推进,应当密切关注。     

The Risk of War in Nuclearized South Asia

Abstract

How did the introduction of nuclear weapons impact the security of the two South Asian rival states India and Pakistan? In this article, the author explores this question by looking at three books written by key experts in the field. The works explore this core question from three different angles, each of which represents an important strand in contemporary research on South Asian nuclear security. The article addresses three specific aspects in detail. First, it challenges the current trend to adopt structuralist explanatory models, which are unable to adequately appreciate the complex dynamics of the nuclear competition. Second, it explores the relationship between nuclear policy making and regime type. Third, it assesses the relevance of the Kargil conflict as test case for the existence of deterrence stability in South Asia.     

从“最低限度介入”到“有条件积极介入”:论中国对阿富汗政策的调整

阿富汗素有"帝国坟墓"之称,不少学者认为中国应尽量避免过多卷入阿富汗问题,尤其是安全事务方面。然而,中国现阶段采取的"最低限度介入"也不能帮助解决阿富汗问题,有必要调整为"有条件积极介入",即:以不单边军事介入、不干涉阿富汗内政和尊重阿富汗人的意愿为原则。在地区安全方面,中国应积极构建中美俄印巴大国安全合作机制,发动五国力量共同提供区域公共安全产品;在外交方面,中国应坚持以双边调解和多边斡旋为主,借中巴、中伊(朗)良好的双边关系以及中国在阿富汗问题上独特地位多方协调,形成稳定有效的双边谈判机制和多边协调机制,并将阿富汗纳入上合组织;在经济方面,中国应依托"一带一路"倡议、中巴经济走廊等机制加大对阿经济援助促进阿富汗经济可持续发展,切实提升阿富汗人民的生活水平;在社会与文化方面,中国可为阿富汗提供可供借鉴的社会管理模式和改革经验,致力于促进中阿两国的文化交流和民心相通,使两国的友谊深入民间;同时,始终保证积极介入的底线所在,以便践行周边外交优先理念,展示负责任大国形象,防范"金德尔伯格陷阱"。     

On new rules for destroying old countries

The attacks on 11 September 2001 were not a major security threat to the United States, but they did create the political conditions for the implementation of an aggressive agenda by the Bush administration to assert U.S. dominance over the global control of oil and to establish an arc of military bases to contain China. Responding to Gowan, this article suggests that bid is unlikely to succeed because the concentration of military strength in the United States is paralleled by a concentration of financial strength in East and Southeast Asia. Though its Asian allies have been more supportive of the U.S. invasion of Iraq than their European counterparts, growing economic integration along Asia's Pacific coasts is likely to lead to a reduction in capital inflows to the United States and thereby aggravate the consequences of its high current accounts deficits and its low rates of domestic savings. The Bush administration's conservative social policies and anti-foreigner zeitgeist is also sapping the competitive edge of the U.S. economy in new technologies.     

大国博弈、双层均势的亚洲时刻--俄罗斯智库对中美经贸摩擦的认知与政策立场

俄罗斯智库对中美经贸摩擦有着独特的认知和期待,并与克里姆林宫的官方立场互为表里。总体上,俄方智库的观点是,在经贸摩擦的背后,是中美两国对军事、政治、科技、地区和全球领导权的竞争;两国的国内议程和对外政策,将因此受到深远影响并产生溢出效应--在亚洲区域内形成两极结构。即使两国会因国内和国际政治因素,在经贸问题上达成妥协,但中方不会放弃获得世界科技领导者的雄心,美方也不会打消遏制中国发展动能的战略意图。俄罗斯应与中国继续保持经济与军事合作,避免与美国和西方关系的继续恶化,并在亚太地区推动"大欧亚伙伴关系"倡议。俄罗斯政策分析界基于自身利益的演绎,将中美经贸摩擦定性为大国博弈,相应的政策建议反映出俄罗斯以在全球和亚洲分别制衡美中为目标的双层均势策略。俄罗斯将在有亚洲其他国家参与的情景下扮演战略平衡手角色,借中美全面对抗之势,在中美俄三边关系之外扭转不利的外部发展环境。俄罗斯对亚太国际局势的盘活作用,将催生双边和三边竞合新模式的建立。     

Theater Missile Defense and Japanese Nuclear Weapons

Abstract

The development of a joint US-Japan theater missile defense system could have significant ramifications beyond the defense of Japan and of American forces in the region. A growing debate within Japan on its international security position, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and questions about the role of the United States in the region conspire to create conditions for significant changes in Japan's conception of its security status and its long‐term political-military calculations. By upgrading Japan's strategic responsibilities, theater missile defense could inadvertently induce a reassessment of many of its national security policies, perhaps even the decision to forego nuclear weapons.     

Next steps for nuclear disarmament

As the next step toward nuclear disarmament, the US and Russia should begin negotiations on a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) III, even though the Duma has not approved the ratification of START II, says Mitsuru Kurosawa, professor of the Osaka School of Public Policy, Osaka University. In addition, the United States and Russia should pursue bilateral treaties on fissile cut‐offs, transparency, and irreversibility, and on non‐strategic nuclear weapons. No‐first‐use and negative security assurances among nuclear weapon states should also be considered.