德国联邦宪法法院的抽象审查权

在大陆法系国家宪法法院制度中，德国联邦宪法法院制度是比较完善的。在德国联邦宪法法院的诸种管辖权中，抽象法律法规审查权和具体法律法规审查权更为完善和具体。本文阐述了德国违宪审查制度的产生和发展；论述了德国联邦宪法法院对法律法规进行抽象违宪审查的内容、条件、标的和标准、原则和程序；分析了对抽象审查案件的裁判的效力等问题     

德国联邦宪法法院的具体审查权

在德国联邦宪法法院的诸种管辖权中，具体法律法规审查权是与抽象审查权并行的重要一翼。本文阐述了宪法法院与其他法院的具体审查权的区别、联邦宪法法院具体审查权的范围；论述了向联邦宪法法院移送具体法律审查案的必备要件、移送程序、审查程序；分析了联邦宪法法院对国际法的一般规则能否成为德国国内法和对联邦基本法制定前的法律法规的地位的审查权等     

埃及违宪审查制度研究

埃及的违宪审查属于专门机关审查模式,由最高宪法法院行使违宪审查权。最高宪法法院在行使违宪审查权的过程中,创造性地吸收和运用了其他国家,尤其是美国,在宪法监督制度方面的成功经验。同时,将国际人权条约、非洲人权公约等国际人权文件所规定的人权保护条款与埃及伊斯兰的传统相结合,扩大了埃及宪法在人权保护方面的作用。     

消极的司法积极主义——意大利违宪审查制度之介评

意大利是一个充满政治斗争、新的社会问题不断涌现的国家,其违宪审查制度独具特色、值得借鉴。意大利宪法法院充当着宪法和人民权利守护神的角色。在审查态度上,意大利违宪审查制度采取消极的积极主义。由于违宪审查请求只能由个案审理中的普通法院法官提起,于是,普通法院充当了违宪审查的"过滤"机制而有效避免了滥诉,消弭了当事人的一时情感冲动,缓和了立法机关和宪法法院之间的对抗。而且,意大利宪法法院还极力避免做出违宪审查的判断,通过合宪性解释或暂时违宪判决等措施,避免直接对抗立法机关,而是由立法机关自己主动改正有违宪瑕疵的立法。     

完善我国宪法监督制度之构想

设立宪法法院负责宪法监督工作是一种最切合实际的完善我国宪法监督制度的方案。除在中央设立宪法法院外,可在地方设立巡回宪法法院。宪法法院应当具有相对独立性。为保证宪法法院有效行使其宪法监督职能,必须赋予其事前审查权、宪法解释权等职权。宪法监督程序须由相应的主体提起。     

从基本权功能看我国社会保障权的问题与完善对策——以若干焦点案例为例

从基本权的功能看,社会保障权可以区分为防御权功能、受益权功能以及价值秩序功能,分别对应国家的消极义务、给付义务、保护义务。我国的社会保障权历经休眠阶段、萌芽阶段和发展阶段,时至今日还存在着诸多制度障碍,如社会保障制度僵硬,公众信任不足;社会保障权的收益权受到不合理限制;政府权力异化;社会保障权的自由权丧失;社会保障被社会治理挤压;社会力量参与社会保障受到瓶颈制约等等。为此,需要进一步强化国家在社会保障方面的给付义务、严格国家的消极义务、明确国家的保障义务、健全国家的救济义务,积极引入社会力量,对中央和地方政府的保障义务进行妥善平衡。     

世界上第一个宪法法院之争

作为奥匈帝国(奥地利帝国)分裂后成立的国家,奥地利共和国和捷克斯洛伐克共和国在宪法审查方面很大程度上有着相同的历史渊源,并且较早设立了宪法法院。两国宪法法院的设立都是以凯尔森的纯粹法理论作为理论基础,因而两国的宪法法院可谓同源同宗,但在组织和职能等方面却大相径庭。哪一个宪法法院是世界上第一个宪法法院,是有争议的。根据不同的标准会得出不同的结论。对奥地利宪法法院和捷克斯洛伐克宪法法院进行历史的、多方面的考察,或许答案会更为明确。     

福利、政府与第三部门——对社会弱势群体权利保护的反思

对社会弱势群体的权利保护关系到福利权制度在我国的建构.福利权的义务主体应当是政府,而不是企业更不是个人.福利权的性质决定了政府应当主动、积极地履行自己的责任,保障福利权的实现.在福利制度的模式选择上,建议我国采取政府支配型的福利多元主义模式.而且,第三郭门的发展在福利制度的建构中越来越扮演重要的角色.     

社会权国家义务的实践维度——以公租房制度为例

自2009年以来,我国多个城市展开了较大规模的公租房建设。在转型社会,国家被期待能够积极作为,保障民众的生活利益,实现社会的安全与公平正义。从宪法学的角度看,公租房的制度实践应当以社会权的国家义务理论为基础。公租房由政府主导,具有明显的社会福利性,是我国迈向"居者有其屋"目标在法治框架内的重大社会政策安排,是社会权的国家义务在住房领域的具体体现。国外的成功经验对完善我国的公租房制度具有积极借鉴意义。     

论越权代表中相对人的合理审查义务以《合同编解释》第20条为中心

在法定代表人越权代表的情形下,如果相对人为善意,则法人、非法人组织应当承受越权代表行为的法律效果。判断善意的一个重要标准,是相对人是否尽到了合理审查义务。对此,我国民事立法经历了效力审查、赋权性审查、形式审查及合理审查四个阶段。《合同编解释》确立的合理审查义务,有助于促进相互合作,推动公司治理结构的完善。合理审查的核心在于确定相对人是否知晓或应当知晓法定代表人在代表权限范围内行为。判断合理审查义务的标准,要考察审查义务的法定性、审查对象的公开性、审查程度的合理性、审查方式的效率性。合理审查需要区分代表权法定限制与意定限制,从而确定不同的审查内容。在未尽到合理审查义务时,相对人不满足善意要件,该越权代表的效力不应当由法人、非法人组织承受。在法定代表人超越授权而相对人尽到合理审查义务仍无法知晓时,有关越权代表的效力应当由法人、非法人组织承受。     

Human Dignity and Socio-Economic Rights

The South African Constitution numbers among a very few constitutions around the world which include justiciable socio-economic rights. One of the controversies surrounding judicial enforcement of such rights is the extent to which it is appropriate for courts to engage in policy choices in relation to the use of state resources in light of the doctrine of the separation of powers. The South African Constitutional Court has responded by developing an approach to adjudication of socio-economic rights in which the role of the court is to determine the reasonableness or otherwise of measures taken by the legislature and executive to implement such rights. However, the South African Constitution is also notable for its identification of human dignity as an underlying value and the explicit duty placed on the courts to interpret the rights protected under the Bill of Rights in conformity with this value. This article scrutinises the socio-economic rights jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional court in light of the Constitutional commitment to human dignity. It questions whether reasonableness review in socio-economic cases successfully balances human dignity with the appropriate degree of deference to the legislature and executive, in compliance with the doctrine of the separation of powers.     

The influence of the rulings of the Constitutional Court on the development of health law in Lithuania

This article highlights some recent developments in the constitutional doctrine of the right to health care in Lithuania, and more in particular the impact of the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania on the development of health law. The right to health care, enshrined in the Constitution, is both an obligation of the state and an individual right. The Constitutional Court has developed a doctrine of the right to health care, as well a doctrine of certain other constitutional social rights, which is based on the understanding of the close interrelation between the different constitutional rights, the principle of indivisibility and equal importance of these rights, and the presumption of justiciability of social rights. The analysis is based on the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. Two cases on the disputes of the legal regulation concerning the pharmaceutical activities are presented in more detail.     

德国《基本法》中的社会国家原则

从语义解释的角度看,社会国家原则在《联邦德国基本法》(以下简称《基本法》)文本中不具有显著地位,且内容不够明确;但从体系解释而言,该原则享有不得修改的宪法基本原则的突出地位。社会国家原则产生的历史则表明,该原则具有弥补《基本法》中社会基本权利缺失的功能。但社会国家的目的以及社会国家原则保障的基本权利都必须通过立法者制定的法律来加以具体化。联邦宪法法院在发挥社会国家原则的宪法规范功能以及确定社会国家的最低宪法标准方面起到了重要作用。社会国家原则在联邦宪法法院的判决中一般与基本权利条款、基本权利限制条款以及社会国家的目标一起发挥作用,被用来为立法者设定社会权利保护义务或论证限制基本权利的法律规范的正当性。     

Social Insurance Monopolies in Community Competition Law and the Italian Constitution: 'Practical' Convergences and 'Theoretical' Conflicts

An Italian judge, following earlier suggestions of the national antitrust Authority, has referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC Treaty two questions on the interpretation of Articles 81 and 86 of the EC Treaty. With those questions, raised in an action brought by a self‐employee against the Istituto Nazionale per l'Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro (INAIL) concerning the actor's refusal to pay for social insurance contributions, the Tribunale di Vicenza has in summary asked the Court of Justice whether the public entity concerned, managing a general scheme for the social insurance of accidents at work and professional diseases, can be qualified as an enterprise under Article 81 EC Treaty and, if so, whether its dominant position can be considered in contrast with EC competition rules. This article takes this preliminary reference as a starting point to consider in more general terms the complex constitutional issues raised by what Ge´rard Lyon‐Caen has evocatively called the progressive ‘infiltration’ of EC competition rules into the national systems of labour and social security law. The analysis is particularly focused on the significant risks of ‘constitutional collision’, between the ‘solidaristic’ principles enshrined in the Italian constitution and the fundamental market freedoms protected by the EC competition rules, which are implied by the questions raised in the preliminary reference. It considers first the evolution of ECJ case law—from Poucet and Pistre to Albany International BV—about the limits Member States have in granting exclusive rights to social security institutions under EC competition rules. It then considers specularly, from the Italian constitutional law perspective, the most recent case law of the Italian Constitutional Court on the same issues. The ‘contextual’ reading of the ECJ's and the Italian Constitutional Court's case law with specific regard to the case referred to by the Tribunale di Vicenza leads to the conclusion that there will probably be a ‘practical convergence’in casu between the ‘European’ and the ‘national’ approach. Following the arguments put forward by the Court of Justice in Albany, the INAIL should not be considered as an enterprise, in line also with a recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court. And even when it was to be qualified as an enterprise, the INAIL should in any case be able to escape the ‘accuse’ of abuse of dominant position and be allowed to retain its exclusive rights, pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty. This ‘practical convergence’in casu does not, however, remove the latent ‘theoretical conflict’ between the two approaches and the risk of ‘constitutional collision’ that it implies. A risk of a ‘conflict’ of that kind could be obviously detrimental for the European integration process. The Italian Constitutional Court claims for herself the control over the fundamental principles of the national constitutional order, assigning them the role of ‘counter‐limits’ to the supremacy of European law and to European integration. At the same time, and more generally, the pervasive spill over of the EC market and competition law virtually into every area of national regulation runs the risk of undermining the social and democratic values enshrined in the national labour law traditions without compensating the potential de‐regulatory effects through measures of positive integration at the supranational level. This also may contribute to undermine and threaten, in the long run, the (already weak) democratic legitimacy of the European integration process. The search for a more suitable and less elusive and unilateral balance between social rights and economic freedoms at the supranational level should therefore become one of the most relevant tasks of what Joseph Weiler has called the ‘European neo‐constitutionalism’. In this perspective, the article, always looking at the specific questions referred to the Court of Justice by the Tribunale di Vicenza, deals with the issue of the ‘rebalance’ between social rights and economic and market freedoms along three distinct but connected lines of reasoning. The first has to do with the need of a more open and respectful dialogue between the ECJ and the national constitutional courts. The second is linked to the ongoing discussion about the ‘constitutionalization’ of the fundamental social rights at the EC level. The third finally considers the same issues from the specific point of view of the division of competences between the European Community and the Member States in the area of social (protection) policies.     

Automated communication and basic rights

Nowadays communication does not necessarily originate from humans, but also from “machines” such as “social bots” or “things” in the Internet of Things. From a basic rights perspective, this phenomenon raises the question if such communication benefits from the same level of protection as communication created by human beings. With regard to the basic rights of the Grundgesetz, the Federal Constitutional Court for years has been excluding some forms of communication from the scope of protection as not needing or deserving protection. The ratio of these decisions must not be applied to cases of automated communication without noticing possible differences. Automated communication can mostly be linked to the human beings or legal entities applying it. Therefore, its prohibition or regulation is a matter of proportionality of infringements with fundamental rights.

     

Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation

The doctrine of the margin of appreciation that the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights has developed in its case law has givenrise to considerable criticism. In this article I draw a distinctionbetween two different ways in which the Court has used the doctrine.The first one is in cases where the Court has to decide whethera particular interference with a Convention freedom is justified.In answering that question, the Court often uses the label ‘marginof appreciation’ without drawing on a substantive theoryof rights that can justify the conclusion reached. The seconduse appears in cases where the Court refrains explicitly fromemploying a substantive test of human rights review on the basisthat there is no consensus among Contracting States on the legalissue before it. My aim is to highlight the principles thatcan be used to justify each use of the doctrine, by locatinghuman rights within broader issues in moral and political philosophy.Particular emphasis is placed on the distinction between reason-blockingand interest-based theories of rights as well as on the natureof the duties of the European Court, as a matter of internationalhuman rights law.     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

A call for minds: the unknown extent of societal influence on the legal rights of involuntarily and voluntarily committed mental health patients

This article begins and ends with a call for more empirical research to understand the connection between societal views of mental illness and the legal system. The author asserts that changing social perceptions of mental illness certainly affect legal outcomes and commitment levels, but the degree remains unknown. This article explores the above two topics through the framework of the Circuit Court 'split' regarding the Constitutional rights of persons committed to state mental health institutions. A main facet of the 'split' is centered on the Circuits' disagreement about whether or not all mentally ill patients committed to institutions deserve the same Constitutional protections.     

Mental health courts: serving justice and promoting recovery

This article begins and ends with a call for more empirical research to understand the connection between societal views of mental illness and the legal system. The author asserts that changing social perceptions of mental illness certainly affect legal outcomes and commitment levels, but the degree remains unknown. This article explores the above two topics through the framework of the Circuit Court 'split' regarding the Constitutional rights of persons committed to state mental health institutions. A main facet of the 'split' is centered on the Circuits' disagreement about whether or not all mentally ill patients committed to institutions deserve the same Constitutional protections.