德国《基本法》中的社会国家原则

从语义解释的角度看,社会国家原则在《联邦德国基本法》(以下简称《基本法》)文本中不具有显著地位,且内容不够明确;但从体系解释而言,该原则享有不得修改的宪法基本原则的突出地位。社会国家原则产生的历史则表明,该原则具有弥补《基本法》中社会基本权利缺失的功能。但社会国家的目的以及社会国家原则保障的基本权利都必须通过立法者制定的法律来加以具体化。联邦宪法法院在发挥社会国家原则的宪法规范功能以及确定社会国家的最低宪法标准方面起到了重要作用。社会国家原则在联邦宪法法院的判决中一般与基本权利条款、基本权利限制条款以及社会国家的目标一起发挥作用,被用来为立法者设定社会权利保护义务或论证限制基本权利的法律规范的正当性。     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

Constitutional Rights and Social Welfare: A Comment on the Canadian Chaoulli Health Care Decision

Chaoulli v Quebec (A.G . ) may be the most controversial Supreme Court of Canada decision to date. The Court used social science evidence of foreign health care systems to justify its finding that a provincial ban on private health care insurance unjustifiably violated the right to security of the person. The decision could lead to fundamental structural changes in the way Canadian provinces deliver health care services. Given the importance of Charter jurisprudence in the United Kingdom, and recent debate about the wisdom of incorporating social rights, the case raises a number of pertinent issues for British lawyers. This comment advances two general arguments. First, that the case was wrongly decided because of its poor characterisation of the legislative objective of the ban, unprincipled approach to judicial deference, and poor treatment of expert and social science evidence. Second, far from justifying suspicion of constitutional social rights, the case illustrates precisely why such rights can make a positive difference.     

Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: The ECJ and the Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order

The European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) jurisprudence of fundamental rights in cases such as Schmidberger and Omega extends the court's jurisdiction in ways that compete with that of Member States in matters of visceral concern. And just as the Member States require a guarantee that the ECJ respect fundamental rights rooted in national tradition, so the ECJ insists that international organisations respect rights constitutive of the EU. The demand of such guarantees reproduces between the ECJ and the international order the kinds of conflicting jurisdictional claims that have shadowed the relation between the ECJ and the courts of the Member States. This article argues that the clash of jurisdiction is being resolved by the formation of a novel order of coordinate constitutionalism in which Member States, the ECJ, the European Court of Human Rights and other international tribunals or organisations agree to defer to one another's decisions, provided those decisions respect mutually agreed essentials. This coordinate order extends constitutionalism beyond its home territory in the nation state through a jurisprudence of mutual monitoring and peer review that carefully builds on national constitutional traditions, but does not create a new, encompassing sovereign entity. The doctrinal instruments by which the plural constitutional orders are, in this way, profoundly linked without being integrated are variants of the familiar Solange principles of the German Constitutional Court, by which each legal order accepts the decisions of the others, even if another decision would have been more consistent with the national constitution tradition, ‘so long as’ those decisions do not systematically violate its own understanding of constitutional essentials. The article presents the coordinate constitutional order being created by this broad application of the Solange doctrine as an instance, and practical development, of what Rawls called an overlapping consensus: agreement on fundamental commitments of principle—those essentials which each order requires the others to respect—does not rest on mutual agreement on any single, comprehensive moral doctrine embracing ideas of human dignity, individuality or the like. It is precisely because the actors of each order acknowledge these persistent differences, and their continuing influence on the interpretation of shared commitments in particular conflicts, that they reserve the right to interpret essential principles, within broad and shared limits, and accord this right to others. The embrace of variants of the Solange principles by many coordinate courts, in obligating each to monitor the others' respect for essentials, creates an institutional mechanism for articulating and adjusting the practical meaning of the overlapping consensus.     

论宪法社会基本权的分类与构成

社会基本权是宪法基本权利体系中的重要组成部分 ,区别于自由权。到目前为止 ,它还是一个比较笼统的概念和指称。依据文献研究方法 ,兼采理论与司法实务见解 ,社会基本权应进一步区分为 :经济权利、狭义的社会权利和文化权利 ,且不同类型的权利在各国得到承认和普遍化的程度不相一致。与自由权相比 ,各种社会基本权还只停留在指导原则和宪法委托阶段 ,其司法救济程度还比较低 ,主要依赖立法裁量和行政措施     

Rules for Rights: European Law,Health Care and Social Citizenship

Social citizenship is about equality. The obvious problem for European social citizenship in a very diverse Union is that Member States will not be able or willing to bear the cost of establishing equal rights to health care and similar aspects of social citizenship. Health care is a particularly good case of this tension between EU citizenship and Member State diversity. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) strengthened the right to health care in other Member States, but this cannot create an equal right to health care when Member States are so different. In its efforts to balance a European right, the Court has formulated ‘rules for rights’—not so much European social citizenship rights, as a set of legal principles by which it judges the decisions of the Member States.     

Cautious scrutiny: The Federal Climate Change Act case in the German Constitutional Court

In a unanimous decision of 24 March 2021, the German Federal Constitutional Court declared certain provisions of the Federal Climate Change Act (FCCA) unconstitutional. The Court upheld the greenhouse gas emission targets for the period until 2030 but found the outlined review procedure for the following years lacking: it failed to adequately specify targets, thereby violating the fundamental rights of the applicants. Despite the at times exuberant reception, this case note argues that the decision stopped well short of a legal revolution. Ultimately, the Court embraces an orthodox doctrine on positive obligations that emphasises deference to the legislature on climate change policy. Nonetheless, there are some genuine, albeit subtle legal innovations: (1) extending legal standing to applicants resident outside of Germany; (2) specifying general constitutional commitments to tackling climate change through the Paris Agreement, and (3) relying on a concept of intergenerational equity in the distribution of emission reduction burdens.     

Social Insurance Monopolies in Community Competition Law and the Italian Constitution: 'Practical' Convergences and 'Theoretical' Conflicts

An Italian judge, following earlier suggestions of the national antitrust Authority, has referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC Treaty two questions on the interpretation of Articles 81 and 86 of the EC Treaty. With those questions, raised in an action brought by a self‐employee against the Istituto Nazionale per l'Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro (INAIL) concerning the actor's refusal to pay for social insurance contributions, the Tribunale di Vicenza has in summary asked the Court of Justice whether the public entity concerned, managing a general scheme for the social insurance of accidents at work and professional diseases, can be qualified as an enterprise under Article 81 EC Treaty and, if so, whether its dominant position can be considered in contrast with EC competition rules. This article takes this preliminary reference as a starting point to consider in more general terms the complex constitutional issues raised by what Ge´rard Lyon‐Caen has evocatively called the progressive ‘infiltration’ of EC competition rules into the national systems of labour and social security law. The analysis is particularly focused on the significant risks of ‘constitutional collision’, between the ‘solidaristic’ principles enshrined in the Italian constitution and the fundamental market freedoms protected by the EC competition rules, which are implied by the questions raised in the preliminary reference. It considers first the evolution of ECJ case law—from Poucet and Pistre to Albany International BV—about the limits Member States have in granting exclusive rights to social security institutions under EC competition rules. It then considers specularly, from the Italian constitutional law perspective, the most recent case law of the Italian Constitutional Court on the same issues. The ‘contextual’ reading of the ECJ's and the Italian Constitutional Court's case law with specific regard to the case referred to by the Tribunale di Vicenza leads to the conclusion that there will probably be a ‘practical convergence’in casu between the ‘European’ and the ‘national’ approach. Following the arguments put forward by the Court of Justice in Albany, the INAIL should not be considered as an enterprise, in line also with a recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court. And even when it was to be qualified as an enterprise, the INAIL should in any case be able to escape the ‘accuse’ of abuse of dominant position and be allowed to retain its exclusive rights, pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty. This ‘practical convergence’in casu does not, however, remove the latent ‘theoretical conflict’ between the two approaches and the risk of ‘constitutional collision’ that it implies. A risk of a ‘conflict’ of that kind could be obviously detrimental for the European integration process. The Italian Constitutional Court claims for herself the control over the fundamental principles of the national constitutional order, assigning them the role of ‘counter‐limits’ to the supremacy of European law and to European integration. At the same time, and more generally, the pervasive spill over of the EC market and competition law virtually into every area of national regulation runs the risk of undermining the social and democratic values enshrined in the national labour law traditions without compensating the potential de‐regulatory effects through measures of positive integration at the supranational level. This also may contribute to undermine and threaten, in the long run, the (already weak) democratic legitimacy of the European integration process. The search for a more suitable and less elusive and unilateral balance between social rights and economic freedoms at the supranational level should therefore become one of the most relevant tasks of what Joseph Weiler has called the ‘European neo‐constitutionalism’. In this perspective, the article, always looking at the specific questions referred to the Court of Justice by the Tribunale di Vicenza, deals with the issue of the ‘rebalance’ between social rights and economic and market freedoms along three distinct but connected lines of reasoning. The first has to do with the need of a more open and respectful dialogue between the ECJ and the national constitutional courts. The second is linked to the ongoing discussion about the ‘constitutionalization’ of the fundamental social rights at the EC level. The third finally considers the same issues from the specific point of view of the division of competences between the European Community and the Member States in the area of social (protection) policies.     

南非宪法法院的"合理性审查标准"介评

"合理性审查标准"是南非宪法法院对政府积极义务进行审查的主要标准,是在宪法法院的判例中形成并逐渐发展起来的。"合理性审查标准"的采用,使宪法法院可以在不侵入立法和行政功能、不与政治部门发生直接冲突的情况下,实现对社会权一定程度的保护。但是,宪法法院对"合理性"的过分关注也制约了法院对政府积极义务审查的范围和程度,对社会权的保护产生了一些不利影响。     

论美国联邦最高法院宪法解释的创造性

美国联邦最高法院的宪法解释具有创造性,其主要表现在司法审查权、三重审查标准、选择性吸收理论、推翻先例和创造新的公民权利等五个方面。原旨主义和非原旨主义都会达至具有创造性的宪法解释,原旨主义具有天然的民主合法性,有时美国联邦最高法院会以原旨主义来掩饰它们具有创造性的宪法解释。宪法解释的创造性是一把双刃剑,有积极性的一面也有消极性的一面。美国联邦最高法院的宪法解释曾经也将永远具有创造性,只有如此它才能为宪法提供与时俱进的新意义。     

公民宪法义务的语义辨析

由于对中国传统义务本位的深恶痛绝,研究义务特别是宪法义务被看作是“屈服国家”或“过时的思想”。宪法学界普遍认识到人性与失察权力结合可能导致严重后果,但对人性与失范权利结合可能产生的后果关注较少,造成了宪法义务研究阙如的事实。清晰界定公民宪法义务的内涵和外延,是形成义务与权利的良性互动,构建宪法的平衡精神,教育公民“讲权利的同时,讲义务,讲责任”的基础。     

South Africa: highest court orders government to provide antiretrovirals to prevent mother-to-child transmission

On 5 July 2002, South African treatment activists won a significant victory when the Constitutional Court ordered the South African government to make the antiretroviral drug nevirapine available in public hospitals and clinics for the purposes of preventing mother-to-child transmission of HIV. The Court also ruled the government has a constitutional obligation to implement a program to realize the right of pregnant women and their newborn children to access health services to prevent transmission.     

Human Dignity and Socio-Economic Rights

The South African Constitution numbers among a very few constitutions around the world which include justiciable socio-economic rights. One of the controversies surrounding judicial enforcement of such rights is the extent to which it is appropriate for courts to engage in policy choices in relation to the use of state resources in light of the doctrine of the separation of powers. The South African Constitutional Court has responded by developing an approach to adjudication of socio-economic rights in which the role of the court is to determine the reasonableness or otherwise of measures taken by the legislature and executive to implement such rights. However, the South African Constitution is also notable for its identification of human dignity as an underlying value and the explicit duty placed on the courts to interpret the rights protected under the Bill of Rights in conformity with this value. This article scrutinises the socio-economic rights jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional court in light of the Constitutional commitment to human dignity. It questions whether reasonableness review in socio-economic cases successfully balances human dignity with the appropriate degree of deference to the legislature and executive, in compliance with the doctrine of the separation of powers.     

美国隐私权的宪法保护述评

美国隐私权的宪法保护建立在其独特的司法审查的基础上,有其独特的特色,不仅体现在通过最高法院对宪法的司法解释回应了公民权利运动对隐私权保护的要求,而且宪法对隐私权的保护具有开放性,虽然美国宪法对隐私权的保护受制于社会传统伦理道德和政府的政策,但是通过消极的个案判决方式从基本人权的角度确立了宪法对自决权意义上的隐私权的保护。     

A call for minds: the unknown extent of societal influence on the legal rights of involuntarily and voluntarily committed mental health patients

This article begins and ends with a call for more empirical research to understand the connection between societal views of mental illness and the legal system. The author asserts that changing social perceptions of mental illness certainly affect legal outcomes and commitment levels, but the degree remains unknown. This article explores the above two topics through the framework of the Circuit Court 'split' regarding the Constitutional rights of persons committed to state mental health institutions. A main facet of the 'split' is centered on the Circuits' disagreement about whether or not all mentally ill patients committed to institutions deserve the same Constitutional protections.     

从基本权利到宪法权利

从“是否基本”的角度来认识宪法上的权利不能满足宪法理论与实践的要求,甚至容易造成误解。相较于“基本权利”,“宪法权利”是更为规范的表述。宪法权利是表示个人与国家关系的概念。宪法权利体系基本包含两个方面：每个人都享有的各种构建和控制政府的权利与个人基于人之目的性对国家提出诉求的权利。前者表示在一个共同体中的个人与其他所有人的关系,后者表示个人与包括他在内的整个共同体的关系。     

Justifying the Distinction Between Justifications and Power (Justifications vs. Power)

The paper suggests that there are two different ways in which a legal system restricts an individual’s rights. It can either grant a power that revokes the legal protection of the right or it can acknowledge the infringement of a legal right and yet justify such an infringement by means of a criminal law justification. The distinction proposed by the paper has both expressive and practical implications and is useful in solving dilemmas arising in emergencies when constitutional constraints make it impossible to grant the power to revoke legal protection of a basic right. In some of these situations a criminal law justification might support infringement of such a right. This claim is demonstrated by analyzing the ruling of the German Constitutional Court concerning the shooting down of a hijacked airplane in circumstances similar to those of September 11.     

South Africa: airline found guilty of employment discrimination

On 28 September 2000, the Constitutional Court of South Africa ruled that South African Airways (SAA) violated the constitutional rights of Jacques Hoffmann in September 1996 by refusing to employ him as a cabin attendant on the ground that he is HIV-positive.     

论宪法上的财产权——根据人在社会中的自治地位所作的解说

在宪法上 ,财产权是社会中自主、自决、自治的人追求幸福的条件 ,而不是法律上一切人格体瓜分经济价值的形式。它与经济学的产权概念有巨大差异 ;同时 ,也不是复制民法的财产权概念。宪法列举财产权 ,旨在排除公权力的侵犯。公权力侵犯财产权的本质在于限制甚至排斥社会中自我决定和自我实现的独立人格 ,其形式包括扭曲该项权利的主客体结构、恣意予以剥夺和不适当地予以限制 ,其最严重的不利效果是公共财产过度扩张。宪法保护财产权最关键的环节不是公私财产“一体保护” (平等保护 ) ,而是防止公共财产过度扩张。只要公共财产过度扩张 ,即使实行“一体保护” ,人们也不能享有适当的自治地位。 2 0 0 4年 3月通过的宪法修正案加强了对财产权的保护 ,突出了它作为人权的特征。科学实施 2 0 0 4年修正案的规定 ,需要从人在社会中的自治地位出发 ,结合现行宪法的发展历程 ,适当解决条文没有直接回答的若干重大问题     

Text Matters: Some Reflections on the Forging of a New Constitutional Jurisprudence in South Africa

The South African Constitution establishes a constitutional democracy with a strong form of constitutional review. The Constitutional Court is required to declare invalid any legislation or conduct of the President which is inconsistent with the Constitution. The author, a former judge of the Constitutional Court, argues that the text of the Constitution has been an important determinant of the Court's jurisprudence, both in relation to the Court's jurisprudence concerning the institutional structures established by the Constitution and its Bill of Rights jurisprudence.