宪法“人格尊严”条款的规范地位之辨

规范地位是指某一条款在基本权利内部乃至宪法规范体系中的效力,取决于该条款在特定宪法秩序中的法律属性。尊严条款因其法理基础、宪法文本表述及宪法解释实践的差异在各国宪法上享有不同的地位,归纳起来可分为宪法原则、基础价值、规定功能的宪法概念。我国宪法第38条人格尊严的哲学基础不同于其他国家的人是目的、人格发展、交往理论,而是着重于个人的名誉与荣誉保护;宪法文本表述并非人的尊严、人性尊严,而是人格尊严,且该条既未规定在总纲中,亦未置于"公民的基本权利和义务"一章之首,即使与"国家尊重与保护人权"一款结合起来阅读,亦无法取得与其它国家宪法上的规范地位。人格尊严在我国宪法上属于独立条款,也是公民的一项基本权利,具有具体的法律内容,在宪法解释过程中可作为规范与特定宪法事实相涵摄,证明公民的人格尊严受到了侵犯。     

两种宪法案件:从合宪性解释看宪法对司法的可能影响

碍于宪法的基本架构,违宪审查意义上的"宪法司法化"在我国绝无可能。但法官作为受宪法约束的公权力主体,基于其宪法义务,有在具体案件中对法律进行合宪性解释的必要。合宪性解释并非宪法解释,而是法律解释的一种方法。而且,合宪性解释已经从最初的法律解释方法转化成了法官的宪法义务。在部门法的研究中已经有在司法中进行合宪性解释的主张与尝试。合宪性解释可以在法律解释的体系解释、目的解释以及法外续造中应用。     

“法律监督机关”的立法内涵、演进逻辑及内在机理

“法律监督机关”是我国宪法对人民检察院的性质定位。1979年《人民检察院组织法》首次将“法律监督机关”法定化,立法内涵为注重法律监督下重建法制权威,是在中国检察理论和实践中形成的机关,侧重刑事诉讼监督和打击犯罪。1982年宪法使“法律监督机关”成为了宪法规范上的国家机关,基于宪法职能和诉讼制度改革而侧重于加强诉讼监督,并在监察体制改革下进行了自我更新,成为与监察委相互配合行使法律监督职能的机关。“法律监督机关”内涵演进的内在机理是人大体制下权力分工模式的必然要求,落实宪法规定的法律监督职能的重要选择,以及参与宪制层面政治体制改革的要求。“法律监督机关”概念内涵具有延展性,会随着立法修订和制度变迁衍生出新的内涵和解释,不断凸显中国特色社会主义检察理论的特性。     

符合法律的宪法解释与宪法发展

符合法律的宪法解释是在宪法有复数解释时以法律为准据而选择宪法解释的方法,与合宪性解释的方向恰恰相反。在我国宪法实践上,全国人大常委会曾经将《宪法》第40条上的公安机关解释为涵盖国家安全机关,这是较为典型的符合法律的宪法解释。从理论上说,为化解违宪疑虑,也可以通过这种解释方法将《宪法》第40条上的通信解释为排除通讯记录,而将检察机关解释为涵盖监察机关在内。与合宪性解释不同的是,符合法律的宪法解释属于逆向的"以宪就法",因此通过这种方法得出的结论须接受宪法上的再审查。这种解释方法既能维持宪法的最高性,恪守宪法与法律之间的界分,同时又能容纳宪法含义新的发展。     

何谓合宪性解释：性质、正当性、限制及运用

法律的合宪性解释是指法律有两种甚或多种解释可能时,择取其中与宪法不相抵触的解释。合宪性解释是一种法律解释方法,更是一项法律解释要求。此种解释方法对于维护国家法秩序的统一与稳定不可或缺,其正当性源于权力分立原则下的司法自制理念。合完性解释有其运用上的限制,对于字义本身违宪之法律适用合宪性解释是对此种解释方法的滥用与误用。在美国、德国等实行宪法审查的国家,合宪性解释方法在其司法实践中得到了广泛运用。具有实效性的宪法审查制度在我国尚未真正建立,合宪性解释方法在我国的司法裁判中有无适用空间值得商榷。     

法益理论的发展源流及其启示

法益概念的产生对大陆法系国家刑法理论的发展有重大的意义。法益理论在不同的历史时期被赋予不同的内容。自由主义始终是法益概念的精神内核,坚持法益论就必须坚持刑法的个人主义与规范主义。基本法实现了法益概念规范性与非规范性之间的平衡,现代刑法必须强调宪法的重要作用。宪法和刑法规定是对刑法保护客体的规范限制,此外,刑法的谦抑性原则及实害原则也是对刑法保护客体的重要的限制原则。     

不抵触宪法原则的适用范围:规范差异与制度逻辑

不抵触宪法原则是我国宪法上国家法制统一原则的一项重要内容。该原则对于贯彻宪法精神和原则,维护国家法制统一以及确定合宪性审查的对象范围,具有重要作用和指导意义。根据宪法第5条第3款、第67条第7项第8项、第100条第1款第2款的规定,不抵触宪法原则的适用范围包括法律、国务院制定的行政法规、决定和命令以及省、自治区、直辖市、设区的市人大及其常委会制定的地方性法规和决议。而根据《立法法》第72条第1款第2款、第87条、第97条第2项、第99条第1款第2款、第100条第1款第3款的规定,不抵触宪法原则的适用范围"被扩大"了,还包括自治条例、单行条例和规章。从合宪性审查的制度逻辑出发,宪法之所以将部分行政法规和地方性法规纳入不抵触宪法原则的适用范围,是因为它们存在着直接依据宪法制定的情形。而《立法法》将不抵触宪法原则的适用范围扩展到所有的法律规范,遵循的是一种宽泛意义上的制度逻辑,其所谓的"不抵触",不应当被解释为不抵触宪法原则适用范围的"扩大"。     

当下中国宪法司法化的路径与方法

法院适用法律必须解释法律,而解释法律又必须进行合宪解释,合宪解释是目前我国宪法在司法中适用的最好方式,是现行体制下我国宪法司法化的最佳路径。各级人民法院在民事、刑事和行政诉讼中审理每一起案件适用法律时都应当考虑到宪法,进行合宪解释。每一位法官都是合宪解释的主体,都享有法律解释权和宪法解释权,但这并不否定最高人民法院的最高司法解释权以及全国人大常委会对法律和宪法的最终解释权。法院通过合宪解释方式间接适用宪法,不必将宪法作为裁判依据而引用,但应当在裁判说理部分引用宪法条款。法院在合宪解释过程中发现法律明显违宪时,应当中止诉讼,逐级上报,由最高人民法院报送全国人大常委会处理。     

The Idea of a European Constitution

Any abstract account of a field of law must make generalizationsthat are both faithful to the legal materials and appropriateto the subject matter's aims. The uniqueness and fluidity ofthe European Union's institutions makes such generalizationsvery difficult. A common theoretical approach to EU law (onethat is often relied upon by the Court of Justice, the Parliamentand the Commission) is to borrow directly from the theory ofdomestic constitutional law. The most recent manifestation ofthis tendency is the draft Treaty on the European Constitution,which includes many of the symbolic features of a domestic constitutionalorder. But the European Union is not a state and the constitutionalanalogy is in many ways problematic. In this article I defendthe view that a more complex theory is more appropriate to theunique combination of ordinary politics with diplomatic conferencesthat constitutes the European Union. The key to these institutionsis, in my view, a Kantian international ideal of liberal peace.The foundational constitutional principles of the EU, principlesthat both fit the current legal framework and offer its mostattractive interpretation, require the qualified autonomy ofmember states in a union of republics that create collectiveinstitutions for the purposes of liberal peace.     

论中国特色社会主义法律体系、法治体系与制度体系的有机统一

作为国家根本法,宪法为中国特色社会主义法律体系、法治体系与制度体系三个体系的建设提供了基本的法律依据。党的十九届四中全会审议通过的《中共中央关于坚持和完善中国特色社会主义制度推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化若干重大问题的决定》所提出的涉及到十三个方面的中国特色社会主义根本制度、基本制度和重要制度是对现行《宪法》第1条第2款所规定的国家根本制度——社会主义制度内涵的补充、深化和发展,充分体现了宪法所规定的中国特色社会主义国家制度和法律制度之间的一致性和统一性。中国特色社会主义制度体系概念的提出并不是要在理论上替代中国特色社会主义法律体系、中国特色社会主义法治体系,而是通过进一步理顺法律体系、法治体系与制度体系之间的内在逻辑,凸显依法治国、依宪治国,依法执政、依宪执政在中国特色社会主义制度体系建设中的重要作用。既强调宪法和法律在中国特色社会主义制度体系中的地位和作用,又重视中国特色社会主义制度体系中各项具体制度的相对独立性。     

The Genesis of the Austrian Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation

Abstract The European model of the constitutional review of legislation, characterized by the concentration of the constitutional review power in a single constitutional court, had its origin in the Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920. This is all the more remarkable when one considers that this Constitution established at the same time a parliamentary system of government in a fairly radical form. As the author explains, this “invention” of a constitutional court is attributable to two factors. One factor is the federal aspect. The Court was conceived by the framers of the Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920 as an umpire between federal legislation and the legislation of the states or Länder. In this respect it was meant as a substitute for the principle of the priority of federal law over state or Land law. This is manifest in the initial draft of the Constitution, where actions on questions of the constitutionality of legislation could only be brought by the Federal government (against the legislation of one or another of the states or Länder) and by the State or Land governments (against federal legislation). Right from the beginning, however, the Court could examine a parliamentary act ex officio when it had to apply such an act in another proceeding. It was this power of the Court that triggered the development of constitutional review. Its exercise gradually transformed the Court into a guardian of the Constitution as a whole, in particular, the fundamental rights of citizens. The author traces this development in the context of the concept of state and law that prevailed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This concept included specific restrictions on constitutional review. On the basis of a different understanding of the functions of a constitution, the Court gave up these restrictions and followed the examples of the European Court of Human Rights, the German Constitutional Court and—indirectly—the American Supreme Court.     

宪法演进模式之比较

本文对宪法演进模式进行了评析 ,认为在一般意义上说 ,大陆法系的宪法演进采取的是立宪式的路径 ,英美法系宪法演进所采取的则是释宪与惯例式的路径 ,在此基础上对两种模式之优劣进行了比较分析 ,提出中国宪法演进发展的模式应当尽可能采取释宪演进方式 ,以此提高宪法的权威性、稳定性和连续性 ,从而在全体社会成员之中培养起尊重宪法、信任宪法乃至信仰宪法的传统。     

法律保留实质是权利保留

自"权利"概念提出以来,权利保留方式就一直是宪政理论和实践所关注的话题之一,它历经了人民自己保留、宪法保留等不同形态。到19世纪末,德国行政法学家奥托.迈耶基于德国宪法基本权利条款缺乏效力和司法审查作用微弱之宪政实践,提出了法律保留,其实质是以行政法所关注的问题及行政法语言重述权利保留。     

论我国学术自由的宪法基础

《中华人民共和国宪法》第47条规定的科学研究自由,目前被学者们诠释为文化权利或者文化权利的组成部分,而文化权利这一范畴不仅被我国宪法学者指称宪法第47条规定的自由,还被人权法学者用来解读国际人权法中的有关权利,并且具有内涵模糊、外延不确定、宪法规定与国际人权法的规定不一致的特点,弱化了科学研究自由的独立价值和功能。笔者认为,我国宪法中规定的科学研究自由,在外国宪法中多规定为学术自由或学问自由,因此可以吸收和移植域外宪法学理论关于学术自由的诠释资源,来丰富我国科学研究自由的权利内涵。遵循宪法解释学的路径,运用基本权利的客观价值秩序理论,可以架起科学研究自由通往我国高等教育制度的桥梁,以科学研究自由为宪法基石构筑我国现代大学法制,从根本上破解我国高等教育"行政化"的顽疾。     

宪法在司法审判中的适用性研究

自建国以来,最高人民法院没有明确拒绝宪法在司法审判中的可适用性,但在具体司法实践中,更倾向于在民事审判领域将宪法作为司法审判的法律依据,对刑事审判和行政审判中能否适用宪法采取回避态度。地方人民法院在司法审判中适用宪法的情况呈现多样化和复杂化趋势。地方人民法院在司法审判中援引宪法作为判案依据必须谨慎而行,尽量避免涉及宪法解释和违宪审查的事项。但对于援引宪法能够强化审判案件中法律依据的合理性和法律效力的,可予以保留。     

Constitutions,Constitutionalism, and the European Union

The institutional reforms of the EU, coupled with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, have fuelled the debate about a European Constitution. This paper begins by examining the nature of constitutions and constitutionalism. The focus then turns to the EU itself. It is argued that the Community has indeed been transformed into a constitutional legal order, and that the arguments to the contrary are not convincing. This does not however mean that the EU has, or should have, a European Constitution cognisable as such which draws together the constitutional articles of the Treaties, together with the constitutional principles articulated by the European Court of Justice. The difficulties with this strategy are examined in detail, and the conclusion is that we should not at present pursue this course. It would be better to draw on the valuable work done by the European University Institute in its recent study in order to simplify and consolidate the Treaties.     

The issue of constitutional law legitimacy on "human assisted reproduction" between reasonableness of the choices and effectiveness of the protection of all involved subjects.

This artiche analyzes the constitutionality petition to the constitutional Court against Law 40 of 2004 on "human assisted reproduction", where it prohibits the "preimplantatory genetical diagnosis", because it could be against the mother's right to health (art. 32 Italian Constitution) and the egalitarian protection clause (art. 3 Italian Constitution). In the constitutionally petition the ordinary judge proposes an interpretation in accordance with Constitution of the contested disposition (art. 13 of Law 40 of 2004) and this could be the possibility to teste the "living law" theory and its relation with the "adequate interpretation" of the law and the Constitution.     

再说“《宪法修正案》修正了什么”——“法治”、“人权”入宪之断想

1999、2004年的《宪法修正案》,将"法治"与"人权"载入宪法。这不仅是对"法治"与"人权"的确认,而且标明了建构中国现代法治秩序的价值准则与基本方向。更重要的是,它揭示出宪制与法律制度的逻辑问题。依据这样的逻辑,《宪法修正案》的根本涵义,就是要求对宪制与法律制度进行"修正",以实现和巩固"法治"与"人权"。     

Interpretation of Law and Judges Communities

The principle of omnia sunt interpretanda refers to the derivational conception and derivational theory of interpretation. The principle appears in disputes concerning the role of a judge in the process of interpretation, and this has produced an effect that Polish theory of law is currently getting closer to the conceptions presented in the American debate on activism and textualism. In the practice of jurisdiction, the principle of omnia sunt interpretanda is mostly invoked outside theoretical context. It becomes a manifestation of a new dimension of judicial independence, namely an independent authority over the meaning of legal text. In the following paper the legal cultures and legal theories involved in the dispute are being disclosed in order to put in question the possibility of achieving a clear result of interpretation against a background of a crisis of the relations between law and law-making state, which manifests itself in the peculiar process of legal institutions becoming autonomous in relation to state institutions. In this context, the aforementioned principle constitutes the manifestation of the way in which courts come up with a new definition of the role of the third (sui generic) power. The certain organizational requirements placed upon the courts (especially the SAC and provincial administrative courts) are being scrutinized in order to find out in which mode it is possible to at least reduce the degree of inconsistency of the results of interpretation. Here, the attempt to organize a community of judges for the activities of legal interpretation undertaken by them plays a crucial role.