马来西亚政治中的伊斯兰教因素

马来西亚是一个伊斯兰教色彩非常浓厚的国家 ,但长期以来宗教对政治的直接影响有限。 1 999年大选后 ,宗教问题成为主要的政治议题 ,朝野马来人政党都试图比对方更加伊斯兰教化 ,马哈蒂尔总理甚至宣布马来西亚是伊斯兰教国。根据马来西亚的民族构成和政治斗争现实 ,笔者认为近期马来西亚不会成为神权伊斯兰教国 ,但政治伊斯兰教化会促使巫统和伊斯兰教党继续强调自己的宗教色彩。     

对立与合作:马来西亚华人政党与伊斯兰党关系的演变

20世纪80年代以来,马来西亚政治的主导因素是种族政治和伊斯兰政治化,伊斯兰党崛起成为主要反对党之一.华人政党马华公会和民政党对伊斯兰党坚决反对;行动党对伊斯兰党的态度是在反对和合作中反复,为了建立公正和民主的马来西亚,行动党与伊斯兰党合作,但因为伊斯兰教国问题,行动党与其决裂.华人政党与伊斯兰党关系的变化,影响到马来西亚的种族关系、种族政治和伊斯兰政治化.     

伊斯兰教与马来西亚政治民主化

马来西亚是伊斯兰国家,其政治发展与种族关系和伊斯兰教息息相关,在政治民主化进程中,种族政治和宗教政治都发挥了重要作用.本文主要通过安瓦尔事件以及伊斯兰党的理念和实践研究伊斯兰教在马来西亚政治民主化中的作用,进而探讨伊斯兰原教旨主义与政治民主化的关系,探讨伊斯兰教能否推动伊斯兰国家的民主化进程.     

马来西亚华人如何看待伊斯兰教国

随着伊斯兰复兴运动在马来西亚的发展,代表马来人利益的巫统和伊斯兰教党也转向伊斯兰教寻求合法性.伊斯兰教党要建立政教合一的神权伊斯兰教国,而执政党巫统则提出马来西亚已是世俗的伊斯兰教国,这引起马来西亚华人对国家政体、民主、信仰自由的忧虑,他们反对将马来西亚建成伊斯兰教国.华人社团和反对党民主行动党反对建立任何形式的伊斯兰教国,而执政党马华公会和民政党坚决反对伊斯兰教党的神权伊斯兰教国,但赞同巫统的世俗伊斯兰教国.     

马来西亚的伊斯兰潮及政府对策

一本世纪60、70年代以来,伊斯兰潮席卷全球,马来西亚的伊斯兰运动也如火如荼。马来西亚是一个多种族和多宗教的国家,代表了伊斯兰国家的一种特殊经历。伊斯兰教为官方宗教,穆斯林人口占全国人口总数的529%。其中绝大多数为马来族人,约占全国人口的45%。其余人口由许多不同的种族和宗教团体组成,其中最大的少数民族是华族(占35%)和印度族(占10%)。很长时间以来,伊斯兰教与马来族的民族认同和政治地位是相互关联的。同时,种族矛盾成为政局稳定和社会安宁的潜在威胁。马来西亚伊斯兰潮的泛起就是在这种十分复杂的社会背景下产生的,概括起来说,…     

马来西亚“伊斯兰国”与民族国家:争论、影响与趋势

伊斯兰党在20世纪80年代转型后,致力在马来西亚建立"伊斯兰国"。"伊斯兰国"与巫统主导下的民族国家建构是完全不同的建国方向,两者在最高权力的来源、统治阶层、意识形态三方面有着显著的差异。伊斯兰党现阶段重提伊斯兰刑法后,引起马来西亚两线制的重新分化与组合。由于政党之间的建国理念相异,马来西亚未来的建国方向大体上有三种:马来人主导下的民族国家、伊斯兰国和多族群国家。另外,伊拉克与大叙利亚伊斯兰国组织在中东的崛起,令身处伊斯兰世界的马来西亚民族国家体制也面临着来自外部的强烈冲击。     

伊斯兰原教旨主义与马来西亚穆斯林妇女

伊斯兰原教旨主义推动了马来西亚社会和政治的伊斯兰化,并影响到马来穆斯林妇女的权利和地位.本文从分析伊斯兰原教旨主义妇女观入手,探讨马来西亚政府、政党、宗教部门和非政府组织如何从法律、法特瓦、政策、宣传来规范妇女的行为,并分析联邦政府与州政府、执政党与反对党、乌来玛与非政府组织围绕妇女权利展开的争论和斗争.     

马来西亚伊斯兰金融系统发展研究

目前,马来西亚已建立起完整的伊斯兰金融体系,它与传统的金融系统一起被称为"双系统".马来西亚广义的伊斯兰金融系统包括伊斯兰银行市场、伊斯兰保险市场和伊斯兰资本市场,系统性和完整性是其重要特点.马来西亚持续发展伊斯兰金融体系的努力,使得其成为伊斯兰金融发展的领跑者.     

马来人及其宗教

著名马来人学者扎巴在20世纪30年代对马来人习俗及宗教的讨论,涉及马来人信仰伊斯兰教的历史、马来人中的印度教和万物有灵论成分、伊斯兰现代思潮、宗教派别及其观点、马来人的现代主义观念等,是全面了解一个世纪前马来人信仰状况,特别是当时出现的教派分裂及思想的重要资料。     

马来西亚伊斯兰教复兴运动试析

马来西亚伊斯兰教复兴运动试析范若兰马来西亚伊斯兰复兴运动亦称“达克瓦”（ｄａｋｗａｋ），它在传教中的本意是“叫”、“邀请”，现在它的涵义扩展到宣传伊斯兰教、纯洁伊斯兰教。本文试图对马来西亚伊斯兰复兴运动兴起原因，组织类型和特点作一初步探讨。一马来西...     

The Missing Link: Explaining the Political Mobilisation of Islam in Indonesia

Abstract

Why has an increase in personal piety among Indonesia's Muslims not translated into electoral gains for Islamic political parties? To help explain this conundrum, this article focuses on the role of Indonesia's mass Islamic social organisations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Using a political economy lens, it argues that control over state resources and the provision of social welfare facilities have helped political parties maintain power over the years and that NU and Muhammadiyah have at times played important mediating roles in this process. Extending this analysis into Indonesia's contemporary politics, it then proposes that since 2004 in particular, the health and education facilities provided by NU and Muhammadiyah are becoming less important to ordinary people in relation to the services provided by the state. It concludes that this trend has weakened the ability of these organisations to channel public support to political parties/candidates and is one reason why Islamic parties have not been able to capitalise on increased religiosity in the social sphere.     

Laissez-faire versus Strict Control of Political Finance: Hegemonic Parties and Developmental States in Malaysia and Singapore

ABSTRACT

This article compares the financing of political parties and candidates in two Southeast Asian countries. In Malaysia, some political finance regulations exist only on paper, and political financing is for the most part not restrained at all. In contrast, the financing of candidates and parties has always been tightly circumscribed in Singapore. These different strategies, “laissez-faire” versus “strict control,” are the consequence of various factors. In Malaysia, the New Economic Policy has effected a close, often economically unproductive linkage between the state, the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition, and business. The rise of businesspeople has resulted in the commercialization of competition within (the United Malays National Organisation. Additionally, increasing competition between the ruling coalition and the opposition has resulted in growing expenditures for electioneering in the form of advertisements and electoral patronage. The laissez-faire style of regulation has been compounded by the difficult-to-control practices in East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak), where vote buying, electoral patronage based on the largesse of oligarchs, and obvious nonobservance of the rules have been typical. In contrast to Malaysia as a whole, the costs for parties and candidates are still relatively low in Singapore. As a cadre party, the PAP (People's Action Party) is relatively autonomous from private business interests, and intraparty competition is not commercialized; the developmentalist state is highly productive, and the ties between the state, the PAP, and business are not characterized by cronyism. Moreover, electioneering is not very commercialized because the opposition is still relatively weak.     

The opposition Pakatan Rakyat in the twelfth Malaysian parliament, 2008–12, and parliamentary behaviour on the budget process

In the post-2008 Malaysian general election, the opposition political parties the Parti KeADILan Rakyat, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party and the Democratic Action Party started to gain currency, especially when the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) government was denied its two-thirds of the majority in parliament. The 2008 result indicated that there was a substantial shift in support from the incumbent BN to the opposition parties. The opposition later on was formed into a coalition known as Pakatan Rakyat (PR). The minor victory of the PR in the 2008 election suggested that it had secured a considerable number of seats in the twelfth Malaysian parliament. This article argues that the 2008 electoral outcome exhibited substantial competitive parliamentary behaviour despite the authoritarian nature of Malaysia. The article examines PR behaviour in the twelfth parliament with reference to the budget process. Besides elections, the Malaysian parliament is a very crucial indicator of the development of democratic governance in Malaysia. This article argues that the opposition PR is still relevant in the way in which it has fully exercised its legal parliamentary capability, especially its de facto leader Anwar Ibrahim, in questioning and posing constraints on the ruling BN policies concerning the budget process.     

浅析新秩序时期后的印尼伊斯兰教

印尼是伊斯兰教徒最多的国家 ,伊斯兰问题在印尼向来是比较敏感的。新秩序之后 ,伊斯兰问题尤为突出 :内部派别矛盾加剧 ,各政党四分五裂 ;在外则与基督教之间的冲突和骚乱此起彼伏。印尼国家及民族的统一和团结正经受严峻的考验 ,印尼的伊斯兰面临艰难的抉择。     

Inclusion-moderation or political opportunity? Lessons from the case of Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party,PAS)

Much of the recent literature on the inclusion-moderation thesis revolves around Islamist political parties. This paper contends that the case of Parti-Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party) is instructive in this regard. I argue that political opportunity is what decides whether a party would adopt more ‘moderate’ tendencies, not its mere inclusion in the electoral system. PAS’ raison d’etre was initially based on campaigning for an Islamic State. Subsequently, when it was in a coalition with two other secular parties, it began espousing the concept of a 'Benevolent State'. When the alliance eventually failed, PAS reverted to calls for an Islamic polity. PAS’ ideological commitment to an 'Islamic state' was dependent on political opportunities. This study argues for a more nuanced understanding of the trajectories of Islamist parties.     

A Study of Nation Building in Malaysia

Nation building is a major issue in the political agenda of many countries, a project made more arduous in countries fragmented along racial, linguistic, and religious lines. In an attempt to gain some understanding of the issue, this paper examines the trajectory of nation building in Malaysia. Basically, the Malaysia government uses the model of nation-state to create a sense of collective national identity in a multi-ethnic society. It is a top-down approach with the state playing a dominating role. The main political parties are communal parties, based on race or religion. Well-crafted programs of nation building have been not properly implemented. While the government has achieved impressive economic development, it is at the same time becoming more authoritarian and the country faces a range of disturbing social and political problems. Thanks to a growing educated middle class, urbanization, demographic change, globalization, and the spread of the Internet, mass-based civil movements and a multi-ethnic coalition of opposition parties have emerged with the potential of redressing the situation. The study suggests a framework for understanding the trajectory and dynamics of the nation-building project in Malaysia. The framework gives a list of historical forces that are likely to shape the course of nation building in the coming years.     

Jihad in the Bastion of “Moderation”: Understanding the Threat of ISIS in Malaysia

ABSTRACT

Malaysia has long been hailed as a beacon of moderate Islam. Yet, at present, there is considerable support for ISIS amongst Malaysians, and it represents a unique articulation of contemporary violent Islamist extremism. Malaysians who joined ISIS in Syria and its supporters at home are characterized by a sense of Islamic righteousness. Also, they share distinctive features that differentiate them from the old jihadi generation: a diverse occupational background, the lack of either formal or informal religious training, and the growing nexus of criminality-radicalization. Malaysian support for ISIS can be historically and politically contextualized in relation to the Islamization race between the main political parties, the presence of Salafi-jihadi discourse and ISIS’s discursive construction of authentic Islam.     

Islam,ethnicity and the state: contested spaces of legitimacy and power in the Kurdish-Turkish public sphere

ABSTRACT

The pro-Kurdish nationalist mobilization in Turkey was mostly built on the right to self-determination aligned with the Marxist-Leninist ideology for the insurgent Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the early 1980s and ethnic minority rights for the secular-leftist pro-Kurdish legal parties in the 1990s. The Turkish state mostly framed the legal and illegal pro-Kurdish mobilization as ‘the enemy of the state’ and ‘the enemy of Islam’ in its counter-insurgency efforts. However, in the 2000s, the PKK and the pro-Kurdish legal parties became more tolerant and inclusive toward Islamic Kurdish identity by mobilizing their sympathizers in events such as ‘Civic Friday Prayers’ and a ‘Democratic Islamic Congress’. This move aimed to function as an antidote to the rising popularity of the ruling conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Kurdish Hizbullah in the early 2000s. In other words, Islam and pious Muslim identity has increasingly become contested among Turkish Islamists, Kurdish Islamists, and the secular Kurdish nationalists. This article seeks to unpack why, how, and under what conditions such competing actors and mechanisms shape the discursive and power relationships in the Kurdish-Turkish public sphere.