中原地区村落社会中青年择偶观及其变化——以西村为例

一、传统婚姻中理想的配偶条件 传统中国婚姻的目的是“传宗接代”,择偶标准是为这种目的服务的。在这种婚姻中,感情因素是次要的,那种完全出于当事者性魅力的相互吸引、一见钟情的浪漫婚姻是极少见的,毋宁说这种婚姻在传统婚姻中是受贬抑的,因为这种婚姻通常没有那种通过明媒正娶、仔细权衡各种条件后缔结的婚姻来得稳定。因此,同注重个人感情因素的现代婚姻形式相比,传统村落社会中的婚姻具有实际、理性和慎重的特点。这种婚姻更接近商品交换,即在     

论我国的无效婚姻制度

我国修改后的《婚姻法》首次规定了婚姻无效制度,这是婚姻立法的一大进步,但其规定还不尽完善。尤其是无效婚姻的种类列举不够全面,无效婚姻主张的法律程序不健全,无效婚姻的法律后果规定不够科学,所有这些问题,需要在今后的立法中不断加以完善。     

新生代农民工的婚姻稳定性研究——基于社会交换理论的视角

当前新生代农民工的婚姻稳定性遭遇严重的冲击和挑战。从社会交换理论的视角来看,在新生代农民工的婚姻模式中,婚姻的内在吸引力日渐弱化,婚姻替代吸引力不断增强,农村婚姻解体的社会成本有所下降,婚姻离散的风险增加,在很大程度上弱化了婚姻的稳定性。     

论《易经》婚姻观的当代价值

《易经》之婚姻观反映了中国古代人对婚姻的基本观点和看法,是中国传统婚姻观的重要源头。《易经》以和谐婚姻为主线,说明了婚姻之产生是符合天道,一夫一妻是婚姻的主要构成方式,婚姻年龄合适,应坚持长久的婚姻等观点,对引导当代中国青年树立正确婚恋价值观具有重要借鉴意义。     

我国事实婚姻存废的思考

1994年1月12日新《婚姻登记条例》的颁布,取消了事实婚姻制度,从而否认了原司法解释中的事实婚姻所具有的合法效力,事实婚姻这一法律概念,亦因现行法律的否认而不具现实意义,仅在法学研究层面上仍有其一定的价值。法律之所以对事实婚姻作如此重大调整,意在使婚姻更有效地纳入法律调控的界域,却忽视我国的社会现实,引发诸多社会问题,因而有必要在婚姻立法中重新构建事实婚姻制度以完善婚姻法律制度。     

婚姻市场要价:理解农村婚姻交换现象的一个框架

本文基于各地农村大量的婚姻现象,抽象出婚姻市场要价这一理解当前农村婚姻交换的理论框架。该理论以农村人口流动中婚姻市场形成与农村婚姻资源配置的结构性失衡为背景,阐述了婚姻财礼的性质,以及婚姻市场中女方要价的可欲性、可能性与基础性,论述了男方婚姻负担的表现形态,并呈现了婚姻变迁所带来的一系列社会后果。     

婚姻承诺理论视角下农民工婚姻关系的维系

以往关于农民工婚姻稳定性的研究,忽视了婚姻承诺在婚姻维系中的作用。基于对东莞、厦门、龙岩等地调研资料的质性分析,从婚姻吸引力、约束性因素和道德规范三个方面分析农民工婚姻承诺的动因,归纳出农民工婚姻承诺的三种类型,并从文化、制度和结构三个维度探讨农民工婚姻承诺的特点。研究发现,农民工对婚姻的承诺能解释婚姻的稳定性;受文化、制度和结构因素的影响,农民工的婚姻承诺虽然也包含个人承诺的成分,但以结构性承诺和道德承诺为主。研究拓展了婚姻承诺理论的适用群体,丰富了对流动与婚姻稳定性的探讨。     

佳偶天成:辽海地域传统婚俗漫谈

正对中国人来说,婚姻是人生的大事,它不仅是两情相悦的男女的个人结合,而且是两个家族的联合,是家族势力的延伸,因此在中华文化中婚姻是具有仪式性的重要礼俗,它表示着结为婚姻的两个家族彼此的礼敬和认同。婚姻的社会意义决定了它繁琐却充满了喜悦的仪式过程。这也决定了婚聘礼仪具有的严正与戏谑的双重内容,作为一个礼仪系统它被赋予了鲜明的地域色彩,是一个地域民风民气民间文化的典型表现,在这里我们要向大家介绍一下辽海地域的婚礼礼俗,     

辽代契丹人的婚姻形式及特点

契丹族的婚姻主要有两姓世婚、劫掠婚、姐妹婚,异辈婚和收继婚等形式。婚姻深受政治因素的影响,在与中原文化的交流中,契丹族的婚姻观念有一些改变,但婚姻形式更多地保留了民族特色,对于汉化程度较高的契丹民族而言,这是值得注意的现象。     

建法婚姻面面观

尽管我国婚姻法已颁布多年,但我国近年来违法婚姻有急剧增加的趋势。违法婚姻妨碍了国家对婚姻家庭的监督和管理,也直接冲击着我国计划生育的基本国策,已成为一个不容忽视的社会问题。 违法婚姻知多少 顾名思义,违法婚姻是指违犯《婚姻法》的规定而成婚的。它在全国到底有多少,很难有一个确切的统计。据来自权威部门的调查,近几年来违法婚姻占成婚总数的20％左右,个别的省高达30％以上。 在违法婚姻中,未到法定婚龄、不到婚姻登记机关办理结婚手续就同居生活者占绝大多数。黑龙江省     

寻找浪漫的玫瑰

福克纳的《献给艾米丽的玫瑰》讲述了艾米丽从一个对爱情渴望的淑女最终成了杀人的魔鬼的故事。虽然艾米丽的一生经历了痛楚，同时也形成了不少性格缺陷，她是一朵顽固的、受压迫的、冷酷凋零的玫瑰，但本文还是不断寻找艾米丽生活中的闪光点，最终寻找到了艾米丽那朵原本应该娇艳浪漫的玫瑰。     

试论张爱玲小说对传统理想爱情婚姻解构

生于没落贵族家庭的张爱玲是20世纪四十年代文学的另类"传奇"。她以女性特有细腻和自我生活经历观照社会,书写世俗婚姻爱情,写"物化"的婚姻、扭曲变态的爱情和无望夭折的爱情,以自己的悲剧意识构建了一个世俗而又深刻的婚恋世界,形成独特的庸俗化、去理想化的爱情婚姻书写模式。     

The Morality of Sex: Contra Kant

Abstract

While much that is admirable in romanticism stems from Kant's philosophy, a better account of how sexuality can be an ethical possibility exceeds the cramped parameters that he imposes. His conception of marriage and its dependence upon a contractual exchange of rights may well be irremediable because of its formal emptinesses. His idea of human love as good will and an interest in the welfare of the beloved is defensible as far as it goes. But it does not go far enough to explain the morality of love, either in sexuality or in marriage.     

Eleanor Rathbone and the Politics of Citizenship

Despite Eleanor Rathbone having many firsts to her name she is largely forgotten. While students are now taught little about her ideas or successful political campaigns as an Independent MP, her ideas on feminism are relevant to today's political debate about the rise of anti-social behaviour. The failure of many families to teach their offspring those common decencies which make possible living in close proximity to other human beings brings back centre stage Eleanor Rathbone's views on endowing motherhood.     

An Analysis of Women''''s Social Status at Bourgeois Times from Marriage in Pride and Prejudice

The opening sentence of Pride and Prejudice left the deep impression on readers almost two centuries ago.As the author of Pride and Prejudice,Jane Austen was one of the famous realistic writers in English literature in the nineteenth century. In Pride and Prejudice Austen wrote four marriage types:ideal Elizabeth and Darcy,realizable Charlotte and Collins,felicitous Jane and Bingley,unhappy Lydia and Wickham.She pointed out emphatically economic consideration is the bonds of wedlock and love.She said marriage is not determined by property and family status;it is unwise to marry without money,but it is wrong to marry for money;the marriage settled by love is happy and ideal.     

The private stake in public goods: overcoming the illogic of collective action

Conclusion According to the Logic of Collective Action, most actions in the service of common interests are either not logical or not collective. In a large group, the argument goes, individual action counts for so little in the realization of common interests that it makes no sense for a person to consider group interests when choosing a course of personal conduct. Only private interests are decisive. Their fulfillment, at least, depends in a substantial way on one's own behavior. Individual actions designed to achieve private advantage are therefore rational. Actions aimed at collective goods are a waste of time and effort. Occasionally, of course, a person acting on the basis of private interests may inadvertently provide some collective good from which many other people derive benefit. This is what happens in the case of the Greek shipping tycoon. But it occurs only because one person's private good fortuitously coincides with the collective good of a larger group. From the tycoon's perspective, there are no collective interests at stake in the sponsorship of an opera broadcast, only his own private interests. Nor does his decision to underwrite a broadcast take account of the other people who will listen to it. His action is a solitary one designed to serve a private interest, and it is perfectly consistent with Olson's argument concerning the illogic of collective action, because it is not grounded in collective interest and is not a case of collective behavior. Olson's theory permits people to share collective interests but not to act upon them voluntarily. The only acknowledged exception occurs in the case of very small groups, where each member's contribution to the common good represents such a large share of the total that any person's default becomes noticeable to others and may lead them to reduce or cancel their own contributions. In this instance, at least, one person's actions can make a perceptible difference for the chance of realizing collective interests, and it is therefore sensible for each person to consider these collective interests (and one another's conduct) when deciding whether or not to support group efforts. Outside of small groups, however, Olson finds no circumstances in which voluntary collective action is rational. But in fact the conditions that make collective action rational are broader than this and perhaps more fundamental to Olson's theory. They are inherent in the very ‘collectiveness’ of collective goods - their status as social or group artifacts. In the absence of a group, there can be no such thing as a collective good. But in the absence of mutual awareness and interdependence, it becomes extremely difficult to conceive of a social group. The assumption that group members are uninfluenced by one another's contributions to a collective good is no mere theoretical simplification. It may be a logical impossibility. Being a member of a group, even a very large one, implies at the very least that one's own conduct takes place against a background of group behavior. Olson's assumptions do not acknowledge this minimal connection between individual and group behavior, and they inhibit recognition of the elementary social processes that explain why slovenly conduct attracts special attention on clean streets, or why the initial violations of group norms are more momentous than later violations. It may be argued, of course, that the groups of Olson's theory are not functioning social groups with a collective existence, but only categories or classes of people who happen to share a collective interest. The logic of collective action is intended precisely to show why these ‘potential’ groups are prevented from converting themselves into organized social groups whose members act in a coordinated way. In such latent groups, perhaps, members are unaware of one another, and Olson's assumption that they are uninfluenced by one another's conduct becomes a reasonable one. Another implication, however, is that Olson's theory is subject to unacknowledged restrictions. The logic of the free ride is for potential groups. It may not hold for actual ones. The distinction is exemplified, in the case of public sanitation, by the difference between what is rational on a clean street and what is rational on a dirty one. The logic of the free ride does not make sense for the members of an ongoing group that is already operating to produce collective goods such as public order or public sanitation. While this represents a notable limitation upon the scope of Olson's theory, it apparently leaves the logic of collective action undisturbed where potential or latent groups are concerned. But suppose that a member of an unmobilized group wants her colleagues to contribute to the support of a collective good that she particularly values. Her problem is to create a situation in which such contributions make sense to her fellow members. As we have already seen in the case of the neighborhood street-sweeper, one possible solution is to provide the collective good herself. If it has the appropriate characteristics, its very existence may induce other members of the latent group to contribute to its maintenance. This is not one of those cases in which one person's private interest fortuitously coincides with the collective interest of a larger group. The neighborhood street-sweeper is acting on behalf of an interest that she is conscious of sharing with her neighbors. Her aim is to arouse collective action in support of that interest. She does not expect to pay for public cleanliness all by herself, or to enjoy its benefits all by herself. Her role bears a general resemblance to the one that some analysts have defined for the political entrepreneur who seeks to profit personally by supplying a collective good to the members of a large group (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young 1971). Like the neighborhood street-sweeper, the entrepreneur finds it advantageous to confer a collective benefit on others. But the similarity does not extend to the nature of the advantage or the manner in which it is secured. The entrepreneur induces people to contribute toward the cost of a collective good by creating an organizational apparatus through which group members can pool their resources. The existence of this collection mechanism can also strengthen individual members' confidence that their colleagues' contributions are forthcoming. What the entrepreneur gains is private profit - the difference between the actual cost of a collective good and the total amount that group members are prepared to pay for it. By contrast, the neighborhood street-sweeper induces support for a collective good, not by facilitating contributions, but by increasing the costs that come from the failure to contribute. As a result of her efforts, she gains a clean street whose benefits (and costs) she shares with her fellow residents. She takes her profit in the form of collective betterment rather than private gain, and her conduct, along with the behavior of her neighbors, demonstrates that effective selfinterest can extend beyond private interest. Self-interest can also give rise to continuing cooperative relationships. The street-sweeper, acting in her own interest, brings into being a cooperative enterprise in which she and her fellow residents jointly contribute to the production of a collective good. Cooperation in this case does not come about through negotiation or exchange among equal parties. It can be the work of a single actor who contributes the lion's share of the resources needed to establish a collective good, in the expectation that its existence will induce others to join in maintaining it. The tactic is commonplace as a means of eliciting voluntary collective action, and it operates on a scale far larger than the street or the neighborhood. Government, paradoxically, probably relies on it more than most institutions With its superior power and resources, it may be society's most frequent originator of voluntary collective action. Its policies, imposed through coercion and financed by compulsory taxation, generate a penumbra of cooperation without which coercion might become ineffectual. By providing certain collective goods, government authorities can move citizens to make voluntary contributions to the maintenance of these goods. The stark dichotomy between private voluntary action and public coercion - one of the mainstays of American political rhetoric - may be as misleading as the identification of self-interest with selfishness. There is more at stake here than the voluntary production of collective goods. Continuing cooperative behavior can have other results as well. Once group members begin to expect cooperation from one another, norms of cooperation and fairness are likely to develop. Axelrod (1986) has suggested that modes of conduct which have favorable outcomes for the people who pursue them tend to evolve into group norms. Public-spirited action that serves self-interest could therefore engender a principled attachment to the common good, undermining the assumption of self-interestedness that gives the logic of collective action its bite. Laboratory studies of cooperative behavior have already demonstrated that experimental subjects have far less regard for narrow self-interest than rational choice theory requires (Dawes 1980). In one extended series of collective action experiments, however, Marwell and Ames (1981) found a single group of subjects who approximated the self-interested free-riders of Olson's theory. They were graduate students in economics.     

Diving into the Wreck: Aesthetic Spectatorship at the Fin-de-siècle

Abstract

The popularity of films like Titanic betokens a massive shift in the nature of aesthetic spectatorship in our time. The contemplative, distanced viewer who is able to judge from afar the spectacle before him or her, has been replaced by a more proximate, involved "kinaesthetic" subject whose body is stimulated as much as his or her eye. This is evident not only in mass culture with amusement thrill rides and the return of what has been called the "cinema of attractions"; this new spectator can also be discerned in avant-garde culture, as shown by the Sensation exhibition of Young British Artists which caused such a stir in London and New York. This spectator is especially attracted to simulacral scenes of destruction and catastrophe, in which he or she is virtually immersed. If aesthetic judgement is to be a model for its political counterpart, as has been argued by theorists like Lyotard and Arendt, it cannot do so on the basis of this aesthetics of violent immersion.     

家庭在场:一个华北乡村的婚姻策略

在华北乡村的婚姻策略中,家庭通过"父母之命,媒妁之言"以及"嫁妆"和"彩礼"等等各种婚姻习俗文化,巧妙地将家庭本位主义理念嵌入到现代乡村年轻人的婚姻实践中,让他们在追求个性自由、权利平等现代婚姻理念的同时,真切感受到传统婚姻文化的力量。     

'Settling Accounts' Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms with Local Agency

In the mid- to late-1980s, the discourse of transitional justicewas shaped above all by the experience of countries in LatinAmerica, where military forces continued to exercise autonomouspower even after ceding formal authority to democratically electedgovernments. In this setting, while human rights professionalsagreed that fledgling democracies should undertake prosecutionsin accordance with their international legal obligations, theywere divided over the question of whether further developmentof international obligations in respect of punishment was desirable.Nor was it clear what, precisely, international law alreadyrequired. Writing in the early 1990s, the author of this essay concludedthat States parties to certain international treaties were ingeneral required to prosecute specific crimes. More generally,she argued, wholesale impunity for atrocious crimes was generallyincompatible with States’ responsibility to ensure thatindividuals subject to their power enjoyed fundamental rights.But these duties, she wrote, should not be interpreted to requireaction incompatible with a nascent democracy's political orlegal capacity. In this essay, the author describes how her views have evolvedin the past 15 years. Noting that international legal normsagainst impunity have grown increasingly strong and arguingthat this trend has itself proved a powerful antidote to impunity,the author nonetheless affirms ‘the central importanceof promoting the broad participation of victims and other citizensin the process of designing as well as implementing programmesof transitional justice’ and addresses the inherent tensionbetween these values and norms.     

韩国“黄金单身女”现象研究——“黄金单身女”晚婚现象分析

现代社会以情感来判断婚姻理想的选择,但韩国社会在现实婚姻匹配结构中很大程度上仍延续着同类匹配的价值判断特征。而且社会经济地位越高,这种现象也就越普遍。女性学历的不断提升刺激他们参与到经济活动并获得经济独立,但同时也延迟了适婚年龄。本文主要从文化特征的维度分析在韩国工业化社会转型期中出现的专职女性晚婚现象。