Discourse and violence: the friend–enemy conjunction in contemporary Iranian–American relations

Iranian–American relations have been beset by mistrust and occasional outbreaks of vitriol and violence for the past three decades. In this article I attempt to map, theoretically and empirically, the ‘discursive field’ in which relations between Iran and the United States reveal themselves. I am interested in representations of Iran and the United States, and how the fundamental friend–enemy distinction setting the two countries politically apart has come about. I take as a starting point the fact that discourse has a real and present impact on policy and that a lot of what is happening in world politics can be adequately contextualised with an appreciation of the linkages between ‘utterance’ and ‘action’.     

Global Governance Reform

President Barack Obama has trumpeted a ＂new era of engagement＂ for the United States. The central components of his strategy include a world order characterized by peaceful accommodation between established and rising powers; the collective management of transnational problems; and the overhaul of international institutions to reflect these shifting power dynamics and the new global agenda. Placing less emphasis than his predecessor on the pursuit of American primacy, Obama envisions--indeed, insists-that other global powers assume new responsibilities. Notwithstanding its multilateral instincts, though, the Obama administration is limited in its practical ability to promote and embrace sweeping reforms to global governance. Therefore, rather than casting its lot entirely with universal organizations like the United Nations, the United States will adopt a pragmatic approach to international cooperation that combines formal institutions with more flexible partnerships to achieve US national interests. The balance sheet for Obama＇s first year in office underscores both the opportunities for and the constraints on global governance reform in the current geopolitical environment.     

Trump and the End of an Era? The Liberal International Order in Perspective

ABSTRACT

The liberal international economic and political order which the United States created from the ashes of World War II and has since led is in trouble. To United States President Donald Trump, the order which provided the framework under which sovereign states agreed to follow a rules-based system of economic and political cooperation and shared multilateral governance, has not only allowed other nations (in particular, China) to take advantage of US ‘magnanimity’, but also weakened the United States economically, while asymmetric alliances compromised its military advantages. Given the sustained assault this cosmopolitan order is facing, many fear that it may not survive if Trump is re-elected in November 2020. Indeed, if the United States response to the COVID-19 pandemic is any guide, an ‘America First’ agenda, especially a hard-line approach to China, will shape US policy if Trump wins a second term.     

Geopolitics of Nuclear Hypertrophy. America,the Bomb and the Temptation of Nuclear Primacy

The United States’ grand strategy has consistently been marked by a distinct tendency toward nuclear hypertrophy. Especially the inherent difficulties in extending deterrence to its allies and friends, compounded by the geopolitical characteristics of the US as an unassailable ‘insular’ fortress off Eurasia, have generated, rather paradoxically, a strong incentive for Washington to pursue a wide margin of nuclear superiority, if not nuclear primacy. This has implied, in turn, the deployment of redundant arsenals, robust counterforce capabilities and even a ballistic missile defence. Significantly, not even the Obama administration, though solemnly committed to nuclear disarmament, abstained from embracing a very ambitious modernisation program of American nuclear forces.     

Alliance Forging or Partnership Building? China’s Policy in the Asia-Pacific under the Xi Administration

ABSTRACT

Should China forge a military alliance? Some scholars believe it should, others believe it should adhere to a policy of non-alignment. For China many risks are associated with military alliances. On the one hand, China would likely be involved in unwanted conflicts and confrontations created by potential allies. On the other hand, China would be bound to compete with the existing hegemon, the United States, which has already established a huge alliance system, to win more allies. China just cannot afford this. The intensified strategic competition between China and the United States may also lead to a new antagonism in the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, China’s ‘non-alliance’ policy does not mean China has to abandon the development of strategic cooperation with other countries or renounce the right to build a cooperative partnership network. Since Xi Jinping came to power, the Chinese government has continuously expanded its strategic partnership network in the region. This policy could avoid US-China competition over military allies and enhance strategic trust between China and its neighbouring countries, creating conditions for China’s peaceful development and global strategic stability.     

Regionalism in Asia as Disguised Multilateralism: A Critical Analysis of the East Asia Summit and the Trans-Pacific Partnership

Revolving around the concept of ‘Community’ or ‘community’, debate on an Asian region has ostensibly pitted those who proposed an entity limited to East Asia (China, Japan, South Korea and the ten countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations, ASEAN) against those who proposed a much wider region embracing India, North (and, perhaps, South) America, as well as Australasia. Previously these two conceptualisations possessed their eponymous translation in the East Asian Economic Caucus (reincarnated as ASEAN+3) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. However, with the creation in 2005 of the East Asian Summit to include India, Australia and New Zealand and, above all, its 2011 enlargement to include the United States and Russia, the contrast between the two conceptualisations of an Asian region has become confused. In order to explain this development, this article suggests that the language of ‘region’ or ‘community’ is a discursive smokescreen disguising changes in approaches to multilateralism. An examination of the East Asia Summit, contrasting it with another recent regional project, the Trans Pacific Partnership, suggests that the actors involved are seeking to ensure the primacy of individual nation states in intergovernmental multilateral relations.     

Navigating two Asias: how Washington deals with the Indo-Pacific’s rising powers

ABSTRACT

The United States has sought over the last two decades to facilitate India’s rise as a means of balancing against China’s ambitions. Notwithstanding the rich literature that has emerged on Sino-Indian dynamics and the U.S.-India-China triad, there has been remarkably little examination of the ways in which the United States navigates its relationships with these two rising powers. This study poses a simple question: to what extent has the United States’ pursuit of its interests with India meant that it has accepted trade-offs with respect to its interests with China? Drawing on government documents, interviews with current and former U.S. officials, and an array of case studies between 2005 and early 2019, this study argues first that the U.S. bureaucracy has long been structured in such a way as to heavily compartment policy decision-making related to South Asia and East Asia, respectively, and to produce a pronounced but largely explicable structural bias toward East Asia; second, that relatively few policy matters have arisen since 2005 that have forced the United States to consider meaningful trade-offs between its India and China equities; and third, that new challenges may arise for Washington as its deals with an increasingly inter-connected Indo-Pacific region, and manages the bureaucratic and policy implications of its renewed emphasis on great power competition.     

Explaining the behaviour of small states: an analysis of Jordan's nuclear energy policya

Conventional analyses claim that small states bandwagon with leading international powers. The dominant view is that small states' vulnerabilities and limited power hinder their ability to pursue policy goals. This study critiques this position by investigating why and how Jordan continues to pursue a nuclear energy programme despite objections from the United States—its principal ally. By using theories of small states, this study analyses discursive practices in Jordanian policymaking. This approach is used to describe Jordan's nuclear energy policy and posit a logic of the effects that energy insecurity has on the government's perception of Jordan as a ‘small state’. I use this to create hypotheses concerning the conditions under which small states may not simply bandwagon with key international allies, but may have more freedom to pursue their goals than traditional analyses predict. Explanations that assume small states always have limited freedom to pursue policy goals without the backing of key allies are not supported by the evidence considered here.     

Obama and Afghanistan: a constructivist approach to shifting policy narrative and practices

Abstract

This article adopts a constructivist approach to explain how and why the Obama administration shifted its policy narrative and practices towards Afghanistan from 2011 onwards. It recognizes that the ‘Global War on Terror’ narrative helped pave the way for a set of institutionalized militarized practices and collectively held beliefs that have structured the post-9/11 world. At the same time, the article argues that the Obama administration’s ‘selling’ of its Afghan policy provided the space for an evolving approach. This policy narrative involved the ‘existential threat’ of transnational militant actors operating out of an Afghanistan–Pakistan ungoverned space being downgraded to a ‘containable’ one. Three key factors prompted this change: the administration’s discursive decoupling of the Taliban and al-Qaeda; the changing perception that the threat posed by ‘al-Qaeda and its affiliates’ was a decentralized one; and the United States’ changed conception of Afghanistan as a ‘safe haven’ for transnational terrorists.     

Rights vs. Effectiveness? The Autonomy Thesis in EU Internal Security Cooperation1

Abstract

In the EU's internal security policy-making, parliamentary power remains—de jure and de facto—patchy. This situation has been (unofficially) justified by reference to the idea that the liberal constraints on executive power typically introduced by parliaments mark an irresponsible challenge to the effectiveness of policy. This essay tests this apologia, examining three cases where the retention of liberal values would actually be conducive to effectiveness: the EU-US ‘Passenger Name Register Agreement’, the elaboration of common data protection standards and the ‘Returns Directive’ on the expulsion of illegal immigrants. It suggests that the posited ‘rights/effectiveness’ incompatibility in fact masks a search for autonomy by executive participants.     

European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?

The European Union has, since 1999, moved deliberately, if slowly, to develop the capability to undertake autonomously a range of demanding political military operations beyond Europe's borders. This effort, the European Security and Defense Policy (esdp), is a puzzle insofar as post-Cold War Europe is very secure, and most European nations are members of an established alliance, the u.s.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization. esdp is best explained by the international relations theory known as structural realism, the modern guise of balance of power theory. Balance of power theory is contrasted with balance of threat theory. Though European states are not motivated by a perception of an imminent threat from the United States, they are balancing u.s. power. The concentration of global power in the United States, unipolarity, is uncomfortable even for its friends who fear the abandonment that u.s. freedom of action permits and who wish to influence the global political environment the United States could create.     

The future is uncertain and the end is always near

The standard view of contemporary unipolar politics is that systemic constraints impede the translation of American power capabilities into influence over security outcomes, rendering the United States (US) much less capable than its material capabilities imply. Challenging this logic, William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks argue that systemic constraints under unipolarity are largely inoperative with respect to the security policies of the unipolar power. Indeed, the US is uniquely positioned in today's world to convert its enormous capability advantages into influence and usable power. While World out of balance is a masterwork of logical and rigorous argumentation, Brooks and Wohlforth, in their exclusive focus on the hegemon and its policies, do not attempt to offer a general theory of unipolarity. Thus, they do not consider the possibility that unipolarity does not constrain any actors or the issue of system change. This essay advances two routes out of unipolarity: (1) a ‘delegitimation’ phase followed by regular balancing behavior and (2) a sudden and dramatic shift from unipolarity to multipolarity brought on by an unforeseen US collapse.     

The Two Halves of Sports-Diplomacy

ABSTRACT

What strategies does the United States pursue when it no longer perceives overt military intervention as politically viable or desirable but the problems or issues for which it was formerly undertaken remain? This analysis identifies three such periods in American foreign policy since the United States became a World Power and draws from the work of Peter Hall to develop a typology of strategies according to the magnitude of policy change. These range from adjustment in the settings of interventionism – persistence; the substitution of alternative instruments of foreign policy – ameliorism; and the principled rejection of interventionism in conjunction with a more systematic critique of prevailing foreign policy assumptions – transformationalism. Yet each approach is beset by certain structural limits and contradictions arising from the domestic politics and constitutional-institutional system of the United States that are important in understandiing and appreciating more fully the challenges – and opportunities – of the period ‘after interventionism’.     

NATO's Southern flank in the east‐west balance

American primacy continues to characterise the international system, despite trends toward a diffusion of power. The discussion is too often biased in favour of multipolarity due to imprecise or misleading definitions of US primacy. On the basis of a simple definition of what a “pole” is, combining GDP and defence expenditure, only the US can be considered a global pole. The current economic crisis is not changing this reality. Even considering perceptions, soft power, and the ability to translate power into influence, rising powers like China or an aggregate power like the EU have a long way to go before they can get on an equal footing with the United States.     

Conceptions of National Security and American Entry into World War II

During World War II, official definitions of the requirements of United States national security were extended beyond the defense of the western hemisphere to include preventing any single power dominating Eurasia. This article challenges the commonly expressed view that this change was due to a belief that a strategy of continental defense would no longer suffice to protect the physical safety of the United States. The focus is on the period between Munich and Pearl Harbor when U.S policy moved away from the principle of non-involvement embodied in the neutrality legislation of 1935–37. The role in this process of the argument that America’s own safety was dependent upon the European balance of power, particularly because of the dangers posed by the development of aviation and the possible suborning of Latin America, is critically examined. It is argued that the broader conception of America’s security requirements reflected both a consciousness of the unique power of the United States to determine the outcome of the war and an implicit belief that the values and interests for which the nation should be prepared to fight extended beyond physical security.     

Evidence of Russia's Bush Doctrine in the CIS1

Abstract

The article discusses the emergence of a Russian version of the Bush doctrine in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Russian officials’ conceptual stretching of the strategic culture embodied in the National Security Concept (NSC) and the Military Doctrine (MD) from 2000 onwards. While these documents seem to cherish multilateralism and United Nations (UN) primacy in questions of global and regional security, terrorist attacks on Russia proper have engendered a more assertive approach to regional security issues in the Caucasus and Central Asia and brought Russian officials to consider unilateral pre-emptive strikes against terrorist bases. In the case of the Caucasus, Russia has been striking against terrorist bases on Georgian territory and contributed to constructing a failed state, whereas in the Central Asian case, Russia has sought to revitalise the defunct CIS security framework and pledge assistance to ‘allies’ in the fight against terrorism. The article argues that the war against terrorism has given Russia a new footing in the CIS. The issue of security is more salient, as is the reliance on military force to facilitate it.     

Spatial hierarchy and/or contemporary geopolitics: what can and can't uneven and combined development explain?

This article reviews the current Marxist debate on imperialism through an examination of the concept of uneven and combined development. This has been used in two ways: first, to show that geopolitical competition between advanced capitalist states continues to be of primary importance in the international capitalist order; second, to show how global capital accumulation is an intrinsically uneven, unequal and cumulative process. The article argues that uneven and combined development is limited in its utility for explaining the former, but is of greater utility in the case of the latter. This is further briefly illustrated in the concluding section, which returns to a consideration of imperialism; first, through an examination of the rise of China and ‘decline’ of the United States in the context of the global economic crisis; and, second, through a demonstration of how a Marxist approach that accepts the primacy of cooperation between advanced capitalist states can still provide a critique of a liberal—and imperialist—international order.     

US anti‐terrorism policies: Lessons to be learned to meet an enduring and changing threat

The evolution of United States anti‐terrorism policies has been marked by inconsistency and the lack of a unity of action. The declaratory no ransom policy enunciated by President Nixon has been constantly violated. In addition, the absence of a consensus on the nature of terrorism has been exacerbated by bureaucratic turf battles. This debate has created negative administrative and operational impacts on the organizations that are responsible for meeting the terrorist threat. Bureaucratically, despite the attempt to coordinate action through the lead agency concept, Washington's anti‐terrorism mechanism remain unnecessarily complex. Furthermore, different operational approaches to combating terrorism have impeded the development of an integrated counter‐terrorism capability. The need for streamlining has become critical in the rapidly transforming international arena. The use of terrorism by governments who seek regional hegemony and the development of the ‘Gray Area Phenomenon’ where non‐state actors employ terrorism as a means of realizing their objectives will challenge Washington's resolve. The political leadership faces the task of reconciling the present budgetary constraints with the requirements to identify and effectively respond to future threats.     

Statecraft and Migration: A Research Note on American Strategies to Use Immigration in Foreign Policy from the Founding Era through the Early Twenty-First Century

How has the United States used migration as part of its statecraft and foreign policy? This question is significant because migration is an important contemporary transnational policy area for the United States; and because a state’s foreign-immigration policy nexus remains an under-explored vantage point for examining diplomatic and international history. This review article answers the question and lays conceptual and empirical ground in the area by examining the historical record and extant research to show that American leaders from the country’s founding through the early twenty-first century have used migration as an instrument of statecraft by primarily attempting to reach three foreign policy objectives: pleasing, harming, and bargaining with states. For each of these categories, the analysis explicates relationships between statecraft and migration for the United States, identifies policy instruments used by American leaders to influence migration for diplomatic and foreign policy objectives, and presents historical cases of American migration policies designed for foreign policy goals. The conclusion provides the research and policy implications of its findings.     

The cold peace: Russo-Western relations as a mimetic cold war

In 1989–1991 the geo-ideological contestation between two blocs was swept away, together with the ideology of civil war and its concomitant Cold War played out on the larger stage. Paradoxically, while the domestic sources of Cold War confrontation have been transcended, its external manifestations remain in the form of a ‘legacy’ geopolitical contest between the dominant hegemonic power (the United States) and a number of potential rising great powers, of which Russia is one. The post-revolutionary era is thus one of a ‘cold peace’. A cold peace is a mimetic cold war. In other words, while a cold war accepts the logic of conflict in the international system and between certain protagonists in particular, a cold peace reproduces the behavioural patterns of a cold war but suppresses acceptance of the logic of behaviour. A cold peace is accompanied by a singular stress on notions of victimhood for some and undigested and bitter victory for others. The perceived victim status of one set of actors provides the seedbed for renewed conflict, while the ‘victory’ of the others cannot be consolidated in some sort of relatively unchallenged post-conflict order. The ‘universalism’ of the victors is now challenged by Russia's neo-revisionist policy, including not so much the defence of Westphalian notions of sovereignty but the espousal of an international system with room for multiple systems (the Schmittean pluriverse).