Democratic Hegemony and American Hegemony

The emergence of an ‘American democratic empire’, rising from the global informational and transportation revolution, that has its epicentre situated on the territory of the United States (US), has produced a profound metamorphosis in world affairs. National power elites, including those in America, are confronting a dilemma. They are compelled to accept, favour and even defend the so-called globalisation process in order to avoid further erosion of their economic and political power. On the other hand, this process is also directly threatening this same power. The paradox is that the US is the main promoter and defender of last resort of the new global ‘order’, which at the same time is restricting its own margins for sovereign action. The ‘democratic empire’ is thus fostering the rise of a democratic hegemonism at the expense of a ‘US hegemonism’. This democratic hegemonism is a gradually rising—and fragile—consensus on a proliferating set of perceptions and values, stressing individual freedom, responsibility and political and social activism. This consensus arises from the material possibilities of a more individualistic way of life and the increasing capacity of single individuals or organised groups to participate in global and local political decision-making processes. This is a process that favours the empowerment of interest groups whose reference is no longer solely the nation-state. Hence, traditional power elites are progressively losing their ability to present themselves as the ultimate embodiment of a national ‘general interest’. The irony of the seemingly intractable contradiction between US hegemonism and democratic hegemonism is that the actual spreading of the logic of the latter is closely dependent on US power and willingness to defend its own national interest. The greatest challenge for the coming decades will be the construction of supranational governance institutions under democratic hegemony, so as to avoid a classic imperial self-isolation of the US—a situation that would trigger the inevitable demise of democratic hegemonism and, for the time being, of any order as such.     

Globalisation

The term ‘globalisation’ is widely used to describe a variety of economic, cultural, social, and political changes that have shaped the world over the past 50-odd years. Because it is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, globalisation has been credited with a wide range of powers and effects. Its proponents claim that it is both ‘natural’ and an inevitable outcome of technological progress, and creates positive economic and political convergences. Critics argue that globalisation is hegemonic and antagonistic to local and national economies. This article argues that globalisation is a form of capitalist expansion that entails the integration of local and national economies into a global, unregulated market economy. Although economic in its structure, globalisation is equally a political phenomenon, shaped by negotiations and interactions between institutions of transnational capital, nation states, and international institutions. Its main driving forces are institutions of global capitalism – especially transnational corporations – but it also needs the firm hand of states to create enabling environments for it to take root. Globalisation is always accompanied by liberal democracy, which facilitates the establishment of a neo-liberal state and policies that permit globalisation to flourish. The article discusses the relationship between globalisation and development and points out that some of the most common assumptions promoted by its proponents are contradictory to the reality of globalisation; and that globalisation is resisted by more than half of the globe's population because it is not capable of delivering on its promises of economic well being and progress for all.     

Two dimensions of democracy and the economy

Does democracy influence economic policymaking and outcomes? Our study investigates the implications of Dahl's two dimensions of democracy (‘polyarchy’): contestation/competition and inclusion/participation. We hypothesize that increases in democratic competition inspire policy incrementalism, thus lowering growth volatility and generating fewer deep crises. Meanwhile, increases in substantive democratic inclusion – genuine political voice, or democratic participation in the presence of a minimum of contestation – should increase the political weight of relatively poor voters, who have a differentially strong aversion to deep growth crises. A statistical analysis of 149 countries for 1961–98 finds greater democracy associated with fewer years of sharply negative growth (‘crisis’), with both democratic contestation and substantive inclusion contributing to this outcome. Our conclusions question the wisdom of designing economic policy institutions that are intentionally insulated from the democratic process.     

Participatory development: an approach sensitive to class and gender

This article begins by presenting development experience gained in the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya as a means of highlighting the centrality of popular participation to the development process. Important lessons from the ongoing development work in Irian Jaya were that it is not sufficient to consult beneficiaries and then act on their behalf or to engage in a development process unless the participants understand the project's conceptual orientation and language and have the tools to assess their needs and options for constructive change effectively. Also, developers must supply participants with information about the larger economic and political context in which they are operating. The article continues with an exploration of the ways in which a focus on class and gender raises participatory development to a new level. Constraints on transformative participation are then defined as 1) the political conditions and power structures existing in the country and community, 2) administrative opposition, 3) sociocultural impediments, and 4) limitations imposed by daily life. While it may be impossible to avoid the effects of such constraints, development agents can help villagers anticipate their impact and support efforts to cope with them. Participatory development challenges the status quo by enhancing economic equity and social equality and, if effective, will engender opposition, especially when a large amount of funding is at stake. Opposition can take many forms, including ridicule or resistance and can get personal. The demand to produce quick results also creates restraints on development agents. It is concluded that the development agent must engage key sectors of the local population in the development process and nurture this participation. Development agents should act as facilitators rather than independent initiators telling people what is best for them. Development agents must become very familiar with the community to earn the trust that is needed to guide people toward self-analysis and priority-setting.     

International NGOs and the challenge of modernity

The forces associated with economic globalisation and the apparent supremacy of market forces have unleashed a range of political and social processes that have served, and were indeed designed, to enrich and empower the few at the expense of the majority. These include phenomena such as the rise in armed conflict, threats to food security, the loss of livelihoods and traditional ways of life of millions of people worldwide, the commodification of social provision, assaults on national sovereignty, and the privatisation of citizenship. However, the author argues, the most significant impact of globalisation is the 'localisation' of social and political struggle, and the emergence of new forms of international solidarity. Many NGOs have too readily succumbed to the view that globalisation in its present form is inevitable and irreversible, and have accommodated to it by trading their essential values for technical professionalism, often imported from the private sector. However, if NGOs are to assume their place as part of a transformational movement for social justice, they must rediscover and foster the values of citizen participation and develop a genuine respect for diversity.     

The lawless presidency: Economic crisis and democratic accountability in Mexico, 1970–94

The Mexican government has adopted policies of market‐oriented reform since 1982 which have for the most part been praised by professional economists. Mexico even joined the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1994. However the performance of the economy has been disappointing. Yet a failure to achieve any real per capita economic growth over an extended period is unusual among Latin American countries which have consistently pursued policies of market‐oriented economic reform. A large part of the explanation has to do with the character of Mexico's political institutions, most notably a lack of democratic accountability. The unmistakable trend toward greater democracy since 1982 has so far been expressed principally in terms of greater honesty and competitiveness in the electoral arena. But there has been no significant reform of the executive branch of government, which has for many years been run on authoritarian principles. This makes it difficult for the Mexican government to control corruption, limit the economic consequences of political shocks and prevent the shifts in political power which occur at the end of each sexenio from destabilising the economy.     

Conquest and Regime Change: An Evolutionary Model of the Spread of Democracy and Peace

Whereas the literature on the democratic peace tends to treat the phenomenon as a causal law, we follow Immanuel Kant in interpreting it as a macro-historical process that expanded from a small number of democracies to about 50% of all states. In order to account for this development, we introduce an agent-based model that combines a natural-selection logic with an adaptive mechanism of regime change. The latter is implemented as an empirically calibrated, contextual rule that prompts democratization as an S-shaped function of the democratic share of a state's immediate neighborhood. A similar transition rule governs regime change in the opposite direction. The computational results show that regime change and collective security are necessary to produce realistic trajectories of democratization at the systemic level.     

De-Democratisation and Rising Inequality: The Underlying Cause of a Worrying Trend

This article is concerned with the question of why economic inequality has increased so dramatically in recent decades and what can be done about it. It suggests that the fundamental cause of the recent rise in economic inequality, underlying all the more proximate factors, is a major process of de-democratisation that has taken place since the 1970s, which has increased the political representation of capital while reducing that of labour. The article pulls together a wide range of research from different disciplines in order to decisively show the ways in which economic governance has been de-democratised in this period. This analysis has important consequences with regard to policy attempts to reduce inequality and suggests that these must focus not on technical issues but on ways to strengthen democracy. And if the dynamics of de-democratisation are fundamentally global, then solutions must also be global. These conclusions are in stark contrast with current academic and policy approaches which tend to focus on technical, rather than political, solutions, and which focus overwhelmingly at the national, rather than the global, level. This article thus calls for a major rethinking of the causes of rising inequality and the policy changes needed to reduce it.     

How to understand Pakistan's hybrid regime: the importance of a multidimensional continuum

Pakistan has had a chequered democratic history but elections in 2013 marked a second turnover in power, and the first transition in Pakistan's history from one freely elected government to another. How do we best categorize (and therefore understand) political developments in Pakistan? Is it now safe to categorize it as an electoral democracy or is it still a hybrid case of democracy? Using the Pakistani case as an example, this article argues that hybrid regimes deserve consideration as a separate case (rather than as a diminished subtype of democracy or authoritarianism), but must be categorized along a multidimensional continuum to understand the dynamics of power within the political system.     

Incomplete Democratization and the Outbreak of Military Disputes

Whereas most research on the democratic peace has focused on relations within pairs of states, research on the relationship between democratization and armed conflict has centered primarily on the behavior of individual states. Moreover, the existing literature has placed primary emphasis on explaining the effects of democratization on war, rather than military disputes more generally. In this article, we find that certain types of democratic transitions markedly increase the risk of such disputes within dyads, even when economic and political relations between states are taken into account. Particularly prone to violence are dyads in which either state undergoes an incomplete democratic transition; that is, a shift from an autocratic to a partially democratic (or anocratic) regime that stalls prior to the establishment of consolidated democratic institutions.     

转型时期俄罗斯政治制度探析

俄罗斯实行宪政民主制度,要求有一部至高无上的宪法。并在宪法范围内推行民主制度,经过几年的改革,目前俄罗斯宪政制度的框架已基本建立起来。俄罗斯政治制度的最大特点是其过渡性,目前的民主化进程正处于由高度集权政治向民主政治过渡阶段——权威政治的初始阶段,要建立起真正现代意义上的民主政治制度还有漫长的道路要走。     

Responses to Financial Crises: An Evolutionary Perspective

As the world currently faces the ever-deepening sub-prime crisis, we are reminded that the process of globalisation can cause significant disruptions in global markets and political systems. This article focuses on the evolution of financial crisis responses to gain a better understanding of the dynamics affecting current responses. By using a focused comparison of case studies it argues that the development of crisis response and the dominance of the current multilateral actors is a result of an evolutionary process. This process privileges learning and innovation within a complex political economic system. The crises of each era, born of many of the same problems, generate a variety of responding actors, a few of which are adopted. These actors help to address the immediate problems and even work well for a while. Eventually, they are overwhelmed by the tendency of financial interactions to grow. Another set of crises generates another round of actors and mechanisms. As time goes on, crisis response requires more formal institutions that can deal with more complex systems. The article concludes that response actors are becoming more public, multilateral and global in scope. Understanding this pattern of response should help to shed light on the potential for reform of the financial architecture and help to explain the dominance of multilateralism as a crisis response.     

The UN Global Compact and the Global Governance of Corporate Social Responsibility: Complex Multilateralism for a More Human Globalisation?

In recent years, questions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) have developed into a global policy issue. Multinational corporations, as high-profile representatives of economic transnationalisation and globalisation, have come under ever closer scrutiny in regard to their actual development impact, especially in Third World countries. The UN Global Compact as an example for evolving “complex multilateralism on a global level” aims at solving two problems at once, namely the implementation of minimum standards of “good corporate conduct” and socio-economic development, especially of poor countries. In a paradigmatic policy shift, the United Nations has fostered close partnerships with global business to promote CSR and socio-economic development, thereby opening the UN system to private business interests. This shift has been criticised by many civil society actors. Despite its remarkable achievements, the Global Compact reveals many problems of contemporary global governance related to its understanding of globalisation, the implementation and control of its core norms and rules as well as in regard to issues of transparency and democratic legitimacy. Finally, the Global Compact serves to illustrate how international institutions try to adapt to the growing complexity of development and economic governance issues and the larger influence of non-state actors in the global political economy.     

Argentina's Turmoil: The Politics of Informality and the Roots of Economic Meltdown

This article argues that Argentina's current economic crisis cannot be fully understood without an analysis of recent political processes. It defines the politics of informality that have characterised Argentina's democracy-building processes. This de-institutionalisation of politics was perceived as the facilitator of democratic consolidation, state reform and economic restructuring. In practice, the politics of informality contributed to the crisis of 2001. The article begins by analysing the scale of the political and economic crisis from 1999. It is followed by an analysis of the politics of informality implemented by the Raúl Alfonsín and Carlos Menem's governments and then goes on to explain the consequences of informal politics. Finally, it concludes by outlining the main factors that conspire against democracy and economic stability in Argentina.     

Are lions democrats? The impact of democratization on economic growth in Africa, 1980–2010

If we look back at the past two decades, timing seems to point to a close connection between democratic reforms and economic growth in sub-Saharan states. Most countries in the area introduced multiparty politics and made dramatic – if incomplete – democratic progress between 1990 and 1994. Quite strikingly, it is exactly from 1994 to 1995 (and particularly from 2000) that the region began to undergo a period of significant economic progress. Because of the undeniable temporal sequence experienced in the region – that is, first political reforms, then economic growth – some observers pointed to a nexus between democratic progress and economic performance. But is there evidence in support of a causal relationship? As of today, no empirical research has been conducted on the democracy–growth nexus in the early twenty-first century's so-called “emerging Africa”. To fill this gap, we discuss the different arguments claiming an economic advantage of democracies, we present our theoretical framework and carry out an empirical analysis of the growth impact of political regimes in 43 sub-Saharan states for the entire 1980–2010 period. Our findings confirm that African countries, many of which had long suffered the combination of authoritarian rule and predatory practices, derived some economic dividends from democratic progress.     

Anti-Corruption Strategies and Democratization in Bosnia-Herzegovina

There is an international consensus that corruption undermines the democratic process and the legitimacy of government. Anti-corruption strategies are increasingly becoming an integral part of democratization programmes in non-western states. Where there are doubts over the effectiveness of these programmes they have tended to be expressed in relation to the level of social and economic development necessary to ensure a separation between private and public spheres. The experience of extensive international anti-corruption policies in Bosnia provides an opportunity to assess the relationship between anti-corruption initiatives and democratization in the European context. Taking a broad systemic approach to tackling political corruption, it was assumed that international policy in this area could strengthen the authority of democratic political institutions, encourage public participation and rebuild relations of trust within and between communities. This study of the impact of systemic anti-corruption strategies focuses on the effectiveness of these initiatives in meeting democratization goals. The results have been disappointing. The reasons for this may lie in the initial assumptions, not because they assume a higher level of social and economic development than Bosnian society has attained but because they have a narrow reductive view of the political process.     

Capacity-testing as a means of increasing political inclusion

Some competent political actors, primarily young people and the cognitively impaired, are excluded from political participation by modern liberal democratic states. This exclusion occurs because the means utilized by states to distinguish between competent citizens (who must be included) and incompetent ones (who may be excluded) are imperfect. They include age restrictions on enfranchisement and, commonly, legal restrictions on enfranchisement for those with cognitive disabilities. Capacity-testing provides a means to improve on these existing mechanisms for exclusion. It is not, however, often suggested, nor seen as viable. Here, I argue that we should utilize capacity-testing to more effectively include capable citizens in our democratic practice. I defend a particular scope and kind of capacity-testing against common objections.     

蒙古国政治转型与新政府的走向

蒙古国政治与经济转型同步,这对处于民主改革进程中的国家具有借鉴意义。蒙古国政治与经济的发展对于东北亚区域经济合作的发展无疑具有重要影响。     

Political party formation by former armed opposition groups after civil war

ABSTRACT

Under what conditions are rebel groups successfully incorporated into democratic politics when civil war ends? Using an original cross-national, longitudinal dataset, we examine political party formation by armed opposition groups over a 20-year period, from 1990 to 2009. We find that former armed opposition groups form parties in more than half of our observations. A rebel group’s pre-war political experience, characteristics of the war and how it ended outweigh factors such as the country’s political and economic traits and history. We advance a theoretical framework based on rebel leaders’ expectations of success in post-war politics, and we argue that high rates of party formation by former armed opposition groups are likely a reflection of democratic weakness rather than democratic robustness in countries emerging from conflict.