Levels of Generality in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice

The level of generality or of abstraction used to describe a precedent, a right, or the legislative intent behind a statutory provision or constituent purpose behind a constitutional provision can have a decisive impact on the outcome of a case. Characterising it in narrow terms has the effect of reducing the scope of decision of a judgment; conversely, a broader characterisation provides more leeway for a judge in a case to encompass its facts within the precedent, right or purpose in issue. The issue raised by the level of generality problem is the extent to which courts have a discretion or freedom of manoeuvre as to the level of generality they decide upon, and thus whether generality and abstraction are manipulable in the hands of judges and are not really predetermined by the legal sources in question or an established judicial method of interpretation. Uncontrolled judicial discretion of this kind is problematic from the point of view of the rule of law and democracy, especially when adjudication concerns constitutional provisions, the equivalent in the EU being interpretation by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of the EU Treaties; reversal of ECJ interpretation through Treaty amendment is particularly difficult to achieve because it requires unanimous coordination by the Member States. This article examines two alternative ways of determining the correct or appropriate level of generality issue in ECJ interpetation, coherence or the legal traditions of the Member States, and argues in favour of the latter as a less subjective method. Application of the two alternative approaches is tested in two areas of EU law, state liability and criminal law.     

Constitutionality of ‘bride price’ in Nigeria: echoes from the supreme court of Uganda

The practice of bride price is a distinctive and established feature of African customary law marriage. In Nigeria, the practice has received statutory and judicial approval. However, the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Uganda on the practice of bride price in Uganda has disturbed the assumption of its constitutionality. This article envisages legal and ideological influence; consequently, it examines the validity of the decision against the background of Nigerian constitutional law. It agrees to a nuanced change in the practice but argues that the change must be authentic and not dictated by Western liberal typology.     

对宪法适用问题的再思考——与童之伟教授商榷

宪法适用就是国家机关依照法定职权和程序,应用宪法规范处理具体案件或纠纷的专门活动。中国全国人大及其常委会制定或者修改法律的活动,国务院规定行政措施、制定行政法规,发布决定和命令的活动,都不属于宪法适用。不论从权力来源方面看,还是从人民法院审理案件的实体法依据来看,中国宪法第126条中的“法律”都是包括宪法在内的广义的法律,中国多元多级的立法体制,为人民法院对从属性造法机关所制定的规范性文件进行违宪审查,留下一定的空间。     

The decision of the Italian Constitutional Court on numerus clausus: A matter for Community law

This article discusses the recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court on the numerus clausus issue, containing the first relevant pronouncement by the highest jurisdiction on the constitutional legality of the measures adopted so far by the Ministry. The Constitutional Court considers these measures in conformity with the Constitution to the extent that they implement Community law, and especially certain directives on the recognition of qualifications. Thus, Community law is deemed to provide the proper legal framework to adopt certain regulations, amongst which restrictions to access. This article argues that, in the context of litigation on access to university, Community law has been used improperly and that, in any event, a convenient solution to the issue could have been found in national law. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

National Judges,Community Judges: Invitation to a Journey through the Looking‐glass—On the Need for Jurisdictions to Rethink the Inter‐systemic Relations beyond the Hierarchical Principle

The historical conflict between the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the national constitutional courts regarding primacy is a misunderstanding. In going through the looking‐glass, we can understand that, on the contrary, the ECJ and the national constitutional courts adopt comparable solutions in their treatment of legal pluralism, and that they see the negation of pluralism as essential for the survival of their own legal orders. Therefore, these judges must be offered a new theoretical context to help them reconcile their role as supreme guardian with the taking into account of the pluralist context. Finally, practical proposals must be made to give judges the instruments and techniques that are capable of reflecting this plural structure.     

Pluralism and Integrity

One of the theoretical developments associated with the law of the European Union has been the flourishing of legal and constitutional theories that extol the virtues of pluralism. Pluralism in constitutional theory is offered in particular as a novel argument for the denial of unity within a framework of constitutional government. This paper argues that pluralism fails to respect the value of integrity. It also shows that at least one pluralist theory seeks to overcome the incoherence of pluralism by implicitly endorsing monism. The integrity and coherence of European law is best preserved by considering that both the national legal order and the international or European legal orders adopt sophisticated views of their own limits.     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

"Pro-life" absolutes, feminist challenges: the fundamentalist narrative of Irish abortion law 1986-1992

This article asks how Irish abortion law developed to the point of stopping a young pregnant rape victim from travelling abroad to have an abortion in 1992 (Attorney General v.X). The author argues that this case, which ultimately saw the Irish Supreme Court overturn that decision and recognize the young woman's right to abortion, was the last chapter of the fundamentalist narrative of Irish abortion law. The feminist critique of that law needs to consider its particular fundamentalist aspects in order to clarify the obstacles posed to the struggle for Irish women's reproductive freedom. The author argues that a fundamentalist narrative ordered the post-colonial and patriarchal conditions of Irish society so as to call for the legal recognition of an absolute right to life of the "unborn." The Supreme Court's interpretation of the constitutional right to life of the fetus in three cases during the 1980s is evidence that Irish abortion law was constructed through a fundamentalist narrative until that narrative was rejected in the Supreme Court decision in Attorney General v. X.     

Another Look at Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union

Constitutional pluralism is a theory, or movement, or idea, for some perhaps even an ideal, about the relationship between the legal system of the European Union and those of its Member States. In this paper, Julio Baquero Cruz analyses its assumptions and implications in the light of historical experience and of the consequences it could have for the practice of law in Europe. To do so, constitutional pluralism is compared with the other main positions about that relationship: the national constitutional position and the position of Union law.     

The influence of the rulings of the Constitutional Court on the development of health law in Lithuania

This article highlights some recent developments in the constitutional doctrine of the right to health care in Lithuania, and more in particular the impact of the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania on the development of health law. The right to health care, enshrined in the Constitution, is both an obligation of the state and an individual right. The Constitutional Court has developed a doctrine of the right to health care, as well a doctrine of certain other constitutional social rights, which is based on the understanding of the close interrelation between the different constitutional rights, the principle of indivisibility and equal importance of these rights, and the presumption of justiciability of social rights. The analysis is based on the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. Two cases on the disputes of the legal regulation concerning the pharmaceutical activities are presented in more detail.     

Asking the Sovereignty Question in Global Legal Pluralism: From “Weak” Jurisprudence to “Strong” Socio‐Legal Theories of Constitutional Power Operations

The article examines recent theories of legal and constitutional pluralism, especially their adoption of sociological perspectives and criticisms of the concept of sovereignty. The author argues that John Griffiths's original dichotomy of “weak” and “strong” pluralism has to be reassessed because “weak” jurisprudential theories contain useful sociological analyses of the internal differentiation and operations of specific legal orders, their overlapping, parallel validity and collisions in global society. Using the sociological methodology of legal pluralism theories and critically elaborating on Teubner's societal constitutionalism, the author subsequently reformulates the question of sovereignty as a sociological problem of complex power operations communicated through the constitutional state's organization and reconfigured within the global legal and political framework.     

Competing Supremacies and Clashing Institutional Rationalities: the Danish Supreme Court's Decision in the Ajos Case and the National Limits of Judicial Cooperation

On 6 December 2016, the Supreme Court of Denmark (SCDK) ruled on the grounds of Ajos case. The ruling concerned the scope of the principle of non‐discrimination on the grounds of age and whether a national court could weigh the principle of non‐discrimination on grounds of age against the principles of legal controversy, as the protection of legitimate expectations. The ruling has caused a great deal of controversy as the SCDK defied clear guidelines from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the ruling. Moreover, the case has been seen by some as an example of a new ‘sovereigntism’ in Danish law that is at odds with the project of European integration through law. This article explains the case from both an EU law and Danish constitutional law perspective. It concludes by providing a set of explanations of the new course of the SCDK in its relationship with the EU.     

Restrictions on the Use of Analogy in Law

This article touches on the issue of the restrictions and bans concerning the use of analogical reasoning in law. In order to clearly present this topic, the Author appeals to different branches of law, having thus a separate regard for criminal law, tax law, administrative law, private law and legal procedures. In this context, he also pays attention to the domain of the constitutional law and the practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Additionally, allowance has been made for some other interpretative directives that aim to truncate the potential usage of an analogical argument in law such as the principle that exceptions should not be extended, the requirement not to meddle with the plain and precise meaning of the wording of statutory provision or a ban on negating the ‘exhaustive’ nature of some statutory enumerations through extending them analogically.     

From Status Politics to Technocratic Pluralism: Toleration of Religious Minorities in Canada

This paper examines patterns of public regulation as they may emerge throughout the West from controversies constructed around new and minority religions. Following Beckford's and Richardson's insights about the sociological exemplarity of these issues, we argue that evidence for some of these trends as well as clues for interpretation can be found in contemporary Canadian constitutional development that parallels and at times precedes that of Europe. Close examination of notions of society and religion found in more than 35 religion cases brought before the Canadian Supreme Court from 1951 to 1997 lead to the conclusion that beside governmental and parliamentary intervention, legal management of religious pluralism is assuming a decisively normative turn. Notions such as status politics, civic ethos, and technocratic pluralism are offered as an explanation of this trend.     

The Idea of a European Constitution

Any abstract account of a field of law must make generalizationsthat are both faithful to the legal materials and appropriateto the subject matter's aims. The uniqueness and fluidity ofthe European Union's institutions makes such generalizationsvery difficult. A common theoretical approach to EU law (onethat is often relied upon by the Court of Justice, the Parliamentand the Commission) is to borrow directly from the theory ofdomestic constitutional law. The most recent manifestation ofthis tendency is the draft Treaty on the European Constitution,which includes many of the symbolic features of a domestic constitutionalorder. But the European Union is not a state and the constitutionalanalogy is in many ways problematic. In this article I defendthe view that a more complex theory is more appropriate to theunique combination of ordinary politics with diplomatic conferencesthat constitutes the European Union. The key to these institutionsis, in my view, a Kantian international ideal of liberal peace.The foundational constitutional principles of the EU, principlesthat both fit the current legal framework and offer its mostattractive interpretation, require the qualified autonomy ofmember states in a union of republics that create collectiveinstitutions for the purposes of liberal peace.     

A Key Influence on the Doctrine of Actual Malice: Justice William Brennan's Judicial Philosophy at Work in Changing the Law of Seditious Libel

Much of the scholarship on Justice William Brennan's landmark opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan has focused on the actual malice doctrine and its implications. In light of the historic change in the law of seditious libel in the United States as a result of the case and the need for further exploration of the human factors behind the case, this article explains how Justice Brennan's instrumentalist judicial philosophy had an important influence on changing the course of legal protection for speech critical of the government. The article concludes that the outcome of the case probably would have differed notably if a justice with a formalist, Holmesian or natural law philosophy had authored the opinion for the Court.     

Other Phases of Legal Pluralism in the Contemporary World

Since the discovery of the dual structure of state law and minor law in non-Western countries, the scope of the inquiry into legal pluralism has been expanding gradually. This article attempts to prompt this inquiry by identifying hitherto neglected phases of legal pluralism working in the contemporary world. After discussing various kinds of legal pluralism, other types of legal pluralism are suggested for verification by interested scholars, such as legal pluralism in conflict, legal pluralism in subjectivity, a conceptual scheme and an operational definition of legal pluralism.     

The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty

Abstract:  One of the core constitutional questions for national constitutional courts in the EU in the past decades has been whether to accept the claim made by the Court of Justice that EU law is the supreme law of the land, taking primacy even over conflicting national constitutional provisions. With the inclusion in the recently adopted Constitutional Treaty of a clause explicitly confirming the 'primacy of EU Law' appearances suggest that the EU is about to establish a characteristic of mature, vertically integrated, federal states such as the USA. This article argues that this view is mistaken. It develops a comprehensive jurisprudential framework for addressing constitutional conflicts, 'Constitutionalism Beyond the State' (CBC). CBS detaches the discussion of supremacy and constitutional conflict from a statist framework; provides a jurisprudential account that explains and justifies the highly differentiated, context-sensitive and dynamic set of conflict rules that national courts have in the past adopted; and provides the lacking theoretical basis for the more attractive, but undertheorised sui generis accounts of European constitutional practice that have recently gained ground in the literature. CBS provides a jurisprudentially grounded reconstructive account of why the issue of constitutional conflict is as rich and complicated in Europe as it is and why it is likely to remain so even if the Constitutional Treaty is ratified. The article then goes on to make concrete proposals addressed to national constitutional courts and the Court of Juctise respectively about how, in application of the developed approach, constitutional conflicts ought to be addressed doctrinally. It includes a proposal to read the new 'constitutional identity' clause as authorising Member States as a matter of EU Law to set aside EU Law on constitutional grounds under certain circumstances.     

The Ad That Changed Libel Law: Judicial Realism and Social Activism in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan

The 1964 decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan transformed libel law by extending constitutional protection to the publication of false and defamatory statements about public officials made without actual malice, that is, without knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Less well recognized is the decision's advancement of advocacy advertising and unhindered news coverage as a means to counter racism in the United States. Civil rights history, increasing visibility of advocacy advertisements and the Court's reliance on thin legal precedent suggest the decision embodies judicial realism and social activism.