Virtuous Circularity: Positive Law and Particular Justice

This paper argues that the positive allocative decisions paradigmatically carried out by the application of legal rules are a necessary condition for arguments about particular justice (i.e., distributive and commutative justice) to make sense. If one shifts the focus from the distinction between distributive and commutative justice to what the two aspects of particular justice are for, namely, providing criteria to judge the allocation of goods, it becomes clear that the distinction is conceptually unstable. The paper argues that stabilizing the distinction is worthwhile and that this can only be accomplished by the introduction of positive allocation schemes.     

社会权与自由权区别主流理论之批判

积极权利与消极权利之间存在明确而具体的区别,但它不同于社会权与自由权之间的区别。主流人权理论所谓社会权与自由权之间的“义务区别”、“冲突区别”和“效力区别”都是虚构的、错误的。每一项权利都与积极义务和消极义务相联系;相应地,与社会权一样,自由权之间也存在相互冲突;社会权对国家不仅产生政治和道德约束力,也产生与自由权同样的法律约束力,并在一定范围和程度内产生可由司法裁决的法律效力。     

宪法权利本质论、价值论与实践论

宪法权利反映了民族国家的社会政治理想和法治理念 ,它既是一种政治道德权利 ,又是一种针对国家的法律原则性权利。宪法权利既有使权利作为目标和手段的正义化和使社会政治制度秩序化的内在价值 ,也有满足宪法关系主体需要的工具性价值。宪法权利一方面依托宪法进行宏观实践 ;另一方面依托自身的权利构造进行各种具体权利的微观实践。我国的宪法权利反映了宪法权利的基本方面 ,也显示出在上述方面存在的不足     

试论WTO和人权的可协调性

WTO与国际人权规则的关系愈来愈受到国际社会的关注。许多人权规则将直接或者间接影响WTO的运作 ,并为WTO和其规则发展提供指南。这些规则对WTO成员应当有一定的约束力。事实上 ,许多涉及人权 ,特别是经济权的规则已经被WTO规则接受和承认。WTO和人权关系的焦点在于两者之间是否存在着等级或者从属关系 ,即国际人权法是否有高于WTO规则效力的问题。从国际立法角度讲 ,WTO规则和国际人权法均为独立的国际法体系 ,但已经成为国际习惯法的某些人权规则有高于WTO规则的地位。从WTO的宗旨看 ,至少人权中的经济权是WTO追求的最主要目标之一。WTO和人权的关系应当在这些因素的基础上达成协调和统一。     

民间规范与习惯权利

本文以探讨民间规范和习惯权利的内在关系为宗旨:习惯权利是针对法 (国家法 )定权利而言的,它是指一定社区内的社会主体根据包括社会习俗在内的民间规范而享有的自己为或不为、或者对抗 (请求 )他人为或不为一定行为的社会资格。习惯权利的规范载体是民间规范;民间规范的重要规范内容是习惯权利。在民间规范中,对习惯权利的载定既有明示方式的,也有隐含方式的。应当透过民间规范来观察、理解习惯权利。     

The Principle of Universalizability and its Semiosis

The article illustrates the universal nature of lawby phenomenologically considering some legalcategories: legal subject, legal interpretation, legalmeaning, and third person. The starting-point is theuniversalizing nature of some fundamental rules ofpractical discourse, respectively of legal reasoning.Like universalizability, this is a process that can besemiotically explained. Semiosis itself presupposesmediation; besides, it posits that the principle ofuniversalizability has no direct effect. It usesmediators. The instance of `third' as such amediator is clarified in various aspects and levels.This instance refers to impersonality. The positionalcharacteristic of semiosis excludes any participationof subjectiveness. This universalizability is backedup both by the reference itself and by its referenceto law. Relation to law is a relation of likeness. Asa relation it is a predication, i.e. universal. Itrefers to the normative quality of law, which isuniversal, too. Substantially, the co-relations oflikeness are explained like a shifting of legalmeaning from one position of semiosis to another. Themeaning is universal unlike the sense. Through itsmediation the principle of universalizability rulesover the semantic continuity of law, including itsknowledge. Beginning with a universal, through theplay of semiosis, the subject can perceive theuniverse of law.     

论国际人权法对国际刑法的影响

冷战结束后,国际人权法获得了较为广阔的生长空间,国际刑法也进入复兴和快速发展的阶段。国际人权法对国际刑法各个领域的影响都十分明显,从基本原则到具体规则,从实体法到程序法,从刑罚制度设计到刑罚的执行,并努力在保护被害人与保障被告人权利两者之间保持微妙的平衡。然而,透过国际人权法推动国际刑法发展的帷幔,不难发现其背后＂人权＂和＂主权＂之间的紧张博弈：为保护人权,国际人权法引领着国际刑法试图突破国家领土的藩篱进而穿透国家主权的坚硬＂铠甲＂;国家则奋力祭起＂主权＂大旗并诉诸＂司法独立＂的坚固盾牌,抵御某些外部政治实体利用国际刑事司法机构干涉其内政、侵蚀其＂司法独立＂,以最大限度地维护国家利益。     

Negative governmentality through fundamental rights: The far side of the European Convention on Human Rights

This essay analyses those statements that mention legal norms in negative terms. Specifically, it analyses those statements that define a legal system by mentioning how legal protection does not work and where legal protection ends, and those statements that identify what rights‐holders do not have to with their legally protected free capacities. This essay argues that these statements address a systemic question. It calls such a dynamic as negative governmentality. The argument proceeds in four steps. It introduces the concept of negative governmentality by arguing that the idea of freedom requires both the positive affirmation of moral agency and the constraining of moral agency (Section 2 ). It then explores how rights constitute freedom by limiting rights or making exceptions to them (Section 3 ). Later, it analyses how rights‐based norms prevent abuse of rights by holders of rights (Section 4 ). Finally, it sees how rights‐based norms constrain the legal guarantor of rights, i.e., a state (Section 5 ). The essay concludes by mentioning the importance of negative governmentality (Section 6 ).     

Principle,Proceduralism, and Precaution in a Community of Rights

Abstract. This paper presents a sketch of the way in which an ideal‐typical community of rights, Gewirthia, responds to the so‐called “internal problem of authority.” Notwithstanding the deep moral consensus in Gewirthia, where citizens are fully committed to the Principle of Generic Consistency (requiring that agents respect one another’s freedom and basic well‐being), Gewirthians make no claim to “know all the answers.” In consequence, public governance in Gewirthia needs a strategy for dealing with the many kinds of disputes—disputes that relate to matters of both principle and practice—that require authoritative settlement. In this context, having outlined the nature of (and justification for) the procedural strategy that Gewirthia adopts in order to resolve such disputes, we discuss the range of regulatory questions that are potentially moot in Gewirthia, and focus on three hard cases in which the State might argue for a precautionary licence—namely, where there is a dispute about indirect and speculative harm to rights‐holders, about harm to arguable rights‐holders, and about the possible corrosion of the conditions that are essential for the sustainability of a moral community.     

Strong Rights and Disobedience: From Here to Integrity

In Taking Rights Seriously Dworkin claimed that people had strong rights to disobey the law so that the government would be wrong to punish anyone who exercised them. This claim raises fundamental questions about the source of obligation and the limits of legitimacy. These questions of political theory have been given surprisingly little attention by him or his critics. I examine whether strong rights make any sense and conclude that his political theory cannot even generate the minimal prima facie obligation necessary to justify coercion, and hence, law. My solution is to interpret justice in the same way as law. Dworkin resists what I call Justice as Integrity because of concerns about ethical relativism. By considering his more recent works on objectivity and moral truth, I attempt to show that Dworkin's aversion to Moral Constructivism is based on an undue fear of the uncertainty of social practices and an undue faith in the certainty of empirical observation. By reconstructing the interpretive derivations of justice I offer a method to make the idea of obligation, strong rights, and hence, law as integrity, more viable.     

民间文学艺术知识产权正义论

民间文学艺术的知识产权保护受到现代知识产权制度获益最多的发达国家质疑。只有合乎理性和正当性的社会制度才能被广泛地接受,并易被人们遵从和执行。正义是社会制度的首要价值,民间文学艺术必须接受正义价值观的审视。正义具有流变性和恒定性,分配正义和社会正义观从不同的角度为民间文学艺术的知识产权保护提供了理论依据。     

权利冲突的司法化解

法定权利之间的冲突并非一个伪命题,其在司法实践中颇为常见。受到立法者的有限理性、社会的变动性以及法律语言的模糊性等多重因素的影响,某些情形下权利的边界未被立法者清晰界定,并由此引发法定权利之间的冲突。权利冲突的实质是利益冲突和价值冲突。权利冲突的存在导致了法律适用的难题,法官需要借助个案中的法益衡量来确定权利边界并进而化解权利冲突。法官在进行法益衡量时,可以参考权利位阶来作出判断,然而权利位阶秩序缺乏整体确定性,仅有有限的参考价值,因此法益衡量还需诉诸比例原则。比例原则包括适当性原则、必要性原则和狭义的比例原则三项子原则。比例原则能够指引法官对权利作客观和理性的衡量,最大限度地缩小法官的裁量余地。鉴于个案中的法益衡量具有决策性质,法官必须在司法能动主义与司法克制主义之间维持恰当的平衡,在解决权利冲突时不能逾越司法的限度。     

权利位阶论——关于权利冲突化解机制的初步探讨

权利位阶是法律世界的客观现象,反映了权利效力间的高低、强弱或者价值上的轻重关系.权利位阶规则指在直接规定不同权利之间的效力优先顺序为内容的法律规则,依权利位阶规则获得的权利优位是绝对的、确定的.权利位阶规则可分为意定权利位阶规则、法定权利位阶规则.权利位阶原则指以确定权利的价值轻重为内容的法律原则,依权利位阶规则获得物权利优位不是绝对的.确定权利位阶原则的过程是价值判断活动.     

Rights and Resources—Libertarians and the Right to Life

The author addresses Robert Nozick's claim that: “The particular rights over things fill the space of rights, leaving no room for general rights to be in a certain material condition.” Hence Nozick insists that rights are violated if citizens are compelled to contribute to others' welfare, however urgent their needs may be. The author argues that it is characteristic of libertarian theories that they invoke the moral sanctity of private property against welfarist or egalitarian conceptions of social justice. Nozick's version of the libertarian critique has three conceptual pillars–“right,”“thing” and “space.” On that basis Nozick claims that talk of welfare “rights” can be condemned on the plane of rights. This is true, Nozick maintains, even of “the right to life.” The author contends that this argument fails. It equivocates over the idea of “rights”; and it misconceives crucial features of property. Nozick deploys exclusive “domain rights,” whilst attacking “important‐interest rights.” His historical‐entitlement theory fails as a justification of private property. The author argues that, so far as material objects are concerned, private property institutions depend upon trespassory rules which do not impose morally binding obligations unless basic needs are catered for. Furthermore, private property institutions also comprise monetary resources to which the spatial metaphor of exclusive rights does not apply. Holdings vested in any particular person at any particular time are stamped, morally, with a mix of contestable and mutable property‐specific justice reasons. Hence it is fallacious to suppose that ownership rights together exhaust all normative space over “things.” The major objection to speaking of everyone's having a right to various things such as equality of opportunity, life, and so on, and enforcing this right, is that these “rights” require a substructure of things and materials and actions; and other people may have rights and entitlements over these. [≡] The particular rights over things fill the space of rights, leaving no room for general rights to be in a certain material condition. (Nozick 1974, 238)     

环境规制与财产权保障的冲突和协调

环境保护应当协调好环境规制与财产权保障之间的关系。德国《宪法》尽力协调私人财产权的自由保障功能和社会公正功能之间关系的做法值得我们借鉴。在环境规制行动中,要分清对财产使用的负外部性的规制和特殊贡献两种不同情形,贯彻好比例原则和平等原则。     

Legal Rights and Moral Rights: Old Questions and New Problems*

Abstract. The author examines the discipline of moral rights and in particular the need to embed them in a consequential system. He argues that the widely held opinion that independence from consequential evaluation is the right way of guaranteeing individual freedom is based on an inadequate appraisal of the role of moral rights in the social context. In this perspective he examines two specific cases: (1) elementary political and civil rights, and (2) the reproductive rights of women in the context of poor countries with the problem of fast population growth. He argues that a coherent goal-rights system which accommodates rights among others goals, can overcome the non-consequential arguments and justify the force of moral rights fully within a consequentiality perspective.     

Deliberative Democracy and Liberal Rights

Many liberals cannot help distrusting deliberative democracy theory. In their view, the theory offers no sufficient guarantee that the outcomes of democratic deliberation will be respectful of individual interests generating what they conceive as basic moral rights. The purpose of this text is to provide one argument showing that liberal rights are sufficiently protected within deliberative democracy theory. The argument does not rest on the idea of moral rights or material justice. It rests on the conditions of legitimate law deliberative democracy theory presupposes, namely, the conditions that make concrete the idea of legitimacy as "actual public justification."     

制定中国物权法的若干问题

本文对我国自解放以来调整民事关系的法律法规进行了述评 ,指出了现行有关物权法律法规的缺陷 ,提出在我国正在进行的物权立法中坚持对合法财产一体保护原则 ,实行物权变动与原因行为相区分的原则 ,从中国实际出发构建用益物权体系并完善担保物权制度。     

Shaping the Structure of Legal Opportunities: Environmental NGOs Bringing International Environmental Procedural Rights Back Home

Research on legal opportunity structures has focused on how existing law, standing rules, and the costs of litigation shape the likelihood that social movement groups will mobilize the law. Yet there has been relatively little research on how and why legal opportunity structures change over time. This article focuses on a case study of the mobilization of procedural environmental rights contained within the Aarhus Convention. It addresses the following empirical puzzle: how did rights that were designed to help Eastern Europeans achieve environmental democracy eventually contribute to a reshaping of the structure of legal opportunities in Britain? Through a two‐step historical process‐tracing analysis that relies on a social constructivist theoretical approach, this research shows that environmental groups mobilized Aarhus rights in a number of ways and across different judicial venues, resulting in an evolution over time of the meaning of access to justice so that it included being “not prohibitively expensive.” This research builds on previous work to show that civil society agents are not passive agents situated within legal opportunity structures but instead are strategic actors who can develop and shape access to justice through policy entrepreneurialism and litigation.     

Liberalism and Minority Rights. An Interview

The interview focuses on Kymlicka's major area of research, i.e., the issue of minority rights. Kymlicka explains why the rights of national minorities have been traditionally neglected in the Western political tradition. He argues that these rights promote individual freedom, and so should be seen as promoting liberal democratic principles. The interview covers many issues including the relationship between ethno-cultural groups and other forms of "identity politics"; how to individuate cultural groups with legitimate claims to minority rights; whether something like a "cosmopolitan view" can seriously challenge the need for minority rights; what are the dangers of building transnational political institutions such as the EU for democratic citizenship; what are the bases of social unity in multination states and what are the limits of toleration of illiberal minorities.