Positivism,Legal Validity,and the Separation of Law and Morals

The essay discusses the import of the separability thesis both for legal positivism and for contemporary legal practice. First, the place of the separability thesis in legal positivism will be explored, distinguishing between “standard positivism” and “post‐Hartian positivism.” Then I will consider various kinds of relations between law and morality that are worthy of jurisprudential interest, and explore, from a positivist point of view, what kind of relations between law and morality must be rejected, what kind of such relations should be taken into account, and what kind of such relations are indeed of no import at all. The upshot of this analysis consists in highlighting the distinction between two different dimensions of legal validity (formal validity and material validity respectively), and in pointing out that the positivist separability thesis can apply to formal validity only. On the other hand, when the ascertainment of material validity is at stake, some form of moral reasoning may well be involved (here and now, it is necessarily involved). The essay concludes with some brief remarks on the persisting importance of the positivist jurisprudential project.     

The Intensionality behind Legal Concepts and Their Extensional Boundaries: Between Conventionalism and Interpretivism

This article constitutes an attempt to reexamine a crucial issue of legal theory from the perspective of philosophy of language and of social ontology: by analyzing a jurisprudential case recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, we explain how Searle's account on rules in The Construction of Social Reality constitutes an important starting point for the clarification of the old jurisprudential debate between conventionalism and interpretivism. In a nutshell, we show that Searle's framework, while strictly conventionalist, makes it possible to conceive of the distinction between the semantic content of rules (their intended purpose) and their extension, by drawing a parallel with the idea of “deep conventions” (and “essential rules”) as well as with the semantic conventions in natural language. The paper thus touches on the broader problem of the relations between legal concepts and nonlegal values (law and morality).     

Sources of Law Are not Legal Norms

Anglo‐American authors have paid little attention to a subtle distinction that has important jurisprudential implications. It is the distinction between sources of law (e.g., statutes, precedents, customs) and the legal norms which can be derived from sources by means of interpretation. The distinction might also be rendered as a threefold one, separating sources of law from legal norms and both of these from that which mediates their relation, namely, methods of legal interpretation. This paper intends to state the “source‐norm” distinction clearly and to give examples of jurisprudential insights that are missed, and mistakes that may be made if the distinction is not given its due.     

作为实践理性的法律

理性是法理学的永恒主题。现代法理学的理性话语经历了从“理性法”向“法律理性”的转向,这实际上是法理学从理论理性向实践理性的转向。法律与实践理性的关系体现为“法律是实践理性的体现”、“法律是行为的正当理由”、“法律是实践性信息”等命题。同时,作为实践理性的法律也具有客观性,其客观性基础在于实践商谈。     

The Use of Unwritten Legal Principles by Courts*

Abstract. I argue that one can distinguish two types of unwritten legal principles as applied by courts (in Europe). On the one hand, what are called “structural principles,” which are induced, or at least pretended to be induced, from the written law. On the other hand, what are called “ideological principles,” which are not induced from the actual legal system, but refer to current dominant beliefs in society as to morals, politics or other non legal ideologies. It is argued that the distinction between structural legal principles and ideological legal principles could be an important element for the elaboration of a legal principle theory, as both these types of principles meet a different need and play a different role in legal practice. Structural legal principles primarily meet the need for a new ius commune, in order to achieve the coherence and the completeness of the legal system, whereas ideological legal principles, just like the human rights, meet a revived demand for an ethical framework for the law.     

古代法制的生成及其演进逻辑——以事制为中心

中国古代法制在其发展过程中,实际上形成了事制与刑制并驾齐驱的两面:一方面是通过"议事以制"——"制事典"——"令以存事制",编成令典;一方面是历经"不为刑辟"——"正法罪"——"律以正罪名",编成律典。它们是中国古代法的两个重要组成部分。人定规则的生成、成文法的出现、法典编制成功及"诸法合体"格局的突破,是中国古代法生成发展的三个关键节点。而从先秦的"制事典",到中古的"益事律"、"存事制","议事以制"的传统一脉相承,演绎了中国古代法源远流长的另一面。     

法人侵权责任能力的理论预设与制度设计——以法人本质理论为线索

我国民法学界以法人实在说承认法人的独立意志为理由,论证了法人承担侵权责任能力的合理基础,继而对拟制说进行批判,而事实上法人承担侵权责任完全是基于特定利益衡量的立法构造,与其意志的有无没有必然的关联。法人的侵权责任是法人机关的侵权责任,从形式逻辑的角度而言,它与法人的工作人员的侵权责任是有本质区别的,但就立法构造而言二者区分并无实际价值,在法人侵权责任具体承担方式上应该采取让法人机关与法人承担连带责任的方式。     

Visual Jurisprudence of the American Yellow Traffic Light

In the United States, the steady yellow light means that a driver should either speed up or slow down. State laws written about a driver’s behavior at these yellow lights are vague and indeterminate and result in what is referred to as the dilemma zone (Hurwitz et al. in Transp Res Part F Traffic Psychol Behav 15(2): 132–143, 2012). This paper will reconsider law’s vagueness as intentional rather than problematic, insofar as cultural understandings of the yellow light lead to a framework of visual jurisprudence in which drivers interact with law through legal discretion and common sense confronting a yellow light. Through a jurisprudential juxtaposition between the yellow light and red light cameras used to enforce yellow lights, the semiotics of automaticity compete with the semiotics of context-bound decision-making.     

Lochner v. New York and the Challenge of Legal Historiography

This essay reviews three works addressing the famous case Lochner v. New York: David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual Rights Against Progressive Reform (2011); Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers (1992); and Victoria Nourse, “A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights” (2009). The author argues that a comparison of these three works raises historiographic issues relating to legal historians’ deployment of assumptions about the continuity of legal development, the role of key actors or social forces, and the autonomy of legal development in relation to other societal events. Further, the essay argues that there is a tendency toward “law school historiography,” referring to the selection of historiographic approach to suit a preconceived jurisprudential narrative that appears when the subject is the history of legal and, especially, constitutional doctrine.     

Islamic Law,Women's Rights,and Popular Legal Consciousness in Malaysia

Drawing on original survey research, this study examines how lay Muslims in Malaysia understand foundational concepts in Islamic law. The survey finds a substantial disjuncture between popular legal consciousness and core epistemological commitments in Islamic legal theory. In its classic form, Islamic legal theory was marked by its commitment to pluralism and the centrality of human agency in Islamic jurisprudence. Yet in contemporary Malaysia, lay Muslims tend to understand Islamic law as being purely divine, with a single “correct” answer to any given question. The practical implications of these findings are demonstrated through examples of efforts by women's rights activists to reform family law provisions in Malaysia. The examples illustrate how popular misconceptions of Islamic law hinder the efforts of those working to reform family law codes while strengthening the hand of conservative actors wishing to maintain the status quo.     

网络型公用企业竞争的法律规制

规制法治化是网络型公用企业竞争的必要前提,以事业法和反垄断法规制为其主要内容。事业法规制包括市场准入与退出规制、价格规制、互联互通与接入费规制、禁止交叉补贴与普遍服务规制、不对称规制等,其价值取向为涵盖在位生产者、潜在竞争者、交易者和消费者的福利在内的经济效率与社会公平之间的均衡;反垄断法规制包括滥用网络优势行为规制、合并与拆分规制、联合限制竞争规制、行政垄断规制等,其价值取向为“有限竞争自由→适度竞争自由→充分竞争自由”的发展。就法律位阶体系而言,反垄断法应为“基本法律”,而事业法为“非基本法律”,反垄断法应优于事业法。     

“法律人”建构论纲

立足于法学学科基点的设定,必须提炼“法律人”的人学模式。所谓法律人,即参与法律生活的普通民众,他们依存于法律、参与法律及受制于法律。法学体系、法律基础、法律分析及法律发展方面的需要,为法律人模式的构建奠定了坚实基础,而人类行为的常态、法律制度中人的观念的引入及法学流派有关人的模式的竞争,使法律人模式的构建得以可能。至于法律人的具体特性,论文以“拟制人”、“一般人”、“正常人”、“复合人”进行了概括。     

唐以前盗罪之变迁研究

尽管名称不一,但盗罪无疑是古今刑事法律均极为关注的罪名,今人也习惯于以财产性犯罪来理解传统中国的盗罪。然而,在中国文字初创之时,“盗”其实是泛指“不正”“不当”之义的词汇;至战国时代,才被相对明确地用来指称侵犯财产的行为,但其“不正”“不当”之义也并未完全消失。此种日常语义的多层次性也影响到战国秦至汉代的法律对盗罪的设计,使盗罪一方面以非法取财为主旨,另一方面又保留着超越财产性犯罪之概念限定的可能,从而表现出一定的含义复杂性。至魏晋南北朝,立法者们虽试图对盗罪予以分化或净化,但由于“盗”字的日常语义依然具有多层次性,作为法律术语之盗罪的含义复杂性也无法彻底改变并最终遗留在唐律之中。     

The Special Case Thesis. An Assessment of R. Alexy's Discursive Theory of Law

Legal Argumentation Theories seek mainly to develop procedures, criteria and principles which can guarantee a proper justification of legal propositions within modern legal systems. In doing this, those theories solicit in general an interconnection between practical reasoning and legal reasoning. This paper refers mainly to what seems currently to be the most elaborate theory of legal argumentation, that is R. Alexy's Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Although the discussion is mainly concentrated on critical points of R. Alexy's theory, this paper's scope is slightly broader; it attempts to present an overall view of the current discursive theory of law. This is mainly performed through the critical examination of R. Alexy's Special Case Thesis, which seems to raise a handful of counter arguments on behalf of the other proponents of Legal Argumentation. In the first part the special case thesis is presented, as well as the main objections to it. In the second part the validity of the special case thesis is checked against K. Günther's model of practical discourse, which proves to be more elaborate in certain points, when compared with the corresponding model of R. Alexy. In the third part it is shown that the special case thesis can be accepted consistently only if it is combined with a normative theory of law that advocates the interconnection of the concept of law with the idea of right morality. It is further suggested that legal discourse has to be perceived as a special case of a broader moral-political discourse that “explains” or “justifies” (morally) the various restrictions that the positive legal systems impose on the legal discourse.     

Asking the Sovereignty Question in Global Legal Pluralism: From “Weak” Jurisprudence to “Strong” Socio‐Legal Theories of Constitutional Power Operations

The article examines recent theories of legal and constitutional pluralism, especially their adoption of sociological perspectives and criticisms of the concept of sovereignty. The author argues that John Griffiths's original dichotomy of “weak” and “strong” pluralism has to be reassessed because “weak” jurisprudential theories contain useful sociological analyses of the internal differentiation and operations of specific legal orders, their overlapping, parallel validity and collisions in global society. Using the sociological methodology of legal pluralism theories and critically elaborating on Teubner's societal constitutionalism, the author subsequently reformulates the question of sovereignty as a sociological problem of complex power operations communicated through the constitutional state's organization and reconfigured within the global legal and political framework.     

支持理论下民事诉讼当事人法律意识的实证研究

传统研究重视“法的供给”视角,致力于创设“良法良制”。通过转向“对法的需求”视角,本研究基于支持理论和法律意识理论,访谈了142名四类常见民事诉讼案件的当事人。本研究发现,当事人对司法的信赖分为“特定支持”和“普遍支持”两个维度。负面的诉讼经历仅会降低当事人对主审法官(法院)的评价(特定支持),尚未削弱他们对法院系统及司法制度的评价(普遍支持)。此外,当事人可以被进一步分为“门外汉”和“入门者”。前者不信赖法院的根本原因在于其法律意识与司法制度间存在巨大的冲突和矛盾;“入门者”的意识则限定于法律体系内,只在意法官的审判质量。随着司法系统的日渐完善,“入门者”对司法的信赖有望逐步提升。但“门外汉”则需要通过“知情(法)受益”这一过程先转化为“入门者”。     

The Derivational Theory of Legal Interpretation in Polish Legal Theory

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique - The article presents so-called “derivational” theory of legal interpretation and...     

法律认知和法律原则：情感、效率与公平

情感、效率、公平是人们认知活动中惯常的三个进程。对应这三个进程,人们对法律的认知有一些基本的原则。这些认知互动既可能形成社会自发秩序,也可能为法学提供一个基于认知背景的分析框架,有助于法学应对实践问题。“公平主导”的一个简单回答是,面对不同场合,情感、效率、公平三种进程被激活的程度不同。大体上,家庭场合激活情感,工程场合激活效率,市场和法律则更激活公平。在实践中,公平主导的法律原则由于比较接近主流社会认知,所以法律规范在社会中往往可能“自执行”,无需全靠外界监督或者激励。公平原则也有其自身的局限。虽然规范和原则很重要,是社会秩序的母体。但是,公平原则并不能解决所有问题。缺乏制度上的法治,光靠情理法是不足的。所以现代社会形成了规则化解决纠纷的机制,这就是二阶意义上的法律。     

关于近代民法移植问题的一点思考

中国法律的近代化过程是和法律移植密切相关的,而民法近代化主要是通过法律移植方式完成的。在对民法近代化过程的考察中,人们认识到了法律移植在中国民法近代化中的必要性;从中国固有传统法律文化来看,西方法律的移植在中国也存在可行性。     

Legal Hypocrisy

Accusations of hypocrisy in law and politics typically invoke hypocrisy as a personal failing. This locution misses the much more dangerous way laws and legal institutions themselves can be hypocritical. Hypocrisy can be equally revealed when an institution not only deceives another but acts against its avowed values or does not act in ways required by the values professed. Thus, legal actors, institutions, and norms can, in their institutional role, act against the values they avow, displaying legal hypocrisy. By avowing attractive values while acting in ways that undermine those values, laws and legal institutions victimize citizens to achieve goals that could not be openly justified. In doing so, hypocritical laws not only harm their victims but, by obscuring the injury, undermine the victim’s ability to call the law into account. Hypocrisy is important to highlight precisely because it suffocates the voice of its victims. Because hypocrisy takes advantage of a person while only pretending to justify one’s actions, hypocrisy not only harms citizens but treats them with a form of contempt. The vicious irony is that hypocrisy in the law not only harms its “direct victims” but ultimately undermines the very rule of law.