Counter-terrorism and communities: an interview with Robert Lambert

The targeted sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council against individuals and entities suspected of association with terrorism are managed through procedures that infringe fundamental human rights, and there are no mechanisms for actual accountability. With the exception of the ECJ in Kadi, municipal and regional courts tend to consider the UN Security Council's resolutions and domestic measures implementing them outside the scope of judicial review. This article argues that the Security Council is bound to observe human rights even in the context of international security action, and that States are not exonerated from international responsibility for violations committed under the umbrella of Chapter VII resolutions.     

UN sanctions burden sharing: Article 50 of the UN charter and assistance to third states

This article proposes the establishment by the UN Security Council of a system of mutual support for third states whose economies have been adversely affected as a result of UN non-military sanctions. This system consists of several components: (1) creating new markets for the sale of goods and services of third states; (2) crafting of a logical UN sanctions costs methodology; (3) bringing into UN Security Council for a those bilateral and regional efforts involving cases of UN sanctions compensation; (4) devising norms and procedures for acquiring and pooling of the requisite funds out of which states' claims for damages attributable to UN sanctions might be satisfied; and (5) establishing a mechanism for the adjudication of such claims. While many obstacles admittedly exist to creating such a system of mutual support, the article argues that effective UN sanctions burden sharing is nevertheless important to international relations theory and practice, since UN sanctions appear to be increasing in frequency as they undergird many of the Security Council's contemporary enforcement actions.     

UN sanctions burden sharing: Article 50 of the UN charter and assistance to third states

abstract

This article proposes the establishment by the UN Security Council of a system of mutual support for third states whose economies have been adversely affected as a result of UN non‐military sanctions. This system consists of several components: (1) creating new markets for the sale of goods and services of third states; (2) crafting of a logical UN sanctions costs methodology; (3) bringing into UN Security Council for a those bilateral and regional efforts involving cases of UN sanctions compensation; (4) devising norms and procedures for acquiring and pooling of the requisite funds out of which states’ claims for damages attributable to UN sanctions might be satisfied; and (5) establishing a mechanism for the adjudication of such claims. While many obstacles admittedly exist to creating such a system of mutual support, the article argues that effective UN sanctions burden sharing is nevertheless important to international relations theory and practice, since UN sanctions appear to be increasing in frequency as they undergird many of the Security Council's contemporary enforcement actions.     

Attitudes toward Consent-Based and Non-Consent-Based International Law in a Regional Power Context

International legal scholars have identified and argued for and against new forms of non-consent-based international law. We study variation in Brazilian public opinion about adherence to international law created in three different ways: through a consent-based multilateral treaty, by the U.N. Security Council with the participation of Brazil, and by the U.N. Security Council without the participation of Brazil. Information that Brazil has participated in creating the international legal obligation through a multilateral treaty or membership on the Security Council yields levels of support for adherence to the legal obligation that are similar to those found when the origins of the legal obligation are generic. Information that the international legal obligation was created without Brazil’s participation, on the other hand, results in reduced support for compliance. This difference, which is particularly concentrated among highly educated respondents, is not driven by reduced concerns about reputational consequences or sanctions. Our results suggest that the increased use of non-consent-based forms of international law might be challenged by a lack of public support for compliance.     

United Nations sanctions: Lessons of experience

Despite the apparent virtues of UN sanctions in terms of legitimacy and universality, attention in recent years has focused on their questionable achievements and adverse consequences. In particular, the cost of imposing sanctions is unevenly spread, while comprehensive measures harm the civilian population in the target and spare those responsible for the offending policies. This article discusses the merits of UN sanctions in the context of the membership and practice of the Security Council and looks closely at flaws in sanctions programmes and in their administration. Experience suggests careful review of alternative means of pressure as well as reform of existing procedures.     

Notes on contributors

Despite the apparent virtues of UN sanctions in terms of legitimacy and universality, attention in recent years has focused on their questionable achievements and adverse consequences. In particular, the cost of imposing sanctions is unevenly spread, while comprehensive measures harm the civilian population in the target and spare those responsible for the offending policies. This article discusses the merits of UN sanctions in the context of the membership and practice of the Security Council and looks closely at flaws in sanctions programmes and in their administration. Experience suggests careful review of alternative means of pressure as well as reform of existing procedures.     

Are European Union sanctions “targeted”?

The emergence of targeted sanctions in the mid-1990s was due to the humanitarian impact of embargoes, which were deemed unacceptable and compelled senders to shift to measures designed to affect only wrongdoers. Twenty years on, the present paper considers the extent to which autonomous sanctions are designed to affect those individuals and elites responsible for the behaviour the EU aims to condemn. How faithful has the EU remained to this concept in its sanctions policy? The enquiry scrutinizes diverse practices in three established sanctions strands of the EU, development aid suspensions, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) sanctions and Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) withdrawals. It shows that it has been more faithfully implemented in some strands of EU sanctions than in others. Specifically in the flagship CFSP sanctions practice, the due process motivated court challenges of its blacklists have led the EU to modify selection criteria in a way that renders them potentially less targeted.     

The humanitarian responsibilities of the United Nations Security Council: Ensuring the security of the people1

The United Nations Charter confers on the Security Council prime responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Yet these very concepts are undergoing radical change. More than the absence of war, peace has come to mean harmony both within and among nations. It has acquired a dimension far larger than the original State-centred notion of the Charter. Security connotes inclusion, cohesion, and integration - a sense of belonging to a society and a prevailing international order that is predicated on fairness and respect for differences and human dignity. Today, especially given the rise in conflicts of a non-international character, the Council musturgently review the appropriateness of existing instruments and traditional diplomacy. The author calls for better links between the UN, the Security Council, NGOs, and civil-society organisations; and proposes legal and practical mechanisms both to afford better protection to aid workers and to ensure that, when they are applied, sanctions regimes are effective means of placing pressure on those responsible for the abuse of power.     

European security and defence policy: from cologne to sarajevo

This article reviews the development of the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) from its inception at the Cologne European Council Summit in June 1999 until its most immediate challenge, namely, the establishment of a military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina to take over from NATO's SFOR mission at the end of 2004. After a general survey, an analysis of the challenges and trends that confront ESDP in the coming period follows. In particular, issues relating to recognition, governance and post-nationalism are explored.     

Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy

This article seeks to analyze the impact that sanctions have on democracy. We argue that economic sanctions worsen the level of democracy because the economic hardship caused by sanctions can be used as a strategic tool by the targeted regime to consolidate authoritarian rule and weaken the opposition. Furthermore, we argue that economic sanctions create new incentives for the political leadership to restrict political liberties, to undermine the challenge of sanctions as an external threat to their authority. Using time-series cross-national data (1972–2000), the findings show that both the immediate and longer‐term effects of economic sanctions significantly reduce the level of democratic freedoms in the target. The findings also demonstrate that comprehensive economic sanctions have greater negative impact than limited sanctions. These findings suggest that sanctions can create negative externalities by reducing the political rights and civil liberties in the targeted state.     

In Search of a European Dimension in the UN Security Council

Both Belgium and Italy want to give their current mandate in the UN Security Council a European dimension. Yet, the conclusion that they are natural partners in doing so may be premature. Before focussing on Belgian and Italian objectives, the article presents the current state of the ongoing reform processes in Brussels and New York and of EU actorness in the Security Council more generally, as both are critical for estimating the prospects for a stronger European profile. It concludes by discussing the possibilities and constraints that the non-permanent members face within this framework.     

The beginning of a new cold war?

The proactive policies of the United States in expanding NATO, its bombing of Iraq in December 1998, NATO's air war on Yugoslavia in 1999 in which the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was accidentally bombed, and the United States’ new perspectives on the use of force in the global arena have led to increasing resentment and tensions on the part of Russia and the PRC. As Washington is seeking new rationales for the unilateral use of force worldwide, or circumventing the use of sanctions, of the UN Security Council before taking military actions, Russia and China are becoming increasingly convinced that the United States is bent upon establishing its global hegemony. Obviously, neither Russia nor China will let this increasing proactivism go unchallenged.     

Either with us or against us? Third-country alignment with EU sanctions against Russia/Ukraine

Since the mid-1990s, selected neighbours have in impressive numbers aligned with European Union (EU) foreign policy sanctions. However, much more than for any other sanctions case, neighbours have declined joining recent measures against Russia/Ukraine. This article uses freshly gathered data from the entire period of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to analyse how the practice of alignment influences international relations in Europe. Thereby, the article demonstrates that: (1) sanctions are not a two-party game, but an instrument that impacts broadly on relations with third countries; (2) alignment with sanctions not only articulates similarity, but contributes to normative polarization in wider Europe; (3) for a high-salience case such as Russia sanctions, neighbours are reluctant to be instrumentalized for EU foreign policy purposes.     

Diplomacy at the United Nations: The dual agenda of the 1992 security council summit

The Security Council summit meeting of 31 January 1992 was supposed to be a momentous event that would determine the course of the world body and international peace and security in the post-Cold War era. Despite high expectations, though, the actual meeting did not produce much more than a broadly-phrased declaration of good intentions. The article examines the hypothesis that the meeting had a dual agenda, with a hidden as well as a public part. It is argued that the main item on the hidden agenda was the confirmation, beyond any doubt or potential challenge, of Russia as the rightful successor to the USSR permanent seat on the Security Council. This suited well the weakened major remnant of the former Soviet Union as well as the other permanent members of the Security Council, especially the UK and France, who had good reasons to want to defer indefinitely any reexamination of the Council's composition and powers.     

Diplomacy at the United Nations: The dual agenda of the 1992 security council summit

The Security Council summit meeting of 31 January 1992 was supposed to be a momentous event that would determine the course of the world body and international peace and security in the post‐Cold War era. Despite high expectations, though, the actual meeting did not produce much more than a broadly‐phrased declaration of good intentions. The article examines the hypothesis that the meeting had a dual agenda, with a hidden as well as a public part. It is argued that the main item on the hidden agenda was the confirmation, beyond any doubt or potential challenge, of Russia as the rightful successor to the USSR permanent seat on the Security Council. This suited well the weakened major remnant of the former Soviet Union as well as the other permanent members of the Security Council, especially the UK and France, who had good reasons to want to defer indefinitely any reexamination of the Council's composition and powers.     

External networks and institutional idiosyncrasies: the Common Security and Defence Policy and UNSCR 1325 on women,peace and security

In 2008, the Council of the European Union (EU) adopted a ‘Comprehensive Approach’ that outlines a strategy for securing gender mainstreaming; two years later, the Council introduced a set of indicators to assess its implementation. The EU was responding to the United Nations Security Council’s call for regional institutions to assist in implementing Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, adopted on 31 October 2000, concerning ‘women, peace and security’. This resolution sought to meet the ‘urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations’. Considering that prior exposure to gender issues, resources and well-established relations with civil society and gender advocates are lacking, the adoption of both the Comprehensive Approach and the indicators, as well as the structures and procedures established since then as part of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, requires some explanation. This article draws on feminist institutionalist approaches to argue that the impetus for change came from individuals and groups within the EU who were involved in external networks, both above and below the supranational level, who seized on institutional idiosyncrasies that also shaped the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in important ways.     

‘Walking the tightrope’: The Kosovo conflict and Russia in European security, 1998–August 1999

This article argues that Russia has pursued a policy of inclusive multipolarity towards European security after Primakov's appointment as Foreign Minister in 1996. This policy focused on three dimensions to constrain NATO and ensure a Russian voice in Europe. First, ties with NATO; second, the pursuit of OSCE reform and a European ‘Security Charter'; third, the primacy of the UN Security Council in international affairs. NATO actions in the Kosovo crisis deeply undermined all dimensions of this policy. However, inclusive multipolarity was not discarded by the Russian leadership. The tortuous path of Russian accommodation after May 1999 highlighted Russian attempts to reinstate this policy and restore a Russian voice in European security affairs — with limited success. This article examines the evolution of Russian shifts in this crisis until Vladimir Putin's appointment as Prime Minister in August 1999.     

Between European and national role conceptions – the EU3 initiative regarding the Iranian Nuclear Programme

This paper addresses whether Germany, France and the UK (the EU3) – with the EU in the background – can shape their own approach to a common Europeanised position or even a European role conception regarding the Iranian Nuclear Programme. As the EU3 initiative appears situated between Europeanisation and national role conceptions, it seems that the EU3 members – after a coherent start – were finally inclined to readapt themselves to certain of their national role conceptions, resulting in a “mix” of national and European role patterns in the process leading up to 2016. Currently, this mix hints at still-prevailing hindrances involved in genuine European conflict management, although this outcome holds the promise of greater European coherence in the future.

Abbreviations: E3: Germany, France and UK (without formal support of the EU); EU: European Union; EU3: Germany, France, UK and the “High Representative for the Common Security and Foreign Policy of the European Union”; EU3?+?3: official designation of the contact group concerning the Iranian Nuclear Programme, consisting of the EU3, the USA, Russia and China; IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency; P5?+?1: informal designation of the contact group concerning the Iranian Nuclear Programme, consisting of the EU3, the USA, Russia and China (Permanent Security Council Members [P5] plus Germany); UK: United Kingdom; UNs: United Nations; UNSR: Security Council of the United Nations     

United Nations Security Council Reform Revisited: A Proposal

The United Nations [UN] came into being following the Second World War. Resembling earlier efforts of co-operation by the most powerful states of the international system, it was an attempt to effect global governance through the maintenance of international peace and security amongst states. However, led by its main executive organ, the Security Council, the UN has been unable to prevent and effectively deal with armed conflicts and mass atrocities in a number of situations. Over the years, the inability of the UN Security Council to take collective action has resulted in its ineffectiveness in dealing with war and humanitarian crises. This situation has led to calls for Security Council reform and has generated several initiatives to that end. This analysis discusses major shortcomings of the Security Council, analyses prominent reform initiatives, and introduces a proposal, the “Two-Layered Regional Model,” for Security Council reform.     

The Zimbabwe Issue in Sino-U.S. Ties

The United States has criticized the domestic and foreign policies of the Mugabe regime, and has attempted to raise the Zimbabwe issue in the UN Security Council, thus creating a point of potential conflict in Sino-U.S. relations.China differs from the United States on this issue not because of the measures taken by the Western countries such as economic sanctions and political pressure, but,more significantly, because of the Western conception of democracy and human rights, and the difference between the U.S. and Chinese strategies in Africa. The policies of China and the United States on the Zimbabwe issue can be interpreted as a struggle between two powers in Africa. In the short term, however, it is the Middle East that will continue to preoccupy U.S. foreign policy, and Zimbabwe will not become a major flash point in Sino-U.S. relations.