Is a Plea Really a Bargain? An Empirical Study of Six Cities in China

There is a belief in the criminal justice system that it is better to take a plea offer to avoid uncertain consequences than risk going to trial. Prior studies using the data in Anglo-American courts have suggested that many legal and extralegal factors influence the decision of a guilty plea versus trial. China developed its own plea-bargaining system in 2016. Using 6826 DUI cases adjudicated in six cities, this study examines what factors affect the decision of a guilty plea and whether the guilty plea brings true benefits in Chinese courts. The results show that more serious crimes and more dangerous defendants were less likely to be disposed of through guilty pleas (as opposed to going to trial). One possible explanation is that prosecutors may make more punitive offers in these cases, which in turn discourages defendants from accepting them. In addition, using a propensity score weighting technique to control for potential confounding variables, this study finds that defendants who pleaded guilty were more likely to receive favorable case outcomes regarding pretrial detention and probation decision, which supports the argument that a guilty plea could help a defendant to avoid the “trial penalty” in Chinese criminal justice system.

     

Is Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of the Trial” a Mirage?

It has been well established that a ??plea discount?? or ??trial penalty?? exists, such that defendants who plead guilty receive significant sentencing discounts relative to what they would receive if convicted at trial. Theorists argue that the exact value of this plea discount is determined by bargaining ??in the shadow of a trial,?? meaning that plea decision-making is premised on the perceived probable outcome of a trial. In trials, the strength of the evidence against defendants greatly impacts the probability of conviction. In the present study, we estimate the probability of conviction at the individual level for those who pled guilty. We find that, contrary to the shadow of the trial model, evidentiary factors either do not impact or negatively impact the probability of conviction, which stands in stark contrast to the impact evidence has at trials. These findings suggest that plea bargain decision-making may not occur in the shadow of the trial.     

Limitations on the ability to negotiate justice: attorney perspectives on guilt,innocence, and legal advice in the current plea system

In the American criminal justice system the vast majority of criminal convictions occur as the result of guilty pleas, often made as a result of plea bargains, rather than jury trials. The incentives offered in exchange for guilty pleas mean that both innocent and guilty defendants plead guilty. We investigate the role of attorneys in this context, through interviews with criminal defense attorneys. We examine defense attorney perspectives on the extent to which innocent defendants are (and should be) pleading guilty in the current legal framework and investigate their views of their own role in this complex system. We also use a hypothetical case to probe the ways in which defense attorneys consider guilt or innocence when providing advice on pleas. Results indicate that attorney advice is influenced by guilt or innocence, but also that attorneys are limited in the extent to which they can negotiate justice for their clients in a system in which uncertainty and large discrepancies between outcomes of guilty pleas and conviction at trial can make it a sensible option to plead guilty even when innocent. Results also suggest conflicting opinions over the role of the attorney in the plea-bargaining process.     

Effects of Individual Characteristics on Plea Negotiations Under Sentencing Guidelines

ABSTRACT

Research conducted on the decision points between arrest and sentencing is scarce. There is a need for research to examine processing decisions. This research attempts to fill in the gap of knowledge about case processing decisions by focusing on plea negotiations; specifically, the examination of the effect of individual characteristics on the prosecutor's plea bargaining decisions in a sentencing guideline state by using two dependent variables (negotiated plea vs. a non-negotiated plea and a three category dependent variable simultaneously analyzing negotiated pleas, non-negotiated pleas, and bench or jury trials). The results indicate that race/ethnicity, sex, and age of the offender did not predict the likelihood of receiving a negotiated guilty plea. Using multinomial logistic regression, it was discovered that demographic characteristics were predictors of the decision to negotiate a guilty plea compared to the bench/jury trial conviction. Black offenders were more likely than white offenders to have their case go to trial rather than straight pleading or negotiating a guilty plea.     

有罪答辩与量刑减让

被告人的有罪答辩对其获得的量刑减让有着重要的作用和影响。在英美等国 ,有罪答辩是量刑减让的正当依据 ,但有罪答辩与量刑减让之间并不存在必然的因果关系 ,法官对被告人施以的量刑减让以及减让的程度 ,还需考虑犯罪的性质、被告人的基本情况等其他因素。同时 ,量刑减让制度对于被告人有罪答辩的作出又存在反作用。被告人有罪答辩的作出来自于律师、检察官和法官传递的量刑减让的信息 ,在英美等国 ,法官对量刑减让信息的披露是受到严格限制的。我国传统意义上的坦白属于被控人的一项法定义务 ,具有实体意义 ,不同于有罪答辩 ,故坦白从宽政策不具有正当性。与此同时 ,我国简易程序中对有罪答辩的量刑减让则具有正当性 ,但减让的实施较英美等国有较大的限制。     

Direct and Indirect Effects of Case Complexity, Guilty Pleas, and Offender Characteristics on Sentencing for Offenders Convicted of a White-Collar Offense Prior to Sentencing Guidelines

Previous research on the punishment of offenders convicted of a white-collar offense estimated models that specify only direct effects of defendant characteristics, offense-related variables, and guilty pleas on sentence severity. Drawing from conflict or labeling theories, much of this research focused on the effects of offender's socioeconomic status on sentence outcomes. Findings from this research are inconsistent about the relationship between defendant characteristics and sentence severity. These studies overlook how differences in case complexity of white-collar offense and guilty pleas may intervene in the relationship between offender characteristics and sentence outcomes. This study seeks to contribute to an understanding of federal sentencing prior to the federal sentencing guidelines by testing a legal-bureaucratic theory of sentencing that hypothesizes an interplay between case complexity, guilty pleas and length of imprisonment. This interplay reflects the interface between the legal ramifications of pleading guilty, prosecutorial interests in efficiency and finality of case disposition in complex white-collar cases, and sentence severity. Using structural equation modeling, a four-equation model of sentencing that specifies case complexity and guilty pleas as intervening variables in the relationship between offender characteristics and length of imprisonment is estimated. Several findings are noteworthy. First, the hypothesized interplay between case complexity, guilty pleas, and sentence severity is supported. Second, the effect of offender's educational attainment on sentence severity is indirect via case complexity and guilty pleas. Third, offender's race and gender effect length of imprisonment both directly and indirectly through the intervening effect of case complexity and guilty pleas. These findings indicate the need to specify sentencing models that consider the direct and indirect effects of offender characteristics, offense characteristics, and guilty pleas on judicial discretion at sentencing.     

Certainty of punishment and sentence mitigation in plea behavior

Mitigation of sentence severity has been cited as a primary factor underlying defendant decisions to plead guilty. It has been studied extensively and it has been assumed, but rarely examined, that few defendants plead guilty in the absence of significant benefits. This paper examines the relationship between sentence benefits and plea behavior. A crime-specific analysis reveals that some defendants frequently plead guilty in the relative absence of significant benefits; conversely, others plead not guilty even though significant benefits are available for guilty pleaders. Applying several decision theory constructs to justice system processing, the defendant's desire to reduce uncertainty is discussed and offered as a tentative explanation for the phenomenon of pleading guilty in the relative absence of significant benefits.     

To Waive or Not to Waive: The Right to Trial and Plea Bargaining

Criminal defendants in many countries are faced with a dilemma: If they waive their right to trial and plead guilty, they typically receive charge or sentence reductions in exchange for having done so. If they exercise their right to trial and are found guilty, they often receive stiffer sanctions than if they had pled guilty. I characterize the former as ‘waiver rewards’ and the latter as ‘non-waiver penalties.’ After clarifying the two and considering the relation between them, I briefly explicate the grounds for a moral right to trial. I then assess the defensibility of such rewards and penalties. In addition to considering whether waiver rewards and non-waiver penalties serve the aims of legal punishment, I address the three main arguments for permitting them. The first suggests that defendants willing to plead display more remorse for their crimes and thus are deserving of lighter sentences. The second defends waiver rewards and non-waiver penalties in cases where prosecutors are alleged to know that defendants are guilty but face problems establishing their guilt at trial. The third holds that guilty defendants who are willing to plead conserve scarce state resources and should be rewarded for it, whereas those unwilling to plead squander such resources and should be penalized accordingly. I contend that none of these arguments provides persuasive grounds for waiver rewards or non-waiver penalties, even on the assumption that we can distinguish those defendants who should waive their right to trial from those who should not. This conclusion presents a fundamental challenge to contemporary plea bargaining practices.

In defense of criminal defense expenditures and plea bargaining

Given the continuing controversy over defendants' buying justice through defense expenditures, this paper shows that disparities in criminal defense expenditures can insure that it is the guilty and not the innocent who will be punished. Our model allows defense and prosecution expenditures to be simultaneously determined. We show that criminal defense expenditures result in lower expected penalties for the innocent at trial and that they helo ensure that plea bargaining efficiently screens defendants even when differential risk aversion is present. Finally, we examine how differences in defendant's wealth and the use of public defenders affect the legal system's ability to differentiate the innocent from the guilty.     

Plea Discounts or Trial Penalties? Making Sense of the Trial-Plea Sentence Disparities

Abstract

There is a consensus that defendants who plead guilty generally receive less harsh sentences than similarly-situated defendants convicted at trial. However, there is less consensus on how to characterize this disparity in the sentence. Some researchers refer to the disparities as “trial penalties,” whereas others refer to them as “plea discounts.” We contend that the two terms have different theoretical backgrounds and underlying assumptions. As a result, the theories require different modeling strategies, and can lead to different predictions on the relationship between the disparity and some key case characteristics.

We start by differentiating the two perspectives theoretically. We then present an empirical analysis on defendants in New York State to substantiate our theoretical arguments. We demonstrate that the estimates of the trial-plea disparities depend on the assumption of the default, as estimates of the trial penalties differed considerably from the estimates of the plea discounts.     

AN EXPLICIT TEST OF PLEA BARGAINING IN THE “SHADOW OF THE TRIAL”

Bargaining in the “shadow of the trial,” which hinges on the expectations of trial outcomes, is the primary theory used by noncriminologists to explain variation in the plea discount given to defendants who plead guilty. This study develops a formal mathematical representation of the theory and then presents an empirical test of the theory using an innovative online survey with responses to a hypothetical case from 1,585 prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. The key outcomes are the probability that the defendant will be convicted at trial, the sentence for the defendant if convicted, and the best plea that the respondent would accept or offer. Variation in the outcomes is created through experimental variation in the information presented to the respondents. Structural regression models are estimated to fit the formal theoretical models, and the instrumental variables method is used to correct for measurement error in the estimate for probability of conviction. The data support the basic shadow model, with minor modifications, for only prosecutors and defense attorneys. Controlling for the characteristics of the individual actors and their jurisdictions adds explanatory value to the model, although these control variables did not affect the key coefficients from the shadow model.     

Guilty plea hearings and judicial supervision: Some differences between federal and state judges regarding Rule 11 and a defendant’s right to due process

Samples of 120 district court judges from six randomly selected circuit court jurisdictions were compared with 62 circuit and criminal court judges in Tennessee concerning their compliance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (U.S.C.A., 1986) governing guilty plea hearings. Among other things, Rule 11 provides that judges will inquire of defendants in open court about the voluntariness of their guilty pleas, whether they understand that they are waiving several important constitutional rights, whether there is a factual basis for the guilty plea, whether they realize they have a right to an attorney, and whether they understand the nature and consequences of the charges against them. It was found that federal judges are substantially in compliance with these provisions of Rule 11, although full compliance was not observed for all issue areas. By comparison, Tennessee trial judges adhered to these provisions (duplicated in the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure verbatim) much less frequently. Various reasons for these discrepancies are discussed, as are some implications for defendant’s access to due process and certain constitutional guarantees.     

Guilt Shall Not Escape or Innocence Suffer? The Limits of Plea Bargaining When Defendant Guilt is Uncertain

This article examines optimal prosecutor behavior with respectto plea bargaining when defendant guilt is uncertain. I showthat when jury beliefs and behavior are determined endogenouslyin equilibrium along with defendant and prosecutor behavior,plea bargaining can play only a limited role in managing society'sconflicting desires to maximize punishment of the guilty andminimize punishment of the falsely accused. In particular, whileit can be optimal for prosecutors to use plea bargaining toinduce a large fraction of guilty defendants to voluntarilysort themselves from the innocent, such sorting must come atthe cost of imposing relatively short sentences on such guiltydefendants who accept plea bargains.     

An aggregate-level examination of the caseload pressure hypothesis

The idea that guilty pleas may be encouraged by time-conscious attorneys to process court caseloads expediently implies that some defendants may be influenced to forego their constitutional right to trial. If true, these defendants may be denied an adequate determination of legal guilt. Building on previous research, this paper presents a more thorough aggregate level test of the caseload pressure hypothesis than has previously been offered. Controlling for variation in structural and procedural characteristics across 101 Illinois circuit courts, this study supports the idea that felony caseload pressures significantly covary with felony guilty plea rates. Also, this relationship was stable between 1973 and 1984.     

Whither the Prosecutor? Prosecutor and County Effects on Guilty Plea Outcomes in Wisconsin

Abstract

By most accounts, the prosecutor is the most powerful person in the courtroom, with discretion to dismiss cases, reduce charges, and offer noncustodial sentences in exchange for guilty pleas. Yet, little is known about the effects of individual prosecutors or community contexts on case outcomes. Relying on data from 318,000 felony and misdemeanor cases in Wisconsin, the present study examines the impact of several prosecutor and county characteristics on case dismissal, guilty plea to lesser charges, and the imposition of a noncustodial sentence following a guilty plea. The authors find that prosecutor caseload composition is associated with variations in guilty plea outcomes, but that neither prosecutor experience nor prosecutor caseload pressure affect other case outcomes. The authors also find that defense counsel and change in defense counsel exert significant influence on guilty plea outcomes. These findings are discussed in relation to focal concerns and courtroom communities perspectives.     

The Time Penalty: Examining the Relationship Between Time to Conviction and Trial vs. Plea Disparities in Sentencing

Although studies of sentencing routinely find that defendants who plead guilty receive relatively lenient sentences compared with similarly situated defendants convicted by trial, we have yet to fully understand the role of “mode of conviction” in the sentencing process. In particular, we know little about how the size of the disparity between guilty pleas and trial convictions may depend upon time in case processing, or the timing of pleas; that is, when during the process defendants plead guilty. This is a considerable issue, as “time” often is central to explanations given for plea-trial disparities. The current study examines this central, yet seldom empirically captured, dimension of the sentencing process. Using information gathered in an ancillary data collection effort operated under the supervision of the American Terrorism Study, we differentiate between the mode of conviction and time to conviction and explore the role of “time” in sentence severity, especially with regard to the plea-trial disparity. While consisting of defendants identified in connection with terrorism investigations, and sentenced in federal courts, our study takes advantages of a unique opportunity to isolate the effects of time from the mode of disposition and to explore time correlates of sentencing outcomes. In doing so, we raise important questions about the multiple ways in which time and mode of conviction may affect sentencing more generally and contribute to the larger theoretical discussions of how punishment decisions are made.     

Convicting and sentencing differences among black,Hispanic, and white males in six localities

The many studies examining differences in convicting and sentencing black, Hispanic, and white defendants have not led to solid generalizations about the treatment of these defendants because the studies have been done at different times and with different methodologies. This study examines differences in convicting and sentencing male defendants in six localities, at the same time and with the same methodology. It concludes that discrimination is directed against blacks and is manifested in incarceration rates. The exact source of this discrimination is not identical in all cities. In some, it seems to occur because whites get better plea bargains than blacks; in others, it is due to the different rates of guilty pleas by black and whites. Overall, there is less evidence of discrimination in cases where a trial is held than in those where a guilty plea is entered.     

Plea decision-making: the influence of attorney expertise,trustworthiness, and recommendation

ABSTRACT

Attorney recommendations influence defendant plea decisions; and the degree of influence likely rests on the perceived trustworthiness and level of expertise of the attorney (factors of source credibility). We explored attorney source credibility factors and how these characteristics influence defendants’ plea decision-making. MTurk participants read a hypothetical plea scenario and were asked to imagine themselves as the defendant in a DWI/DUI case making a plea decision; in the scenario, we manipulated the defense attorney’s level of trustworthiness, expertise, and plea recommendation. There was a significant interaction between attorney recommendation and trustworthiness on defendants’ plea decisions; participants who were advised to accept the guilty plea were more likely to plead guilty when the attorney was high in trustworthiness compared to low in trustworthiness. Attorney trustworthiness did not affect plea decisions for defendants advised to reject the guilty plea. Importantly, attorney trustworthiness affected defendants’ decision to follow the attorney’s recommendation and ultimate plea decision (regardless of expertise), and attorney expertise affected defendants’ confidence in their decision (regardless of trustworthiness). Results suggest individual-level characteristics of defense attorneys affect the influence of the attorney and their recommendation, and ultimately defendants’ plea decision-making.     

No Job Too Small: Justice Without Bargaining in the lower Criminal Courts

Plea bargaining and other informal disposition devices dominate case processing in the lower criminal courts. Consistently, studies have found such courts characterized by assembly-line procedures, deemphasis or disregard of formal due process rights, and guilty plea rates approaching 100% of all convictions. Caseload pressures, tendencies toward cooperation among courtroom participants and, above all, process costs of litigation that greatly outweigh the stakes in minor cases are widely thought to render informality and high guilty plea rates inevitable.
The study reported here challenges these assumptions. The author finds that in Philadelphia roughly one-fifth of all misdemeanor dispositions and one-half of all determinations of guilt are the result of genuine adversarial trials. He shows that an adversarial trial system need not impose prohibitive resource costs, even when extended to misdemeanor cases involving little likelihood of imprisonment, and that process costs will not deter defendants from invoking formal procedures when the court culture is committed to providing trials. Finally, the author argues that even routine misdemeanor cases benefit from guarantees of fairness and accuracy afforded by trial but unattainable when cases are processed by plea bargaining.     

Plea bargaining: An organizational perspective

A microlevel analysis of factors affecting the decision to plead guilty in felony trial courts in Chicago in 1972 and 1973 is presented. The court system is viewed from an organizational perspective, and guilty pleas are analyzed in light of the court's overall design for disposing of its workload. Operational definitions of the concepts introduced are presented, and multiple regression is used to analyze some of the hypothesized relationships. The implications of the findings, from an organizational perspective and for some of the issues of plea bargaining, are discussed.