Foreign Policy in Transition? Human Rights, Democracy, and U.S. Arms Exports

During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was dominated by the strategic goal to contain Communism. Human rights and democracy were of secondary importance. In the post-Cold War period, the promotion of human rights and democracy as foreign policy concerns rose in prominence. In the spirit of Andrew Pierre, who once characterized arms transfers as "foreign policy writ large ," this study questions whether the transfer of U.S. arms mirrors America's foreign policy goals. To what extent do U.S. arms transfers reflect a concern for human rights and democracy? As a foreign policy instrument, do U.S. arms transfer patterns mark a transition between Cold War and post-Cold War worlds? To address these questions, I examine the empirical linkage between U.S. foreign policy goals and arms export agreements with developing countries for the years 1981–2002. I use a two-stage model to evaluate the decision-making process. The first-stage addresses whether a country is eligible to receive U.S. arms. If a country successfully passes through the selection stage, it progresses to the second stage where a decision is made about the amount of arms transferred. I use a Heckman model to estimate empirically the determinants of arms at both the initial selection stage and the subsequent amount stage. The findings indicate that during the Cold War years, human rights were not a significant determinant of arms transfers—although democracy was positively linked to U.S. arms in the selection stage. In the post-Cold War period, both human rights and democracy had a meaningful impact in determining the eligibility of a country to receive arms.     

The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation

The role and range of activities of ethnic interest groups in U.S. foreign policy has received relatively little scholarly attention, though in the wake of the Cold War analysis of their activities has increased. The case of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) during the 1980s suggests, however, that ethnic interest group activity is not new and may be far more complex than our standard conceptualizations allow. We review the literature on the role of ethnic interest groups in U.S. foreign policy and assemble some common assumptions and arguments about their origins, roles and relations with the government, and the conditions that favor their success. Then we examine origins of CANF, its web of relationships with government even during the Cold War, and its role as a near co-executor of policy. We conclude by assessing what the CANF case suggests about standard views of the roles of at least some ethnic interest groups in the process of making U.S. foreign policy, including the need to see how the state may try to use and sponsor such groups to further its policy goals.     

U.S. Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: Building Strong Relationships by Doing It Right!

Foreign aid policies cannot be more successful than their implementation, which inherently involves people and institutions. But people have their own interests and cultural frameworks, and institutions are inevitably grounded in culture and politics. Inattention to the agendas of individuals involved on both sides of foreign aid to Central and Eastern Europe played a major role in its shortcomings. A recent court decision holding two Harvard university scholars guilty of defrauding the U.S. government while running a flagship project to reform the Russian economy underscores the pitfalls in outsourcing traditional functions of government to small, well-connected groups that are not fully accountable in serving the public interest. Drawing on the author's experience studying informal systems and networks over several decades, this article illuminates the importance of foreign policy and aid relationships—how they are set up, who wins and who loses, and how their lack of accountability can contribute to the derailment of nation-building and constructive relations among countries.     

Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in U.S. Foreign Policy

How should we explain the recent unilateralist turn in U.S. foreign policy? Some accounts treat growing American unilateralism as a passing aberration attributable to the neoconservative ideology of the Bush administration. This paper, by contrast, traces U.S. unilateralism to the structural effects, at home and abroad, of the end of the Cold War. Internationally, the removal of the Soviet threat has undermined the "institutional bargain" that once guided relations between the U.S. and its major allies. Absent Cold War imperatives, the U.S. is less willing to provide collective goods through strong international institutions and other states are less likely to defer to U.S. demands for special privileges that exempt the U.S. from normal multilateral constraints. Domestically, the end of the Cold War has weakened the ability of presidents to resist the appeals of powerful veto players whose interests are threatened by multilateral commitments. These factors suggest that American unilateralism may have deeper roots and more staying power than many expect.     

俄罗斯外交传统与冷战后俄外交政策的特点

俄罗斯独立以来的外交政策在继承了其外交传统的同时，又具有自身的某些特点，它们反映了世纪之交在俄罗斯国内和国际舞台上所发生的一系列根本变革。根据外界形势的变化和本国利益的具体驱动，俄罗斯外交的行动准则几经调整。冷战后俄罗斯外交有三个突出特点，即全方位的平衡外交、维护国家利益的务实外交、确保大国地位的积极外交。     

俄罗斯对外政策中的地缘经济因素

后冷战时期，俄罗斯地缘政治潜力下降，促使其对外政策中地缘经济战略凸现。地缘经济战略中的能源外交成为俄对外政策的重点。俄地缘经济战略的实施使其经济从解体后的萧条中复苏，但其也存在着不可忽视的变数。随着世界政治经济格局的变化，俄对外政策中地缘政治与地缘经济因素互动着，这成为后冷战时期俄罗斯对外政策的特点。     

Bridging the Realist/Constructivist Divide: The Case of the Counterrevolution in Soviet Foreign Policy at the End of the Cold War

The surprising end of the Cold War has led to a debate within international relations (IR) theory. Constructivists have argued that the end of the Cold War is best explained in terms of ideas and agency—specifically Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev's new thinking. A few realists have countered that Soviet material decline was "endogenous" to the new ideas. Can these two theoretical perspectives be reconciled with respect to this case? They can be partially integrated with a path-dependent strategy that places an emphasis on "institutions." Nevertheless, explaining the end of the Cold War largely requires a theory of Soviet foreign policy and its relation to the state. As a former or ossified revolutionary state, Soviet foreign policy for at least several years was largely based on the principle of externalization: outside threats were used to rationalize radical centralization, repression, and the dominance of the Party. In using the USSR's institutionalized legacy as a revolutionary state, Gorbachev acted as a counterrevolutionary and reversed this process with his revolution in foreign policy. In creating a new peaceful international order, he sought—through the "second image reversed"—to promote radical decentralization, liberalization, and the emergence of a new coalition. The case examines how Gorbachev's domestic goals drove his foreign policy from 1985 to 1991.     

Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967-1970

The military coup of 21 April 1967 brought to power a repressive dictatorship in Greece. It proceeded to deprive Greeks of their human rights and civil liberties, outraged international public opinion and strained transatlantic relations during the Cold War. The “Greek case” culminated in the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe and calls for its expulsion from NATO. This article will analyse the foreign policy considerations that determined British policy towards the Greek junta during 1967—such as Cold War realities, alliance dynamics, economic and commercial imperatives, regional instability in the Mediterranean and domestic pressures. It will look at how these factors coalesced into shaping British policy towards the Greek junta into one in which human rights had little bearing. The article will also consider the impact of the “Greek case” on the image and credibility of the Labour government of 1966-1970 and explain why vociferous anti-junta activities in London were to create such policy difficulties for the British government.     

Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967–1970

The military coup of 21 April 1967 brought to power a repressive dictatorship in Greece. It proceeded to deprive Greeks of their human rights and civil liberties, outraged international public opinion and strained transatlantic relations during the Cold War. The “Greek case” culminated in the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe and calls for its expulsion from NATO. This article will analyse the foreign policy considerations that determined British policy towards the Greek junta during 1967—such as Cold War realities, alliance dynamics, economic and commercial imperatives, regional instability in the Mediterranean and domestic pressures. It will look at how these factors coalesced into shaping British policy towards the Greek junta into one in which human rights had little bearing. The article will also consider the impact of the “Greek case” on the image and credibility of the Labour government of 1966–1970 and explain why vociferous anti-junta activities in London were to create such policy difficulties for the British government.     

新形势下中国对朝外交政策的调整

冷战结束后,中朝关系逐渐向以国家利益为导向的"正常的国家关系"转变。2010年以来朝鲜半岛发生的多次争议事件导致局势不稳加剧,中国对朝鲜半岛外交及中朝双边关系面临微妙形势。分析当前中国对朝外交新形势,应以国家利益为出发点,调整对朝政策:承担必要责任,摆脱被动牵制;撬动对朝"杠杆",发挥主动影响;遵循务实原则,谋求国家利益;理解对方关切,保持传统友谊,从而实现中朝关系长远而健康的发展。     

The Foreign Policy Beliefs of Political Campaign Contributors

Since the Vietnam War, scholarly interest in public and elite opinion of U.S. foreign policy has grown. Because elites generally have greater access to policy makers and more consistent political views, most work on this topic has focused on elite opinions of foreign policy. Most research has defined the term elite broadly, often placing more emphasis on social status than political power. We will reexamine elite foreign policy beliefs using a different elite, presidential campaign contributors. We have two main goals in this article. First, we will assess the differences between the foreign policy outlooks of political campaign contributors and other elites. While many types of elites may influence policy, political contributors are particularly likely to gain access to policy makers. The second part of this research note offers some food for thought on the origins of these beliefs. We present evidence that foreign policy beliefs are related to the same ideological orientations that shape contributors' views on domestic issues. The origins of foreign and domestic policy views should probably be considered together.     

关于越战期间美国老挝政策的国外成果研究综述

冷战初期，老挝本不是美国东南亚政策的重点问题，但随着越南战争的爆发，美国对老挝的重视程度逐步加深，直至派出地面部队进行干涉。这一问题值得深思。国外针对该领域的研究已硕果累累，但国内的相关研究才刚刚起步。对国外相关研究成果的整理和推介，应有助于推动国内学者在该领域的研究取得更新突破。     

The Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy Behavior in Middle Eastern Enduring Rivals, 1948–1998

Rivalry-related issues tend to dominate the foreign policy agenda of states in enduring rivalries. Thus, the enduring rivalry research program provides an important framework for foreign policy analysis. This paper probes the domestic elements of strategic interaction in the three main Middle Eastern rivalries: Israel–Egypt, Israel–Jordan, and Israel–Syria. The empirical tests probe whether the number of parties represented in Israel's cabinet and Arab and Israeli domestic unrest impact the propensity for these rivals to employ hostility against each other. We specify vector autoregression (VAR) models and negative binomial event count models with monthly levels of hostility as the dependent variables for the period 1948–1998. The results provide interesting foreign policy implications regarding the impact of Israeli domestic political structures on conflict dynamics in the Middle East. There is no evidence that the foreign policy behavior of Arab states becomes risk averse when Israeli leaders might need an external scapegoat. These findings are discussed in the context of other research on enduring rivalries and strategic interaction.     

老挝全方位外交政策与老中关系

随着冷战的结束、国际及地区形势的变化,老挝逐步摒弃＂一边倒＂的外交观念,于20世纪80年代中期确立了全方位外交方针和政策。经过20多年的实践,老挝全方位对外交往活跃,在深化与传统友好国家关系同时,与世界各国建立了广泛联系,老挝与中国的关系也获得了长足发展和较大突破,并成为老挝发展全方位务实外交关系中的重要关系。     

The Growing Role of States in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the State Partnership Program

States can and do play an important role in contemporary U.S. foreign policy. This article will discuss the growing role of states through an investigation of the State Partnership Program (SSP). The SSP pairs state National Guards with the militaries of other countries through U.S. military engagement programs. The state-level National Guard then becomes the primary site for implementing U.S. military engagement programs. Both a federalism and decision-making perspective, however, are unable to recognize this role. The decision-making bias of foreign policy analysis affords states a limited international role and minimal influence in shaping the policies of the government toward other countries. An implementation perspective, however, reveals a growing role of states carrying out U.S. foreign policy, including the "high politics" of national security issues. States give decisions meaning through the practice of policy implementation. A detailed case study of the Maryland–Estonia partnership illustrates how an implementation perspective can recognize a growing role of states in shaping U.S. foreign policy.     

New EU Members in Europe's Security Policy

What impact will the 2004 round of enlargement have on the European Union's common foreign and security policy? This article argues that the new members' arrival in theory strengthens the Euroatlantic camp within the EU. This impact has, however, been limited by the accession states' difficulty in exercising effective influence in Brussels so far, and their foreign policy is also coming under pressure at home because of the unpopularity of the Iraq War. The newcomers hold distinct views on the EU's policy toward Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. On this point, their efforts have begun to slowly but demonstrably transform the European Union's own involvement in countries on the EU's eastern frontier. In addition, the first signs are becoming apparent of the new members' effective imprint on the EU's common foreign and security policy.     

Notes on contributors

There is a widely held perception that intelligence is the purloining of secret information from foreign countries, which is then used for advantage in wartime and as an aid to diplomacy and statecraft in peacetime, and the catching of foreign spies, or counterintelligence. In reality, intelligence serves a number of other purposes, such as technology development in support of other intelligence programmes, support to treaty negotiations and monitoring, arms control, and more. Several recently declassified Cold War intelligence activities are reviewed as examples of some of the other uses and benefits of intelligence gathering, and to show that leaders, policy makers and other consumers of intelligence may choose to use, abuse or ignore it, depending upon their own predilection, prejudices, biases, or political agendas, and sometimes altering the original intent of the intelligence.     

The use and abuse of intelligence: An intelligence provider's perspective

There is a widely held perception that intelligence is the purloining of secret information from foreign countries, which is then used for advantage in wartime and as an aid to diplomacy and statecraft in peacetime, and the catching of foreign spies, or counterintelligence. In reality, intelligence serves a number of other purposes, such as technology development in support of other intelligence programmes, support to treaty negotiations and monitoring, arms control, and more. Several recently declassified Cold War intelligence activities are reviewed as examples of some of the other uses and benefits of intelligence gathering, and to show that leaders, policy makers and other consumers of intelligence may choose to use, abuse or ignore it, depending upon their own predilection, prejudices, biases, or political agendas, and sometimes altering the original intent of the intelligence.     

Centralizing Advisory Systems: Presidential Influence and the U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process

This study is motivated by a simple yet vitally important question for an understanding of U.S. foreign policy. Quite simply, how does a president's choice of management style influence the U.S. foreign policy decision-making process and decision outcomes? Presidents play a critical role in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy; however, the presidential studies literature and foreign policy analysis literature arrive at very different conclusions regarding how presidents influence the policy process and both are often inaccurate. This study develops an Advisory Systems Typology to address how presidents influence the decision-making process. In addressing this question, this study overcomes the deficiencies of both the presidential studies and foreign policy analysis literature. Four different types of decision-making processes are produced by a president's choice of advisory structure and level of centralization. In addition, the study identifies "unstructured solutions" that indicate how the presidential advisers and president choose to resolve policy disagreements, thereby providing an indication of the decision outcome. The identified decision-making processes and their associated decision outcomes are explored using four cases of decision making on security policy drawn from the Nixon (Vietnam War), Carter (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II), Reagan (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks I), and Clinton (Bosnia conflict) administrations. The case studies are constructed using the method of structured–focused comparisons, whereby a set of theoretically based questions and anticipated observations to those questions are made in order to guide the research and allow for comparison of decision making within and between cases.     

Uganda and U.S. Foreign Policy

Washington's relationships with the “leveraged allies” preferred by realists—those countries that have little choice but to follow America's lead—have long been considered more reliable than in its relationships with the “natural allies” favored by idealists: prosperous, democratic nations that share the goals and interests of the United States. President Bush's foreign policy requires these natural allies, but many U.S. government officials are more wary. Uganda under President Museveni is a model “natural ally” candidate, with its relatively humane and democratic internal policies, but its greater capacity to act without American leverage, approval, or supervision is likely to worry realist career diplomats.