Reassurance: A Strategic Basis of U.S. Support for Israel

This article argues that Israel experiences a unique perception of the perils of anarchy that drives it to a strategic preference for disproportionately offensive action against rivals and enemies. Actions taken pursuant to that doctrine have caused serious inconvenience to U.S. foreign policy in the Mideast for over four decades. This article argues that by reassuring Israel, both diplomatically and with arms sales, that the United States is committed to its survival, the United States has obtained significant measures of strategic restraint on Israel's part. That restraint has brought significant benefit to the United States as it seeks to guarantee regular access to the vital resources of the Middle East. This article provides examples of both successful reassurance and reassurance denied to illustrate the argument that U.S. support produces tangible strategic benefits for the United States.     

U.S.＇ Middle East Policy

After the 9/11 incident, the United States further shifted its strategic focus on the Middle East. This article analyzes the strategic dilemma faced by the U.S. in the Middle East and the origins of its Middle East strategy. It uses an historical perspective by comparing former strategies with current policy.     

Navigating two Asias: how Washington deals with the Indo-Pacific’s rising powers

ABSTRACT

The United States has sought over the last two decades to facilitate India’s rise as a means of balancing against China’s ambitions. Notwithstanding the rich literature that has emerged on Sino-Indian dynamics and the U.S.-India-China triad, there has been remarkably little examination of the ways in which the United States navigates its relationships with these two rising powers. This study poses a simple question: to what extent has the United States’ pursuit of its interests with India meant that it has accepted trade-offs with respect to its interests with China? Drawing on government documents, interviews with current and former U.S. officials, and an array of case studies between 2005 and early 2019, this study argues first that the U.S. bureaucracy has long been structured in such a way as to heavily compartment policy decision-making related to South Asia and East Asia, respectively, and to produce a pronounced but largely explicable structural bias toward East Asia; second, that relatively few policy matters have arisen since 2005 that have forced the United States to consider meaningful trade-offs between its India and China equities; and third, that new challenges may arise for Washington as its deals with an increasingly inter-connected Indo-Pacific region, and manages the bureaucratic and policy implications of its renewed emphasis on great power competition.     

U.S. and East Asian Integration

the U.S. is directly impacting on the future of the East Asian community. Therefore, finding ways to get along with the U.S. is crucial to the speed, direction, configuration and character of the East Asian community. In this paper, the author has analyzed the interests of the United States in East Asia and its stands towards the East Asian integration. The author concludes that it is to the interest of the United States to make more efforts to further join in the East Asian integration. And East Asia should accept and welcome the American participation.     

The Zimbabwe Issue in Sino-U.S. Ties

The United States has criticized the domestic and foreign policies of the Mugabe regime, and has attempted to raise the Zimbabwe issue in the UN Security Council, thus creating a point of potential conflict in Sino-U.S. relations.China differs from the United States on this issue not because of the measures taken by the Western countries such as economic sanctions and political pressure, but,more significantly, because of the Western conception of democracy and human rights, and the difference between the U.S. and Chinese strategies in Africa. The policies of China and the United States on the Zimbabwe issue can be interpreted as a struggle between two powers in Africa. In the short term, however, it is the Middle East that will continue to preoccupy U.S. foreign policy, and Zimbabwe will not become a major flash point in Sino-U.S. relations.     

U.S. Strategy in a Transitioning Middle East: Reviving ‘State Responsibility’

In light of the uncertainty surrounding the Middle East stemming from the Arab Awakening, and the inability of Washington to shape the process of transition, U.S. decision- makers must rethink their strategy for the region in general and for counterterrorism in particular. Reducing U.S. involvement in the region and letting the dust settle will serve American interests better and allow for building healthier relations with Middle Eastern countries. At the same time, since the risk of negative effects on neighboring states that accompany transition must be kept in check, the United States, together with other powers, should lead the international community in reviving the principle of “state responsibility” as a productive way to reduce spillover of conflicts and even provide incentives for actors in the region to limit violence.     

Cause,effect, and consistency: A response to Kenneth Waltz

In The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, we argued that the “special relationship” between the United States and Israel is due largely to the influence of a domestic interest group—comprised of Jews as well as non-Jews—and that this unusual situation is harmful to both the United States and Israel. Jerome Slater's thoughtful review endorses many of our central arguments, but it also highlights several points of disagreement. He argues that we overlooked important alternative sources, defined the lobby too broadly, and exaggerated its influence on Congress and especially the Executive Branch. Although Slater is even more critical of U.S. Middle East policy than we are, he argues that the special relationship is due to strong cultural and religious affinities and broad public support in American society, and not to the influence of the lobby. In fact, the alternative sources cited by Slater do not undermine our basic claims; a broad conception of the lobby makes more sense than his narrower definition; and there is little disagreement between us about the lobby's influence on Capitol Hill or in the White House. Most importantly, public opinion in the United States does not explain why the United States gives Israel such extensive and nearly unconditional backing. Although most Americans have a favorable image of Israel, surveys show that they also favor a more even-handed Middle East policy and a more normal relationship with Israel. Thus, the special relationship is due primarily to the lobby's influence, and not to the American people's enduring identification with the Jewish state.     

美国的中东石油战略与中国能源安全

对于中国和美国这两个石油进口与消费大国来说,有世界油库之称的中东的战略地位不言而喻,但美国的中东石油战略实质上是一种霸权战略。美国这种霸权稳定论下的石油安全观及其中东石油战略,不仅排斥和谐世界理念下的中国和平发展石油安全观,而且成为引发或激发中东政治与石油形势动荡的深层根源之一。美国对中东石油霸权战略的实施和推进,对中国以商业原则与和平方式安全而稳定地获取中东石油形成了严重的制约和挑战。     

美韩FTA的起步、拖延及影响——以东亚区域合作为视角的分析

美韩签署FTA是两国对现实背景和贸易环境所做出的适应性反应,尽管美国的遏制意图和韩国的抢占制高点的意图有所不同,但其共同点都是试图使自身在未来的东亚区域合作中占据主动位置,但美韩FTA的久拖不决也使其潜在的影响产生了变数。韩国的这一举动显然是在走一条有别于东亚区域合作既有模式的道路,必然会对原有进程产生影响。它还使中国目前在东亚区域合作中所取得的成果缩水,因而有必要重新评估我国自身的FTA战略,以寻找根本性的解决方案。     

艾森豪威尔处理苏伊士运河战争危机的经验及其对奥巴马政府的启示

1956年10月,以色列在美国总统大选前8天,不顾艾森豪威尔政府预先劝诫,在英、法两国幕后策划下,对埃及发动先发制人的打击。艾森豪威尔总统为此采取一系列行动,如诉诸联合国、启动对以经济制裁、甚至威胁驱逐其出联合国,最终实现被他称之为"侵略者"的三方无条件停火撤退。艾森豪威尔成功的范例给2012年面临同样难题的奥巴马提供了一些历史经验:美国的外交不能被一个小盟国所捆绑,即便他们曾是美国的"铁杆"朋友。美国只有坚持公正、理性与原则,且在冲突中支持受害者,才能最大程度上维护美国的利益与形象,并最终使美国成为中东最具有决定性的外部力量。     

美国战略重心东移的军事步骤及中国的应对策略建议

奥巴马政府就职以来,美国战略重心东移的态势不断加强,美国比过去更加重视亚太地区,并制定实施了较为系统的战略。奥巴马政府的第二任期开始后,继续实施其战略重心东移战略。军事方面的投入是美国战略重心东移的最重要基础和核心内容。美国战略重心东移的军事步骤对中国和亚太局势产生了重要影响。     

The Last Good Chance: A Reassessment of U.S. Operations at Tora Bora

The inability of the United States to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and many of his top deputies at Tora Bora is widely recognized as one of the most significant missed opportunities of America's struggle with al Qaeda. However, the debate over U.S. actions at Tora Bora during Operation Enduring Freedom lacks in-depth analysis, especially concerning the commonly offered solution of more U.S. troops on the ground. This paper dissects the original operation against al Qaeda forces entrenched in the mountain complex in eastern Afghanistan in late 2001 and its impact on the debate over the Afghan model of warfare. An alternative plan involving U.S. conventional forces is presented that takes into account the considerable constraints of the scenario and analyzes the key make-or-break points of the operation. Although the challenges are far greater than most critics have allowed, the revised plan would likely have offered the best chance to capture or kill Bin Laden and a significant portion of the al Qaeda leadership.     

The Information Confrontation with Radical Islam

Information has emerged as a critical—potentially the decisive—front in both the global war with violent radical Islam and the overlapping but so far largely unadmitted Cold War with nonviolent radical Islam. In fact, the information front is undoubtedly the closest thing that al Qaeda has to a strategic center of gravity. Unfortunately, America faces an extremely hostile information environment in the Middle East and al Qaeda has proven far more effective at getting its message across than has the United States. A more effective U.S. information strategy would be one that stresses three themes: a democratic critique of radical Islam; an Islamic critique of radical Islam; and a critique of the crisis in Middle Eastern civilization. While these will not necessarily make the U.S. or its policies more popular, they may drive a wedge between radical Islam and potential supporters.     

从“重返”到“再平衡”——奥巴马政府第二任期的东南亚政策

美国总统奥巴马2009年上台后,对东南亚表现出浓厚的兴趣并高调"重返",推出了一系列加强在东南亚存在的举措。2013年连任后,他将在未来4年继续把东南亚作为"亚太再平衡"战略的着力点。同时,奥巴马政府意识到其东南亚政策也需要进行"再平衡",应放缓军事"重返"脚步,在经济、政治、安全等领域全方位投入,均衡化、长期化地推进东南亚外交。国内财政限制、中东等地区外交挑战和外交人员人事变动等因素会对美国新一届政府的东南亚外交有所制约,但其未来政策走向仍将对中国周边外交和中美关系产生持续影响。     

The Politics of U.S.–UN Reengagement: Achieving Gains in a Hostile Environment

From 1999 to 2001, the United States actively tried to improve its image and role in the United Nations (UN). This was a difficult process due to the many areas of disagreement between the United States and other UN members. However, throughout this period, the focus of reengagement was centered on resolving the large and longstanding U.S. arrears to the UN. While the United States was not able to achieve everything it desired, this period of reengagement resulted in new scales of assessment for the UN's regular and peacekeeping budgets that were much more favorable to the United States. This article draws on practitioner interviews to analyze the U.S. campaign to resolve its arrears, most specifically focusing on six factors that explain why the United States was able to achieve so much in the face of such an inhospitable environment at the UN. In doing so, the article identifies several areas where scholars and practitioners are highlighting similar dynamics, and it uncovers important policy implications for future U.S. efforts to push other UN members in directions that they may not be eager to go. These policy implications are especially relevant for current U.S.–UN relations given the U.S. failure to secure Security Council authorization for the use of force against Iraq in March 2003 .     

2011年美国外交面临的挑战

2011年国际局势中的许多事态对美国的中东外交政策形成新的挑战。西亚北非的动荡和变局可能导致中东地缘政治版图重新绘制,对美国未来的中东外交必将带来许多变数;美国一巴基斯坦之间发生的事态可能对奥巴马政府的反恐战略及南亚战略提出新的挑战;巴勒斯坦不顾美国阻挠申请加入联合国,使美国与穆斯林世界的关系面临新的考验。这些挑战今后有可能进一步发酵,对美国全球战略产生影响,其中包括对奥巴马政府＂-3前高调进行的“重返亚洲”形成牵制。     

Business as Usual

In the years since 9/11, there is no doubt that the emphasis of U.S. global strategy has been on counter-terrorism and the war in Iraq. During this period of time, the U.S. investment in strategic, political and military resources in the Middle East, Iraq, and the war on terror, which are the top priorities on the list of Bush＇s foreign policy, has been far greater than in any other fields. However, there are some in the U.S. who believe that China＇s rise has been much ignored by the U.S., due to the global war on terror （GWOT）, and that America should, in fact, be focusing more on China, not the Middle East. However, as we see it, China has by no means been ignored by the U.S., neither has China＇s rise been the result of U.S. ignorance.     

关于美国“重返亚太”的几点看法

2011年美国高调“重返亚太”的实质是从过去集中关注全球反恐战争回归到全面经营亚太。其主要特点有：战略重点向亚太地区倾斜,加大对经济手段的倚重,加大军事上进攻色彩,加强对中国的防范。美国高调“重返亚太”具有深刻的背景和出于多重战略考虑,并且迄今已收到一些效果。但也应看到,美国“重返亚太”也存在许多难以克服的阻力和制约因素,这些因素既有亚太地区内和外部的,也有美国国内经济、政治、社会方面的。     

Deterrence by Presence to Effective Response: Japan's Shift Southward

Over the past fifteen years, a quiet strategic shift has occurred in Japan. During the cold war era, Japan's defense was oriented towards the Soviet threat north of Hokkaido. However, under the very real threat of North Korean aggression, the less tangible threat of terrorism, and the perceived need to participate more fully in international peacekeeping activities, Japan has changed the characteristics of its armed forces. Additionally, an increasingly self-confident China is testing Japan's resolve in the waters surrounding Japan, simultaneously speaking of cooperative development while laying claim to a swathe of Japanese territory and waters. An apparently ambivalent United States, in relative decline, watches these proceedings. Japan has reoriented its defense posture to face south, towards the East China Sea, trying to shape Chinese behavior and hedge against future Chinese adventurism. However, with a tangible recommitment of American attention to East Asia and a firm, public, American stand on behalf of Japan's territorial integrity, future conflict can be deterred.     

从普京出访看俄罗斯亚洲外交

2000年俄罗斯外交十分活跃．从7月份开始．普京总统先后出访了中国、朝鲜、日本、印度和蒙古五国。其亚洲之行的主要目的是与亚洲国家加强合作．共同反对美国主导的单极世界．维护全球战略平衡密切与亚太国家的经济联系．加速西伯利亚和远东的开发维护周边地区的和平与稳定恢复和扩大俄罗斯在亚太地区的影响．加强俄全方位外交的力度．增强同美国等西方大国在欧洲对抗的筹码。