The London Ambassadorship of David K. E. Bruce During the Wilson-Johnson Years, 1964–68

Using recently released sources, this article offers a fresh perspective on the London ambassadorship of David K. E. Bruce in the years of Harold Wilson and Lyndon Johnson, 1964–68. Bruce's running of the US Embassy is examined, as are his views of the Anglo-American relationship. Further attention is given to his diplomatic management of the Anglo-American relationship in the context of the difficult personal relations between Wilson and Johnson and with regard to policy differences over the Vietnam War and Britain's position as a world power. It is argued that while Bruce did help to ease some of the personal strains between Wilson and Johnson, he was generally less significant to the White House than has previously been asserted. It is also contended that his vision of Britain joining the EEC, yet retaining extensive military commitments beyond Europe was not viable.     

Ambassador David Bruce and “LBJ's War”: Vietnam Viewed from London, 1963–1968

Recent decades have seen growing historical interest in “second rank” officials who, whilst they do not play a leading role in government or political movements, can influence the way decisions are shaped and executed. At the same time, the interest of scholars in American policy during the Vietnam War shows no signs of abating. This article investigates the experience of one second rank official during the war, David Bruce, who was Ambassador to London during 1961–1969. Making particular use of Bruce's extensive diaries, it traces his shifting views on the war, looks at the extent to which he shared the outlook of other official,s and asks what influence, if any, he had on events. It argues that, whilst he always remained loyal to his own government and often mirrored the outlook of the Johnson Administration, Bruce had his own perspective on events, was consistently critical of American tactics on the ground, and, in Spring 1967, influenced by Robert McNamara, became an early advocate of retrenchment.     

D. Rossini,Woodrow Wilson and the American Myth in Italy: Culture,Diplomacy, and War Propaganda

The period 1967–1968 was a difficult one for the Anglo–American relationship, as a result of developments such as British defense cuts “East of Suez.” In the run-up to a visit to Washington by Prime Minister Harold Wilson in February 1968, the State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau provided a lively and detailed evaluation of American bonds with Britain. The analysis maintained that the relationship was based on deeply established cooperation in defense, diplomacy and intelligence, and that despite recent problems Britain would remain of unparalleled importance as an American ally. The immediate impact of the memorandum in the White House of Lyndon B. Johnson was quite limited, but among other things the document helps to explain the ready blossoming of close high-level Anglo–American bonds during, for example, the Falklands War of 1982. The most important sections of the memorandum are reproduced, and a brief analysis is provided to put the issues in context.     

A 'visionary hope' frustrated: J.M. Keynes and the origins of the postwar international monetary order

During the 1930s and 1940s Keynes developed the vision of a world in which every country would be able to pursue its own New Deal. He believed in the Second World War that Anglo-American partnership would provide the foundations of this benevolent new order. But his enterprise was frustrated by Washington's insistence on economic orthodoxy. It was an outcome which left Keynes pessimistic about the prospects for international economic cooperation. However the prejudices of Keynes's first biographer, Roy Harrod, in combination with the political exigencies of the early cold war period, obscured the extent of his disillusionment.     

Green Politics, Green and Orange Diplomacy: Lyndon Johnson and Eamon de Valera's Farewell Tour of the United States

Ireland had significant pull in domestic American politics, but was a minor power in world affairs. The Irish influence was inverse to the relationship the United States had with the United Kingdom. In 1964, these political and diplomatic factors converged when Eamon de Valera, the American born President of the Republic of Ireland, made one last tour of the United States. Lyndon Johnson used the trip to his political advantage without harming the relationship the United States enjoyed with the United Kingdom. Johnson showed a skillful touch in both the diplomacy and politics that went along with this visit, challenging dominant views about his competence in this area.     

Green Politics,Green and Orange Diplomacy: Lyndon Johnson and Eamon de Valera's Farewell Tour of the United States

Ireland had significant pull in domestic American politics, but was a minor power in world affairs. The Irish influence was inverse to the relationship the United States had with the United Kingdom. In 1964, these political and diplomatic factors converged when Eamon de Valera, the American born President of the Republic of Ireland, made one last tour of the United States. Lyndon Johnson used the trip to his political advantage without harming the relationship the United States enjoyed with the United Kingdom. Johnson showed a skillful touch in both the diplomacy and politics that went along with this visit, challenging dominant views about his competence in this area.     

The Future Foretold: Lyndon Baines Johnson’s Congressional Support for Israel

Lyndon B. Johnson became a senator the year of Israel’s creation: 1948. Moral, political, and strategic considerations guided Johnson’s outspoken support for Israel from an early point in his political career. This analysis reveals that Johnson’s advocacy of Israel whilst a senator foreshadowed his policy as president of championing the Israeli-American military-strategic alliance. Beginning with his time in Congress, Johnson had many Jewish American friends supporting the establishment of a Jewish state and, due to the importance of Jewish-American backing of the Democratic Party, Johnson supported Israel for significant political reasons. From a moral and strategic perspective starting in the 1950s, Johnson believed that Israel served as a humanitarian refuge for Jews in the aftermath of the Holocaust and, as a liberal democracy, was well suited to oppose the expansion of Soviet influence and communism in the Cold War Middle East. For these reasons, Johnson supported the initiation of American aid to Israel in the early 1950s, which would presage decisions to arm Israel with the first American tanks and fighter jets as president. As a senator, Johnson staunchly opposed President Dwight Eisenhower’s threat to impose sanctions against Israel if it did not withdraw from Egyptian territories occupied in the 1956 Suez crisis. Johnson’s stance on Suez – that Israel deserved greater security guarantees prior to withdrawal – would starkly parallel his policy following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.     

The First World War as Catalyst and Epiphany: The Case of Henry P. Davison

The experience of the First World War was central to the emergence of a trans-Atlantic elite committed to close collaboration and an international alliance, either formal or de facto, between Great Britain and the United States. The reactions to the conflict of Henry P. Davison, dominant partner in J. P. Morgan and Company, illustrate the manner in which the First World War was catalytic in the creation of an Atlanticist elite. Davison, moreover, experienced something like a personal epiphany during the war, metamorphosing from a hard-driving businessman into an international philanthropist who developed ambitious schemes to remake the world. For seven years, Davison energetically sought to affect the course, outcome, and consequences of the First World War. Fundamental to Davison's worldview were the desirability and necessity of Anglo-American collaboration, on which all his other plans were predicated. When the war ended, Davison proposed almost visionary schemes, on the one hand to provide massive American governmental and private economic assistance to finance European postwar relief and reconstruction efforts and, on the other, to establish an international Red Cross organization that would mount a massive campaign to eradicate global public health problems. Although abortive in the short term, in the longer run his plans proved prophetic, anticipating the post-Second World War Marshall Plan and World Health Organization.     

Wilsonian Pragmatism? Woodrow Wilson, Japanese Immigration, and the Paris Peace Conference

“He [Wilson] was more than just an idealist: he was the personification of the heritage of idealism of the American people. He brought spiritual concepts to the peace table. He was a born crusader.”

Herbert Hoover ¹

The issue of the Japanese plea for race equality at the Paris Peace Conference is generally seen as a secondary issue for American delegates. Most accounts see Wilson as being bullied into rejecting the proposal by the Dominion delegates — most notably Australia's Billy Hughes. Analyzing his views on race and its intricate connection with immigration and examining his own and his advisers response to political allies and opponents at home and in Paris over these issues, this piece will argue that Wilson responded as much to domestic pressures as external forces in his eventual compromise with the Japanese in Paris.     

Woodrow Wilson’s Neutrality,the Freedom of the Seas,and the Myth of the “Civil War Precedents”

This analysis shows the importance of a problem of maritime law in an on-going debate between two interpretations of Wilsonian neutrality that have competed in various guises since the end of the First World War: can British blockade actions in that war be justified by American Civil War precedents? It proves that reliance on the “Civil War precedents” to justify Britain’s blockade measures was disingenuous from the beginning. British diplomats first used it in October 1914, and Woodrow Wilson embraced it to defend his mild response to British violations of neutral rights to incensed American citizens despite continuous protests from the State Department. Whilst all politicians involved knew the comparison was wrong, historians have embraced it as a justification of Britain’s illegal blockade ever since Arthur S. Link claimed it as the key to understanding Wilson’s neutrality policy.     

Anglo-American relations after Suez, the rise and decline of the working group experiment, and the french challenge to NATO, 1957-59

This article explores the establishment of a number of Anglo-American working groups at the Washington Conference of October 1957, and explains how the British regarded the groups as an attempt to institutionalize the principle of consultation in Anglo-American relations. American and British officials were anxious that the existence of the groups be kept secret for fear that they would be a cause of resentment to other close allies. De Gaulle's attacks on an Anglo-American monopoly within NATO, and disruptive calls for institutionalizing tripartite cooperation following his assumption of power in June 1958 underlined this point, and helped to cool US attitudes to any notion of formal machinery that by-passed established alliance structures. Practical problems associated with the functioning of the groups, as well as the potential for political embarrassment they could represent, meant that their role had largely by the spring of 1959, yet their brief history was illustrative of the tensions that exclusivity in ANglo-American relations could bring to the Western alliance.     

Anglo-American relations after Suez,the rise and decline of the working group experiment,and the french challenge to NATO, 1957-59

This article explores the establishment of a number of Anglo-American working groups at the Washington Conference of October 1957, and explains how the British regarded the groups as an attempt to institutionalize the principle of consultation in Anglo-American relations. American and British officials were anxious that the existence of the groups be kept secret for fear that they would be a cause of resentment to other close allies. De Gaulle's attacks on an Anglo-American monopoly within NATO, and disruptive calls for institutionalizing tripartite cooperation following his assumption of power in June 1958 underlined this point, and helped to cool US attitudes to any notion of formal machinery that by-passed established alliance structures. Practical problems associated with the functioning of the groups, as well as the potential for political embarrassment they could represent, meant that their role had largely by the spring of 1959, yet their brief history was illustrative of the tensions that exclusivity in ANglo-American relations could bring to the Western alliance.     

Climbing off the Back Burner: Lyndon Johnson's Soft Power Approach to Africa

The general historiography of United States–African relations in the 1960s holds that the policies of Lyndon Johnson towards this continent were a failure. Johnson, most historians suggest, generally ignored Africa and, in doing so, squandered the good feelings that many Africans had developed towards his more charming and polished predecessor. However, such views do a disservice to the Johnson Administration, which in fact embarked on a quiet African programme rooted in American cultural and economic power, and which proved to be more successful than is generally believed. Two factors lay at the heart of Johnson's decision to rely on a soft power policy in Africa: the domestic political constraints of the civil rights movement at home; and the belief in modernisation theory that had emerged as a guiding principle for many of his advisors. Johnson, to put it simply, may have lacked his predecessor's style but he compensated with a substantive and imaginative policy that quietly produced a superior method of advancing both American and African interests.     

‘Gunboats of soft power’: Boris on Africa and post-Brexit ‘Global Britain’

As Britain prepares to leave the European Union after the popular vote of June 2016, the government is embarking on the revision of foreign policy. Boris Johnson, or ‘just Boris’, has been entrusted with forging the new ‘Global Britain’ for the post-Brexit era and reinventing British economy around new relationships. Boris has a track record of misrepresenting and offending foreign peoples, leaders and countries. This article assesses the prospects for Africa in Johnson’s vision for ‘Global Britain’ as presented in his foreign policy speeches. The paper unpacks Johnson’s discursive construction of ‘Africa’ and inserts it into a broader historical and political context of British relations with Africa. It argues that, by constructing Africa as a ‘problem’ and offering liberal values as a condition for development, Johnson is continuing British imperial and post-colonial discourses of ‘developing’ or ‘civilizing’ Africa. In the post-Brexit world of a changing global balance of power, democratic conditionality serves to sustain and reproduce British forms of power and policies.     

Steadfast Yet Reluctant Allies: Japan and the United Kingdom in the Vietnam War

During the Vietnam War there were high expectations from the Johnson and Nixon Administrations for Japan and Britain to provide practical and political support for American military and strategic objectives in Indochina. The leader of Japan's conservative Liberal Democratic Party, Sato Eisaku, and the British Labour Party's Harold Wilson, balanced political support for the United States with significant public pressure at home to eschew any entanglement in the highly unpopular conflict. As junior allies of the United States both Sato and Wilson did not want to see the United States fail in Vietnam or the communist sphere expand in Southeast Asia. Both leaders accrued significant foreign policy advantages as a result of politically and publicly supporting American actions in Vietnam. But to placate domestic electorates that clearly felt uncomfortable over their governments providing explicit, albeit non-military, support to the United States in Vietnam, Sato and Wilson expended substantial prime ministerial diplomacy in attempting to play a mediatory role in the conflict. Each was highly successful in balancing domestic and American demands, whilst maintaining their security partnerships with the United States.     

With a Little Help from My Friends: The Anglo-American Atomic Intelligence Partnership, 1945-1958

This article looks at the Anglo-American atomic intelligence relationship in the early post-war period. In 1946 the wartime sharing of technical atomic information was terminated; despite this barrier, atomic intelligence relations continued and given the common objective of discerning Soviet capabilities, flourished. The close relationship offered many mutual benefits to both sides. As such, the atomic intelligence relationship was to become a crucial instrument in achieving a resumption of relations in 1958, what Prime Minister Harold Macmillan referred to as the “great prize.” This article details the composition of the Anglo-American special-relationship's special-relationship, describing joint operations and placing these within the normal nuclear partnership at this time.     

Lord Home and Anglo-American Relations, 1961-1963

This article focuses on the role of Lord Home, the British Foreign Secretary, in the conduct of Anglo-American relations between 1961 and 1963. It studies three controversial policy areas: the newly independent states of Laos and the Congo, along with the debate over the decolonization of British Guiana; the key Cold War issues of Berlin and Cuba; and a variety of nuclear weapons-related matters. It is argued that Home, in constantly striving to maintain the alliance, was more pro-American than Macmillan. He exercised an important restraining and calming influence on the Prime Minister, preventing him from pursuing potentially damaging initiatives. However, the relationship between the two men was strong. Home's diplomacy usually complimented Macmillan's interventions and they often worked together.     

An Endangered Partnership: The Anglo-American Defence Relationship in the Early Twenty-first Century

Abstract

This article examines the contemporary Anglo-American defence relationship. It begins by setting the general historical and contemporary context, including the impact of the Iraq war, before focusing on the military dimension. The main body of the paper addresses UK/US military planning and operations, UK defence budgetary issues, nuclear weapons collaboration and the impact of changing strategic relationships between the UK, US and Europe. The author argues that the longstanding defence partnership is threatened by a number of factors, including interoperability problems, the UK's national and defence spending priorities, the likely impact of a decision to replace Trident and the decline in the importance of the transatlantic strategic partnership in NATO. The paper concludes that changing US strategic priorities and further reductions in Britain's military capabilities are likely to erode the perceived value of the Anglo-American defence partnership on both sides of the Atlantic.     

Louis Fischer and India, 1947–1964: Gandhi’s Disciple,Nehru’s Bête Noire?

This article focuses on the shift in the attitude of the liberal American journalist Louis Fischer to India. It contrasts Fischer’s admiration of Mahatma Gandhi and his support for Indian independence, expressed vociferously and prolifically in the period 1942-47, with Fischer’s criticisms and eventual opposition to the personality and foreign policy of Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister. Going beyond Fischer’s reputation as a “friend of India” earned through his works on Gandhi and his efforts for Indian independence, thus far considered as the only important prisms to study his views on India, this treatment of Fischer situates his criticism of Nehru within his personal development as an anti-communist in the late 1940s and 1950s. This shift in Fischer’s attitude from Gandhi to Nehru provides an interesting personal sidelight to the intergovernmental relations between India and America in that period.     

浅析威尔逊主义对新殖民主义形成的影响——基于威尔逊政府对菲律宾政策的分析

学术界目前对威尔逊主义和新殖民主义的专门研究比较深入[1],但关于威尔逊主义与新殖民主义的关系的探讨尚需继续开展.笔者拟在充分利用现有研究成果的基础上,以威尔逊政府对菲律宾政策为例,梳理威尔逊主义对美国新殖民主义的影响.