企业集团与少数股东保护的法律研究

传统公司法是建立在公司之问彼此独立、互不参股的基础上的。在企业集团与关联企业日益增多的今天,各国公司法都实现了从只调整单一公司到以调整单个公司为主,以调整关联企业与企业集团为辅的立法思想转变。从少数股东保护角度验证中国公司法增加对关联企业与企业集团的规定的必要性。     

"从属公司债权人保护"的法律体系构建--试析关联企业中特殊债权人问题

当代经济的一个重要特征就是以企业集团(关联企业)为中心进行发展,这是实现规模经济的有效途径之一。但它也产生了不可忽视的负面影响,如从属公司成为控制公司进行欺诈的工具等。在关联企业涉及的众多法律问题中,从属公司债权人保护尤为值得关注。我国法律对此仍是一处空白。系统地对关联企业进行概述介绍,并列举了有关各国和地区的相关立法,认为有限责任例外和公司法人格否认是从属公司债权人保护的法理基础;并对我国立法模式选择,控制公司责任要件及形式,债权人的直接诉权,举证责任倒置等问题进行探讨,初步构建了从属公司债权人保护的法律框架。     

关联企业的公司法调整

关联企业是指为达到一定的经济目的而通过特定手段所形成的企业之间的联合。关联企业中母公司与子公司之间存在实际利益冲突。从属公司不再是独立的主体，因为须听命于母公司。这种控制权的存在引发了一系列的法律问题，其中，关于公司法的问题，主要是从属公司债权人的利益保护问题，以及从属公司及其少数股东的利益保护问题。国外法律对于关联企业的反应，存在不同模式，我国就立法而言，尚处于空白，可以借鉴德国和台湾的做法，采取在现行公司法中单列一章对关联企业进行集中规定，以利于与现行公司法相配合，且有利于体例安排和法律执行。     

上市公司关联交易的透视

上市公司关联交易频繁发生侵害了公司、中小股东和债权人的利益,我国公司法以调整法人治理结构为基点,建立了关联交易的规制体系。但其中一些制度缺乏具体规定,导致这些条款在实践中难以运用。针对这些问题,笔者对完善我国公司法提出了一些建议。     

公司法修订的基本目标与价值取向

公司法修订的目的在于建立和发展符合中国现实需要的先进公司法理念和制度。公司法修订应通过对当事人行为的规范和对公司内外法律关系的调整,鼓励投资,促进企业发展和公司繁荣;应给予公司法正确的定性和定位,对其强制性和任意性加以合理界定;应关注公司、股东和债权人的合法权益,协调三者之间的关系;应梳理整合现行立法,以统一的公司法对所有公司企业予以法律调整。     

《公司法》关联交易规制理念纠偏与规则重构

《公司法》以第21条为中心的关联交易规范面临制度困境，实践中无法有效规制因关联交易而引发的控股股东与小股东以及公司与管理层之间利益冲突等公司治理问题，亟待公司法修订时对其规制理念与规制工具予以体系性完善。在规制理念上，一方面小股东以及债权人利益保护应纳入我国公司法关联交易规范的直接保护范畴；另一方面引入关联交易“一体化”规制理念，克服现行法“碎片化”规制路径的弊端。在规则重构上，将《公司法》第21条从侵权责任条款改造为直接界定关联方、交易、公允性判断规则及其举证责任规则等构成要件的一般性条款，同时引入关联交易的法定豁免情形，以期实现权益保障与经济效率的平衡。此外，结合我国《公司法》框架下不同类型公司治理的特殊性，关联交易的批准规则和披露规则作为规制工具亦应进行本土化再造。     

关联企业中从属公司利益保护探讨

关联企业的发展在一定程度上促进社会资源发挥更大的经济和社会效益,但也极易损害从属公司和其他利益相关者的利益。从属公司具有独立的法人人格,利益应受到公司法保护,但我国现行的公司法对这方面的规制不全面。本文拟从信息披露和公司治理结构两方面来规范从属公司控股股东的行为,促进《公司法》中关于从属公司利益保护方面的立法完善。     

论公司法债权人保护制度的完善

随着我国公司法改革问题讨论的深入 ,如何防止公司控制人滥用权利 ,如何保护公司弱势利益群体的利益 ,维护法律正义 ,提高公司公信力及强化法律保护效力日益引起法学界的关注。认为 ,处于局外人地位的公司债权人 ,特别是普通债权人在公司法律制度中处于最弱势地位 ,新的公司法必须给予更具可操作性的更强有力的保护 ,以弥补 1993年公司法存在的制度上的缺陷。从单个公司、关联企业、企业 (含跨国 )集团的角度论述了公司债权人保护存在的问题 ,提出了较具体的立法完善思路 ,供有关部门参考。     

中国企业集团的公司化构造

企业集团的组建问题是一个企业集团的公司化构建的问题。企业集团的公司化构建意味着：在法律观念上,应认识到企业集团是一个矛盾的集合,它是已经形成支配与从属关系的独立企业之间的联合体;在企业集团的构建上,应注重运用资本参与机制,并通过企业购并作为其实现手段;在企业集团的立法问题上,应立足于企业集团内部成员企业之间的关系,建立起一种关联企业法的调整模式     

加强公司关联交易法律规制的若干思考

关联交易独特的法律性质决定了其后果利弊共存。关联交易可以降低企业交易成本，有利于实现关联关系中局部或全局利益的最大化；同时，关联交易中也隐藏着损害公司、债权人以及中小股东利益的风险。关联交易在我国经济生活中大量存在，关联方利用关联交易侵害公司以及利益相关者的问题十分严重。新公司法对于关联交易的规定过于简单抽象，借鉴国外的立法经验，在公司法上建立与完善对关联交易的法律规制已成为迫切需要。     

Governing Globalization? The State,Law, and Structural Change in Corporate Governance

Current analysis of the 'globalization' of the activity of capitalist corporations tends to argue that the legal institutional frameworks of the nation state are of little importance in determining the governance of those corporations, and that the regulation of those corporations therefore is impossible. This view simply ignores the role that those frameworks do in fact play. In this paper, various styles of corporate governance are analysed in terms of the influence of the company law, financial market regulation, and employment law promulgated by nations or nation state groupings. Rather than the globalization of corporate governance reflecting the unimportance of the nation state, it reflects a change in the style of regulation.     

Balancing Social and Corporate Culture in the Global Economy: The Evolution of Japanese Corporate Structure and Norms

Japanese corporate law is undergoing a transition with new Commercial Code amendments in 2003 that allow corporations to opt for an Anglo‐American model of governance. Combined with shifts in securities regulation, shareholder activism, and the notion of Japanese lifetime employment, there is an important issue of whether these shifts represent a move towards an optimal corporate governance paradigm. The evolution is tempered by particular cultural norms that drive Japanese corporate law. While there is a perception in North America that Japanese corporations have shifted to an Anglo‐American model of corporate governance, the reality is more layered. It may be that ultimately, the governance model that evolves will adopt the best elements of increased transparency, corporate accountability, enhanced shareholder protection, employee long‐term employment protections, and production synergies, that would allow Japanese corporations to compete internationally, but retain those elements of corporate community that have long been considered a primary objective of the social and economic life of Japan.     

一人公司“法人格滥用推定”制度的法理评析——兼论公司立法的价值抉择

我国《公司法》第64条规定的一人公司"法人格滥用推定"制度,与"公司法人格否认"制度有着质的差别。对一人公司实行"法人格滥用推定",实质上是自始就没把一人公司当"公司"。这不仅在逻辑上自相矛盾,而且在法律上有违平等原则,并有可能打击人们创设一人公司的热情,从而使"一人公司"仅仅停留于纸面而失去实际意义。为追求自由、效率、公平、安全等价值目标,我国《公司法》应当取消专门针对一人公司的"法人格滥用推定"制度,转而对包括一人公司在内的各种类型的公司统一适用"公司法人格否认"制度。     

The Profits of Recognition: A Praxeological Approach to Corporate Crime

This paper offers a methodological intervention into the study and understanding of regulation and compliance with respect to corporate crime. We advocate Pierre Bourdieu’s “praxeological” sociology as the bases for what we hold is an innovative model of regulation and compliance. The praxeological or relational approach offers structural analyses that take seriously the constructivist fixation with meaning, subjectivity, and perception without succumbing to the limitations of an interactionist conception of power. We first show theoretical affinities between the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Louis Althusser in order to highlight their shared concern with subject formation and their respective conceptions of “mis/recognition”. As this provides us with the theoretical basis of a more robust theory of regulation and compliance than is commonly found within the corporate crime literature, we argue that studies of corporate wrongdoing would benefit from rethinking the conceptions of compliance that currently shape corporate crime scholarship. We then demonstrate the benefits of this praxeological approach to regulation and compliance through discussion of the state’s efforts to discipline corporations through criminal law in Canada and the United Kingdom.     

The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime

In many cases of criminality within large corporations, senior management does not commit the operative offense—or conspire or assist in it—but nonetheless bears serious responsibility for the crime. That responsibility can derive from, among other things, management’s role in cultivating corporate culture, in failing to police effectively within the firm, and in accepting lavish compensation for taking the firm’s reins. Criminal law does not include any doctrinal means for transposing that form of responsibility into punishment. Arguments for expanding doctrine—including broadening of the presently narrow “responsible corporate officer” doctrine—so as to authorize such punishment do not fare well under the justificatory demands of criminal law theory. The principal obstacle to such arguments is the large industrial corporation itself, which necessarily entails kinds and degrees of delegation and risk-taking that do not fit well with settled concepts about mens rea and omission liability. Even the most egregious and harmful management failures must be addressed through design and regulation of the corporation rather than imposition of individual criminal liability.     

中国公司法之构造缺陷及克服

作者认为 ,中国公司法在实践中存在以下缺陷 :有限公司与股份公司的组织机构之间区别模糊、国有独资公司定位不当、股份公司之董事会缺少有效约束、监事会的监督职能虚拟化以及对关联公司以及公司集团的约束不力。为更好地发挥公司在市场经济中的作用 ,实有改革有限公司制度以及重新塑造股份公司之董事会与监事会关系的必要。此外 ,还应当增加对关联公司与公司集团的法律规定。     

Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility in Profit- and in Non-Profit-Organizations

Corporate Governance governs corporations. To discuss the law and economics of corporations, their performance on the market and management control by legislation and government, is to discuss Corporate Governance. Now, Corporate Governance is being challenged by a new concept to conceive the role of corporations in the world and to control their managers: this is the concept of Corporate Social Responsibilty (CSR). This concept focuses on other than merely profit centered functions of corporations; rather, performance of corporations is measured by criteria of good corporate citizenship. In the Non-Profit sector, corporations also play a major role, although organizations in this sector typically differ from business corporations in several aspects. Yet, deficits of transparency and control of NPO are being discussed here as well. The tendency is to draw from the concept of corporate governance to develop appropriate remedies. Furthermore, the discussion of Corporate Social Responsibilty has also made its way to the NPO sector.     

论萨维尼法人代理说的政治旨趣和知识谱系

代理说将法人团体视为一个需要他人监护的法律残废,法人代表者是法人的监护人,代表者的人格与法人人格相互独立、相互平行,代表者直接承担国家法上的侵权和刑事责任,法人的终极监护权掌握在国家手中。从私法角度论,代理说的真正基础是法定代理。从政治旨趣上说,萨维尼的代理说建立于其对社团自治的悲观和拒斥态度之上,是其全能国家观念的体现,是当时德国诸侯割据政治的曲折反映。就知识谱系而言,代理说与当时流行的政治观念息息相通,它们的灵感来源都是罗马家父制。     

Interpreters of International Economic Law: Corporations and Bureaucrats in Contest over Chile's Nutrition Label

This article analyzes the everyday interpretive practices of corporations and bureaucrats that shape the meaning and force of international economic law. To understand how common practices such as public consultation submissions, corporate threat letters, and external legal assistance influence regulators' understanding of their “legally available” policy space, we study the contested introduction of a pioneering nutrition labeling regulation in Chile. The transnational food industry powerfully challenged the regulation's legality under World Trade Organization law. But Chilean health bureaucrats, in coordination with segments of the country's legally highly competent economic bureaucracy, effectively defended the legality of their proposed regulatory measure. Drawing on data from freedom-of-information requests and in-depth interviews, the article argues that the outcomes of such interpretive contests are substantially shaped by participants' knowledge of the entitlements created by international economic law and thus by the international legal expertise they have access to. This often but not always puts transnational corporations at an advantage over national regulators in the strategic interpretation of international economic law.     

论公司法的性格——强行法抑或任意法?

本文分析公司法的基本性格 ,探讨参与公司制度的各方当事人是否有选择或退出法律规范的自由。对有限公司法而言 ,原则上普通规则可以是任意性的 ,而基本规则应具有强制性 ,不得由当事人自由变更。股份公司法中的基本规则和有关权力分配的普通规则适用于管理层与股东之间利益冲突最为激烈的领域 ,原则上它们应该是强制性的 ,有关利润分配的普通规则则允许有一定的灵活性。在此基础上 ,作者对完善我国的公司法体系和结构提出了若干建议。