The Strategic Response to Ambiguity

Two different forms of ambiguity have been hallmarks of several major conflicts over the past two decades: tactical and political. These two forms of ambiguity interact differently with strategy. The first interferes with the internal logic of strategy itself, whereas the second inhibits the political choice in favor of practicing strategy, but does not inhibit strategy itself. The strategic response to political ambiguity is military force, which still works in such contexts. Any inhibitions against strategy in a politically ambiguous context are political, rather than strategic. Yet, even political objections can be minimized by relying on the West's own ambiguous forces to respond to a Russian ambiguous invasion.     

Coming to Terms with Separatist Insurgencies

Although insurgencies may begin their rebellions with expressed desires for outcomes unacceptable to opposing governments, the desired insurgent outcomes sometimes undergo modification, creating conditions that can make governments more amenable to external mediation. In certain separatist conflicts, the likelihood of external mediation increases when the political redefinition of the state insisted upon by the insurgents undergoes a revision, from secession to self‐determination, understood as a variant of autonomy. In the same vein, although it may not happen concurrently, insurgent movements become more amenable to external mediation if and when opposing governments revise the preferred conflict outcome from a military defeat of the insurgents to a containment of the movement. These two developments can serve as objective referents helping external parties to identify a ripe moment in the conflict and initiate mediation. But the implementation of an agreement ending separatist conflict may not occur if the government fails to submit the proposed territorial bounds of autonomy to prior review by constituents. Potential spoilers among government constituents should be identified and recruited to participate in the negotiations so that the likelihood of agreement rejection is reduced. In some states, however, the legal mechanisms and political opportunities for constituents to act as spoilers do not exist.     

Explaining Myanmar's regime transition: the periphery is central

In 2010, Myanmar (Burma) held its first elections after 22?years of direct military rule. Few compelling explanations for this regime transition have emerged. This article critiques popular accounts and potential explanations generated by theories of authoritarian “regime breakdown” and “regime maintenance”. It returns instead to the classical literature on military intervention and withdrawal. Military regimes, when not terminated by internal factionalism or external unrest, typically liberalize once they feel they have sufficiently addressed the crises that prompted their seizure of power. This was the case in Myanmar. The military intervened for fear that political unrest and ethnic-minority separatist insurgencies would destroy Myanmar's always-fragile territorial integrity and sovereignty. Far from suddenly liberalizing in 2010, the regime sought to create a “disciplined democracy” to safeguard its preferred social and political order twice before, but was thwarted by societal opposition. Its success in 2010 stemmed from a strategy of coercive state-building and economic incorporation via “ceasefire capitalism”, which weakened and co-opted much of the opposition. Having altered the balance of forces in its favour, the regime felt sufficiently confident to impose its preferred settlement. However, the transition neither reflected total “victory” for the military nor secured a genuine or lasting peace.     

War and Democratization: Legality,Legitimacy and Effectiveness

Promotion of democracy in post-war and post-conflict societies became a hot topic during the 1990s. External actors linked their peace-building efforts to the promotion of democracy. Four modes of promotion of democracy by external actors can be distinguished: first, enforcing democratization by enduring post-war occupation (mode 1); second, restoring an elected government by military intervention (mode 2); third, intervening in on-going massacres and civil war with military forces (‘humanitarian intervention’) and thereby curbing the national sovereignty of those countries (mode 3); and fourth, forcing democracy on rogue states by ‘democratic intervention’, in other words, democracy through war (mode 4). In this special issue we consider the legality, legitimacy, and effectiveness of the four modes where the international community of states not only felt impelled to engage in military humanitarian or peace-building missions but also in long-term state- and democracy-building. All cases analysed here suggest that embedding democratization in post-war and post-conflict societies entails a comprehensive agenda of political, social, and economic methods of peace-building. If external actors withdraw before the roots of democracy are deep enough and before democratic institutions are strong enough to stand alone, then the entire endeavour may fail.     

族性视野中多民族国家族际政治问题比较研究——基于尼日利亚与印度尼西亚民族国家建构的经验观察

族性是影响多民族国家安全及其族际政治走向的关键变量。它既能促进族际政治整合、维护国家安全、有助于民族国家建构,也能导致族际政治冲突、危及国家安全、阻碍民族国家建构。以"族性"为分析视角,通过对尼日利亚与印度尼西亚民族国家建构历程的梳理及其族际政治问题的比较,其共性特征包括:族际政治问题的分析单位是多民族国家;族际政治问题虽然发生在现实中的多民族国家,却往往带有深刻的历史根源;政治与文化边界的重叠是族际政治问题产生的逻辑起点;国内不同民族群体无法得到平等公正对待是导致族际政治问题的核心因素;军事专政和腐败会增加族际政治问题的风险和国家安全的不确定性。解决多民族国家族际政治问题、确保国家安全的关键在于如何让一个在历史上和观念中都不曾存在的国家民族能够超越族性分界而被成功建构。结合两国国情提出应对策略:寻找重叠共识,建构文化多元、政治一体的国族共同体;借鉴差异政治和差别公民权利思想,探寻积极回应不同民族群体正当利益诉求、实现各族人民成果共享、利益均沾的政治制度、体制和机制;消除军人在政治生活中的影响,惩治腐败;探索包容促进多语言、多宗教和谐相处的民族政策。     

Madagascar between peace and conflict—domestic capabilities for peaceful conflict management

Despite severe political instability and many political crises since independence, Madagascar has experienced peace for nearly four decades. Unlike the dominant research on causes of armed conflict, this article focuses on the causes of peace. It introduces a new concept—domestic capabilities for peaceful conflict management—to identify factors related to conflict fault lines, civil–military relations and a culture of constructive conflict management, that facilitate the prevalence of peace. The domestic capabilities for peaceful conflict management perspective draws attention away from preventive diplomacy and external intervention and places the focus on internal capabilities for peace. On this basis, the article also analyses the severe crisis in 2009 and how it was handled.     

External Intervention in Ethnic Conflict

Recently, ethnicity has received greater attention from international conflict scholars. This study explores a new aspect of how ethnic composition of states and the power of ethnic kin affect external state interventions in ethnic conflicts. Here it is hypothesized that states with dominant ethnic groups but still-significant ethnic minorities are expected to be more prone to intervention in ethnic conflict than states without one of these two characteristics. A new measure is proposed to capture such variation in ethnic composition more precisely. Looking at large-N panel data, it is found that ethnically fractionalized states with dominant ethnic groups are indeed the most likely to intervene in ethnic conflicts. Additionally, the power of the embattled ethnic kin minority, as determined by its settlement patterns in the host state, also increases the likelihood of intervention. Traditional variables like proximity and capability retain statistical significance. However, ethnic variables have the strongest effects on interventions in ethnic conflict.     

Problems of maintaining defense security in today's world

This article addresses critical problems relating to Russian defense requirements in the first decades of the twenty‐first century. In the modern system of defense security two interrelated problems come clearly into view. On the one hand, political‐diplomatic, economic, informational and other non‐military means are necessary to resolve antagonisms, prevent conflicts, and provide for the national defense. On the other hand, when all these capabilities are exhausted, one must be ready to use military force. The author discusses the international environment confronting Russia, the threats facing the state, the organization of national defense, force structure, the nature of possible armed conflicts and the ways in which the armed forces and other troops may be used, and military training and education of personnel.     

19世纪马来半岛的社会环境与华人秘密结社

19世纪马来半岛是一个典型的移民社会,人口增长飞快,男女比例严重失调,社会关系极不稳定,政治统治力量薄弱,社会冲突频繁不已。移民社会关系的重组和脆弱,以及社会的暴力化倾向,为超自然关系的、并带有武装暴力色彩的华人秘密结社提供了广阔的成长环境。     

Elections and “sons of the soil” conflict dynamics in Africa and Asia

Recent research reveals that nearly one-third of ethnic civil wars since 1945 have been “sons of the soil” (SoS) conflicts that pit indigenous populations against internal migrants. Despite important differences across SoS conflicts, many share a common trait as they often escalate during elections. While scholars have examined the causal mechanisms behind electoral violence, the relationship between elections and SoS conflicts has been overlooked. By examining a wide range of cases, the article breaks with previous research that privileges in-depth case studies of SoS conflicts with high levels of violence. Using insights from recent fieldwork in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Indonesia, the article sheds light on the causal dynamics that link elections and diverging levels of SoS conflict. In so doing, it illustrates how the severing of patronage networks and the shifting balance of power towards migrants create fertile contexts for political elites to instrumentalize local grievances. Elections are thus more likely to produce violent SoS conflicts when elites (at both the national and local levels) are able to mobilize supporters by playing upon these grievances, often through the politicization of citizenship and/or the ethnicization of the local sphere.     

民族分裂主义及其治理模式研究

具有高度政治分离目标和主权诉求的民族分裂主义是导致国内、国际政治失序和政局动荡的重要因素。由于民族分裂主义不时出现在国际政治的发展进程中,不时搅动或重组原有的政治格局,因而抑制和应对民族分裂主义是必要的多民族国家治理功能。实现有效的民族分裂主义治理应当从分析民族分裂主义的特点和诱发机制起步。发生普遍、目标明确、诱因复杂、认同坚韧是民族分裂主义的特点。利用和强化族性认同、渲染政治主张、通过动员形成集体行动、获取外部支持等环节构成了民族分裂主义行动的诱发机制。因循民族分裂主义生成与发展的机理,从无条件捍卫主权的理路采取的严厉打击模式,从不同程度赋权的理路采取政治容留模式,从消减族性动员的理路采取认同调控模式,从抑制精英力量的理路采取柔性控制模式,从转化政治生态的理路采取外部干预模式,可成为多民族国家治理中的参考。     

Blurring the Dividing Line: The Convergence of Internal and External Security in Western Europe

Abstract

A distinctive feature of the security landscape in western Europe of the post-Cold War era is that the dividing line between internal and external security has become increasingly obsolete—mainly as a consequence of the growing importance of transnational as well as other challenges to security which defy the distinction between domestic and international security. This article examines this convergence of internal and external security agendas from the perspective of the coercive apparatus of western European countries, pointing to a militarisation and externalisation of policing, and an internalisation and ‘policisation’ of soldiering: while police forces are taking on military characteristics, and are extending their activities beyond the borders of the state, military forces are turning to internal security missions, and are adopting certain police features. Moreover, agencies which have traditionally been located at the interface between police and military forces, i.e. gendarmerie-type or paramilitary forces, are assuming an increasingly important role.     

Moldova and Transdniestria: Painful past,deadlocked present,uncertain future

The ethnic conflict between Slavs and Moldovans in the Moldovan region of Transdniestria is one of the lesser‐known post‐Soviet conflicts, as, mercifully, its scale never reached that of conflict in Chechnya or Nagorny‐Karabakh. Nevertheless, this conflict, which started in 1990 after the Russian‐speaking Slavic minority on the left bank of the Dniester declared its independence from the Romanian‐speaking right bank, has claimed hundreds of lives. Today, it remains unresolved; a political settlement has not been achieved. The frozen ceasefire in the region simply preserved the status quo which is virtual independence for the self‐declared, but not recognised by any other state, Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), or Dniester Republic, from Moldova.

This work seeks to attempt to answer the following questions: what were the roots of the ethno‐political conflict in Moldova ? What were the circumstances that prompted the escalation of the conflict into bloodshed? To what extent did external forces influence events, and, finally, what are the prospects for a political settlement in the republic?     

Dismantling former Yugoslavia,recolonising Bosnia

Recent conflicts in the Balkans have been portrayed largely in terms of ethnic and religious divisions, with Western military and diplomatic intervention seen as essential to securing a positive outcome. However, these divisions are the consequence of a deeper process of economic and political fracturing. The re-structuring of the former Yugoslav economy, and the policies of the international financial institutions, have not been sufficiently emphasised. However, the author contends that, far from being the basis for social and economic reconstruction, the application of free-market policies in former Yugoslavia favoured the dismantling of social-welfare structures and contributed to the rapid decline in national economic capacity. The terms of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords suggest that a similar future is in store for the successor states of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia.     

后苏哈托时代印尼军队的改革

印尼军队的改革主要是解决军队“双重职能”的问题。印尼军队的改革随着国家领导人的更迭以及军队内部派系斗争而呈波浪形轨迹发展，但总的趋势是往“军队非政治化与政治过程非军事化”的方向发展。军队的改革经历了哈比比与瓦希德执政时期的混乱，以及梅加瓦蒂时期的停滞不前之后，随着倾向于改革的苏西洛成为总统再一次提上日程。到目前为止已经在军政关系、军队职能立法、军队结构重组等方面取得了不少成就。影响印尼军队改革因素主要是印尼政府与军队以及军队内部之间的权力斗争、国内族群冲突与地区分离主义运动、军队经费不足、军队参与政治的传统等。     

Explaining the number of rebel groups in civil wars

Why do multiple rebel groups form in some civil wars but not others? Since 1946, only half of all civil wars were fought by a single rebel group; the rest were fought by multiple groups. This article argues that this variation is determined by the incentives political entrepreneurs have to enter a war. The higher the demand for political change and the lower the costs of fighting, the more incentives entrepreneurs have to form their own group. Analyzing UCDP data for all civil wars between 1946 and 2015 I find that the two measures of demand – the number of identifiable ethnic or religious groups in a country and the size of the disgruntled population – have the most consistent effects, but that key measures of costs such as the size of the government military also matter. A detailed analysis of the Ethiopian case further reveals the influence of external intervention on the formation of rebel groups. These results suggest that rebel groups emerge in civil wars in rational, predictable ways related to the ease by which rebel elites can mobilize separate groups for fighting.     

The Cold War and Counter-Insurgency

Due to the American-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, theories surrounding counter-insurgency, or COIN, have aroused intense debate in political, military, and academic circles in the United States, Britain, and other Western countries. This article shows that current thinking about how to fight and defeat insurgent movements is based primarily on Cold War-era theories and conflicts. It traces the evolution in COIN thinking both before and during the Cold War—incorporating Western and Eastern bloc experiences of war against insurgents from Malaya to Afghanistan—but also illustrates the conceptual difficulties of applying doctrines based on the historical record of this era. The article concludes by arguing that theories derived from the experiences of states involved in COIN campaigns from 1945 to 1991 still retain utility, but that there are significant differences between Cold War insurgencies and current conflicts associated with the “war on terror”/“long war” which affect the applicability of doctrines based on historical analysis and the works of Thompson, Kitson, Galula, and other “classic” theorists.     

Fuel to the Fire: Natural Disasters and the Duration of Civil Conflict

Do natural disasters prolong civil conflict? Or are disasters more likely to encourage peace as hostilities diminish when confronting shared hardship or as shifts in the balance of power between insurgents and the state hasten cessation? To address these questions, this study performs an event history analysis of disasters’ impact on the duration of 224 armed intrastate conflicts occurring in 86 states between 1946 and 2005. I contend that natural disasters increase conflict duration by decreasing the state’s capacity to suppress insurgency, while reinforcing insurgent groups’ ability to evade capture and avoid defeat. First, disasters’ economic impact coupled with state financial outlays for disaster relief and reconstruction, reduce resources available for counterinsurgency and nation building in conflict zones. Second, the military’s role in administering humanitarian assistance can reduce the availability of troops and military hardware for counterinsurgency, prompt temporary ceasefires with insurgents, or both. Third, natural disasters can cause infrastructural damages that disproportionately hinder the state’s capacity to execute counterinsurgency missions, thereby making insurgent forces more difficult to capture and overcome. The combination of these dynamics should encourage longer conflicts in states with higher incidence of disaster. Empirical evidence strongly supports this contention, indicating that states with greater disaster vulnerability fight longer wars.