Peace building and spoilers

As the UN Peacebuilding Commission begins to plan it work, it is important to consider how to deal with ‘spoilers’ as a threat to security: groups that actively seek to hinder or undermine conflict settlement. This paper takes a broad approach to the concept of spoiling and considers a wide range of actors as potential spoilers: not only rebel groups and insurgents, but also diasporas, governments and other entities. The authors demonstrate that imposed or ill-conceived peace processes can sow the seeds of spoiling, but that spoiler violence does not necessarily indicate that a peace process is doomed to failure.     

Talking with terrorists,talking with governments: insurgent perspectives on legitimisation and engagement

ABSTRACT

It is often claimed that “talking to terrorists legitimises terrorism”. But analysts too often assume that insurgents seek standard forms of liberal-legalistic legitimisation through engagement with the state. From a Weberian perspective, however, liberal-legalistic legitimacy is one of a myriad of symbolic and practical grounds for legitimisation. This paper takes a political sociological approach to the problem of legitimacy in “terrorist” conflicts through a comparative analysis of Irish republican and Basque separatist efforts to end the campaigns of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA). There are three principal findings. First, violent insurgents often reject liberal-legalistic legitimatisation and instead seek recognition of their capacity to shape the trajectories of conflicts – and therefore recognition of their centrality to ending them. Second, the pursuit by violent insurgents for recognition of capacity often comes into conflict with their non-violent allies’ pursuit of liberal-legalistic legitimisation, which can hinder peace-making. Finally, the pursuit of these forms of legitimisation structure peace processes in that armed groups seeking recognition demand direct talks with governments, while legitimacy-seeking non-violent insurgents emphasise engagement with political parties and non-violent organisations. The relative balance between symbolic goals thus shapes the practice of peace-making in such conflicts.     

Success or Failure in the Peace Processes of Aceh and Sri Lanka: A Comparative Study

Abstract

This study examines why some internal conflicts end in negotiated agreements, while negotiations fail in others. In order to address this question, I compare the cases of Aceh, where some 30 years of armed conflict ended in a 2005 peace agreement between Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, the Free Aceh Movement) and the government of Indonesia; and Sri Lanka, where 2002–2006 negotiations between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam broke down. This study adopts ideas from bargaining theories of war, focusing on the adversaries’ power perceptions in relation to actions that led to the civil war settlements. It identifies three variables as decisive: (1) information revealed by war, (2) control over spoilers, and (3) divisions in the ranks of the rebel organization.     

Bringing the Insurgents Back In: Early Wars in British India

What role do weaker actors play in determining the outcomes of irregular wars? The literature on counterinsurgency outcomes has tended to explain weak-side victory either as a result of informational asymmetries caused by constraints on counterinsurgent forces, or as a result of suboptimal strategic choices by the state. We suggest that this underplays the role of insurgents themselves; we attempt to “bring the insurgents back in,” giving variation in insurgent polity a role in explaining their own victories and defeats. In order to do so, we focus inductively on a relatively novel pool of cases: Great Britain's wars in India from the mid-eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries. Doing so allows us to hold the counterinsurgent side constant while evaluating variance among the insurgents themselves. We find that variance on the insurgent side is indeed significant in determining outcomes, and suggest possible reasons why this occurs.     

Gangsters or Gandhians? The Political Sociology of the Maoist Insurgency in India

This article combines concepts from political sociology with evidence from newspaper reports, insurgent and state documents, and ethnographic studies in order to understand the nature of the Maoist insurgency in India. The first section argues that the insurgency should be conceptualized as a state building enterprise rather than organized crime. It demonstrates that both insurgent violence and fundraising serve, on the whole, the collective interests of the state building enterprise – i.e., to consolidate insurgent control in their base areas – rather than the private interests of individual insurgents. The second section seeks to understand how Maoist state builders undermine and fragment the Indian state’s monopoly of the means of violence and administration in areas where they operate. In some areas the state is totally absent, while in others the state forms alliances with the insurgents at the local level in order to maintain the semblance of a sovereign and democratic ruler.     

Separating the Sheep from the Goats among Africa's Separatist Movements

Currently at least 12 separatist/secessionist movements are engaged in negotiations or campaigns of violence (guerrilla and regular armed conflict) in Africa. But though they are agreed on the need for radical constitutional change, they are not agreed on the solutions. More than that, they rarely maintain a unity of aim within their ranks at any given moment of time, or a consistency of aim over time. It is these shifting political objectives and the nature of the calculations behind them that this article intends to examine. At every stage of the conflict the movements' leaders have to assess the advantages of a secessionist policy as opposed to a separatist (or re-negotiated unitary state) policy. This article finds that among the most crucial factors to be weighed are popular support, state response, international recognition, and personal opportunities. There are important consequences of this shifting of political objectives. It makes typologies based on their political objectives and/or methods of limited value; political support problematic; attempts by governments to induce separatist leaders to defect or compromise worthwhile; and certain elements in the population of the homeland more vulnerable. This is the biggest hindrance to successful separatist movements.     

The Peacekeeping–Peacemaking Dilemma

Peacekeeping has become an increasingly prominent tool for conflict management and there has been an accompanying explosion of scholarly studies on peacekeeping. Yet, such analyses typically ignore the process of getting a peace agreement itself, missing the potential impact that a peacekeeping force might have in facilitating a peace agreement between protagonists. In this paper, we explore among both enduring rivalries and civil wars whether the presence of a peacekeeping force enhances the prospects for gaining an agreement between protagonists. The academic literature suggests opposing logics: one suggesting the desirability of peacekeeping forces while the other implies that they may be counterproductive. We consider whether the presence of peacekeeping enhances or inhibits mediation and negotiation attempts. We also explore whether the success rates for international mediation and negotiation efforts in those conflicts are affected by the presence of peacekeeping forces. Our results suggest support for the pessimistic view of peacekeeping as it discourages diplomatic efforts and decreases the likelihood of achieving a settlement, although the results are clearer for interstate conflict than for civil wars.     

Beheading the Hydra: Counterinsurgent Violence and Insurgent Attacks in Iraq

We evaluate the effectiveness of anti-insurgent violence as a means to suppress insurgency with micro-level data from the Iraq War. Our findings suggest that while violence against insurgents increases the incidence of future insurgent attacks, the intensity of this violence can significantly influence the outcome. Rather than shifting monotonically, the effect is actually curvilinear, first rising, and then contracting. We argue that at low to moderate levels, violence against insurgents creates opportunities for these groups to signal strength and resolve, which enables them to build momentum, heighten civilian cooperation, and diminish political support for counterinsurgency efforts in these forces’ home countries. The result is an escalation in insurgent attacks. However, at higher levels, this effect should plateau and taper off as insurgent attrition rises, and as civilian fears over personal safety displace grievances that might otherwise provoke counter-mobilization. Our empirical tests on data from the Iraq War, 2004–2009, demonstrate robust support for this argument.     

Terrorism,Counterterrorism, and the Rule of Law

While fighting insurgency, both state and non-state groups depend on the local population for valuable resources such as food, intelligence, and security. By using a repertoire of subsistence coping mechanisms available to households in the context of the local political economy as an indicator of grievances and mechanisms of interactions between local households and the state and insurgents, district level data from Nepal on Maoist conflict is used to test hypotheses regarding state and insurgent violence. The analysis confirms that the state was more likely to kill people in a district where the number of households that borrowed to cope with subsistence was high. The Maoists were more likely to kill in a district with a higher number of subsistence sufficient households.     

Political sources of military defeat in post-communist ethnic conflicts

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, serious ethnic conflicts erupted in Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia and Tajikistan. In these conflicts, three political factors facilitated and worsened military defeat. First, governments were sometimes unnecessarily entangled in conflicts. In some cases, such entanglement might have been avoided or minimized by making early autonomy concessions to ethnic minorities. Once wars were underway, entanglement could sometimes be minimized by agreeing to ceasefires, rather than by risking premature efforts at a military solution. Second, post-communist countries did not typically inherit professional armed forces, and were bedeviled by internal military division. Military operations against ethnic separatist forces were often conducted before central military control was consolidated, fostering military disarray and defeat. Finally, political rhetoric and military tactics often unnecessarily alienated powerful third parties. The resulting external intervention also contributed to military defeat. These political factors frequently reinforced one another. Predictably, internal division and adverse external intervention were correlated with lower levels of economic development.     

Social network analysis and counterinsurgency: a counterproductive strategy?

Social network analysis has been adopted by a number of governments in their counterinsurgency campaigns. By using network analysis, security agencies claim they can render militant groups impotent by targeting ‘nodal points’ or key links in insurgent networks. The article makes three arguments on the potentially counterproductive nature of social network analysis-assisted counterinsurgency campaigns. Firstly, social network analysis may be ‘too successful’ in stripping militant movements of a cadre who could negotiate a peace accord. Secondly, social network analysis-assisted campaigns fail to address the root causes of violent conflict. Thirdly, by denuding communities of social capital and social entrepreneurs, social network analysis – as a counterinsurgency tool – may condemn communities to underdevelopment and failed post-war reconstruction. In short, the ‘magic weapon’ of social network analysis might actually prolong the conflict it is supposed to help quell. The article employs the government of Sri Lanka's social network analysis-assisted counterinsurgency campaign as a case study, though it also has application to other cases. It concludes by considering if social network analysis can be put to more constructive uses, specifically in the rebuilding of communities after violent conflict.     

From Tremors to Talks: Do Natural Disasters Produce Ripe Moments for Resolving Separatist Conflicts?

This article suggests that natural disasters can produce a ripe moment for conflict resolution because governments faced with the demand for effective disaster relief have incentives to offer concessions to separatist challengers. An analysis of the prevalence of new negotiations, ceasefires, and peace agreements during 12-month periods before and after natural disasters for separatist dyads 1990–2004 reveal some support for this proposition. Natural disasters increase the likelihood that parties will initiate talks or agree to ceasefires but have less effect on the signing of peace agreements. In line with the proposed mechanism, these results are particularly strong in democracies and following more severe disasters where the need to provide relief is most acute.     

Failed agreements and their impact on subsequent mediation onset and success in intrastate conflicts

ABSTRACT

What impact do failed mediated agreements have on subsequent mediation onset and success? The question of mediation onset and success is undoubtedly important, given that mediation is one of the international community’s preferred conflict management tools, but its voluntary nature leaves room for the conflict parties to (dis)agree to talks and possible settlements. Existing research suggests that previous mediation outcomes can affect subsequent mediation efforts positively or negatively – depending on the outcome in focus. This article argues that failed agreements – an outcome of mediation that has not been accounted for in existing literature – underscore the persistence of the commitment problem, and therefore the hazards of sharing private information. Consequently, the conflict parties question the utility of mediation, and the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset decreases. If subsequent talks take place despite the failed agreement, the conflict parties refrain from sharing private information, and reaching an agreement becomes thus less likely. Drawing on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) Managing Intrastate Conflict in Africa data set and the UCDP Peace Agreement data set, the results strongly underline the negative impact failed agreements have on subsequent mediation onset, and thereby show that agreement longevity is crucial not only for peace duration but also for leaving the door open to subsequent talks.     

Fuel to the Fire: Natural Disasters and the Duration of Civil Conflict

Do natural disasters prolong civil conflict? Or are disasters more likely to encourage peace as hostilities diminish when confronting shared hardship or as shifts in the balance of power between insurgents and the state hasten cessation? To address these questions, this study performs an event history analysis of disasters’ impact on the duration of 224 armed intrastate conflicts occurring in 86 states between 1946 and 2005. I contend that natural disasters increase conflict duration by decreasing the state’s capacity to suppress insurgency, while reinforcing insurgent groups’ ability to evade capture and avoid defeat. First, disasters’ economic impact coupled with state financial outlays for disaster relief and reconstruction, reduce resources available for counterinsurgency and nation building in conflict zones. Second, the military’s role in administering humanitarian assistance can reduce the availability of troops and military hardware for counterinsurgency, prompt temporary ceasefires with insurgents, or both. Third, natural disasters can cause infrastructural damages that disproportionately hinder the state’s capacity to execute counterinsurgency missions, thereby making insurgent forces more difficult to capture and overcome. The combination of these dynamics should encourage longer conflicts in states with higher incidence of disaster. Empirical evidence strongly supports this contention, indicating that states with greater disaster vulnerability fight longer wars.     

暴力方式与民心向背：寻找治理族群叛乱的条件组合

治理族群叛乱的目标既包括土地的控制，也包括人的控制，这是治理族群叛乱区别于其他形式叛乱的特点之一。人的控制实际包含两个内容，既包括人心向背，也包括人员数量的控制。人心向背关乎民众支持，而争取民众支持的必要性在于，虽然拥有民众支持并不必然导致叛乱的平息，但是没有民众支持是不能平息叛乱的。在族群叛乱已经发生的情况下，国家政府只有赢得更多当地民众的支持，才能成功治理叛乱。根据冲突各方的暴力行为方式及其对当地民众支持的影响，成功平息叛乱应具备国家政府有区别使用暴力、叛乱组织无区别使用暴力、当地温和派主导平叛行动等三个必要条件，以争取更多民众支持。这三个条件构成的条件组合，可以有效控制和减少叛乱组织能够招募到的人员数量，只要国家政府的平叛战略能够有效控制叛乱组织所招募的叛乱人员数量，叛乱组织就将走向衰败并最终消亡，也就是说这一条件组合能够成为国家政府成功平叛的一个充分条件。通过对结合俄罗斯、印度和西班牙等国家治理族群叛乱的经验和教训的分析，进一步证实了以上观点。     

Guerrillas,drugs and peasants: The rational peasant and the war on drugs in Peru

Coca eradication programmes in Peru are undermined by the interaction of cocaine economics and insurgent politics. Coca cultivators can earn far more from the illegal market in coca than from any legal crop and government efforts to eradicate coca production create a political space in which Sendero Luminoso guerrillas can cultivate popular support by protecting coca cultivators from law‐enforcement agents and Colombian traffickers. We use a model of peasant decision‐making to assess the impact of crop eradication, crop substitution and drug interdiction strategies on the economic behaviour and political loyalties of Peruvian coca cultivators. We use the model to assess the likelihood that even successful anti‐drug programmes may destabilize the Peruvian government by generating popular support for Sendero Luminoso.     

Threats,opportunity, and force: Repression and diversion of domestic pressure, 1948–1982

This paper explores empirically how domestic political and economic challenges affect political leaders’ propensity to respond with the use of force at home and abroad. The foreign policy and world politics literatures are replete with references to leaders’ alleged use of external conflict when confronted with domestic challenges, but rarely consider domestic responses to dissent or the role of interstate threats. Comparative research on repression primarily focuses on linkages between domestic challenges and leaders’ resort to repressive policies, but ignores international alternatives. Neither literature considers the influence of external threats and opportunity structures on resort to use of force and coercion at home and abroad. Alternatively, we contend that foreign conflict and repression are complementary and potentially interchangeable policies that leaders may use to maintain political power in the face of domestic pressure. We hypothesize that the level of domestic political constraints conditions the opportunity and likelihood of selecting either repression or foreign conflict in response to domestic challenges. Since the ability to capitalize on external conflict involvement in all likelihood is not independent of international opportunity structures, we explicitly address differences in the availability of historical interstate animosity. We test our hypotheses on resort to repression and external dispute involvement on a global sample of political leaders for the period 1948–82. Our results indicate that repression and external conflict involvement appear to be largely independent and driven by different challenges: While there is some evidence that domestic conflict increases the likelihood of disputes and that external threat may promote repression, there is little support for the idea of direct substitution in kind since leaders frequently combine both dispute involvement and repression.     

印度尼西亚国家认同的危机与重构

一、国家认同的含义“认同”是社会研究领域最基本的概念之一 ,就是指自我具有从属于某个群体的身份。无论是对具有情感的个人 ,还是作为文化载体的群体来说 ,正是这种对身份的确认(认同)将“我者”与“他者”区别开来。这种认同最初虽然起源于物质主义的因素 ,但在后来不断演化的漫长历史中 ,却是逐渐由观念主义的因素建构出来的。认同分个人认同和集体认同。所谓国家认同 ,通俗地说 ,就是指“一个人确认自己属于哪一个国家以及这个国家究竟是怎样一个国家的心理活动” ①。所谓“这个国家究竟是怎样一个国家” ,主要指的是“我国”区别于…     

Retaliation in Rebellion: The Missing Link to Explaining Insurgent Violence in Dagestan

This article posits that the remnants of archaic sociocultural norms, particularly the honour-imposed custom of retaliation, play a crucial role in the process of insurgent engagement in Russia's autonomous republic of Dagestan. Through a series of interviews with former insurgents, this study outlines two retaliation-centred mechanisms: “individual retaliation” and “spiritual retaliation” in order to explain the microcosm of motives behind insurgent activity in Dagestan. In doing so, this study problematizes the role of Salafi/Jihadist ideology as the main impetus for insurgent violence. Reversing the traditional causal link between violence and religion, this study also demonstrates that the development of Jihadist ideology is a by-product of insurgent mobilization rather than its cause.     

Is the Russian federation becoming more democratic? Moscow‐regional relations and the development of the post‐Soviet Russian State

This article addresses the condition of Russian democracy by focusing on the developing political relations between the central government and regional governments. A situation of profound ambivalence and ambiguity has evolved since ratification of the Russian Federation Constitution in December 1993. Regional governments have found it possible to gain a degree of political autonomy uncharacteristic of Russia's long historical experience, yet increasingly in line with global trends toward decentralization of governmental authority. Two political patterns in the current Russian Federation are explored, both of them promising broad and enduring significance. First, the political ambiguity of relations between the national government and regional authorities may provide the context in which divided government serves to enable democracy, despite the appearance of authoritarian rule in many regions themselves. Second, the nature of the interaction between the centre and regional authorities may be breaking new ground, in terms of flexible solutions to intra‐state relations among different levels of government. Because certain aspects of centre‐regional relations in the Russian Federation replicate comparable issues elsewhere (particularly regarding the ethnic‐territorial dimension of politics), the Federation's approaches and solutions to this aspect of state‐formation could suggest useful lessons for other parts of the world.