NATO and the Arctic: is the Atlantic alliance a cold war relic in a peaceful region now faced with non-military challenges?

Abstract

This article analyzes which role the Atlantic Alliance plays in the Arctic and whether it can contribute to the security and territorial integrity of its members in the region. In a dramatic change from the cold war era, the Arctic is no longer at the center of a conflict between two hostile superpowers. But what can a basically military organization such as NATO – though with proven political functions – contribute to stabilizing the Arctic region if its major challenges are non-military? With regional challenges resulting mostly from globalization and climate change, it is open to question whether a military alliance such as NATO has the will and the capability to cope with them. We might thus need to look also at individual members’ interests and abilities besides searching for joint alliance action. If we find NATO not up to the challenges, which alternative institutions offer themselves for coping with the political conflicts and controversies in the Polar region?     

German Military Reform 1998–2004: Leadership and the Triumph of Domestic Constraint over International Opportunity

Abstract

The article analyses the processes and outcomes of military reforms during the two Schröder governments (1998–2005). These reforms are the litmus test for Germany's willingness and ability to play an important role in crisis-management tasks as part of NATO, CESDP and the UN. The study argues that, despite its strengths, the concept of strategic culture provides only a partial explanation of military reform in Germany. The article illustrates the strongly self-referential nature of Bundeswehr reform, despite adaptational pressures from the EU and NATO and the role of ‘international structure’. The domestic politics of base closures, ramifications for social policy, economic and financial restrictions consequent upon German unification and commitment to EMU's Stability and Growth Pact were critical in determining the outcomes of the reform processes undertaken by Defence Ministers Rudolf Scharping and Peter Struck. The study also draws out the important role of policy leaders in the political manipulation of reform as entrepreneurs, brokers or veto-players and in controlling the extent of adaptational pressure from NATO and the EU. In doing so, the article shifts the focus of leadership studies in Germany away from the Chancellor to an examination of the role of ministerial and administrative leadership within the core executive.     

The Capability–Capacity Crunch: NATO's New Capacities for Intervention

Abstract

In September 2006 NATO's role in Afghanistan expanded to cover the whole of the country. With 32,000 troops under NATO command Stage 4 of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) represents an open-ended commitment to rebuilding a country long torn by war and instability. The Alliance's showpiece for advanced military transformation, the the NATO Response Force (NRF) represents a down payment on the future of transatlantic military co-operation. Taken together these two developments reflect the reality of NATO's new interventionism of an Alliance that bears little or no resemblance to that which won the Cold War. NATO today is an organisation designed for global reach and global effect, undertaking operations at their most robust. Unfortunately, the re-design of NATO's architecture has not been matched by a parallel development in Alliance military capabilities. NATO's big three, the US, Britain and France, have taken steps to improve their military capabilities. However, the transformation of NATO's other militaries has proved slow and uneven, leaving many members unable to fulfil any meaningful role. Thus, as NATO today plans for both robust advanced expeditionary warfare and stabilisation and reconstruction vital to mission success in complex crisis management environments a gap is emerging. Indeed, in an Alliance in which only the Americans can afford both military capability and capacity most NATO Europeans face a capability–capacity crunch, forced to make a choice between small, lethal and expensive professional military forces or larger, cheaper more ponderous stabilisation and reconstruction forces. This article explores the consequences of the crunch and the implications for NATO's current and future role as the Alliance struggles to find a balance between fighting power and staying power.     

Bearing their share of the burden: Europe in Afghanistan

Abstract

This article assesses the relative burden European members of NATO are bearing in the war in Afghanistan. Some argue that the current contribution of European forces is on par with the American contribution. However, current studies do not analyze Europe's ISAF contribution in comparison to some benchmark by which relative burden-sharing can be accurately determined. This article compares Europe's involvement in the war in Afghanistan to past missions, current contributions and in light of the benefits each country is likely to enjoy. The quantitative and qualitative findings show that there is an extensive amount of free-riding occurring both in terms of hard and soft power, although it varies across time and even within NATO Europe. Inadequate forces provided by European NATO countries jeopardize the likelihood of success in Afghanistan.     

The changing role of NATO: exploring the implications for security governance and legitimacy

Abstract

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATOs) changing role was debated in the face of the Strategic Concept adopted in late 2010. Two main roles can be identified in the debate; that of NATO as a defence organisation and a security organisation. The article analyses the implications of these roles for security governance and the Alliance's legitimacy – with emphasis on the novelties associated with the role of NATO as a security organisation. This development suggests an increasing need for security governance, something which is reflected in the debate. However, how for instance decision-making and implementation function in a more fragmented environment is unclear. If NATO develops its role as a security organisation new audiences are introduced that determine its appropriateness and the basis of the Alliance's input and output legitimacy changes.     

NATO's Response Force: finally getting it right?

Abstract

At the Riga Summit in November 2006, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) declared the NATO Response Force (NRF) a fully operational capability. Yet only 8 months later – and behind closed doors – the Alliance's military authorities rescinded the declaration as it became increasingly clear that member states were unwilling to make the necessary commitments to the force. To this day, the force has been a qualified failure: while many allies have benefited from participating in the NRF, lack of concrete troop commitments and disagreement as to the force's operational role have largely eroded its credibility. This could change with the allies' recent adoption of a revised NRF-construct. However, as NATO is still in a state of strategic confusion, the NRF is likely to continue to be different things to different nations.     

Defense planning in the fog of peace: the transatlantic currency conversion conundrum

ABSTRACT

Resource allocation to and within defense budgets is grand strategy. NATO and the EU coordinate defense planning and encourage fair burden-sharing among their members. We analyze the effect of agreed planning processes, namely the “NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP)” on the conversion of political will to resources and then to capabilities development across the transatlantic security community. In a “fog of peace” featuring diverse threats, and in which allies may disagree on strategic rivals and sources of risk, national and regional political economies shape strategy, not the other way around.     

Prompting democratic transitions from abroad: International donors and multi‐partyism in Tanzania

It is generally accepted that the international donor community influences the politics of recipient states. In particular, donor calls for political liberalization are seen to have had, and continue to have, effects upon democratization in countries dependent upon international economic assistance. Such democratic contingency tied to aid suggests that the continuation of aid flows, and possibly an increase in aid transfer sums, occurs in response to political liberalization. It also implies the threat of decreases in, or even cessation of, foreign aid should the recipient state fail to implement political reform. This research assesses the role that the donor community plays in recipient states’ transition to democracy, focusing on Tanzania as a case study. Tanzania, a major recipient of foreign aid, underwent fundamental political reform in 1992. This study combines analysis of fluctuations in bilateral aid flows to Tanzania with interpretations of the causal role played by donor pressure from the perspectives of representatives of the donor community as well as from members of Tanzania's political elite. These perspectives are derived from original interviews conducted by the author. The findings indicate no correlation between fluctuations in aid transfers and Tanzania's implementation of multi‐party democracy. Rather, it was the perception among the Tanzanian leadership of a direct linkage between donor aid disbursements and political liberalization that prompted the political transition.     

Soviet propaganda and the neutron bomb decision

Abstract

In July 1977, newly elected President Jimmy Carter suddenly found himself confronted with a difficult neutron bomb decision. With a narrow victory in Congress, pro neutron‐bomb forces had successfully presented the President with the authority to proceed with production. Unfortunately, as the months passed, Carter failed to move swiftly with production of the neutron warheads which many NATO alliance members saw as a much needed deterrent to the Warsaw PACT'S massive armor superiority.

Confronted with mounting international and domestic opposition to the neutron weapon, Jimmy Carter, in the fall of 1977, insisted that the NATO allies officially support American production of the warheads before the United States would produce it. Spurred on by Carter's indecision and by certain NATO members’ reluctance to officially support the weapon, the Soviet Union shifted its propaganda machine into high gear in a massive effort to sway international opinion against the weapon.

During the first few months of 1978, Western Europe saw a flood of protests against this so‐called “inhumane” weapon. Domestic communist and left‐wing socialist opposition to the neutron bomb precipitated a precarious right‐left split within many Western European socialist parties. Nowhere was this split more graphically illustrated than within the ruling West German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his moderate technocrats basically favored the neutron bomb, but feared crippling left‐wing SPD opposition and possible defections if West Germany complied with American demands to break with over 30 years of U.S.‐West German nuclear precedent and agree officially to American production of a nuclear weapon, the neutron bomb.

Only after much American cajoling did the allies move toward official NATO support for production. Carter had failed to understand the disastrous political implications which left‐wing opposition had created within the NATO countries and refused to let Schmidt and other leaders off the hook. And then in an amazing move, after Schmidt and the NATO allies had risked political ruin to reach an agreement to support the neutron bomb, President Carter pulled the rug from under them on April 7,1978, when he indefinitely delayed a decision on the weapon.

With this decision, Carter had set a dangerous precedent by yielding to Soviet pressure and had missed an opportunity to win the favor of skeptical NATO allies and critics who asserted he was too weak and indecisive. But above all, Carter had unnecessarily alienated and angered NATO leaders like Schmidt who risked possible political ruin by supporting the neutron bomb.     

NATO: The View from the East

Abstract

Relations between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and NATO have placed more emphasis on cooperation than confrontation since the Cold War, and Ukraine has begun to move towards membership. At the popular level, on the evidence of national surveys in 2004 and 2005, NATO continues to be perceived as a significant threat, but in Russia and Ukraine it comes behind the United States (in Belarus the numbers are similar). There are few socioeconomic predictors of support for NATO membership that are significant across all three countries, but there are wide differences by region, and by attitudinal variables such as support for a market economy and for EU membership. The relationship between popular attitudes and foreign policy is normally a distant one; but in Ukraine NATO membership will require public support in a referendum, and in all three cases public attitudes on foreign policy issues can influence foreign policy in other ways, including the composition of parliamentary committees. In newly independent states whose international allegiances are still evolving, the associations between public opinion and foreign and security policy may often be closer than in the established democracies.     

Military professionalism in post‐communist Hungary and Poland: An analysis and assessment

Abstract

This article discusses Russian perceptions of and attitudes toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia has historically disliked and mistrusted NATO, seeing it as the primary threat to its international aspirations; in practice Russia pursues a dual policy. Its harsh condemnation of NATO has not stopped it from cooperating in selected areas of mutual interest. The most important among them is support for NATO's military operations in Afghanistan. The recent rejuvenation of relations between the west and Moscow is known as the strategic ‘reset’, meaning a return to diplomatic contacts and limited cooperation regardless of disagreements over the invasion of Georgia and Moscow's other recent international transgressions. The reset in NATO–Russia relations has only tactical significance, however. Cooperation will take place on a limited basis, but a genuine reset in mutual relations must wait for a reset in Russia's political and strategic priorities.     

NATO Regional peacekeeping center in Central and Eastern Europe: A proposal

Abstract

The article asks what the evolution of NATO–Swedish relations signifies for the understanding of the evolution of security communities. Given the astonishing evolution of NATO and Sweden as a community of practise, it is logical to imagine the two as forming part of the same security community. It could then be argued that common practise can bring about new security communities rather hastily. Analysing NATO's and Sweden's recent discourses on security, the author identifies a significant gap between a principally realist and a predominantly idealist discourse that indicates that the two parties do not share key characteristics of a security community – identities, values and meanings. However, if Libya is the case of the future, the discursive differences may fade and Sweden could more easily pursue its journey towards inclusion in NATO, not as a member of an Alliance, but as a member of NATO as a security community.     

Norway and a major international crisis: Suez ‐ the very difficult case

This article reviews Norway's policy during the Suez crisis in 1956, how the policy was formed and how it can be explained. Emphasis is put on the decision‐making process and on the role of the powerful Norwegian Shipowners’ Association. It also discusses Norway's most important interests and considerations in policy formation, and how they were balanced. Norway's Suez policy is seen in connection with the close relations with Israel, which could be viewed as in conflict with the protection of Norway's NATO membership and vital economic interests, represented by the powerful shipowners. In the end, Norway's Suez policy is put in the context of the change in Norwegian foreign and security policy in general, a shift in emphasis from being Britain's close ally and friend to being under the protective umbrella of the US, the new superpower.     

The impact of the Iraqi Crisis on the transatlantic link. A summary of views on the US–EU and US–NATO relationship

Lithuania's security orientation has evolved significantly since 1991. It has moved from prioritising Baltic and, then, Nordic, cooperation to focusing on partnership with Poland, and seeking NATO and European Union membership. Initially re‐buffed by both, Lithuania has gradually sought to strengthen its de facto ties with NATO and WEU, and to build up its economic ties with the EU and its member states, in the belief that this provided a form of ‘soft’ security, and prepared the way for eventual membership of NATO and the EU.     

Victims of ‘Friendly Fire’? The NRF,the EU BG and Contested Identity Constructions within the Transatlantic Community

Abstract

The NRF and the EU BG were launched to enable NATO and the EU respectively to shed some of their Cold War roles and begin to incorporate new organisational functions as means to meet their members’ needs in a changing global security environment. However, since their launch the two rapid reaction forces have both failed to fully consolidate. Our argument is that an examination of intra-NATO/EU contested identities at three levels (supra-state, state and sub-state) provides us with additional insights for the lack of success in consolidating the two sets of rapid reaction forces.     

European security as practice: EU–NATO communities of practice in the making?

ABSTRACT

European security is at a critical juncture and many have called for a more coherent and efficient response, involving both the EU and NATO. However, the primary tool for EU–NATO cooperation, “Berlin Plus”, has been stuck in a political quagmire since the mid-2000s, making a lot of scholars to conclude that this cooperation is obsolete and outdated. This article is challenging this view by analysing a range of informal but regular interaction patterns that have emerged. Using practice theory, it sheds new light on and explores how EU and NATO staff at all levels engage in informal practices on various sites in headquarters in Brussels and in field operations. A study of EU–NATO cooperation as practice focuses on the everyday, patterned production of security as well as what makes action possible, such as (tacit) practical knowledge and shared “background” knowledge (education, training, and experience). The article also discusses the extent to which shared repertoires of practice may evolve into loose communities of practice that cut across organisational and professional boundaries.