External Intervention in Ethnic Conflict

Recently, ethnicity has received greater attention from international conflict scholars. This study explores a new aspect of how ethnic composition of states and the power of ethnic kin affect external state interventions in ethnic conflicts. Here it is hypothesized that states with dominant ethnic groups but still-significant ethnic minorities are expected to be more prone to intervention in ethnic conflict than states without one of these two characteristics. A new measure is proposed to capture such variation in ethnic composition more precisely. Looking at large-N panel data, it is found that ethnically fractionalized states with dominant ethnic groups are indeed the most likely to intervene in ethnic conflicts. Additionally, the power of the embattled ethnic kin minority, as determined by its settlement patterns in the host state, also increases the likelihood of intervention. Traditional variables like proximity and capability retain statistical significance. However, ethnic variables have the strongest effects on interventions in ethnic conflict.     

Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior

This article investigates the influence of transnational ethnic alliances on the international interactions of states. Transnational ethnic alliances exist when both states in a dyad contain members of the same ethnic group. We argue that two types of dyads will experience higher levels of conflict than other dyads: (1) those where an advantaged minority in state A has an ethnic tie to a nonadvantaged minority in state B, and (2) those with a transnational ethnic alliance where the group in one of the states is politically mobilized. Using data from the COPDAB, Minorities at Risk, Polity II, COW, and Penn World Tables projects we find support for these contentions.     

Threats to Primal Identities: A Comparison of Nationalism and Religion as Impacts on Ethnic Protest and Rebellion

The post World War II world has witnessed a proliferation of conflicts based on ethnic differences. Religion and national identity are two dominant features of many of these ethnic struggles. The purpose of this study is to determine which of the two has a greater impact on protest and rebellion using large-n methodology, employing variables from the Minorities at Risk Phase 3 dataset as well as data collected independently. It was found that the simple answer is that nationalism has a greater impact on conflict than does religion. However, this simple answer is not an accurate answer. This is because the simple answer that nationalism has a greater influence is to a great extent due to the fact that the majority of ethnic conflicts are between groups that are not religiously different. If one looks only at those ethnic conflicts where religion can potentially be a factor, religious and national issues are involved in ethnic conflicts approximately as often. Also, while religious issues alone seem to have less of an influence on ethnic conflict than national issues, religious issues have a strong influence on the relationship between nationalism and ethnic conflict, to the extent that the relationship between nationalism and ethnic conflict can not be fully understood without accounting for the influence of religion.     

Religious Causes of Discrimination against Ethno-Religious Minorities

Most existing large-n cross-sectional analyses of ethnic conflict focus on the behavior of the ethnic minority rather than the behavior of the state. That is, they tend to attempt to predict or explain the level of protest or rebellion in which ethnic minorities engage at the expense of determining the causes for the behavior of the government of the state in which these minorities live. Previous studies have determined that discrimination against minority groups is one of the major causes of ethnic protest and rebellion. In addition, much of the literature on ethnic conflict does not sufficiently deal with the religious causes of that conflict. Accordingly this study focuses on the causes of discrimination with a particular emphasis on the religious causes. This study analyzes two populations from the Minorities at Risk dataset: the 105 religiously differentiated minorities and the 163 minorities that are not religiously differentiated. The results show that religious factors influence the process that leads to discrimination and that the causes of religious discrimination are distinct from the causes of other types of discrimination. In addition, the dynamics of this process are markedly different between the two populations analyzed here. All of this, along with other factors, implies that religion is not merely a reflection of general cultural differences, but rather has a distinct and separate influence on ethnic conflict.     

Transnational Transmitters: Ethnic Kinship Ties and Conflict Contagion 1946–2009

Previous research has proposed that ethnic conflict may spread across borders. Although the importance of transnational ethnic groups is often emphasized, the processes through which contagion may take place remain unspecified. The present study presents a context for more precise analysis of contagion. Further, it identifies distinct processes through which contagion is likely to occur within this context. It is argued that when an ethnic group engages in violent conflict in one state, kin in a nearby state may be inspired to rebel because the outbreak of conflict renders ethnic bonds and similar conditions salient. These bonds and similarities become even more salient when the kin group has opportunities and willingness to mobilize for rebellion. Statistical analysis employing unique global data covering 1946–2009 supports this argument. These results indicate that kinship ties matter for contagion and identify some of the conditions which amplify the effects such ties have for contagion.     

Rape as terror: The case of Bosnia

When ethnic minority parties are excluded from government coalitions, are group attributes such as religion related to the groups’ use of political violence? We argue that extremist factions within minority groups make use of divergence in religion to mobilize support for violent action when the group is excluded from government. Thus, we posit that while religion per se is not a source of violence, extremist elements of ethnic minorities, whose religion differs from the majority, may use religious divergence to mobilize group members to perpetrate terrorism. Specifically we test the hypotheses that extremist factions of an excluded group will be more likely to carry out terrorist attacks when the group's members belong to a different religion as well as when they belong to a different denomination or sect of a religion than the majority. To test these propositions, we use data on ethnic minority party inclusion in government coalitions, ethnic minority group religion, and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by matching perpetrators with ethnic groups for all democracies, 1970–2004.     

Civil War Diffusion and the Emergence of Militant Groups, 1960–2001

In this research note, I argue that scholars of the international diffusion of civil conflict would benefit from directly measuring rebel mobilization prior to the onset of civil war. To better understand the way in which international processes facilitate dissidents overcoming the collective action problem inherent in rebellion, I focus on militant organizations and model the timing of their emergence. I use several data sets on militant groups and violent nonstate actors and rely on Buhaug and Gleditsch’s (2008) causal framework to examine how international conditions predict militant group emergence. While Buhaug and Gleditsch conclude that civil war diffusion is primarily a function of internal conflict in neighboring states, once militant group emergence is substituted in the dependent variable, I observe that global conditions affect rebel collective action. A final selection model links militant groups with civil conflict onset and demonstrates the variable performance of diffusion effects. The results indicate that many rebels mobilize in response to more global events and then escalate their behavior in response to local conditions.     

States,Nations, and Territorial Stability: Why Chinese Hegemony Would Be Better for International Order

How would a hegemonic China shape international norms related to states, nations, and territoriality? Scholars have noted the conflict between the right of minority nations to self-determine and the right of states to maintain their territorial integrity. An unrestricted application of the former would risk considerable state fragmentation; an unconditional acceptance of the latter would condemn stateless nations to a subordinate status. Powerful actors like the United States have attempted to navigate these norms by specifying the conditions under which one norm should take precedence over the other, but such decisions are difficult to make in an international environment that lacks consensus, and the result is an ambiguous international order where conflict is common. I analyze the future of these norms in a Chinese-led international order, explaining why China would champion territorial integrity over self-determination, and why this would be better for territorial stability.     

Explaining divergent responses to ethnic exclusion: evidence from two paired comparisons

This article asks why ethnic exclusion from executive-level state power leads to armed conflict in some cases but not in others. To answer this question the author develops a nine-factor model of ethnic conflict, which is used to investigate the diverging conflict trajectories of two pairs of ‘most similar’ ethnic groups. These include the Malinke in Guinea and Northerners in Côte d'Ivoire on the one hand, and Kurds in Syria and Turkey on the other. It is shown that varying responses to ethnic exclusion can mainly be traced back to three factors, which have so far been neglected in the ethnic conflict literature: the selectivity of state violence, the territorial reach of the state and the availability of cross-border sanctuaries. Ethnic rebellion occurs where weak territorial control and indiscriminate repression combine with external sanctuary. Conversely, violent escalation is avoided in a context of strong territorial control, selective repression and no external sanctuary.     

Conflicts between east European states and minorities in an age of democracy

Conflict between dominant and subordinate ethnic groups in eastern Europe has greatly complicated efforts to build stable and just democratic systems in the region. Leaders of new states as well as rulers whose authority extends from the communist era have attempted to create political systems where competition is clearly along ethnic lines. Polarisation and violence have resulted from the manipulation of ethnic feeling, but there are also a range of factors which have encouraged majority and minority representatives to show mutual restraint at crucial moments.

The internationalisation of East European nationality disputes and the gradual acceptance by a number of states of group rights to stand alongside individual ones, have cooled down a number of disputes and possibly forestalled new ones. But the national question will be a troubling one for many still‐fragile democracies unless strong external incentives are offered which encourage states to conciliate internal minorities and estranged neighbours.     

Support for Strongman Rule in Ethnically Divided Societies: Evidence from Estonia and Latvia

Using data from Estonia and Latvia from 2004, this study maps and analyzes support for authoritarianism in ethnically divided societies. It develops and tests three explanatory models, focusing on socialization and the political and economic aspects of regime performance. Because the correlates of authoritarian support may vary by ethnic group, separate models are run for the ethnic majority and the minority. The results lend some support to all three theoretical approaches, although none of these can be considered to be a powerful explanation of support for authoritarianism. The determinants of support for strongman rule vary with ethnicity, suggesting that future studies on political support in multiethnic societies should systematically control for the effects of ethnicity.     

Incentives to Rebel,Bargaining, and Civil War

To fully understand the effects of factors that encourage rebellion, we must differentiate between the way such factors influence mass decisions to join an ongoing rebellion and the way they influence the level of concessions offered by the government. We analyze a three-player bargaining model that allows us to do so. Our results indicate that governments tolerate a greater risk of conflict with their chosen concessions when any conflict that does occur is likely to take the form of a limited, rather than popular, rebellion. We demonstrate that rebellions are more likely to be popular when the general populace is relatively dissatisfied with the status quo and when the government is relatively incapable of putting down rebellions. Widespread poverty and low state capacity might therefore be associated with a lower likelihood of conflict, but a greater probability that the general populace will participate in any conflict that does occur.     

The Nature of Borders and International Conflict: Revisiting Hypotheses on Territory

This study examines the utility of moving beyond a simple "on–off" dichotomous view of contiguous land borders. For each of the 301 contiguous land borders between states in the international system, measures of ease of interaction, salience, and overall border "vitalness" have been developed using Geographical Information Systems technology. These variables are used to test two major extant lines of thought in international relations literature, as well as our proposed alternative, regarding the expected effect of the "nature" of borders on interstate behavior. We conclude not only that the "nature" of contiguous borders matters but also that the relationship between each of the three border measures and the likelihood of conflict is curvilinear concave—with both high ease of interaction and high salience related to lower levels of conflict, and the middle range of both variables related to higher levels of conflict.     

Rethinking the Relationship between Inclusive Institutions and Political Violence

Abstract

In this paper we empirically reexamine the debate over the conflict reducing properties of inclusive political institutions. We examine the purported violence reducing effects of proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, parliamentarism, and federalism, conditioning their effects on ethnic fractionalization and whether a country is conflict prone. In other words, are these institutions more effective in countries that have already experienced major conflict or are they more effective in preventing conflict in countries that have not experienced major conflict? Using a data set that includes a sample of 81 countries and 2488 observations from 1973 to 2018, we test the conditional effects of proportional representation electoral systems, parliamentarism and federalism conditioning these by ethnicity and whether the country has experienced a major conflict (i.e., civil war). We find that these institutions have little effect on reducing the number of riots or political deaths, but PR electoral systems reduces ethnic violence when ethnic fractionalization is high. On the other hand PR electoral systems and parliamentarism reduce ethnic violence in conflict prone countries, but federalism increases the likelihood of ethnic violence. We discuss the implications of these findings with regard to arguments regarding inclusive power sharing arrangements and violence in post conflict environments.     

A Structural Analysis of International Conflict: From a Communication Perspective

The study describes the structure of international conflict with the tools of network analysis to enhance the understanding of multilateral conflict-communication relations and to predict the conflict structure with existing international relations theories (liberal and realist) plus global communication variables. Using data obtained from the Correlates of War Project (http://cow2.la.psu.edu/), the structure of international conflict is described for the period 1993–2001 for 145 nations. The results indicate that this network is very sparse; 42 nations had no conflict, and 36 only one bilateral disagreement. The network is centered about former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Russia, the United States, Iraq, and China. Most conflicts are regional. The paper also evaluates both the liberal, expanded liberal (with communication variables included), and realist (including Huntington's Clash of Civilizations Theory) perspectives as predictors of conflict. The results indicate that communication variables substantially enhance explanatory power of a predictive model, but the effects of the communication variables are inconsistent. A multiple regression model including history of colonialism and prior conflict, physical proximity and contiguity, whether or not a nation is a democracy, and the communication variables—international telecommunication, freight, and exports—accounted for 30.0% of the variance in the structure of international conflict and each variable was significantly related to conflict. The need for further research is discussed.     

Nationalist Sources of International Economic Integration

Most scholars of international relations and nationalism presume that nationalist ideology acts uniformly to hinder international economic integration, globalization, and free trade. This article challenges the conventional wisdom by developing an analytical framework of the incentives majority and minority nationalists face in the realm of foreign economic relations. Defining nationalism as the promotion of the autonomy, unity, and identity of the nation, it argues that nationalists have strong possible motivations both for and against close economic ties with foreign nations and states. As a result, oftentimes nationalists must make trade-offs among their goals of autonomy, unity, and identity when developing foreign economic policy preferences. Case studies of nationalist organizations in Quebec, India, and Ukraine that favor a high degree of international economic integration are presented to show the usefulness of the analytical framework.     

Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict

We know, most notably through Ted Gurr's research, that ethnic discrimination can lead to ethnopolitical rebellion–intrastate conflict. I seek to discover what impact, if any, gender inequality has on intrastate conflict. Although democratic peace scholars and others highlight the role of peaceful domestic behavior in predicting state behavior, many scholars have argued that a domestic environment of inequality and violence—structural and cultural violence—results in a greater likelihood of violence at the state and the international level. This project contributes to this line of inquiry and further tests the grievance theory of intrastate conflict by examining the norms of violence that facilitate a call to arms. And in many ways, I provide an alternative explanation for the significance of some of the typical economic measures—the greed theory—based on the link between discrimination, inequality, and violence. I test whether states characterized by higher levels of gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict. Ultimately, the basic link between gender inequality and intrastate conflict is confirmed—states characterized by gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict, 1960–2001.     

Secession crises,human welfare and conflict resolution

Violent and persistent inter-group conflict often results from antagonisms that arise between minority groups and central governments over the oppressive treatment of the minority group and over efforts by the minority group to secede from the parent state. The legal principles that have guided international involvement in these secession crises, namely self-determination of peoples and territorial integrity of the state, have not been effective or consistent inducements for resolution or prevention of the outbreak of conflict. This paper considers how international recognition of secessionist claims could be made dependent on whether the relevant minority group or central government lays out the most convincing plans for enhancing the welfare of the population, avoiding exclusionary policies, and promoting inter-group cooperation and stability rather than inter-group conflict and disorder. The authors urge policy makers to develop judgment criteria that reflect knowledge of these concerns to induce conditions more favourable for stability and peace.     

Does ethnofederalism explain the success of Indian federalism?

ABSTRACT

Ethnofederalism has been contested as a solution for diverse societies as seen recently in Nepal (where federalism has been accepted, but the design and number of units remains heavily contested) and Myanmar (where ethnic minority demands for increasing federalization have had to take a back seat to the demands for increasing democracy). It remains a heavily contested subject in Sri Lanka. Concerns are expressed that ethnofederalism will increase pressures for secession and/or lead to increased violence through increasing a sense of separateness of the people living within that territory, providing resources for political entrepreneurs to mobilize groups against the center and will lead to the persecution of minorities within the ethnofederal units. India is an example of a federation that appears to demonstrate that ethnofederalism decreases rather than increases conflict through its successful reorganization of states along linguistic lines. However, a group-level analysis reveals a more diverse picture. India has simultaneously been both a success and a failure at conflict management.     

Dangerous Days: The Impact of Nationalism on Interstate Conflict

Does an upsurge in nationalism make interstate conflict more likely? This article gives evidence to suggest that spikes in nationalism do have a direct impact on the likelihood of disputes between states. In it, I use national days or anniversaries as occasions that increase the salience of a national identity and its historical wars. I show that in the two months following national days, conflict is markedly higher than would be expected—almost 30 percent more likely than the rest of the year—and particularly likely for states who initiate conflict or who have revisionist intentions. I demonstrate further how nationalist sentiment can increase international tensions with a case study of national anniversaries in China and Japan. Together, this evidence suggests that the increase in nationalism around national days provides both risks and opportunities to regimes and shapes when they choose conflict over cooperation in international relations.