Maritime security in the United States: Latent threats and latent vulnerabilities

Americans and their government are seemingly unconcerned about the possibility that maritime facilities and personnel might be at risk to armed violence. Not only are current maritime security efforts minimal, they feature a curious dichotomy: one thrust is directed toward occasional acts of terrorism, the other toward coastal defense in wartime. Despite a manifestly more interactive world marked by the ready availability of powerful, mobile weapons, no serious efforts have been directed toward protecting maritime facilities and personnel in the United States against special operations or unconventional warfare. This indifference reflects the prevalence of the Clausewitzian paradigm in America's attitude toward war and the country's historical experience with coastal defense in the wars of this century. The fragmented structure of civil and military protection available to protect ports and other facilities suggests that protection could not be quickly upgraded in the face of a rapidly‐developing threat.     

Do traditional values still exist in modern Chinese societies?

  The stellar economic performance of the Asia-Pacific region in the 90s led many scholars to credit Confucianism as the impetus for it provided the cultural background conducive for entrepreneurs of this region to excel. Some even believed that a “Confucian Revival” is at hand and have proposed the 21st century to be the “Confucian Century”. Although the causes of economic growth and success are complex and likely to vary from one country to another, the significance of culture has been emphasized. Hicks and Redding (1983) commented, “as there are well over a hundred developing countries, the almost perfect correlation between Chinese heritage and economic success could hardly be due to chance.” Another study by Gordon Redding (1990) on the spirit of Chinese capitalism suggested a strong link between Confucian values and modern overseas Chinese business enterprises. However, when the same region triggered a global economic crisis a few years ago, fingers were also pointed at Confucianism, naming it as the culprit behind the downfall of Chinese entrepreneurship. Further, people often loosely refer to Confucianism or Asian Values when analyzing factors relevant to the economy and social matters. They do so without first synthesizing the system of thought upon which they base their claims, thereby weakening their arguments. Moreover, studies on Chinese values are certainly insufficient if not misconstrued by scholars with no Chinese background. How then does Confucianism influence Asian countries? Do Chinese values still exist in modern Chinese societies? Using quantificational tools to support our thesis, this comparative study attempts to investigate whether Confucianism or traditional Chinese values still played an important role in shaping the mind and attitude of modern Chinese in Singapore and China.     

Confucianism and the concept of liberty

Liberty is a concept absent in, and alien to, Confucianism. The term “tsu-you,” (or “cha-yu,” in Korean) is a modern neologism concocted by East Asian thinkers in the 19th century struggling to translate and come to grips with Western political theory. Moreover, the term that they ultimately decided to use was a Taoist, not a Confucian, term. Hence, if this lecture was entitled “Concept of Liberty in Confucianism,” it would have been a very short one. Confucianism has no room for liberty.

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The long-term outlook for economic reform in China: resource constraints, inequalities and sustainability

In China, the inequalities generated by the reforms in the last two decades have been increasing. As a result, the unequal regional and sectoral impact of development associated with the growth-maximisation strategy, has given rise to increasingly severe social and economic tensions and contradictions. The threats to political stability posed by these developments remain, for the time being, potential more than real. But the damage which they have caused to the social, economic and environmental fabric of China is already evident. The main critical facts are: 1) the rise in urban unemployment, both de facto and concealed, that has accompanied the halting restructuring programme among state-owned enterprises (SOEs); 2) the massive reservoir of underemployment that affects at least 130 million farmers; 3) the absence of even basic social security provision for the sick, the unemployed and the old; and the highly differentiated access to education; 4) the pervasiveness of corruption and its destructive impact on the normative framework that usually regulates human economic and social behaviour, to the detriment of the social contract between state and individual.Economic and social polarisation associated with China’s growth-maximisation strategy has become the single most important domestic issue facing the Chinese government. Emphasis by the Hun Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration on a new “people-centred” development strategy highlights the urgency of this problem. When added to the pressures of resource shortages and environmental degradation, the case in favour of shifting from growth-maximisation to sustainability appears to be unanswerable. These are the concerns that have prompted government leaders and officials to question China’s existing development strategy and to formulate a “scientific” concept of sustainable and “harmonious” development.The most authoritative explanation of the new strategy was articulated by Hu Jintao in a speech he made in May 2004, which was subsequently republished in the Party’s leading theoretical journal (Qiushi). In it, Hu demanded a radical change in China’s growth model from one characterised by “high input, high consumption, high pollution, and low efficiency” to a new approach, based on “high science and technology contents, good economic benefit, low resource consumption, less environmental pollution, and full exploitation of human resource advantages.” This change in emphasis was designed to help resolve “prominent contradictions”, such as the excessive pace and scale of fixed-asset investment, which threatened not only to exacerbate resource shortages, but also to generate inflationary pressures attendant on excessive expansion of credit.

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The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China, 1969–1972

United States rapprochement with China should be re-examined by taking into consideration the American negotiating approach towards Beijing regarding the role of Japan, the United States' major Asian ally and China's long-term rival in East Asia. Whilst announcing the Nixon Doctrine, which increased pressure on Japan to strengthen its defense and regional responsibilities, Nixon and Kissinger used the so-called “Japan Card,” Japan's possible military resurgence and China's long-term fear of it, as a tacit negotiating tool to justify to Chinese leaders the continued United States military presence in East Asia. This article examines the impact of the United States rapprochement with China on the American negotiating process with Chinese leaders for the continuation of the United States–Japan Security Treaty and to what extent it changed China's policy toward American relations with Japan.     

Growth and productivity measures of China’s due to international trade: PRC’S experience 1970–1993

Solow’s Growth Model Solow (Q J Econ 70:65–94, 1956) and aggregate data are applied to estimates the increase in productivity due international trade and the resulting technical change and capital augmentation for the years 1970 to 1978 and 1978 (the beginning of the reforms and “open door” policy in China) to 1993. According this paper’s estimations the GDP per man hour in 1978 increased by 1.76 times for the year 1970, from $0.1233 in 1970 to $0.2169 in 1978, and in 1993 by 5.23 time that of 1978 to $1.1348 in 1993. For the period under study due to “open door” policy the GDP per man-hour more than quadrupled, and 76.18% of this increase was due to technical changes and the remaining 23.82 was due to capital augmentation. The paper consists of five sections. “Introduction” Section reviews some of the growth literature as well as looking at the macroeconomic measures of China’s economic performance since 1978 the beginning of the reforms. “Data” Section explains the data modifications. “Empirical results” Section portrays the empirical results and the next indicates conclusions. This paper is dedicated to the memories of Late Dr. Anthony D’Amato, who was a Professor at W. Paul Stillman School of Business at Seton Hall University South Orange, New Jersey.

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European civil society

The concept of “civil society” is still the subject of thorough academic research. It emerged, in Europe, in the 18th century and implied a culture of civility which, while emphasising autonomy from established institutions, also emphasised the freedom to associate and a commitment to common good beyond particular interests. A modern definition of the concept makes civil society the sum of “Organisations which are self-governing and constitutionally independent of the State or political parties; do not involve the distribution of profits to shareholders; and benefit to a significant degree from voluntarism”. The emergence of civil society has followed different historical patterns in different EU Member States, and European State institutions have had different ways to accommodate the emergence of civil society and its aspiration to influence policy-making. From the 18th to the early 20th century, civil society associations and networks mostly emerged and operated within local of national frameworks. It is in the second half of the 20th century that the development of civil society acquired a trans-national dimension. The emergence of a truly trans-national civil society in Europe is a rather recent phenomenon which is increasingly taken into consideration in the formulation of policy by the European Union institutions. The EU foreign policy also aims at strengthening civil society in third countries (including Asia) to achieve its objectives, notably in the field of human rights and democratisation.     

Socio-cultural aspects of the relationship between the EU and East Asia, with particular reference to China

This paper presents a comparative study about words and about sovereignty; about the ancestry of the words that construct the discourse of sovereignty in the context of China; about the analysis and interpretation of the civic discourse and the rhetoric that construct Chinese sovereignty in the field of international relations and foreign policy, and about the consequences of this analysis and interpretation for the formulation of EU foreign policy with regard to East Asia, especially China, and the United States, as well as the feedback that notions of sovereignty have on the construction of Chinese civic discourse. For many contemporary Chinese thinkers, China should modernise without repeating the process of modernism, should leap over the system of values established by the Enlightenment that seemed to justify imperialism, and develop an economy and institutions that would serve to create wealth and to raise the standard of living of the population, without imposing values that are advantageous to a “West” that is already wealthy. They have identified a cultural dissidence within developed societies that advocates the values of postmodernism as a way of rejecting the values of modernism. In this context, they advocate the possibility of modernising their society without having to accept the imposition of values that originated in societies that have already begun to question them. In this way, China could reach postmodernism in a relatively short period of history without having to pass through the traumas that characterised the development of modernism in the “West” over a period of centuries (it would be difficult not to discern echoes of Mao Zedong’s “Great Leap Forward” in these Chinese versions of the postmodernist paradigm). The communicative strategy to be adopted by the EU in the rhetorical construction of its dialogue with China should be fully cognizant of and sensitive to the criteria of China’s moral order as outlined in this study and specified in the Five Principles (mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; non-aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence), the Spirit of Shanghai and the ASEAN Way, with special emphasis on mutual recognition, parity of esteem, and mutual benefit. Any other discourse will be perceived semiotically as unilateralist and exploitative. Respect for diversity is paramount, and the ability to harmonise diversity is a major function of Chinese political and cultural thought. “Harmony” and “peace” are the same word in classical Chinese: hé ( hépíng is the modern word for “peace” and héshēng is the modern word for “harmony”). As a result, any practice that produced harmony, such as music or cooking, was a form of training for maintaining peace, social cohesion and solidarity in society (or among nations).

Military Alliances in the 21 Century: Still Relevant after all These Years?

While military alliances have always been important to the United States, some experts wonder about their future. In today's uncertain security environment, they question whether these alliances may have outlived their usefulness. The author argues that U.S. national security leaders face some difficult choices as they formulate strategy and determine the number and types of collective security arrangements the nation will require to secure its national interests in the future.     

Asian values revisited

  With Asia's economy still booming in the second half of the 1990's “Asian values” were announced by some politicians (Lee Kuan Yew, Mahatir, Ishihara, Mahbubani etc.) and contrasted with “Western values”. Soon a controversial debate within Asia ensued (Kim, Fidel Ramos ea..), into which also the western democracies joined. The “West” however reacted rather defensively to the new assertiveness of some Asian statesmen, inspite of the fact that the authors of this debate put into question the western dominance in global value setting which has been in existence since the French revolution. But has this debate withstood the test of time, the challenges posed by the recession in Asia and by the ever increasing globalization? Hardly. The crisis has destroyed the notion that “Asian values” had been the main cause and guarantor of Asia's exorbitant growth rates. While in the West Christianity forms the essential basics of culture, in Asia there is a multitude of coexisting - and frequently confronting world religions. There is no other continent which in cultural and political terms is so contradictory and potentially conflict ridden like Asia. “Asianism” as a concept was surely also intended as an instrument to integrate multiethnic Asian societies with weak internal cohesion. At the same time it served to neutralize the human rights issue. In the meantime the debate has become quieter and more dispassionate. In the developed West the notion gained acceptance to abandon “Eurocentrism”. At the same time there is recognition that “Asian values” are not exclusive. Also in Europe the family plays a special role. A debate on values is needed for societal integration – also in the “West” which should become more aware of the need to reassert the origins of its own spiritual foundations. Following September 11th the west is well advised to continue the dialogue on values with Asia. Update and expanded version of an article first published in: Au?enpolitik IV/1996, p. 326 “Beginnt das pazifische Jahrhundert?” I would like to thank Julia Prati for the translation of the updated and expanded version of this article     

海权问题与中美关系述论

从近代到冷战时期,海权问题一直是重大战略问题。长期以来,我国在反对美国海洋霸权、维护我国海洋安全进行了不懈的斗争。冷战后,美国的太平洋海权战略安排具有遏制中国作为潜在对手挑战美国太平洋霸权的图谋,并集中体现在美日军事同盟、台湾问题、南海问题等具体领域对中国的海洋主权和海洋权益形成沉重的压力与挑战,对此中国应该引起高度重视。     

新时期印度海权战略的确立及其思想根源

新时期印度海权战略的确立不是一蹴而就的。经过长期的酝酿与积淀,21世纪初新时期印度海权战略最终确立。它集印度洋“区域控制”和向周边大洋“远洋延伸”为一体,以建立世界级“海权国”为终极目标。新时期印度海权战略有两大思想根源：其一是源于印度地理和历史的强烈海权意识,其二是马汉海权论影响下的潘尼迦海权思想。     

Sovereignty at Sea: States and Security in the Maritime Domain

The oceans present a variety of perils to both states and private actors, ranging from smuggling to direct attacks on vessels. Yet, a disconnect exists between states’ maritime power and sovereign fleets due to the emergence of open shipping registries in the 20th century. How have great powers like the United States responded to threats generated by transit of the oceans for legitimate and illicit purposes? The nature of peacetime security threats that states confront at sea has shaped divergent responses. The main maritime powers draw a distinction between threats aimed at states and threats to commerce. Where perceived threats to the state are concerned, great powers have sought to revise understandings of the protections sovereignty provides—specifically, by seeking expanded interdiction rights—to further their own security goals. When maritime powers perceive that international commerce is under threat, they delegate the sovereign protection function both upward to internationally sanctioned maritime coalitions and outward to private security firms. These policies are responses to the security challenges that result from the decoupling of sovereign power and the merchant fleet that followed the emergence of open shipping registries.     

Japanese “<Emphasis Type="Italic">Furītā</Emphasis>” and German “Generation Internship”: The “precarious post-materialist” as an extension to Inglehart‘s theory of value change

With a period of economic recession, rising numbers of unemployed and an increase in non-regular employment, the situation on the German and the Japanese labour market has undergone a change over the past two decades. At the beginning of the twenty-first century a generation of newcomers entered working life under changed conditions. In this paper, I will analyse whether the individual perception of worsening chances on the labour market will have an effect on the attitudes to and expectations of work prevalent amongst young entrants to the labour market drawing upon Ronald Inglehart’s theory of value change as a theoretical base. An analysis of qualitative interviews with Japanese Furītā and members of the German ‘Generation Internship’ will explore whether patterns of work values can be identified that call for an extension of Inglehart’s value concept of “materialist” versus “post-materialist”, namely suggesting the existence of a ‘precarious post-materialist’. The discussion concludes with a short analysis of quantitative data, to see whether this new value type might also be identified in a broader context.

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17世纪初至18世纪中后期越南南河海外贸易中的华商

17世纪初至18世纪中后期，越南南河阮氏政权的海外贸易迅速发展，成为东亚海上贸易的一大亮点。作为当时东亚海上贸易的主导者，华商以操作者、推动者和管理者的身份参与南河海外贸易发展的全过程，为其发展和兴盛做出了重要贡献，同时也为自身的生存和发展打下了坚实的基础。     

Regional integration and (trans)cultural memory

This article asks how we can understand processes of regional integration through the lens of memory. Regional integration, despite its taking place in the here and now, rests on acts of cultural recall. Socially shared versions of history, concepts of identity, values and norms, stereotypes, and prejudices as well as certain modes of behavior are usually formed in long historical processes and become part of a “cultural memory.” Cultural memory is one of the “soft factors” which are inevitably at work in the negotiation of economical questions, energy and power politics—the “hard factors” of regional integration, as it were. It can affect the way in which processes of regional integration function, or fail to do so. And it often does so in ways that social groups are not even conscious of. The article will present theories of cultural memory put forward by Maurice Halbwachs, Pierre Nora, and Aleida and Jan Assmann as well as recent trends in research on “transcultural memory” and ask about their implications for the study of regional integration.     

Asia and European colonialism

  The article reviews the effects of “colonial discourse” for the interpretation of national history in colonized Asian nations. Eurocentric perspectives in early Western narratives and historiography were followed by postcolonial myths termed “cultural nationalism” after independence. The native intelligentsia had acquired modern concepts of nation, nationalism, progress, welfare, democracy and technological modernity from their erstwhile colonial masters. Once the “democratic honeymoon” following independence had turned sour the artificially conceived myths of “cultural nationalism” served to justify various dictatorial regimes. Yet this ideology fails at it is presently being challenged by globalization, representing normative and economic pressures to orient towards the one single dominant pattern of Western liberal capitalism in all spheres.     

History Rhymes: The German Precedent for Chinese Seapower

We compare the rise of Chinese seapower today to the rise of Imperial German seapower a century ago. The comparison is worthwhile for two reasons. First, the comparison holds merits in its own right. We use German Admiral Wolfgang Wegener's three indices of seapower-strategic position, the fleet, and strategic will to the sea-to assess the two countries’ maritime potential. This analysis leads inexorably to the conclusion that China holds far more potential for seapower that did the Kaiser's Germany. And second, the Chinese themselves are consulting German history as they inquire into the triumphs and failures of past great powers. Trying to divine how they interpret the German experience could let Western practitioners and scholars of grand strategy glimpse China's maritime future. In turn they can improve their own handling of strategy in East Asia.     

China's New Multi-Faceted Maritime Strategy

As trade-driven growth and prosperity redefine both the Chinese economy and the global competitive landscape, U.S. policy makers increasingly must ponder whether the Chinese leadership will seek new options and capabilities to protect its far-reaching oceanic lifelines. As imported oil and raw minerals power the Chinese juggernaut, much of these flows traverse the Strait of Malacca and other littorals where there is little current Chinese capability to project power. In recent years, there is an ongoing debate among Chinese military circles regarding the feasibility of constructing a blue-water fleet that could change the balance of power in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. U.S. policy makers watch with increasing unease as a new generation of technically-savvy navy officers forcefully argue for a forward-looking maritime strategic posture that extends beyond the East and South China Seas. In addition, recent Chinese space-based and cyber warfare technology initatives bear watching as Beijing seeks to nullify key U.S. advantages in C4SRI using a high-tech variant of “asymmetric warfare.” Although it is unclear what direction future Chinese maritime strategy and doctrine will take, U.S. policy makers need to remain vigilant about rising Chinese maritime ambitions and capabilities in the future.     

Inter-regionalism in international relations: Comparing APEC and ASEM

  Depending on one's theoretical perspective, inter-regionalism is assumed by IR scholars to have arisen in response to the need to check the exalted power of the United States (and, in the economic realm, also the European Union and East Asia) and/or the growing complexity of world politics (the rise of “interdependence” or “globalisation”). More recently, inter-regionalism has also been interpreted as a way to enhance regional collective identities. This paper looks at the evolution and recent performance of APEC and ASEM in the light of these theoretical assumptions about the origins and the functions of APEC and ASEM. Its principal findings are puzzling: while there are indications that APEC and ASEM were indeed meant by governments to fulfil some of the functions identified by those theoretical perspectives, the evidence that APEC or ASEM effectively served any of them is thin. Their actual functions and their durability against the background of a seemingly poor political track record therefore need to be rethought. RID="*" ID="*" A more extensive version of this paper will be published in: H?nggi H/Roloff R/Rüland J (eds), Interregionalism and International Politics: Stepping Stone to Global Governance? London & New York: Routledge (forthcoming).