Beyond Primacy: Hegemony and ‘Security Addiction’ in U.S. Grand Strategy

The George W. Bush administration embraced a particularly aggressive counter-terrorist and counter-proliferation strategy after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The “Bush Doctrine,” as it became known, reflects a “primacist” approach to grand strategy that aims not only to eliminate global terrorist networks and cowl rogue state proliferators, but also to dissuade potential near-peer competitors from challenging the American-centred international system. Critics expect that this ambitious approach to strategic affairs has become unsustainable in the face of the growing quagmire in Iraq. But “security addiction” in the post-9/11 environment has instead created conditions for a bipartisan consensus on the overall direction, if not the particular modalities, of “primacist” grand strategies. Despite the unpopularity of the Bush administration and significant American commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq, it is highly unlikely that President Barack Obama will heed calls for military retrenchment or strategic restraint.     

Strategies for Managing Rogue States

In the ongoing debates on how to manage relations with rogue states such as North Korea and Iran, the opposing policies of both hawks and doves are unrealistic in their pure forms. Throughout American history, presidents have faced the same choices the Bush administration now has when dealing with adversaries abroad: appeasement, engagement, containment, rollback, and non-entanglement. Each of these five basic strategic alternatives has potential advantages and risks. In analyzing how these have applied to U.S. relations with Iraq, North Korea, and Iran—the so-called axis of evil—it becomes clear that rollback and appeasement are the riskiest options and containment the most promising. Elements of diplomacy, however, can be used in conjunction with a primary policy of containment to head off threats from rogue states.     

Global Debate and the Limits of the Bush Doctrine

The "Bush Doctrine" asserting the right to preemptively attack states that support or harbor terrorists and pursue weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has bitterly divided world opinion. Many seemingly long-settled questions of international politics, especially involving the unilateral use of force, have been reopened. Although we are concerned about the implications of the Bush Doctrine, we do not agree that it fundamentally changes world politics as some have asserted. Instead, we argue that the global debate leading up to the war in Iraq signals widespread support for existing international norms. Most states continue to see force as a last resort, properly subject to multilateral control in all but the most urgent cases of imminent self-defense. The nature of American diplomatic maneuverings in the United Nations and the public statements of high-level officials suggest that even the United States continues to recognize the importance of these norms.     

Preventive War and Permissive Normative Order

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. president George W. Bush articulated a new national security strategy based on striking terrorist organizations and the states that harbor them before they could endanger the United States. Though expressed in the language of preemption, the Bush strategy embodied a far more problematic doctrine of preventive warfare. Whereas the grounds for preemption lie in evidence of a credible, imminent threat, the basis for prevention rests on the suspicion of an incipient, contingent threat. We argue that an American national security strategy that embraces preventive war will set an inauspicious precedent, undermining normative restraints on when and how states may use military force.     

The Bush Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of Republican Empire

The dominant narrative concerning the Bush Doctrine maintains that it is a dangerous innovation, an anomaly that violates the principles of sound policy as articulated by the Founders. According to the conventional wisdom, the Bush Doctrine represents the exploitation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, by a small group of ideologues—the “neoconservatives”—to gain control of national policy and lead the United States into the war in Iraq, a war that should never have been fought. But far from a being a neoconservative innovation, the Bush Doctrine is, in fact, well within the mainstream of U.S. foreign policy and very much in keeping with the vision of America's founding generation and the practice of the statesmen in the Early Republic. The Bush Doctrine is only the latest manifestation of the fact that U.S. national interest has always been concerned with more than simple security.     

The European Union in the new millennium

The Bush administration has been too quick to dismiss containment as an obsolete hangover of the Cold War. Appropriately modified to operate through international institutions and regional alliances, containment provides the most viable available basis for responding to terrorist threats emanating from rogue regimes and weak states.     

布什主义的影响

一、实现了对克林顿总统的美国国家安全战略的巨大转变 二战以来，美国的国家安全战略大体上分为冷战时期的“遏制战略”、“超越遏制战略”和冷战后美国的对外扩张战略。目前美国仍然处于这一全球扩张的过程中。总的说，美国的国家安全战略有“三大支柱”，即安全、经贸和人权。主要是因应2001年“9·11”事件和国际恐怖主义，乔治·W·布什总统在美国的综合实力基础上，借助反对恐怖主义之机维持冷战后美国在世界上的绝对优势和“领导地位”，推出其国家安全战略即布什主义，强调军事主义，     

Bush: The Sequel

This article examines the likely foreign policy initiatives of the U.S. under the leadership of George W. Bush. The new president has outlined a fairly thorough critique of America's international behavior in the 1990s. Because a leader's public statements arguably serve to persuade various audiences and to build support for policy change, the article takes Bush's words quite seriously—along with those spoken or written by his closest foreign affairs advisors. Bush intends to abandon the so-called Clinton Doctrine and deploy national missile defenses. He is critical of American policies toward China and Russia, but has not presented bold new initiatives toward those powers. Under the rubric of "compassionate conservatism," Bush may alter U.S. relations toward the Global South in some interesting ways. The president and his advisors often purport to be realists, but the article demonstrates that their own words belie this claim as they often justify policies based on ideals rather than the pursuit of power.     

Was There a Clinton Doctrine? President Clinton's Foreign Policy Reconsidered

This article discusses the concept of 'doctrine' within American foreign policy and seeks to locate a possible Clinton Doctrine. It argues, against some interpretations of the Clinton presidency, that Clinton's foreign policy did have a degree of coherence necessary to sustain a 'doctrine'. The broad development of Clinton's foreign policy between 1993 and 2001 is summarized and assessed. Five possible Clinton doctrines are investigated. The article concludes that the best case for being regarded as the Clinton Doctrine relates to the doctrine of 'rogue states'.     

Pre-emption,Deterrence, and Self-Defence: A Legal and Historical Assessment

The policy of the United States, outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy, whereby the US claims a right under international law to engage in pre-emptive use of force to prevent a rogue state's development of nuclear weapons, or any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), is unnecessary and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. This conclusion is reached through a comprehensive and intensive assessment of the normative reactions of politically effective actors to China's development of nuclear weapons during a two-year period between the Cuban Missile Crisis and China's first test in October 1964. While pre-emptive use of force against China, a rogue state, was considered by both the United States and most likely by the Soviet Union, neither used force to prevent it developing nuclear weapons. Since a policy of pre-emptive use of force was unnecessary for either state's self-defence, it would have been unlawful under customary international law. Given that the current strategic scenario of states vis-à-vis rogue states is the same under most circumstances, notwithstanding the existence of international terrorist networks, the article concludes that the proposed claim of the United States is, prima facie, unnecessary to its self-defence, and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. It shifts the burden of proof to policymakers claiming that all rogue states can be lawfully prevented through pre-emptive use of force from acquiring nuclear weapons, to establish that a particular state cannot be deterred from the use of nuclear weapons. Though the preventive war claim of the US National Security Strategy 2002 may turn out to be an effective strategic bluff in limiting WMD proliferation, the wisdom of the threat should not be confused with the illogic of preventive war.     

国内外学界对布什主义的研究情况综述

2001年1月乔治·W·布什当选美国总统后，其国家安全政策即布什主义对美国国内和国际社会逐渐产生了重大影响，引起了国内外学界的重视和研究。对布什主义的研究，其实就是对当今美国布什政府的国家安全战略的研究。研究情况各国各异，本文主要就国内外学界对乔治·W·布什总统第一任期内所推出的国家安全战略即布什主义的研究情况进行简单评述。     

The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives Versus Realists

The aim of this article is to contribute to our understanding of both the debate over the war in Iraq and its implications for the future of U.S. foreign policy by examining the relationship between neoconservatism and realism. The article begins by establishing the connection between the tenets of neoconservatism and the arguments for war against Iraq. The primary focus is on the neoconservative Bush Doctrine that served as the primary justification for the Iraq War. Next, we turn to the arguments that realists put forth in their attempt to steer America away from the road to war. The realists, however, proved to be unsuccessful in their attempt to prevent war and in the final section we address the central question of the article; why did realism fail in the debate over Iraq?     

Tacit procedural politics: institutional change and member states' strategies in police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters

This article analyses the dynamics of procedural politics in the EU's Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters across subsequent Treaty regimes (Amsterdam and Lisbon). In the course of legislative policy-making in this area, member states and the European Commission engage in strategic interactions with respect to procedural rules, whereby specifically member states attempt to contain integrationist legislation coming from the Commission through legislative preemption strategies. Drawing on Joseph Jupille's procedural politics approach, the article hypothesizes that member states' strategies are conditioned by several scope conditions, notably jurisdictional ambiguity, influence difference between different decision-making procedures, and prointegrationist case law from the European Court of Justice. I test these hypotheses by analysing the legislative process on a number of selected cases.     

Blundering into Baghdad: an analysis of strategy,structure, principals and agents

Some postmortems of the Bush Administration's pre-Iraq war decision-making have focused on a dysfunctional National Security Council (NSC) structure as the major reason for the lack of a thorough strategic assessment prior to the March 2003 invasion. Other academic and journalistic accounts have focused on a lack of a first rate conceptual thinker at the top levels of the Bush Administration as an important cause of the strategic shortcomings in Iraq decision-making. This article will assess the relative impact of decision-making structure versus quality of strategic leadership in explaining poor performance in the first five years of the Iraq war.     

Evidence of Russia's Bush Doctrine in the CIS1

Abstract

The article discusses the emergence of a Russian version of the Bush doctrine in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Russian officials’ conceptual stretching of the strategic culture embodied in the National Security Concept (NSC) and the Military Doctrine (MD) from 2000 onwards. While these documents seem to cherish multilateralism and United Nations (UN) primacy in questions of global and regional security, terrorist attacks on Russia proper have engendered a more assertive approach to regional security issues in the Caucasus and Central Asia and brought Russian officials to consider unilateral pre-emptive strikes against terrorist bases. In the case of the Caucasus, Russia has been striking against terrorist bases on Georgian territory and contributed to constructing a failed state, whereas in the Central Asian case, Russia has sought to revitalise the defunct CIS security framework and pledge assistance to ‘allies’ in the fight against terrorism. The article argues that the war against terrorism has given Russia a new footing in the CIS. The issue of security is more salient, as is the reliance on military force to facilitate it.     

George H.W. Bush: Conservative Realist as President

This article explores George H.W. Bush's foreign policy in order to examine what it can tell us about the successes and weaknesses of conservative internationalism as a world view and as an analytic construct for scholars of international relations. First, to what extent, if any, did the Bush administration's foreign policy reflect the course and logic of conservative internationalism? Second, what can the Bush administration's foreign policy tell us about the utility of conservative internationalism as a foreign policy approach relative to alternative approaches?     

Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An Integrated Approach and Future Research Agenda

In this commentary, we make the case that the analysis of terrorism and counterterrorism must be based on an integrated theory that links both issues together. Terrorist groups’ ultimate goals must be distinguished from their strategic goals and the strategic logic by which they employ terror and select targets to further their ultimate goals. The strategic logic of terrorism is thus key to understanding patterns of terrorism and the counter-reaction by governments against it. We make the case for a unified approach and suggest major areas for future research.     

A Doctrine Worthy of the Name?: George W. Bush and the Limits of Pre-Emption, Pre-Eminance, and Unilateralism

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the foreign policy of the Bush administration was shifted radically in its pursuit of the war on terror. As part of this change, the administration announced a new strategic doctrine in 2002 in the form of the National Security Strategy of the United States which was to become known as the Bush doctrine. At its heart this document advocated the use of pre-emption and unilateralism in its pursuit of pre-eminence. This article traces the development of this thinking and subsequent application of this doctrine, and argues that policy failures in Iraq have nothing to contribute to American foreign policy in the second term. His argued that because of this failure, it is not a doctrine worthy of the name.     

A Crude Bargain: Great Powers,Oil States,and Petro-Alignment

Abstract

Petro-alignment, a quid pro quo arrangement whereby great powers offer security in exchange for oil states’ friendly oil policies, is a widely used and yet undertheorized energy security strategy. One consequential aspect of this exchange is that great powers choose different levels of security commitment to keep oil producers friendly. With what criteria do great powers rank oil states? How do we conceptualize different types of petro-alignments? What exactly do great powers and oil producers exchange under each petro-alignment type? I posit that a mix of market power and geostrategic location determines the strategic value and vulnerability of individual client oil states, which then generates four corresponding types of petro-alignment—security guarantee, strategic alignment, strategic favor, and neglect. Two carefully selected case comparisons—Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1970–91, and Azerbaijan and Ecuador in 1990–2013—show how great powers created, utilized, and maintained petro-alignments under the unique logic of oil markets and across varying geopolitical settings. The findings have important implications on great powers’ grand strategies, strategic behaviors of oil states, and the role of oil in international security.     

A Doctrine of Contingent Sovereignty

Disengagement of U.S. leadership in recent years has not only emboldened the world's worst actors, it has enabled the emergence of non-state groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) to threaten a new and ominous trend in international affairs—the pursuit of sovereign authority by transnational violent-extremists. Amending both the Clausewitzian “remarkable trinity” to explicitly encompass non-state actors in war and the balance-of-power praxis of Talleyrand to one favoring dynamic repair of failed and failing states in diplomacy, the Doctrine of Contingent Sovereignty proposed in this article provides the requisite tools for bolstering legitimacy of weakened states while simultaneously affording the necessary freedom-of-action for the United States to secure its vital national interests. Analogous to the Monroe Doctrine of the nineteenth-century, which put putative expansionist powers on notice, this new doctrine asserts that the privilege of sovereignty remains contingent upon adherence to accepted international norms of behavior.