美国国家反恐中心简介

“9·11”事件使美国清醒地认识到恐怖主义对美国国家安全的威胁。从2002年起，在美国颁布的历届、历版各层级安全战略中，官方无一例外地将恐怖主义列为国家安全的首要威胁。     

南亚地区恐怖主义态势及反恐合作

冷战结束以来，对中国西部周边安全构成威胁的恐怖主义主要来自中亚地区和南亚地区。伴随相关国家反恐力度的加大及国际反恐合作的强化，中亚地区的恐怖主义得有效遏制，南亚地区则变成了恐怖主义的“重灾区”。一、南亚地区的恐怖主义态势与特点     

美国非洲战略在其国家安全战略中地位的演变简

二战结束以来，美国的非洲战略在其国家大战略中的地位经历起伏。冷战期间，非洲仅仅作为辅助美全球战略实施的边缘化地区。冷战结束后初期，由于失去了作为美苏对抗筹码的价值，非洲的重要性下降。直到90年代中期，随着非洲经济向好和恐怖主义威胁的提升，非洲的重要性才有所回升。“9．11”恐怖袭击极大地改变了美国的外交进程。美国担心非洲的“失败国家”和“无人管理地带”可能会成为滋生恐怖主义的“温床”。将非洲提升到了“高优先级”，非洲战略首次进入到美国国家安全战略。     

美国对核生化恐怖主义的评估与政策

恐怖主义猖獗改变了世界安全战略走向。美国在“9·11”事件及其随后的“炭疽热”事件之后,把防范核生化恐怖主义提上重要的安全议程．着手全面建设应对核生化恐怖主义的国家能力。美国打击恐怖主义、防止大规模杀伤性武器扩散和保卫本土安全也都是在不同程度上应对核生化及放射性威胁。本文着重剖析“9．11”事件后美国对核生化恐怖主义的评估,梳理其在理论体系、组织指挥、国际合作、本土防御、应急救援、专业力量六个方面的反核生化恐怖主义体系。     

解读美国《情报界信息共享战略》报告

2008年4月4日，美国国家情报总监办公室宣布了《情报界信息共享战略》（以下简称“战略”）报告。它是美国情报界关于信息共享出台的第一份战略报告，是布什总统2007年12月发布的《信息共享国家战略——提高与恐怖主义有关的信息共享的成功与挑战》的补充，也是对“9·11”委员会和WND委员会报告所确认的需求的一种反应，同时还是一系列行政命令和《2004年情报改革和预防恐怖主义法案》规定的回应。     

美国中东政策的战略支点——土耳其

土耳其是中东地区大国，地跨欧、亚两大洲，连接黑海和地申海，也是多种文明的交汇地，无论在冷战还是后冷战时期都有十分重要的地缘政治意义。二战后美国与土耳其关系发展很快，土耳其成为美国在中东地区实施扩张势力范围和遏制苏联政策的重要“战略支点”之一。美国中东战略中许多重要举措都是通过土耳其这个“支点”展开的。土耳其与美国等西方国家的关系并非只有融合、亲密的一面，还有不断产生矛盾、出现一些“不和谐声音”的另一面。新世纪土耳其调整外交战略“向东看”，但依然是美国中东政策的战略支点之一，并能“东西逢源”，无疑将在中东地区发挥更大作用。     

美国《2010年度全球恐怖主义形势报告》解读

今年8月18日，美国国务院发布了美国《2010年度全球恐怖主义形势报告》（Country Reports on Terrorism 2010，以下简称“报告”）。报告对过去一年全球恐怖主义发展形势进行了战略评估，对相关国家和地区的恐怖主义形势进行了阐述，并分析了2010年支持恐怖主义国家的新动向。     

美国公众对反恐战争的看法

“9·11”恐怖袭击后，恐怖主义成为美国国家安全的首要威胁，美国为此在安全、军事、民用等领域投入巨资，在国际上发动以其为首的反恐战争。今年8月19—25日，“9·11”事件十周年之际，国际政策舆论项目（PIPA）就恐怖主义及反恐战争相关问题，对美国公众舆论进行调查，以期为美未来反恐与安全政策提供参考依据。     

美国《2005年度全球恐怖主义形势报告》简介

2006年4月28日,美国国务院公布了《2005年度全球恐怖主义形势报告》①(以下简称“报告”),对过去一年国际恐怖主义的发展趋势和恐怖主义威胁的性质进行了战略评估,分析了恐怖主义的庇护所、美国的反恐政策以及恐怖分子试图获取大规模杀伤性武器的情况。这是自“9·11”事件以来     

美国国家安全战略综述

美国国家安全战略是其防务政策和外交政策的总和。尽管在冷战的相当长时间内美国没有正式的国家安全战略文件,但我们仍然可以从美国的防务政策和外交政策的变化中看出其国家安全战略的概貌。1986年,美国会通过《戈德尔特——尼科尔斯国防部改组法》之后,美总统每年向国会提交一份综合性的国家安全战略报告。由此,研究和了解美国国家安全战略有了更加可靠和完整的依据。     

Preventive War and Permissive Normative Order

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. president George W. Bush articulated a new national security strategy based on striking terrorist organizations and the states that harbor them before they could endanger the United States. Though expressed in the language of preemption, the Bush strategy embodied a far more problematic doctrine of preventive warfare. Whereas the grounds for preemption lie in evidence of a credible, imminent threat, the basis for prevention rests on the suspicion of an incipient, contingent threat. We argue that an American national security strategy that embraces preventive war will set an inauspicious precedent, undermining normative restraints on when and how states may use military force.     

The Bush Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of Republican Empire

The dominant narrative concerning the Bush Doctrine maintains that it is a dangerous innovation, an anomaly that violates the principles of sound policy as articulated by the Founders. According to the conventional wisdom, the Bush Doctrine represents the exploitation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, by a small group of ideologues—the “neoconservatives”—to gain control of national policy and lead the United States into the war in Iraq, a war that should never have been fought. But far from a being a neoconservative innovation, the Bush Doctrine is, in fact, well within the mainstream of U.S. foreign policy and very much in keeping with the vision of America's founding generation and the practice of the statesmen in the Early Republic. The Bush Doctrine is only the latest manifestation of the fact that U.S. national interest has always been concerned with more than simple security.     

U.S. Grand Strategy Following the George W. Bush Presidency

Debates over U.S. grand strategy have devoted a disproportionate level of attention to the War on Terror itself rather than the evolving strategic environment. Challenges including an impending shift in the balance of power, structural deficits, and divided public opinion will significantly impact the policy options available to government leaders, but they have not been adequately addressed. This article analyzes the options available for U.S. grand strategy following the George W. Bush presidency by relating key U.S. national interests with domestic and international policy constraints on the horizon. The analysis concludes that the United States must adopt a defensive grand strategy to rebuild popular consensus, to prevent further strain on the military, and to consolidate its gains in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, this strategy will require flexible coalitions, not formal international organizations, because of a significant divergence of security interests and capabilities with its European allies.     

Toward an effective international legal order: from coexistence to concert?

In forbidding the use of force except in self‐defence against armed attack or when authorised by the Security Council, the UN Charter appears to be the culminating development of a system of international order based on the doctrine of state sovereignty. The cumulative result of international‐law‐related acts, omissions and declarations of the Bush administration since its inception can be construed as a fundamental challenge to the sovereign state system. The administration's stated security strategy is one possible response to undoubtedly grave challenges to national and human security. In fact, only an institutionalised partnership between the US and regional powers such as China, India, Brazil and Germany can hope to address those challenges successfully, in part because only it would have the requisite legitimacy. That partnership or concert could be organised within the UN framework, albeit intensifying its hierarchical elements.     

The bush administration's security strategy: Implications for transatlantic relations

There are signs of growing transatlantic estrangement over multiple international issues. An important catalyst for this estrangement is the National Security Strategy (NSS) that the Bush administration promulgated in September 2002, a document that is a detailed imperial blueprint. Despite its pretensions, however, it is not a global strategy, but instead appears to apply primarily to the 'Islamic Arc'--the territory from North Africa to the border of India. The administration's security strategy has important implications for the transatlantic relationship, since the United States is encouraging NATO to become a junior partner for missions throughout the Islamic Arc. Given the growing divergence in US and European interests and policy perspectives, the role that the Bush administration envisages for NATO is probably not sustainable. The 'West' was an artificial geostrategic concept that needed an extraordinarily threatening common adversary (the Soviet Union) to give it substance. The US and its allies will continue to drift apart strategically, and the Bush administration's security strategy may actually hasten that process. It is uncertain, however, whether the European Union will achieve the cohesion necessary to counterbalance US power. The main task facing statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic is to learn how to disagree about specific policies without becoming disagreeable.     

Bush: The Sequel

This article examines the likely foreign policy initiatives of the U.S. under the leadership of George W. Bush. The new president has outlined a fairly thorough critique of America's international behavior in the 1990s. Because a leader's public statements arguably serve to persuade various audiences and to build support for policy change, the article takes Bush's words quite seriously—along with those spoken or written by his closest foreign affairs advisors. Bush intends to abandon the so-called Clinton Doctrine and deploy national missile defenses. He is critical of American policies toward China and Russia, but has not presented bold new initiatives toward those powers. Under the rubric of "compassionate conservatism," Bush may alter U.S. relations toward the Global South in some interesting ways. The president and his advisors often purport to be realists, but the article demonstrates that their own words belie this claim as they often justify policies based on ideals rather than the pursuit of power.     

试析未来美国对外政策的走向

奥巴马国家安全团队组成人员基本上都是经验丰富的温和务实派，体现了美国外交和国际安全问题上的现实主义倾向。美国外交将改变布什政府的单边主义，注重多边合作。中美关系不会过于偏离正常轨道，但在诸如知识产权、汇率、人权、应对全球气候变化等问题上，中国可能面临更多的压力。     

The imperial moment: A European view This article is based on developments up through June 9, 2003, the date it was submitted for publication

This article will first review the essential characteristics of the old exceptionalism in US foreign policy, then compare it with the specific features of the new strategy of the Bush administration and finally address the challenges and risks that this enterprise entails. The article provides an analysis of realist and liberal critiques of the Bush administration's foreign policy in terms of both objectives and results. It concludes that the war in Iraq constituted a truly imperial moment in US history. Preventive war is a flawed strategy, which runs against US principles in world affairs and against its security interests in the current international environment. For this reason, Bush's imperial policy will not last. The author writes here in a personal capacity, and not in the name of the European Union Institute for Security Studies.     

Beyond Primacy: Hegemony and ‘Security Addiction’ in U.S. Grand Strategy

The George W. Bush administration embraced a particularly aggressive counter-terrorist and counter-proliferation strategy after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The “Bush Doctrine,” as it became known, reflects a “primacist” approach to grand strategy that aims not only to eliminate global terrorist networks and cowl rogue state proliferators, but also to dissuade potential near-peer competitors from challenging the American-centred international system. Critics expect that this ambitious approach to strategic affairs has become unsustainable in the face of the growing quagmire in Iraq. But “security addiction” in the post-9/11 environment has instead created conditions for a bipartisan consensus on the overall direction, if not the particular modalities, of “primacist” grand strategies. Despite the unpopularity of the Bush administration and significant American commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq, it is highly unlikely that President Barack Obama will heed calls for military retrenchment or strategic restraint.     

Bush''''s Second-term Foreign Strategy

In2005,the first year of Bush s second term,the U.S.globalstrategy entered a newera of adjustment and intensification afterfour years practice.As Bush won his reelection with an overwhelmingadvantage,he was so ambitious that his mind was preoccupied withd…