刑罚个别化的蕴涵:从发展角度所作的考察——兼与邱兴隆教授商榷

本文通过对刑罚个别化演进的考察 ,认为刑罚个别化在其发展的不同阶段蕴涵不同 :在刑罚个别化的萌发时期 ,刑罚个别化在于弥补严格规则主义指导下的罪刑法定主义的不足 ,以促进刑罚的个别正义 ;在近代学派发展的鼎盛时期 ,刑罚个别化演进为以犯罪的个别预防为适用刑罚的出发点 ,以犯罪人的人身危险性为着眼点 ;在现代刑法中 ,刑罚个别化不仅要考虑预防犯罪的需要 ,而且要考虑报应的需要 ,既考虑犯罪的情状 ,也考虑犯罪分子重新犯罪的可能性。本文认为 ,刑罚个别化充满生机 ,不能否定。我国刑法学界对刑罚个别化的研究仍比较薄弱 ,亟待加强     

浅论刑罚个别化

刑罚个别化是基于个别公正和个别预防的理论形成的一项刑法原则,主要调整"刑罚"和"犯罪人"两大实体范畴关系。其核心要素是犯罪人的人身危险性,包括主客观两方面的再犯可能性,可以通过量化考察人身危险性为法官量刑提供依据。但是,刑罚个别化在使用过程中存在与罪刑法定原则和罪刑相适应原则的冲突,通过彼此的协调融合,绝对的罪刑法定发展为相对的罪刑法定,同时,在罪刑相适应的基础上则需辅以人身危险性进行调整修正。     

刑罚裁量个别化论纲

刑罚裁量个别化是刑罚个别化的重要内容之一.刑罚个别化,在很大程度上就是指刑罚裁量个别化.刑罚裁量个别化的哲学依据是公正与功利的理念,法学依据是犯罪行为的社会危害性与犯罪人的人身危险性。刑罚裁量要实现个案公正与犯罪的预防,应该重视量刑情节中的酌定情节,具体来说就是尽量将其法定化,提高法官的业务素质,法官正确使用自由裁量权。     

刑罚个别化的基本理论及适用问题研究

刑罚个别化的存在价值与犯罪的“个别预防”、犯罪的“人身危险性”以及刑罚的“轻刑主义”相联系。刑罚个别化应当作为刑法的基本原则在刑事立法和司法领域加以运用，并通过程序公正修补其不足。     

刑罚个别化否定论

本文从梳理刑罚个别化的基本蕴涵入手 ,揭示了个别化的理论缺陷与实践困境。个别化因为与一般预防相对立而有失片面 ,因为与报应论相排斥而有失公正。而且个别化的诸多立论不合逻辑。诸如此类的理论缺陷决定了个别化是一种天生不良的刑罚理念。同时 ,由于个别化以犯罪人的人身危险性为核心 ,而人身危险性难以预测 ,因此 ,个别化也不具有实施的现实性。这又决定了它是一种后天不良的刑罚理念。个别化在西方的失败应该激起我们对其失败原因的深思。     

从刑罚的公正性和功利性谈我国刑罚的目的

刑罚既具有惩罚的一面,也具有教育改造的一面。"惩罚罪犯的价值基础是公正,改造罪犯的价值基础是功利。"本文从刑罚的公正性和功利性要求论述了我国刑罚的目的应该是特殊预防与报应的统一。     

个别预防论的价值分析

本文以作为法律的三大价值的秩序、正义与自由为视角,对个别预防论做了系统的价值分析,认为:个别预防论注重对社会秩序的保护,但既因忽视刑罚的一般预防作用而不可能实现刑罚对社会秩序的最大保护,又因被其作为刑罚对社会秩序的保护的主要手段的矫正与剥夺犯罪能力模式难以实施而使得对社会秩序的保护有名无实;个别预防论所谓的正义不是真正能为人所接受的正义,而只不过是正义掩饰下的不义;个别预防论既具有保障个人自由的积极意义,又不可避免地导致对个人自由的干预与剥夺.     

论一般预防的正当性──兼与否定论者商榷

从将人作为目的的命题中不能推论出将一般预防作为刑罚目的必然将人仅仅作为实现社会目的的手段,因而得不出否定一般预防作为刑罚目的的正当性的结论;一般预防与报应之间是一种既对立又同一的关系,基于两者的同一性、将一般预防作为刑罚的目的未必会导致严刑苛罚,基于两者的对立性,一般预防具有相对于报应而作为刑罚目的的独立的意义;一般预防与个别预防的关系同样是一种既对立又同一的关系,解决两者冲突的正确途径不在于简单地舍弃一般预防而保全个别预防;一般预防否定论者所提出的否定一般预防正当性的任一理由均可用以否定其所赞成的个别预防,否定一般预防作为刑罚目的的正当性,必然陷入自相矛盾的逻辑误区。     

理论缺陷与实践困窘--刑罚个别预防论批判

个别预防论具有其理论缺陷与实践困窘.其理论缺陷在于它因否定刑罚的报应性而有失公正,因对一般预防的忽视而有失功利,因自相矛盾与以偏概全而不合逻辑;其实践困窘在于其以对人身危险性的预测为出发点,而人身危险性无法预测,因此,其不具有在实践中贯彻的可行性.     

试论刑罚个别化与法官自由裁量权之规范

制刑个别化、量刑个别化以及行刑个别化是刑罚个别化的逻辑构成,同时也反映了刑罚个别化实现的操作机理。鉴于法官在刑罚个别化实现过程中的枢纽作用,加之刑罚权、裁量权规范行使以及裁量证成顺畅实现目的的存在,必须对法官自由裁量权的行使进行规范。以刑罚个别化为背景,构建量刑基准制度以及在裁量中规范人格责任的认定是实现法官自由裁量权规范的重要路径。     

Criminal Labelling,Publicity, and Punishment

This paper considers whether publicizing criminal labels is justified as a form of punishment. It begins by arguing that making criminal labels public is inevitably stigmatizing and that stigmatization is not, as is often implied, a defining aspect of censure, but needs independent justification. It argues that justifying grounds for public criminal labelling cannot be found in either the communicative account of punishment or deterrence theory. Rather, public criminal labelling should be understood as undermining of both the communicative and the deterrent functions of punishment. Recent empirical work is drawn upon to support the claims about public criminal labelling and deterrence.     

One perspective on sentencing reform in the United States

Summary and Conclusion The most difficult part of constructing a system of criminal sentencing is to be able to give a rationale for each sentence. Historically, this has been an unsurmountable hurdle because it required reformers to resolve the irresolvable conflict between utility and desert as sentencing goals and to measure the immeasurably complex relative utility of the alterative utilitarian strategies of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. The good news is that we need not try to leap these insurmountable hurdles: the greatest utility is found in a desert distribution of liability and punishment. By following desert, the criminal law can establish its moral credibility with the public and thereby harness the real sources of social control—the power of social sanctions and internalized norms. In the context of criminal sentencing, this means the system must establish a reputation for giving offenders the precise amount of punishment they deserve. Despite the utilitarian importance of desert, however, nondesert concerns can govern the selection of the sanctioning method. As long as the total punitive bite of all aspects of an offender’s sentence is what the offender deserves, judges otherwise can be left free to construct the sentence they think will best avoid future crime. With a system of punishment units and punishment equivalencies, a desert-based determination of the amount of punishment can co-exist with a selection of sanctioning methods looking to nondesert, utilitarian considerations, such as the need for deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. This essay is based upon lectures given at the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute (UNAFEI) for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in Fuchu, Tokyo, Japan. B.S., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 1970; LL.M., Harvard University 1975; J.D., University of California-Los Angeles 1973; Dip. Leg. Stud., Cambridge University 1976.     

One perspective on sentencing reform in the United States

Summary and Conclusion The most difficult part of constructing a system of criminal sentencing is to be able to give a rationale for each sentence. Historically, this has been an unsurmountable hurdle because it required reformers to resolve the irresolvable conflict between utility and desert as sentencing goals and to measure the immeasurably complex relative utility of the alterative utilitarian strategies of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. The good news is that we need not try to leap these insurmountable hurdles: the greatest utility is found in a desert distribution of liability and punishment. By following desert, the criminal law can establish its moral credibility with the public and thereby harness the real sources of social control—the power of social sanctions and internalized norms. In the context of criminal sentencing, this means the system must establish a reputation for giving offenders the precise amount of punishment they deserve. Despite the utilitarian importance of desert, however, nondesert concerns can govern the selection of the sanctioning method. As long as the total punitive bite of all aspects of an offender’s sentence is what the offender deserves, judges otherwise can be left free to construct the sentence they think will best avoid future crime. With a system of punishment units and punishment equivalencies, a desert-based determination of the amount of punishment can co-exist with a selection of sanctioning methods looking to nondesert, utilitarian considerations, such as the need for deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. This essay is based upon lectures given at the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute (UNAFEI) for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in Fuchu, Tokyo, Japan. B.S., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 1970; LL.M., Harvard University 1975; J.D., University of California-Los Angeles 1973; Dip. Leg. Stud., Cambridge University 1976.     

THE MISSING LINK IN GENERAL DETERRENCE RESEARCH*

Research on the deterrent effects of punishment falls into two categories: macro‐level studies of the impact of aggregate punishment levels on crime rates, and individual‐level studies of the impact of perceived punishment levels on self‐reported criminal behavior. For policy purposes, however, the missing link—ignored in previous research—is that between aggregate punishment levels and individual perceptions of punishment. This paper addresses whether higher actual punishment levels increase the perceived certainty, severity, or swiftness of punishment. Telephone interviews with 1,500 residents of fifty‐four large urban counties were used to measure perceptions of punishment levels, which were then linked to actual punishment levels as measured in official statistics. Hierarchical linear model estimates of multivariate models generally found no detectable impact of actual punishment levels on perceptions of punishment. The findings raise serious questions about deterrence‐based rationales for more punitive crime control policies.     

暂予监外执行的本质：功利人道与公正人道的统一——兼论我国暂予监外执行制度的完善

暂予监外执行是本应在监禁机构行刑的犯罪人暂时变更到监禁机构外进行刑罚执行，其本质特征应为行刑人道主义，行刑人道主义分为功利的人道与公正的人道两种不同理念。建议我国暂予监外执行制度变更为暂停监禁刑罚执行制度。在构建我国暂停监禁刑罚执行制度中，遇到保护个体的功利人道与保障社会整体的公正人道冲突时，应做出保障个体功利人道的价值选择。     

The Economics of Cruel and Unusual Punishment

It has sometimes been argued that one way to reduce the costs of law enforcement would be to reduce the probability of detection and conviction (hence saving those costs), while at the same time increasing the size of the punishment. Following this strategy would keep the expected costs (to a risk neutral criminal) of committing a crime constant and hence keep the deterrence level constant; it would have the benefit, though, of reducing costs to the rest of society.There are some well-known objections to such a policy. One such objection deals with marginal deterrence: A convicted murderer serving a life sentence with no chance of parole in a jurisdiction which bans capital punishment has nothing to lose from killing a prison guard—there is no marginal deterrence to the commission of a more serious crime or any additional crime for that matter. In fact, so long as there remains any upper limit to the amount of punishment that can be inflicted upon a convicted criminal, the only ways to create some type of marginal deterrence are to reduce the punishments for less serious crimes, which will either reduce the deterrence of those less serious crimes, or alternatively to require the use of more of society's scarce resources to increase the probabilities of apprehension and conviction.It is possible to reduce this marginal deterrence problem, however, by practicing cruel and unusual punishment on perpetrators of serious crimes, i.e. by raising the limits of allowable punishment. Anecdotal evidence suggests this practice is followed unofficially with child molesters and killers of prison guards and hence provides some additional deterrence against these crimes.Despite the theoretical validity of this argument, our society has chosen to impose a constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Furthermore, over time we seem to have lowered the threshold of what is considered cruel and unusual. Following Dr. Pangloss, the concluding section of the paper examines why rational maximizers would choose to give up this additional potential deterrence. The explanations depend upon an assumed positive income elasticity of demand for humanitarianism or for insurance against the costs of punishing the innocent. While there are some reasons to accept the humanitarianism argument, the insurance argument seems more persuasive.     

Punishing Organized Crime Leaders for the Crimes of their Subordinates

The intuition holding that an organized crime leader should be punished more severely than a subordinate who directly commits an offence is commonly reflected in legal literature. However, positing a direct relationship between the severity of punishment and the level of seniority within an organizational hierarchy represents a departure from a more general idea found in much of the substantive criminal law writings: that the severity of punishment increases the closer the proximity to the physical commission of the offence. This paper presents an analysis of the said intuition and attempts to ascertain its roots. Rejecting both retribution and deterrence theory as valid explanations, it will be inferred that the imposition of harsher punishment on organized crime leaders is properly based on the multiplicity of offences for which they are responsible, and not the nature of their involvement in any specific offence.     

Applying generic sentencing aims in domestic violence cases in England and Wales

There is an enduring legacy of trivialisation and ineffectiveness at various stages in the criminal justice process when it comes to responding to domestic violence. One area of contention relates to sentence. Sentencers in England and Wales are bound by law to have regard to a number of aims: the punishment of offenders; deterrence; public protection; rehabilitation; and reparation. Whilst commentators have criticised the framework on the basis that it is contradictory and engenders inconsistency, it will be argued that granting sentencers discretion to balance the prescribed aims maximises the potential for a successful outcome in individual cases.     

Criminalizing Health-Related Behaviors Dangerous to Others? Disease Transmission, Transmission-Facilitation, and the Importance of Trust

Statutes criminalizing behavior that risks transmission of HIV/AIDS exemplify use of the criminal law against individuals who are victims of infectious disease. These statutes, despite their frequency, are misguided in terms of the goals of the criminal law and the public health aim of reducing overall burdens of disease, for at least three important reasons. First, they identify individual offenders for punishment, a paradigm that is misplaced in the most typical contexts of transmission of infectious disease and even for HIV/AIDS, despite claims of AIDS exceptionalism. Second, although there are examples of individuals who transmit infectious disease in a manner that fits the criminal law paradigm of identification of individual offenders for deterrence or retribution, these examples are limited and can be accommodated by existing criminal laws not devoted specifically to infectious disease. Third, and most importantly, the current criminal laws regarding HIV/AIDS, like many other criminal laws applied to infectious disease transmission, have been misguided in focusing on punishment of the diseased individual as a wrongful transmitter. Instead of individual offenders, activities that enhance the scale of disease transmission—behaviors that might be characterized as ‘transmission facilitation’—are a more appropriate target for the criminal law. Examples are trafficking in human beings (including sex trafficking, organ trafficking, and labor trafficking), suppression of information about the emergence of infection in circumstances in which there is a legally established obligation to disclose, and intentional or reckless activities to discourage disease treatment or prevention. Difficulties remain with justifications for criminalizing even these behaviors, however, most importantly the need for trust in reducing overall burdens of disease, problems in identifying individual responsible offenders, and potential misalignment between static criminal law and the changing nature of infectious disease.     

刑罚的正当性探究——从权利出发

刑罚权配置和运作的正当性,应从个体性权利出发进行分析和论证。刑罚的适用即意味着自然人或者单位重大权利的剥夺或者限制,而这类权利应否被剥夺或者限制以及在何种程度上被剥夺或者限制,应通过这类权利的性质来认识和分析。在犯罪设置、刑罚制度方面,都应从个体性权利视角来检验制度、规范和解释结论的正当性。