利己取向视野下的廉政监察原则新思考

廉政与腐败的较量,是政府本身自我修复的一个过程,如何使其在获得合法职位职权履行天然义务的同时葆有稳定的性格,存其正气,去其戾气是政府必须摸清的盲点。立足于贿赂的"正效应"认知、行贿理由成为共同知识、政府官员腐败收益分析、政府官员行为外部性四个方面,阐述腐败行为产生的缘由,进而引出对廉政监察原则的思考:树立非辩证的贿赂观——廉政监察理念的前置性安排;凸显腐败交易的潜在风险——廉政监察工作的"迂回"创新;导入上级政治权威,解除外部性锁定——廉政监察开展的拳头举措。     

吴海红：我国腐败现象的新特点及其治理对策

上海社保案牵涉的资金数额之巨、官员之多、职位之高、影响之大实属罕见,被称为改革开发以来上海最大的腐败案件。此案折射出我国腐败现象的新特点：腐败行为突破简单的权钱交易,上升为权力与资本的勾结,给社会带来的危害更大;明目张胆的显性腐败有所收敛,隐性腐败不断增多,查处腐败更加困难;单兵作战的个体性腐败向群体性腐败蔓延,反腐败阻力加大。     

论交易型腐败的理性预防

目前的腐败以市场经济在我国的形成及其迅速发展为产生背景,因此它与市场经济存在内在的关联,本文称之为交易型腐败。受市场经济运行规律的决定与制约,交易型腐败具有生成的必然,并呈现与市场经济发展同步扩张。功能与作用复杂、经济主体与政治主体双向互动等特征。正因如此,在权力制约机制难以一步到位的政治情势下,预防交易型腐败需要目的与手段的双重理性:目的理性为腐败的扩张被抑制在保证市场经济快速发展的限度内;手段理性即为强化预防腐败的政治措施,同时逐步确立有效的法律制度并稳步提升法律的权威。     

必须高度重视“集体腐败”的治理

集体腐败除指一些机关、部门和企事业单位的违规谋取集体福利行为外,还包括集体贪污、集体索贿受贿、集体行贿等。集体腐败多发在掌握审批和执法权的部门、相对独立的执收执罚机构、直接负责统计、填报、分配、落实各种补贴、补偿资金或实施项目的基层单位等。集体腐败成因多种多样,但主要源于权力结构的相对固化、权力运行的不透明、财经制度纪律的松驰、监督处罚不及时和不到位等。防治集体腐败须多管齐下,综合整治。     

行政心理视域下的官员腐败研究

导致官员腐败的因素较多,其中行政心理因素是一个关键因素。为了探寻官员腐败的行政心理变化,运用实证研究方法,从"正义网"反腐板块中随机抽取30份腐败官员的忏悔录作为样本,对腐败官员的职务级别、成长背景、工作环境等个人特征进行定量描述分析,探究官员腐败的心理原因,对其前腐败、腐败初、腐败中、腐败后及案发后等心理蜕变过程进行研究,发现这一群体腐败的心理变化规律,并从行政心理角度探究预防官员腐败的措施,以期能够引起公共行政领域对行政心理的重视,从而有益于我国公共行政的完善。     

“报复性腐败”及其防范机制构建

报复性腐败"是指某些政府公务人员认为自己长期勤恳清廉的工作,却没有得到相应的升迁或重用,为报复单位和领导而大肆贪腐的现象。"报复性腐败"产生的原因,一是因为这部分官员的做官目的偏狭,导致心理严重失衡乃至极度扭曲。二是官员基本人生观、价值观的迷失导致极端的贪婪腐败。三是一些政府部门内部的民主行政不够健全,普通官员维权通道不畅通。因此,必须加强"报复性腐败"的防范机制建设,营造风清气正的廉政文化氛围;要建立公正公开的人事提拔任用机制,超越"天花板"逻辑,设置多维的正激励路径;要建立官员的精神干预和心理疏导机制、发展党内民主,加强对官员的民主监督。     

开展政府财政支出绩效评价的现实障碍与对策研究

开展财政支出绩效评价，既有利于规范财政资金支出管理，也有利于加强对政府部门权力腐败的约束。由于种种原因，我国政府开展财政支出绩效评价存在诸多的现实障碍，如评价指标重分配轻绩效，评价指标设置不科学，绩效评价包含的内容不全面等。为了更好地充当管理人角色，政府应该通过制度化建设、信息化建设来完善财政支出绩效评价，同时，通过引入中介评价机构来提高财政支出绩效评价的透明度。     

非公有制领域职务犯罪及其预防

非公有制领域职务犯罪是指在非公有制部门中承担一定职务的人员,利用其职务,严重危害部门利益,刑法规定应该受到刑罚处罚的行为。非公有制领域职务犯罪大体可以分为贪利型职务犯罪、背信竞业型职务犯罪和渎职型职务犯罪三种类型。分析非公有制领域职务犯罪的形成原因必须从社会、非公有制部门及个人三个角度来进行,是动机、机会和条件相结合的产物。预防非公有制领域职务犯罪具有重要的现实意义,能够增强非公有制部门信誉,净化市场环境促进良性竞争,抑制官员腐败与打击贿赂行为。预防策略主要包括以下三个方面:加强职工思想教育,重视部门文化建设;加快部门制度建设,规范市场秩序;完善相关法制和监督体系建设。     

转型期中国公共领导体制变革与廉政建设

腐败与反腐败是社会政治生活中的一个永恒主题。腐败的存在与公共权力密切相关,作为公共权力运作的核心性规范,公共领导体制直接规定着高层领导者运用权力的方式,影响着社会的腐败与反腐败活动。伴随着社会发展,中国公共领导体制开始现代化转型,从传统型权威和个人魅力型权威向法理型权威转换,其反腐败方略也相应地从注重思想教育和社会运动转向注重制度约束。与此相适应,必须深化公共领导体制改革,以制度创新根治腐败,包括:进行良好的宪政分权,发展直接民主;引入政治竞争,实行政务公开;转变政府职能,推动行政体制改革,规范政府行为;强化监督机制和惩罚机制;加强思想教育和道德约束,提高政府官员的廉洁自律度,等等。     

政府部门绩效评估初探

政府部门绩效评估可定义为对政府部门的工作效率、能力、服务质量、公共责任和公众满意程度等方面的分析与评价,对其管理过程中投入和产出所反映的绩效进行评定和划分等级。开展有效的政府绩效评估具有重大的理论意义和实践意义。政府部门绩效评估的核心是建构绩效评估模式。我国政府绩效评估模式应包括评估的主题、维度和指标体系三个方面。     

Constitutional Prohibitions in a Rent Seeking Model

I extend the standard rent seeking model to allow lobbying fora constitutional prohibition on wealth transfers. I examinetwo issues: (1) the ability of special interests withsignificant political capacity to block constitutional change;and (2) the effect of adding a constitutional stage on totallobbying expenditures. Defeating a prohibition on wealthtransfers is a public good for rent seekers; success inconstitutional politics merely allows them to lobby for wealthtransfers. The resulting collective action problem for rentseekers in constitutional politics offsets the generalinterest's free rider problems, reducing the probability oftransfers and expected total lobbying expenditures compared tothe traditional rent seeking contest. Introduction of aconstitutional stage also reverses several comparative staticsresults from the rent seeking game. An increase in the numberof rent seekers or the general interest's (consumers') abilityto organize increase lobbying in the rent seeking game butgenerally reduce expected lobbying in the constitutionalprohibition game.     

Rents from in-kind subsidy: “Charity” in the public sector

Public choice analysis usually focuses attention on the behaviour of self-interested individuals but this paper considers rent seeking when some taxpayers are motivated by altruism. Redistribution policies initiated by self-interested rent seekers require taxpayer approval. Even if taxpayers are fully informed, their resistance to inefficient schemes is reduced when public sector schemes are the only means available to pursue altruistic goals. Altruism serves to broaden the scope within which rent seekers may operate. A discussion of international “tied” aid illustrates the impact which rent seeking can exert on public sector “charity.”     

Corruption monitoring and the supply of politicians in China

Monitoring institutions are usually perceived as efficient instruments for improving governance. This article evaluates the link between corruption monitoring and the supply of politicians in nondemocracies. Using China as a case, I show that corruption monitoring pushes capable young elites away from seeking government positions. This effect may be driven by two possible mechanisms: economic returns and career prospects. Specifically, corruption investigations may reduce the expected economic returns for government officials, undermining capable young elite’ willingness and efforts to become government officials. In addition, corruption investigations may indicate that there are potential uncertainties and risks involved when taking on a political career, which reduce capable young elites’ desire to pursue a political career. The empirical analysis confirms these two mechanisms and provides unique evidence for the unintended negative impact of corruption monitoring institutions.     

Privately informed seekers of an uncertain rent

Two departures from antecedent rent-seeking models are invoked: a rent of unknown size is sought, and rent seekers obtain private imperfect estimates of this size. A symmetric equilibrium for a fixed number of rent seekers is characterized, and shown to underdissipate the rent. Then a model of the decision to obtain private information and participate in the rent-seeking contest is built. The symmetric equilibrium participation probability equates expected profit to participation costs. A simple formula for underdissipation results: dissipation is incomplete precisely by the expected aggregate participation costs. If an award mechanism can attain a lower level of dissipation for a fixed number of seekers, then it will raise the endogenous probability of participation, and as a result will dissipate less rent in the equilibrium with an endogenous number of seekers.     

Good government and sustainable anti-corruption strategies: A role for independent anti-corruption agencies?

Aid donors are increasingly seeking to link assistance to sustainable reform, including the provision of a responsible and responsive political and legal framework, the improvement of recipient countries' social, health and educational prospects, and the promotion of economic development and liberalization. Much attention is given to the first of these because of the size and cost to the state and the perceived constraints it exercises on the longer-term changes to the economy and society; in general terms, good government is an essential precondition for good governance and economic development. Increasingly donors have focused on corruption, both as a core obstacle to the encouragement of good government, and on the steps taken to dealing with it as evidence of commitment and the will of recipient countries to their introduction. While the types of activity associated with corruption are readily identifiable, as are the means to attempt to deal with it, it is usually much more difficult to determine effective implementation, particularly with limited resources at a time when longer-term political and economic reforms are also being promoted. It is therefore especially important that, in relation to corruption and good government, a practicable, effective and sustainable means is available to deal with corruption from preventative, investigative and reform perspectives.     

Monopoly rent seeking under conditions of uncertainty

In recent years, economists have come to recognize that the competition to obtain monopoly rents, i.e., rent seeking, may consume resources whose value greatly exceeds that associated with traditionally measured deadweight welfare loss triangles (Tollison, 1982). Early articles by Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974), and Posner (1975) all concluded that this competition would exactly dissipate the rents sought. Later articles by Tullock (1980) and Baysinger and Tollison (1980) modified that original conclusion. The present paper develops a model which raises further doubts about the complete transformation of rents into costs. The emphasis of the analytical framework presented is on the implications of the fact that rent seekers may typically be uncertain about being able to maintain a monopoly position even if they are initially successful in attaining one. It is demonstrated that when there is even a moderate level of uncertainty about retention, the likely effect will be a relatively large reduction in the magnitude of resources invested in rent seeking activities. In addition, it is shown that the size of this waste of resources depends somewhat on the extent to which rent seeking opportunities involve once and for all transfers as opposed to flows of rents. Finally, in those cases where a flow of rents is at stake, it is shown that considerable social waste might be eliminated through institutional changes which would reduce the subjective probabilities of potential monopolists retaining their rent streams once attained.     

领导干部提拔模式对地方政府权力运行方向的影响

利用实证调查数据,通过交叉表分析,发现在提拔领导干部时,存在侧重考察"工作能力"与侧重考察"社会活动能力"两种模式,并且这两种模式对地方政府权力运行的集体决策的程度、为亲友用权、政府工作取向、决策偏好、政策执行取向有显著影响;通过探索性要素分析发现,领导干部提拔模式对政府权力运行方向的影响可以简化为"权力为整体利益服务"和"权力为小团体服务"两个方面;通过综合性结构方程模型分析验证了探索性分析的结论,表明领导干部选拔模式确实会对政府权力运行方向产生显著影响。同时发现:在提拔领导干部时,若强调后备人选的"能力和工作业绩"及"口碑",政府权力将更多地偏向于为公共利益服务;若"背景和关系"、"跑官买官"因素发生关键影响,政府权力则容易演变成为小团体牟利的工具。     

Corruption: Governance challenge towards reducing unemployment in Nigeria

The study examines the possibility of having a very low rate of unemployment in Nigeria, if there is a reduced rate of corruption in the long-term. While using cointegration regressions and Vector Error Correction Mechanism (VECM) over the period 1996–2020, it is affirmed that corruption could increase unemployment rate in the long run. The two corruption indicators employed (control of corruption and corruption index) are found to have a substantial effect on unemployment rate. Further evidence confirms that corruption and unemployment are cyclically interdependent. Findings indeed stress that a high level of corruption is harmful to employment growth. On the other hand, in the absence of sufficient job opportunities, rent-seeking government officials would be more interested in collecting bribes from job seekers, which results in sustained unlawful practices among the public officials. Thus, adopting effective corruption-control measures is critical. It is therefore suggested that to effectively tackle corruption incidents, there should be incentives for citizens or public officials to report bribery and the process of reporting corruption incidents should be further simplified. Strengthening anti-corruption agencies and developing a sound legal framework that promotes a culture of lawfulness and impeccable practices in the public sector are central.     

The economy,corruption, and the vote: Evidence from experiments in Sweden and Moldova

How does corruption affect voting behavior when economic conditions are poor? Using a novel experimental design and two original survey experiments, we offer four important conclusions. First, in a low corruption country (Sweden), voters react negatively to corruption regardless of the state of the economy. Second, in a high corruption country (Moldova), voters react negatively to corruption only when the state of the economy is also poor; when economic conditions are good, corruption is less important. Third, respondents in Sweden react more strongly to corruption stimuli than respondents in Moldova. Finally, in the low corruption country, sociotropic corruption voting (or voting based on corruption among political leaders) is relatively more important, whereas in our high corruption country, pocketbook corruption voting (or voting based on one's own personal experience with corruption, i.e., being asked to pay bribes) is equally prevalent. Our findings are consistent with multiple stable corruption equilibria, as well as with a world where voters are more responsive to corruption signals more common in their environment.     

THE DESIGN AND USE OF PERFORMANCE INFORMATION IN INDONESIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER DIVERGING STAKEHOLDER PRESSURES

Public sector managers in less developed countries are confronted with opposing forces. A lack of sufficient resources along with a tradition of corruption are obstacles for developing and using performance measurement systems. However, recent public sector reforms in less developed countries, including decentralisation and anti‐corruption programmes, stimulate the development and use of such systems. On the basis of a framework, which distinguishes different types of stakeholders, each with particular performance interests, we analyse how public sector managers are coping with the two opposing forces, given the relative power positions and the interests of their stakeholders. On the basis of four cases studies of local government agencies in Bali (Indonesia), we found that with respect to the annual performance reports, managers in these agencies focus more on fulfilling the formal requirements regarding the format of these reports and on their timely submission than on their contents, which are all symptoms of a symbolic rather than functional use of performance information. However, the reports include information on inputs that is linked to similar information in short‐term reports, which the managers use in a functional manner. These managers show a kind of juggling behaviour, in the sense that they partially try to serve conflicting performance interests. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.