从“主权”与“治权”的话语透视两岸关系

1992年台湾单方面提出“主权及于整个中国”、“治权仅及于台澎金马”的话语表述以来,尽管大陆方面至今从未接受关于“治权”的表述,但“主权”与“治权”的研究确已成为两岸共同关注的领域.本文以二者关系为视角,分析了影响两岸关系的若干政治主张,并重点考察“一中框架”论对处理“主权”与“治权”话语的启示,从而透视两岸关系的发展脉络.     

党的十六大报告是如何阐述“一国两制”和祖国统一问题的？

坚持一个中国原则，是发展两岸关系和实现和平统一的基础。世界上只有一个中国，大陆和台湾同属一个中国，中国的主权和领土完整不容分割。对任何旨在制造“台湾独立”、“两个中国”、“一中一台”的言行，我们都坚决反对。开展对话，进行和平统一谈判，是我们的一贯主张。我们呼吁，在一个中国原则的基础上，暂时搁置某些政治争议，尽早恢复两岸对话和谈判。     

国资委设MBO“禁区”中小企业可以借鉴探索

国务院台湾事务办公室副主任王在希12月1日在澳门指出，维护国家领土和主权完整，是包括台湾同胞在内的全体中华儿女的神圣责任。如果陈水扁当局存有侥幸心理，以为中国人民为了争取和平的发展环境，可以姑息“台独”分裂，那将是严重、危险的误判。     

台湾“宪改”与追求台湾“法理独立”的互动

台湾并不一定要走“制宪”的程序才能走上“法理台独”的目的。技巧性运用修宪的方式,或是依循宪法条文规定可修改者,照样迂回的达到“法理台独”的目标。如目前台湾现行“宪法”的领土条款是涵盖中国大陆,但是领土条款被规范是可修改的。在形式上是属于修宪层次的条文,却在实质上可转化程序,解释台湾已成与中国互不隶属的主权独立国家。     

两岸关系和平发展新课题浅析

在领土主权意义上,“两岸一中”是现存状态,不需要追求,但需要维护。两岸关系和平发展的内涵包括两个方面：如何正式结束两个政权之间的敌对状态,达成有序分配内政和外交空间安排的共识;如何解决与两岸人民生活密切相关的经济、社会和文化发展的问题。“领土主权一体,政府差序并存;存量原则不变,增量拓展共商”的原则可以成为两岸关系和平发展的框架。两岸关系和平发展的重点是解决经济、社会和文化发展的问题。双方可以在合作的基础上提出两岸关系和平发展的共同沦述。     

谎言终归要破天——评陈水扁的“台湾主权独立论”

最近，就在陈水扁就任民进党主席之后，公开发表了一系列“台独”言论，鼓吹两岸是“一边一国”、“公民投票决定台湾前途”、“一个中国是改变现状”等论调，声称要把民进党的“台湾前途决议文”作为未来台湾当局大陆政策的最高指导纲领。而这些“台独”言论的要害和基础就是所谓“台湾是一个主权独立的国家”。     

从国际法的角度看台湾问题

台湾问题是中国的内政问题。从《国际法》中国家取得领土主权的主要方式、国际条约必须遵守原则、“公民投票”的法律界定等足以证明台湾是中国的固有领土，中国的领土主权不客置疑，中国的内政不容干涉。     

宣示领土主权和海洋权益，激发两岸同胞共守家园情怀 “万里海疆巡礼”大型宣传报道活动启动

5月7日，大型宣传报道活动“万里海疆巡礼”在辽宁省东港市正式启动。本次活动以大陆海岸线最北段的海岛大鹿岛为第一站，一路向南，集中报道长山群岛、舟山群岛、金门、马祖、澎湖、西沙群岛、南沙群岛等代表性岛屿，宣示领土主权和海洋权益，激发两岸同胞共守家园的情怀。     

主权问题不能谈判

近日来 ,台湾民进党的当权人物不断放话 ,表示愿到大陆访问 ,也欢迎大陆领导人访问台湾 ,两岸可以谈“三通”问题 ,如果“一个中国”作为议题而非前提 ,双方也可以谈。这些话似乎是想展现一种理性务实、追求和解的态度 ,对此北京将如何回应 ?其实 ,台湾新领导人的上述姿态 ,并不是什么新鲜东西 ,当年李登辉不是也表示他想到大陆做“和平之旅”吗 ?不是也扬言要亲自陪汪老在台湾走走看看吗 ?不是也放话说在“两国论”的基础上 ,双方什么问题都可以谈吗 ?但是 ,既然李登辉背弃了一个中国原则 ,他就失去了同大陆对话的资格 ,什么“和平之旅”之…     

彰显民族大义的正义呼声

日本"购岛"闹剧以来,两岸联手保卫包括钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿在内的中华民族海洋领土主权权益,成为两岸同胞和海外华侨华人的一致呼声。两岸同胞呼吁两岸联手保卫钓鱼岛,彰显了民族大义,表达了两岸中国人维护领土主权和民族尊严的坚强意志,体现了不屈不挠、共御外侮的民族品格。彰显中华民族大义。大陆和台湾同属一个中国,两岸同胞都是炎黄子孙,维护领土主权和民族尊严,是两岸共同的责任。"六合同风,九州共贯"是中国社会政治的理想境界,两岸守土有责,有义务合作。正如星云法师所言:钓鱼岛是中国人的,两岸应团结面对钓鱼岛事件。     

两岸对“和平协议”的立场与前瞻

台海和平环境的建立，是两岸当局与人民自1949年内战之后一直的期待。两岸对和平远景的期待可以理解，但从理想走向实际却需要一段漫长而且曲折的过程。本文共分五个部分，包括前言、两岸创议“和平协议”的历史背景介绍、两岸终止敌对状态协议设计与推行、两岸对“和平协议”解读的相互冲突，以及两岸“和平协议”签署的展望，来解析两岸对此一问题的立场与要求，并整理出双方对此事件的不同解读，以及彼此尚无法“跨出门槛”的症结所在。     

From functional integration to structural readjustment: Taipei–Beijing relations and the role of the United States

Regardless of the continued stalemate in the political arena, trade and economic interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have increased steadily. Both aggregate data and the results of survey research have testified to the existence of functional integration of the two societies across the Taiwan Strait. In addition to functional integration, structural readjustments have also been made by political authorities both in Taipei and Beijing so as to facilitate continuity of trade and economic relations. These types of mutual accommodations include: establishing proper ‘unofficial’ agencies on both sides to serve as instruments of practical contacts and negotiation; the more flexible definition of ‘One China’ by Beijing; and the opening of ‘small links’ between Quemoy and Amoy by Taipei. Beijing's refusal to grant Taipei any official diplomatic status and Taipei's reluctance to accept the ‘One China’ principle remain major obstacles to cross‐Taiwan Strait relations. The United States will continue playing a key role in future cross‐Strait relations. Beijing seems to be content, at least temporarily, to maintain cordial relations with the United States in exchange for the latter's adherence to the ‘One China’ principle and rejection of the option of Taiwan independence. Whether Taipei will use enhanced US commitment to Taiwan's security to strike a better deal with Beijing for gradual cross‐Strait integration or to utilize increased American protection to move onto the separatist road will be affected by domestic politics in Taiwan, future US policy toward to the island, and Beijing's response to Taipei's demand for security and international recognition.     

From Zero-sum Game to Positive-sum Game: why Beijing tolerates Pacific Island states' recognition of Taipei

The Pacific Islands region might be regarded as one of the most remote and politically least significant areas in the geopolitical and economic considerations of world giants. However, as the regional order of the Asia–Pacific changes rapidly, China has shown more eagerness to engage the island states. Interestingly, Beijing's former arch-rival Taipei still maintains, arguably, considerable influence over the region. This raises a question that is thought-provoking: why is this status quo tolerated by Beijing? Drawing on empirical sources in relation to communication between Beijing, Taipei and these island states, by focusing on how Beijing handles the South Pacific region in general and the six non-recognizing states in particular, this article attempts to tackle the question by distinguishing the difference in Beijing's mentality today from that of 30 or 40 years ago. It argues that the zero-sum mentality of fighting against Taipei in the region has now been replaced by a positive-sum assumption to engage Taipei, as well as the pan-Chinese community in the world, via the PIS, regardless of whether they establish formal ties with Beijing or not.     

The origins of conflict across the Taiwan Strait: The problem of differences in perceptions

In 1995 and 1996, the Taiwan Strait became an area of considerable tension. Relations between Beijing and Taipei deteriorated as a result of perceptions by leaders in the People's Republic of China that Taiwan was moving toward independence, especially after President Lee Teng‐hui made a widely publicized trip to the US in the summer of 1995. An assessment of the differences in perceptions by scholars, officials and the populations on the two sides, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, are instructive. The author looks at five areas where disparate views are noticeable and divisive: the history of Taiwan (especially its ties with the mainland), Taiwan's legal status, views of the ‘Taiwan issue’ espoused by Beijing and Taipei, current relations between Beijing and Taipei, and the stance of the international community and the nature and structure of international politics. Scenarios are presented regarding the future of the conflict.     

The politics of greater China's integration into the global Info Tech (IT) supply chain

The most notable feature of the public ‘dialogue of the deaf’ taking place across the Strait separating Taiwan and China is its zero‐sum logic. This logic of one‐upmanship in political and security matters dictates that whatever benefits Taipei is detrimental to Beijing and vice versa. Commercial interaction between Taiwan and China, particularly in the broadly defined sector of information technology (IT), is arguably the more powerful driver of cross‐Strait interaction today. Two characteristics of this accelerating dynamic of commercial interaction across the Taiwan Strait are paramount: (1) its tight integration into a global IT supply chain; and (2) the extent of symbiosis by which all participants in this global supply chain depend on the worldwide vitality of this economic ecosystem. In interpreting what cross‐Strait economic integration in IT portends, political logic may be leading Taipei and Beijing along opposite paths to the same end‐point: the presumption that economic integration is undermining, and destabilizing, the cross‐Strait economic and political status quo. As a dominant player in global IT, the US has its own stake in a clear understanding of this globalization dynamic and in astutely maintaining its interests as the global IT supply chain continues to extend across the political fault‐line of the Taiwan Strait. Non‐partisan analysis of the logic of globalization suggests a different outcome for the cross‐Strait commercial dynamic than either Taipei or Beijing has publicly credited: its potential to mutually enhance economic prosperity and contribute long‐term to stabilizing cross‐Strait political interaction.     

Hong Kong's policy possibilities and directions toward the mainland‐Taiwan conflict

On 1 July 1997, Hong Kong was returned from British colonial rule to Chinese rule under the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The change in political status of Hong Kong has great impacts on the triangular relationship between Hong Kong, the mainland and Taiwan, in which the mainland and Taiwan are still in a state of intense political conflict and competition. This paper examines the policy possibilities and directions for Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region of the PRC in handling its relations with Taiwan. It argues that both Beijing and Taipei want to preserve the existing Hong Kong‐Taiwan relations for political and practical purposes but at the same time will try to avoid being forced into a suspected political trap—for Beijing the recognition of Taiwan as an independent political entity and for Taipei the subordination of Taiwan to PRC sovereignty. Between these two baselines, the paper points out that Hong Kong should pursues its own Taiwan policy built upon the interests of Hong Kong and depoliticization of Hong Kong‐Taiwan relations.     

The Taipei Palace Museum： A Collection of Unique Treasures

To avoid chaos caused by war, nearly 20,000 cases of cultural relics from the Forbidden City in Beijing were moved southward in the 1930s. Parts of the imperial collection were then relocated to Waishuanghsi in Taipei. Many people do not know that there are two palace museums in China： one in Beijing and another in Taipei.     

Taiwan's Expansion of International Space: opportunities and challenges

While much is to be celebrated since Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration in 2008, cross-Strait relations are not without challenges. One such crucial test is Ma's call for Chinese leaders to stop isolating Taipei in the world community and give Taiwan adequate ‘international space’. Because the issue strikes at the heart of the fundamental differences between Taipei's and Beijing's positions regarding the island's sovereignty, it needs to be handled carefully by both governments for better cross-Strait relations. This study analyzes the approaches adopted by both Beijing and Taipei regarding Taiwan's status in the international community. Utilizing discussion with Chinese scholars and government officials and the analysis of several waves of survey data conducted in Taiwan, it argues that Beijing's flexibility in its application of the ‘one China’ principle and the Ma administration's practicality in making its requests are critical to the realization of Taipei's demand for international space and hence cross-Strait stability.     

美国因素在两岸关系和平发展进程中的影响

美国对两岸和谈的政策立场,是出于维系台海“不统、不独、不战”局面的战略考虑,以保证自己在台海地区的最大战略利益。美国既不希望两岸举行统一谈判又希望两岸达成和平协议的复杂心态,表现在一方面希望两岸进行谈判,降低敌对状态,另一方面又长期对台提供军售,使其增加与大陆相抗衡的资本。此一“双轨政策”对两岸和平关系的构建,有着不同方向的影响,往往起了互相抵消的作用。由于中国政府对台湾当局谋求“法理台独”的强烈反应以及台海紧张局势的升高,美国政府在20世纪90年代后期开始对两岸政治谈判采取较为积极的态度,反对台湾单方面改变现状。美国的上述战略考虑,在反对台湾“独立”、维系两岸和平这一点上,与中国政府的立场有相通之处,客观上为构建两岸关系和平发展框架提供了较好的外部条件。     

Rapprochement between Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland: implications for American foreign policy

This article examines US policy toward the improving relations between the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. It also analyzes several policy options that the Barack Obama administration may wish to consider. In conclusion, the author suggests that, despite some arguments to the contrary, continuing the current policy supporting the growing rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei is in the best interest of the US.