Poland's conception of European security and Russia

This article examines the problem of contemporary bilateral relations between Poland and Russia. Its thesis largely attributes the rivalry of these two states in Eastern Europe to conceptions relating to the balancing and bandwagoning of power. This rivalry can be put down to the fact that Polish-Russian relations are being developed within broader global processes such as Russia's relations with NATO, the USA and European Union. The greatest obstacle to the maintenance of mutually beneficial relations is the sensitive issue of security. In recent years Poland has consistently underlined its willingness to reinforce NATO's mutual defense mechanisms by supporting the organization's continued presence in Central-Eastern Europe. This issue has been compounded by Poland's striving to bring the countries of Eastern Europe (especially Ukraine) into closer affiliation with Western institutions favoring European integration, which is evidently perceived as interference in what is regarded by Moscow to be a sphere of Russian influence. This has provoked a number of serious crises in bilateral relations between Poland and Russia since the Euro-Maidan Revolution in Ukraine. Russian plans to install new (Iskander) missile systems close to the Polish border and Poland's effective attempts post-2014 to extend NATO presence within its own country testify to the scale of conflicts of interest between the two states and the lack of trust afforded by both sides. The issues highlighted in this paper are of great importance, since they not only enable the complexity of Central European issues to be more fully comprehended but also help to elucidate other global actors' conceptions relating to cooperation with Europe.     

The sources of Russia's fear of NATO

The paper analyzes Russia's perception of NATO since the beginning of its eastern enlargement. Russia's reaction to the enlargement evolved from attempts to diffuse its potential damage through a limited cooperation to passive and then active policies of containment. The latter have resulted in a risky behavior with respect to the alliance and a concentration of Russian military on the Western border. Two factors can assist us in explaining Russia's evolving perception of NATO from a potential partner to a renewed military threat – the historical experience of viewing the alliance, and the West in general, as potentially threatening and the post-Cold war interaction with NATO that served to strengthen the historically developed perception. As of today, Russia has learned from its interaction with the alliance that NATO remains a principle threat to Russia's national security and that through the alliance's expansion the West seeks to exercise its cultural, economic, and political domination in Eurasia.     

Security dilemmas of nuclear-armed Pakistan

Pakistan's security environment has deteriorated through its adoption of a declared nuclear weapons posture in May 1998. Internal fissures have widened along regional and sectarian lines as the Pakistani economy falters, unable to sustain even limited external sanctions following decades of internal mismanagement. Tensions with India have also increased as Pakistan's security managers adopt interventionist policies, based on a misplaced belief in the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. The international community, in particular, the USA's failure to reverse South Asian nuclear proliferation, has emboldened Indian advocates of nuclear deployment. If India deploys nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, Pakistan will follow suit. Operation-ready nuclear weapons will increase the prospects of an India - Pakistan conflict that could assume a nuclear dimension. Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability will not prevent an Indian conventional attack nor will the presence of nuclear weapons deter an Indian accidental, unauthorised or preventive nuclear attack. Changed domestic and external priorities alone can buttress Pakistani security.     

Editor's Notes

The efforts of the United States to promote nuclear non-proliferationduring the 1980s culminated in the establishment of the MissileTechnology Control Regime (MTCR). The US has since enacted aleadership role in the regime, issuing warnings and imposingsanctions according to MTCR regulations. But has the US itselfadhered to the MTCR? Zhao Tong and Li Bin's article Is the UnitedStates Complying with MTCR Rules? analyses this lacuna in commonlyheld perceptions of role of the US. The article presents detailedevidence of US export of strategic missiles and missile defencesystems, and US cooperation on missile defence technology thatconstitute behaviour which is in contravention of the MTCR agreement.These violations, moreover, are not accidental     

Uzbekistan among the great powers

Under the authoritarian regime of Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan has achieved independence and stability by exploiting its natural resources through a strategy of “staple globalism” and by balancing the great powers against each other. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the new regime first distanced itself from Russia and tried regional alliances, then accepted help from NATO, and most recently turned cautiously to Russia (and China). Throughout, Uzbekistan has managed to receive considerable assistance from international agencies and military aid from several outside powers, albeit relatively little private foreign investment, owing to its poor business climate. The country has also handled potential conflicts with neighbors without significant violence.     

试析朝鲜半岛核问题与中国的政策走势

当前,朝鲜半岛形势由于朝鲜最高领导人金正日突然逝世、国家全面进入权力过渡阶段而充满不确定性。在朝鲜权力交替的敏感时期,各方为恢复六方会谈、重启半岛无核化进程进行的积极努力受此影响而放缓。朝鲜寻求核武器既是朝鲜半岛南北长期敌对、朝美间的冲突所铸安全困境之果,也是引发东北亚地区更大范围动荡的诱因,并且由于朝鲜权力交替蕴含的潜在风险,核危机对东北亚地区安全构成的威胁在增大。针对半岛核问题,中国政府一直通过双边和多边渠道发挥着稳定地区局势、推动半岛无核化的积极作用。结合朝鲜半岛形势的变化,在客观分析东北亚地区战略格局的基础上,中国政府将围绕维护半岛和平稳定和实现半岛无核化这两大战略目标继续作出更大的努力。     

“The laughing third man in a fight”: Stalin's use of the wedge strategy

Although much IR theory focuses on balancing, this paper examines a version of the wedge strategy, what Stalin allegedly called being “the laughing third man in a fight.” This is the practice of advancing one's goals by setting up other states to fight each other. The first case study is Soviet strategy in Europe from September 1939 until June 1941. The second is Soviet strategy in the Far East in 1941–45. What I am looking at here is a policy of deliberately encouraging the start of a war and/or aiding its prolongation in order to weaken both sides. The two case studies indicate that the Soviet Union used such a strategy at times in place of the usual forms of balancing, discussed in the international relations literature. Additionally, analysis of Moscow's conduct, statements by Soviet leaders, and the policies of a number of foreign communist parties indicate that, in addition to any security goals, Stalin's agenda included furthering the USSR's goal as a revolutionary state, even thought this had at times to be constrained by realpolitik.     

International terrorism

In this article, it is argued that the U.S. ICBM force has no strategic value and should be dismantled. The article outlines a post‐cold war U.S. strategic nuclear force and proposes how this dyad force fits a strategy rather than offering a strategy to fit within the force. Deterrence theory anchors the analysis here. Second, this article asserts that U.S. security will be enhanced in the next century with Russian‐American cooperation on nuclear issues. Moving to a dyad now is step one in that direction, which in turn changes the perception of U.S. strategic weapons.

As weapons proliferate, deterrence against renegade nations and groups must become the cornerstone of U.S. doctrine. A dyad force and Russian‐American cooperation, both steps that restructure U.S. doctrine, will begin a process that deters these nations or groups.

This article depicts how each leg of the U.S. triad that remains following the START II treaty is a continuation of START I logic and planning. In other words, the article attempts to show how the rationale for a START II treaty force does not mirror a changed world. The purpose of this evidence is not to be dogmatic or critical but to strengthen the argument that U.S. nuclear strategy is still reflective of a bygone era.     

Iran's nuclear programme and the west

Judged by the media reports and statements by US officials in recent months, the USA is seriously considering, or at least thinking about, taking military action against Iran, if it refuses to forgo its legal right to enrich uranium for its nuclear energy programme, which Washington claims is a cover for making nuclear weapons. Iran denies the allegation. The effects of such an attack on Iranian society and the political ramifications beyond Iran's borders are discussed and analysed here. The irony of the present dispute between the West and Iran is that, for three decades up to the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Europeans and Americans helped, in fact earnestly encouraged, Iran in the development of its nuclear programme. The article explains the reasons for the failure of talks between Iran and the European trio to resolve the issue. It argues that, even if the question of Iran's nuclear programme were resolved, the 27-year conflict between the two countries would be unlikely to end in the near future. For Washington the name of the game is ‘regime change’ in Iran, either through military means or through fomenting internal chaos, hoping for implosion. But considering the political and military difficulties that Washington is experiencing in Afghanistan and Iraq, achieving either of these options is highly problematic.     

From a follower to a trendsetter: Hungary's post-Cold War identity and the West

The article attempts to make sense of recent developments in Hungary's relationship with the EU and the US by explicating the logic behind the formation of its post-Cold War identity. The article's central theoretical argument derives from social identity theory (SIT) in social psychology which argues that social groups strive for positive distinctiveness and provides concrete hypotheses concerning the identity management strategies that groups use to enhance their relative position. Extrapolating the identity management techniques predicted by SIT to international politics, I suggest that states may enhance their relative standing by imitating more advanced states (strategy of social mobility), trying to displace the higher-ranked state (strategy of social competition), or finding a new arena in which to be superior (strategy of social creativity). The article argues that Orban's government post-2010 steps in domestic and foreign policy can be conceptualized as attempts to redefine Hungary's identity by moving away from the strategy of social mobility pursued since the end of communism towards the strategy of social creativity.     

Georgian readiness for NATO membership after Russian-Georgian armed conflict

The history of the cooperation between Georgia and NATO had started long before the Rose Revolution. Nowadays, Georgia belongs to the countries which want to join NATO. This article gauges the Georgian readiness for its accession to NATO. Study on NATO enlargement provides requirements on future members of NATO, even though it avoids such an explicit formulation. This article concludes that Georgia is not yet ready to join NATO because it has serious deficiencies in the area of democracy building, military readiness, and settling territorial disputes with its neighbours. The only area where the situation is satisfactory is the support of the public for the accession.     

Poland's foreign policy since 1989: the challenges of independence

In its first decade of post-communist independence, Poland achieved far more than most dared believe in 1989. Despite domestic political and economic turmoil, it has joined Europe as a new member of NATO and a prospective member of the EU. This article traces the evolution of Polish foreign policy since 1989 over four time periods: First, the early uncertainties from 1989 to 1992 when Warsaw — caught between a reunifying Germany and a collapsing USSR — was intent on solidifying its relations with Central European neighbors. Second, the watershed year of 1993, which witnessed changes in every aspect of Poland's external relations — the demise of Visegrad, first moves toward NATO and EU enlargement, the emergence of serious tensions in Warsaw's relations with the East, especially Russia. Third, the years in the anterooms of Europe from 1994 to 1996, when Poland and its central European neighbors lobbied for early accession to the EU and NATO, while relations with Russia remained in the deep freeze. And fourth, the period since 1997, in which Warsaw has been negotiating its “return to Europe”, joining NATO in 1999 and actively pursuing membership in the EU. These gains have not come quickly or easily; rather, they demonstrate a hard earned consistency in Poland's foreign policy agenda, despite numerous changes in domestic politics, as well as an increasingly realistic vision of the country's place in post-Cold War Europe.     

Compliance and non-compliance as sources of recognition: Slovakia and NATO

This article argues that there is a difference in what constitutes the sources of recognition prior to countries' membership in the Euro-Atlantic community represented by NATO and after countries become its members. While prior to membership, countries are recognized for their compliance with NATO standards and policies, upon membership countries get the opportunity to promote specific interests legitimately and may seek recognition via non-compliance with NATO mainstream.The paper explores this dynamic of recognition on the issue of Kosovo independence where Slovakia went from supporting NATO in its effort to protect civilians in Kosovo in the late 1990s to non-recognition of Kosovo in defiance of the majority of NATO member states less than a decade later. The crucial point proposed here is that there was a shift in how recognition by NATO worked prior to Slovakia's membership and upon membership in these frameworks. While prior to membership recognition was achieved by compliance and identification with NATO standpoints, policies and actions, upon membership, recognition is achieved by differentiation from these patterns. More generally, the study shows that NATO membership is a powerful source of conditionality in relation to future members and a powerful source of legitimacy in relation to current members' actions. While this has been discussed in the literature, the point here is that recognition in its various forms is an important driving force in these conditionality processes.     

Choosing Among Parallel Health Care Systems in a Bariba Community

This article assesses the significance of Canada's role in the Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) and, more generally, Canada's foreign policy during the early months of the Congo crisis. It argues that Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's government pursued a policy that recognized the importance of achieving Western objectives in the Congo but at the same time eschewed the strident Cold War views of some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. The Canadian government was forced to weigh the importance of sometimes-conflicting foreign policy considerations when developing policy during the Congo crisis, and this ultimately lead to an unwillingness to be seen to be pursuing a concerted NATO approach to the Congo's tribulations. This would suggest recent interpretations that portray Canadian participation in ONUC as an example of how Canada's peacekeeping policy primarily served Western, Cold War objectives might not be entirely correct.     

Rwanda: an agrarian developmental state?

This article investigates Rwanda’s agricultural policies and institutions as a historically contextualised response to exceptionally adverse developmental circumstances. Using the agrarian question as an analytical point of reference, the article argues that it is extremely difficult to identify how increases in productivity and income in smallholder agriculture can be achieved without forceful state action and a sustained injection of resources. In light of this, entirely right-congruent governance is caught in a dilemma about the extent to which the government overrides peasants’ own agency and the extent to which the agrarian strategy produces a sustained and stable transformation in agriculture. Rather than making a defence or condemnation of the government’s strategy, the article argues against pre-emptive judgements of an agrarian strategy that can only discernibly attain success over a long period. What the article does do is insist that there is development potential in the current strategy, not simply a disaster in the making.     

Foreign policy, rhetorical action and the idea of otherness: The Czech Republic and Russia

This article employs the concept of rhetorical action in an analysis of the recent developments in Czech-Russian political relations. Through the discourse analysis of key Russian political speeches and official documents related to the Czech Republic, as well as Czech speeches tackling the same issues, we look at two different rhetorical actions employed by Russia to induce changes in Czech policy. The attempts to make Czech policy unacceptable in the wider community of European democracies were only partially successful. While the first rhetorical action aimed against Czech NATO membership failed, the new diplomatic strategy stressing the need for a “normalization” of relations was successful in transforming Czech policy towards Russia.     

核武器与冷战时期美国对苏联的政策

冷战时期,作为维护国家安全的重要工具,核武器在美国对苏联的政策中发挥了重要作用。美国政府不仅在战后初期坚持核保密政策,而且还多次利用核武器对苏联施加压力,以迫使其在政治上和外交上做出让步,并制定了一系列针对苏联的核作战计划。与此同时,为了保持对苏联的核优势地位,对苏联构成有效的威慑,美国政府不断加强核力量的建设,使得美苏之间的核军备竞赛愈演愈烈,并使双方走到了核战争的边缘,从而使得美苏决策者都认识到,限制核军备竞赛对双方至关重要,美苏关系也由此进入了相对缓和的时期。及至20世纪70年代,限制战略武器谈判成为美国对苏政策的重要内容。     

International cooperation in locating and recovering stolen nuclear materials

Abstract

With the expansion of terrorist activities in the last fifteen years there has been increasing concern that groups might be able to steal nuclear materials and use nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes. The last fifteen years have also seen growing criminal activity in the nuclear domain including thefts of nuclear material, attacks on nuclear facilities, and threats against American cities, although these latter threats turned out to be hoaxes. Nuclear experts have stated that a relatively few technicians could fabricate a nuclear bomb. The principal impediment is access to nuclear material. Although terrorists usually would not be able to further their aims by threats of mass destruction, it is increasingly conceivable that some group might go for the nuclear jackpot. Congress has recently passed legislation designed to protect nuclear materials and to make nuclear thefts and threats subject to severe penalties. This legislation is geared into a recent U.N. convention providing for international cooperation on protecting nuclear materials for peaceful purposes and prosecuting nuclear crimes. Action still needs to be taken, however, to implement a 1982 Nunn Amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill which calls for the Secretary of Defense to make a study of the feasibility of a nuclear crisis control center for sharing information and monitoring nuclear incidents. The center would help contain such incidents and prevent them from escalating into an international crisis.     

Who Supports Nuclear Armament in Japan? Threat Perceptions and Japan's Nuclear Armament

The security environment in East Asia has been going through drastic changes. As China and North Korea pose a serious threat to Japan, the Japanese are now more concerned about the security issue in the region. Recognizing the highly volatile situation Japan is facing, the purpose of this study is to examine the issue of nuclear proliferation by focusing on people's attitudes in Japan. More specifically, it systematically analyzes the factors that can determine people's opinions of nuclear weapons by utilizing the survey data. The result of the statistical analysis suggests that threat perceptions significantly boost people's support for nuclear armament. Advancing our understanding of nuclear proliferation from a unique perspective, this study makes an important contribution to the literature, thus helping us predict Japan's security policy.     

历史演进视角下的欧盟与北约关系走向——兼析拜登当选的影响

自欧盟确立共同安全与防务政策以来,欧盟独立防务与北约之间存在着“相互替代”和“相互增强”两种论调。争论焦点在于价值观念、威胁评估和战略文化、军事和民事能力、国防工业和支出。在过去几年,欧盟与北约的关系也围绕上述四个方面发生变化。具体而言,欧盟与北约之间总体上呈现以合作为主、竞争为辅、两者同步增强的发展态势。美国新任总统拜登承诺修复美国与盟友的关系,包括进一步加强北约。同时,美、欧将在价值观念上回归“旧常态”,在威胁评估和战略文化上进一步靠拢,在民事和军事手段的运用以及增加国防工业投入上也会有更多共识和共同行动。因此,欧盟与北约的关系将进一步呈现相互增强的态势,但前提是欧盟的战略自主建设不只是出于做强自身,而是更多地为了使欧、美双方公平承担相应的责任。