What Causes the Local Fiscal Crisis in China: the role of intermediaries

Local governments in China are seriously under-funded relative to their assigned expenditure responsibilities for public services, resulting in the infamous ‘revenue–expenditure gap’. The dominant explanation of local fiscal difficulties given in the literature refers to central government behaviour, namely the excessive centralization of tax revenue, but it does not tally with the large flows of central subsidies to local coffers in more recent years. The alternative account we put forward stresses the working of an intermediary level embedded in the multi-tiered governance structure of a large country, and the interaction between local officials' fiscal behaviour and the revenue–expenditure gap. Employing fine-grained analysis of aggregate statistics and local case data, we argue that broader intergovernmental dynamics and practices of local intermediaries, and not only central government policy, are critical to fiscal health and government performance at the county level.     

Fiscal Federalism: a refined theory and its application in the Chinese context

China's central–local relations have been marked by perpetual changes amidst economic restructuring. Fiscal decentralization on the expenditure side has been paralleled by centralization on the revenue side, accompanied by political centralization. Hence, our understanding of China's fiscal relations is not without controversy. This paper aims to make a theoretical contribution to the ongoing debate on ‘fiscal federalism’ by addressing crucial questions regarding China's central–local fiscal relations: first, to what extent do Chinese central–local fiscal relations conform to fiscal federalism in the Western literature? Second, are there any problems with existing principles of fiscal federalism and, if so, how to refine them? Third, how are refined principles relevant to the Chinese case and what policies should the Chinese government pursue in the future? Based on an in-depth and critical review of the theories on fiscal federalism, we develop a refined prototype of fiscal federalism. The model shows that quasi-traditional fiscal federalism is a much closer reality in China, while we argue that the refined fiscal federalism should be the direction of future reform in China.     

Strategy for Fiscal Survival? Analysis of local extra-budgetary finance in China

Since the early 1980s, Chinese local governments have collected a significant amount of revenue outside the budgetary system. Fiscal shortage is commonly cited as the main reason for local extra-budgetary finance. However, a panel data analysis on provincial extra-budgetary practices reveals a different story. The findings suggest that extra-budgetary finance exists in China not as a strategy for local fiscal survival, but rather because local bureaucracies can conveniently exploit their administrative power to extract revenue from the local economy, and that extra-budgetary exactions fall disproportionately on peasants. Despite the constant calls by the central government to reform and regulate the extra-budgetary system, the centrally issued administrative directives have little impact on local practices.     

协商治理与社会矛盾化解

协商民主是实现党的领导的重要方式,是中国社会主义民主政治的独特优势。党的十八大以来,随着社会主要矛盾的变化,实施民主协商逐步成为中国基层预防和化解社会矛盾的重要方式。党的十九届四中全会上,"民主协商"成为社会治理体系的基本组成部分。协商民主对于实现利益整合、降低决策风险、培育社会自治和增进公共理性具有显著功效。在化解基层社会矛盾方面,协商民主制度在不同的决策阶段发挥着重要的治理效能。中国共产党的群众路线的传统、各级党委政府对协商民主制度的倡导、基层社会协商民主实践的创新,构成了中国基层社会协商治理发展的动力。     

农村财税体制与公共服务问题

基于中国式现代化背景下的两次财政体制改革都不利于农村公共服务的均等化,财税体制改革也对乡镇政权性质产生了一定影响。由于财富分配中的结构性失衡、资金使用效率低下,公共品供给领域的误区等体制性问题的存在,导致农村主要公共品供给严重不足。农村公共品供给体制改革必须从调整乡村治理结构、提高中央政府与地方政府的作用与功能以及提高农民主体地位与参与程度等方面着手。     

Business‐Government Relations in Industrializing Rural China: A principal‐agent perspective

This paper explains why rural enterprises prosper in the post-Mao reform era. Based on a case study of Shaanxi province, the paper argues that the institutional arrangements in rural China under economic reforms are conducive to sustained economic growth because the principal‐agent problem is alleviated in two dimensions. First, the interests of local government officials and enterprises overlap. Prompted by the fiscal pressures on local governments as a result of the fiscal reforms, particularly the 1994 tax-assignment reform, local governments are eager to promote local industrial growth. Apart from absorbing rural surplus labour and contributing to the provision of communal welfare to local residents, rural enterprises provide local governments with tax and non-tax revenues to finance their expenditure obligations. In return, local governments provide preferential aid to their enterprises in the form of tax and credit privileges. Second, the principal‐agent problem is abated by a closer effort-and-reward link for the various parties involved in the operation of rural enterprises.     

嬗变与飞跃：农村基层民主建设的新成就

党的十七大以来我国农村基层民主建设在制度、观念和实践三大层面上取得了新进展。同时，在中国发展农村基层民主是一大创举，有一个发展过程，在这一过程中不可避免地存在一些问题。在当前深入推进农村基层民主建设，重要的是要实现党内民主与人民民主的良性互动，把尊重人民群众首创精神同加强和改善党的领导结合起来，要坚持走制度化、规范化的发展路径。     

Review of Poverty Alleviation Work in Rural Areas in China and Its Future Prospects

Since the launched of reform and opening up,the Chinese government has made great efforts and provided a lot of funds to promote poverty alleviation and development in rural areas China has made great achievements in the cause of poverty alleviation and these have been recognized by the international community The infrastructure in poverty-stricken areas has also been continuously improved,and industrial activities have been encouraged in poverty-stricken areas to help promote self-reliance As a result of the government's actions the poor rural population has been greatly reduced,and rural people's living standards have been greatly improved Since the 18~(th) National Congress of the Communist Party of China,the central government has put forward a strategy of accurate poverty alleviation,implemented poverty alleviation projects in areas where poverty has stubbornly persisted and enhanced its efforts to finally eliminate poverty Under the vigorous leadership of the CPC,China is expected to achieve the goal of eliminating absolute poverty nationwide ahead of schedule     

论党内基层民主创新的生成机制——基于基层乡镇党委“公推直选”的案例分析

基层乡镇党委"公推直选"是中国共产党发展党内民主的最新实践成果之一.以基层乡镇党委"公推直选"的典型案例为样本,考察党内基层民主创新发展的生成机制,可以发现,当前在基层党内民主创新中,存在中央与地方、基层的互动、互惠的动力机制;中央和地方、基层的这种互动关系又是在党内现有组织体制内运行的.进而通过这种体制建立起了党内基层民主创新中的控制与传导机制,指导相关党内基层民主创新实践的进行.     

当代中国乡村民主文化结构研究

民主文化是当代中国民主政治建设的重要内容和影响因素。在当代中国乡村,民主文化的发展呈现出的三层结构模型:自身行为层、民主实践层、政府导向层。它们之间的沟通不畅、协调不力使乡村民主文化发展举步维艰。通过民主实践层的制度安排,实现政府理念导向的真实传递,进而内化为村民自身的民主意识,使民主政治成为其自觉自愿的行为,形成完整和谐的民主文化结构,以促进当代乡村民主政治的发展。     

试论我国农村新型治理结构的重构

改革开放以来,农村所发生的经济、社会变迁推动着我国乡村治理结构的转型,也催生了村民自治这一新型的基层民主制度。在村民自治这一制度架构下,一种基于治理理念的新型农村社会治理模式成为可能,即以村民委员会民主选举制度为核心,以村务公开为制度保障,通过培育具有自主治理性质的乡村社团组织,发掘传统乡村社会的文化资源,将制度创新与本土资源的发掘结合起来。     

解决农村公共产品供给困境的路径探讨

目前,解决农村公共产品的供给困境已成为农村发展的关键。鉴于农村公共产品主要还是由政府提供,在委托——代理的理论框架下,根据委托与代理之间的利益差别性以及个体追求利益最大化的理性导致集体行为非理性的理论预设,文章从多元利益博弈的角度,对政府（中央政府和地方政府）与农民在农村公共产品供给中基于各自的理性选择却导致非合作博弈的困局进行解读,并提出正和博弈的有效治理途径。     

新农村建设财政投入情况研究

我国农村落后的重要原因在于资本形成不足,而财政投入是资本形成的重要方式之一。开展新农村建以来,财政对"三农"的投入规模明显增加,投入领域不断扩大,公共财政覆盖农村取得了明显进展。但是,由于宏观体制、政策规定和管理制度等不合理,导致新农村建设中财政投入还存在着规模不够大、结构不合理等问题。为了推进新农村建设,需要推进体制改革,加大政府改革力度,改进政府绩效考评办法,进一步调整财政资源配置格局,提高基层政府财力。     

SUCCESS OUTSIDE THE CITY

Coming as a much-needed boon for the countryside,this year's No.1 Document,jointly released by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council,pledges a series of concrete measures to propel improvements in the rural economy and the livelihood of farmers.Nevertheless,rural prosperity in line with the success of urban areas will prove to be a challenge.The foundation of the agriculture sector remains fluid,and farmers lack a stable source of income and a reliable social safety net.     

Survival Strategies of Township Governments in Rural China: from predatory taxation to land trade

Based on my fieldwork in rural China in 2004–2005, where I conducted semi-structured interviews with 108 local cadres and villagers, this article explores the survival strategies of township governments as the most recent tax reforms (i.e. the tax-for-fee reform and the abolition of the agricultural tax) have been implemented since 2000. It argues that township governments have taken adaptive strategies to maintain over-quota personnel even under pressure to reduce it. It finds that the strategies have changed from predatory taxation in the 1990s to land trade in the last decade, while the implementation of the rural tax reforms has brought fiscal crises in agricultural villages. Local officials have a limited incentive to respond to collective resistance on taxation but do not have the same incentive on land disputes.     

协商民主中的公共治理

在当代西方政治哲学复兴之后兴起的协商民主理论与现代公共治理的理论和实践之间存在着一定的内在逻辑性。协商民主的研究视角使我们看到公民社会的思想意识、精神状态以及公共利益、美德等价值观对现代公共治理的重大意义。引入协商民主理论,倡导公共治理中的对话与协商,公民参与意识与积极的公共精神,可以促进政府与公民、政治国家与公民社会在公共治理中的良性互动,由此也将促进协商民主与善治的实现。     

农村社区警务研究述评

社区警务是最基层、最基础的工作,积极推进以民生为核心的农村社区警务建设．是维护农村地区安全稳定的切实需求,是社会主义新农村建设的重要保障,亦是农村警务改革的现实任务和崭新使命。因此,公安机关只有进一步加强和改进公安社会管理,建立新型农村警务治理模式,才能为农村社区建设和新农村建设提供安全保障。     

人民政协协商民主制度发展的三维度视角

从人民政协协商民主的实践及其制度建构的价值诉求看,人民政协协商民主已成为中国民主政治生活的基本形态之一、政府决策过程的必经程序、加强执政党执政能力建设的重要途径。健全人民政协协商民主的制度和机制,亦应该从这三个维度上把握。如此,可使人民政协的协商民主获得程序化制度化理性化的发展。     

改革开放以来中国农村社会的结构转型及其意涵

传统社会向现代社会的转型本质上是社会关系的转型。当前,我国农村社会正由传统向现代过渡,反映这种社会关系转型轨迹的中国农村经济、社会及政治结构出现了实质性的分化:乡村利益格局日益趋向多元化,教育及文化的发展使农民的意识从"身份取向"向"权利取向"转变,并自发形成了以自主治理为特征的乡村社会团体。农村经济-社会结构的转型构成了未来我国新型乡村治理关系的基础。     

Elections,Democratic Values,and Economic Development in Rural China

This paper assesses several assumptions underlying the promotion of democracy and good governance in rural China. We draw on a 1999 survey of 120 villages in four counties, two in Anhui and two in Heilongjiang provinces (sample of 2,997 households, including villagers, cadres and entrepreneurs). First, we look at how institutionalized ‘democratic procedures’, such as secret ballots, multi-candidate elections, public nominations, and village contracts, are in these villages. Then we analyze villager views on economic development and democracy, finding that villagers want more democracy, even if the economy is doing well. Third, we assess their views on the election process; do they see elections as efficacious, fair, and competitive, or do they feel that the local power elite manipulate outcomes? Fourth, we found that the richest people are less supportive of democracy, with the most democratic being middle-income households. Finally, elections have increased local elite turnover, cadres understand this, and therefore, democracy does lead to good governance.