Marr v Collie: The Ballooning of the Common Intention Constructive Trust

The decision in Marr v Collie represents a significant expansion of the common intention constructive trust doctrine. Unsupported by authority, it relaxes the requirement that the property be acquired for a ‘domestic’ purpose, and widens the doctrine to encompass all property, whether real or personal. The decision's abrogation of the ‘purpose’ restriction redraws the line between the common intention constructive trust doctrine and the presumed resulting trust doctrine and expands the former to the greatest possible extent. This exacerbates a doctrine already apt to adversely affect both individual litigants and the justice system as a whole, and which creates incongruous theoretical divisions within the law of intentionally created trusts. As the doctrine is reliant on the proposition, unsupported by authority or legislation, that conveyance of a title to land into joint names necessarily gives rise to a trust, it is hoped that a future apex court will reconsider the doctrine's proper scope.     

Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise

This article dissects the Tadi court's argument for findingthe doctrine of joint criminal enterprise in the ICTY Statute.The key arguments are identified and each are found to be eitherproblematic or insufficient to deduce the doctrine from thestatute: the object and purpose of the statute to punish majorwar criminals, the inherently collective nature of war crimesand genocide and the conviction of war criminals for joint enterprisesin World War II cases. The author criticizes this over-relianceon international case law and the insufficient attention tothe language of criminal statutes when interpreting conspiracydoctrines. The result of these mistakes is a doctrine of jointcriminal enterprise that fails to offer a sufficiently nuancedtreatment of intentionality, foreseeability and culpability.Specifically, the doctrine in its current form suffers fromthree conceptual deficiencies: (1) the mistaken attributionof criminal liability for contributors who do not intend tofurther the criminal purpose of the enterprise, (2) the impositionof criminal liability for the foreseeable acts of one's co-conspiratorsand (3) the mistaken claim that all members of a joint enterpriseare equally culpable for the actions of its members. The authorconcludes by briefly suggesting amendments to the Rome Statuteto rectify these deficiencies.     

Taking Life and Liberty Seriously: Reconsidering Criminal Liability Under Article 2 of the ECHR

What is the relationship between the right to life and criminal liability, and what should it be, given the significance we rightly attribute both to human life and to human freedom? This article explores the circumstances in which the European Court of Human Rights imposes a positive obligation to criminalise and pursue criminal forms of redress, and concludes that the Court's doctrine carries the potential of both coercive overreach and dilution of the right to life itself. These problems are compounded by opacity in the Court's doctrine. I propose a way forward that takes both the right to life and human freedom seriously.     

A Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-Reed Landscape

Although the Supreme Court of the United States has deployed the content-neutrality doctrine at least twenty-three times in the last decade, two recent cases — McCullen v. Coakley and Reed v. Town of Gilbert — demonstrate that disagreement among the justices over the meaning of the doctrine is endangering its utility for First Amendment jurisprudence. This article describes the manifestations of this disagreement and suggests that without further clarification about the doctrine's nature, purpose and application, the venerable First Amendment canon may soon either lose practical tenability or disintegrate into constitutional oblivion. Such an outcome, the article suggests, is both ill advised and avoidable. By taking several practical steps, the Supreme Court can go a long way toward preserving the doctrine's usefulness for upholding legitimate government interests and protecting the freedom of expression.     

The Trial of Joseph Dotterweich: The Origins of the “Responsible Corporate Officer” Doctrine

This article analyzes the origins of the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine: the trial of Joseph Dotterweich. That doctrine holds that an officer may be personally liable for the criminal act of a subordinate if the officer was, in some indefinite way, able to prevent the violation. Applying this doctrine, the prosecution of Dotterweich entailed strict liability for a strict liability offense. The underlying offenses—the interstate sale of one misbranded and adulterated drug and one misbranded drug—were said to be strict liability offenses. And then, with respect to Dotterweich as the corporation’s general manager, the government argued that he was strictly liable because he stood in “responsible relation” to the company’s acts. The government never tried to prove that the company, Buffalo Pharmacal, was negligent, nor did it try to prove that Dotterweich was negligent in his supervision of the employees of Buffalo Pharmacal. The prosecutor and judge were candid about this theory throughout the trial, although the judge conceded that it seemed bizarre and unfair. The defense lawyer repeatedly sought to inject what became known throughout the trial as the “question of good faith,” but was circumvented at almost every turn. What would thus seem to be the crux of any criminal trial—the personal fault of the defendant—was carefully shorn from the jury’s consideration. The government’s theory was so at odds with intuitive notions of liability and blame that, as one probes into the case, and looks at the language used in the government’s appellate briefs, imputations of moral fault inevitably crept in. Yet the government was not entitled to make such accusations, as it had pruned moral considerations from the trial. The article argues that the responsible corporate officer doctrine can never enjoy a secure place in our legal system. First, the doctrine is at a minimum in tension with, and often in direct opposition to, basic principles of the criminal law; and second, the doctrine fails, when followed to its logical conclusions, to accord with basic notions of fair play. The article concludes that the responsible corporate officer doctrine is either unnecessary, in cases in which the evidence establishes personal fault, or unjust, in cases in which it creates liability in the absence of personal fault through the unspecified notion of “responsibility.” The Dotterweich case illustrates what is contemplated by the latter possibility, and why it is problematic in any judicial system that purports, in the words of the Model Penal Code, “to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.”     

Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility

The joint criminal enterprise doctrine appears more and moreas the ‘magic weapon’ in the prosecution of internationalcrimes. Yet, the doctrine not only gives rise to conceptualconfusion and conflicts with some fundamental principles of(international) criminal law but also invades the traditionalambit of command responsibility liability. This becomes obviousif both doctrines are applied simultaneously in cases againstaccused with some kind of superior position. After a short introductionon both doctrines, as interpreted in modern case law, the articlegives some examples of their simultaneous application and triesto develop distinguishing criteria in light of the case lawand a ‘dogmatic’ analysis of both the doctrines.A reference to the theory of ‘Organisationsherrschaft’shows that there is yet another option to impute internationalcrimes to top perpetrators.     

Probing the Depths of the Responsible Corporate Officer’s Duty

Many criminal law scholars have criticized the responsible corporate officer doctrine as a form of strict and vicarious liability. It is neither. It is merely a doctrine that supplies a duty in instances of omissions. Siding with Todd Aagaard in this debate, I argue that a proper reading of the cases yields that the responsible corporate officer doctrine is just duty supplying, and does not allow for strict liability when the underlying statute requires mens rea. After analyzing Dotterweich, Park, and their progeny, I probe the depths of this duty-supplying doctrine, including to whom the duty is owed, whether the duty is grounded in statute, cause of peril, or contract, and what the content of the duty is. Although the responsible corporate officer doctrine unveils questions we may have about duty generally, it is no more problematic than other duty-supplying doctrines in the criminal law.     

试论环境法上的社会连带责任

环境法领域中的连带责任——社会责任之归责原则、自己责任的社会化、证明责任的“客观化”都隐含了连带责任;复合污染共同侵权行为、企业污染损害赔偿基金与责任保险制度、社会安全体制,国家的连带责任、非政府组织(NGOs)的兴起,都凸显了连带责任的发达;调和社会连带责任——个别责任与连带责任、法定的连带责任与自愿的连带责任、扩大生产者责任与连带责任,使生产者、消费者、公众、国家(政府)间形成合理的既独立又连带的责任分配机制。     

The Responsibility of Accomplices in the Case-Law of the Ad Hoc Tribunals

This article discusses complicity as a form of liability in international criminal law, in particular as interpreted and applied by the ad hoc Tribunals in their case-law. After a short introduction on the distinguishing features of complicity, in particular with respect to joint criminal enterprise, reference is made to the complicity doctrines which, it is argued, mostly exerted an influence on the international judges – namely those developed in the English and French criminal orders. Subsequently, a critical and thorough assessment of the international case-law is provided. Looking forward, some remarks are also made to the complicity model delineated in the ICC Statute. The author concludes with some general observations on the contribution made by the ad hoc judges in giving actual content to the notion of complicity.     

Indirect Co-Perpetration

National and international criminal law systems are continually seeking doctrinal and theoretical frameworks to help them impose individual liability on collective perpetrators of crime. The two systems move in parallel and draw on each other. Historically, it has been mostly international criminal law that leaned on domestic legal systems for its collective modes of liability. Currently, however, it is the emerging jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court that is at the forefront of innovation, with the doctrine of indirect co-perpetration taking the lead in international prosecutions. The article assesses the potential contribution as well as the limits of this compound doctrine to domestic criminal law jurisprudence, particularly with regard to small-group criminality. Four modes of indirect co-perpetration are discussed, namely shared control, concerted control, controlling board, and flawed triangle perpetration. A doctrine of indirect co-perpetration would enable liability in these modes of perpetration, perhaps with the exception of the latter, which marks the limits of its applicability.     

Can Strict Criminal Liability for Responsible Corporate Officers be Justified by the Duty to Use Extraordinary Care?

The responsible corporate officer (RCO) doctrine is, as a formal matter, an instance of strict criminal liability: the government need not prove the defendant’s mens rea in order to obtain a conviction, and the defendant may not escape conviction by proving lack of mens rea. Formal strict liability is sometimes consistent with retributive principles, especially when the strict liability pertains to the grading of an offense. But is strict liability consistent with retributive principles when it pertains, not to grading, but to whether the defendant has crossed the threshold from noncriminal to criminal conduct? In this essay, I review the two most plausible arguments supporting an affirmative answer in the context of the RCO doctrine. First, perhaps this doctrine reflects a rule-like form of negligence, akin to a rule that prohibits selling alcohol to a minor. Second, perhaps this doctrine expresses a duty to use extraordinary care to prevent a harm. Neither argument is persuasive. The first argument, although valid in some circumstances, fails to explain and justify the RCO doctrine. The second argument, a duty to use extraordinary care, is also inadequate. If “extraordinary care” simply means a flexibly applied negligence standard that considers the burdens and benefits of taking a precaution, it is problematic in premising criminal liability on ordinary negligence. If instead it refers to a higher duty or standard of care, it has many possible forms, such as requiring only a very slight deviation from a permissible or justifiable standard of conduct, placing a “thumb” on the scale of the Learned Hand test, identifying an epistemic standard more demanding than a reasonable person test, or recognizing a standard that is insensitive to individual capacities. However, some of these variations present a gratuitous or incoherent understanding of “negligence,” and none of them sufficiently explain and justify the RCO doctrine.     

美国环境犯罪严格刑事责任的演化与评析

为了确保食品、药物及环境等涉及公共福利领域的安全,美国法院发展并确立严格刑事责任制度,该制度包括公共福利犯罪原则和有责任的公司管理人员原则。确立环境严格刑事责任的目的是确保刑法在保护环境和促进环境法遵守方面的效率。公共福利犯罪原则和有责任的公司管理人员原则减轻了美国起诉部门的证明责任,降低了司法成本,同时提高了犯罪的成本,增强了刑法的威慑力。这体现了美国环境刑事政策的价值取向是社会利益保护优先和效率优先。     

Contributory Negligence in the Twenty‐First Century: An Empirical Study of First Instance Decisions

In this article we report the results of an empirical study of 368 first instance decisions on the contributory negligence doctrine handed down in England and Wales between 2000 and 2014. The two central questions at which we looked were: how often a defendant's plea of contributory negligence was successful; and by how much a claimant's damages were reduced when a finding of contributory negligence was made. We also considered the extent to which the answers to these questions depended on the following variables: the claimant's age; the claimant's gender; the type of damage suffered by the claimant; the contextual setting of the claim; and the year of the decision. Our study uncovered several important truths about the contributory negligence doctrine hidden in this mass of case law, some of which cast significant doubt on the accuracy of widely held views about the doctrine's operation.     

Holding Organized Crime Leaders Accountable for the Crimes of their Subordinates

Criminal law doctrine fails to provide an adequate solution for imputing responsibility to organized crime leaders for the offenses committed by their subordinates. This undesirable state of affairs is made possible because criminal organizations adopt complex organizational structures that leave their superiors beyond the reach of the law. These structures are characterized by features such as the isolation of the leadership from junior ranks, decentralized management, and mechanisms encouraging initiative from below. They are found in criminal organizations such as the American Mafia, the Japanese Yakuza, and even outlaw motorcycle gangs. The paper offers a doctrine that may transcend this shortcoming. Referred to as “leaders’ liability,” this doctrine will be assessed and appraised through a comparison with competing theories such as accomplice liability, Organisationsherrschaft, and conspiracy.     

The Requirement of an 'Express Agreement' for Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability: A Critique of Brdanin

The mode of liability known as joint criminal enterprise (JCE)has emerged in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a means of assigning criminalliability to individuals for activities carried out by a collective.As a result, the doctrine must be carefully defined so as notto allow it to extend a defendant's liability beyond the appropriatelimits of individual criminal responsibility. In this regard,a recent ICTY Trial Chamber decision in Branin held that, wherea defendant is not alleged to have participated in the physicalperpetration of the crimes charged but to have contributed insome other way to the commission of the crimes by a group, theprosecution must demonstrate that the defendant entered intoan express agreement with the physical perpetrators to committhe crimes charged. The author argues that this ‘expressagreement requirement’ is both conceptually unsound andpractically unhelpful. Conceptually, it would be inconsistentwith core principles of JCE liability to require an expressagreement between a defendant and the physical perpetratorsof crimes, at least in circumstances in which it is allegedthat there existed a structure of two or more overlapping JCEs.Moreover, because this structure allows the accused and thephysical perpetrators to be operating in two separate JCEs,they need not even share a common criminal purpose. On a practicallevel, arguably in a ‘system-criminality’ contextsuch as the one that developed in the former Yugoslavia duringthe time period in question, the organizers of criminal activityare unlikely to enter into express criminal agreements withthose who physically carry out crimes, because existing organizedhierarchies provide much more efficient mechanisms by whichleaders are able to ensure the realization of their criminalplans.     

组织进化视野下对企业刑事归责模式的反思

我国传统企业刑事归责模式的典型特征在于:一方面,其包含了企业和企业成员两个主体的归责,另一方面,企业归责适用的是以特定企业内个人犯罪行为为处罚根据的同一视原则。虽然该模式与我国早期单一科层制企业形态相适应,但随着组织形态的进化,企业规模扩大,内部权力去中心化以及组织结构复杂化,企业犯罪出现了不同于我国早期企业形态下新的特征。为此,传统企业归责模式不仅难以公正地对企业及其成员进行归责,还会造成组织无责、惩罚效果不理想等一系列不利后果。在法人社会下忽略对企业组织犯罪的控制需求并不现实,法人刑事责任拟制论应当被否定。相反,有必要构建与企业成员归责路径相分离的、以企业自身过错为处罚依据的组织责任模式。应当依据功能对等原则对组织责任模式进行构建,维持刑法体系的逻辑严谨性,并遵守刑法的罪责原则。     

英美刑法上的被害人共同责任

在认定行为人的刑事责任时,英美刑法传统上坚持"不得谴责被害人"的原则,但这一原则不符合被害人学的原理,而且,在英美刑法中,实际上在诸多方面例如被害人同意、自我防卫与挑衅行为中均承认了被害人的共同责任。承认被害人的共同责任,具有合理的规范性基础。根据权利的限定性原理,被害人共同责任可区分为自愿的权利减少型和非自愿的权利减少型,在此基础上考虑行为人与被害人在具体案件中相关权利的重要性程度、比较因果关系与比较罪责等因素,从而为被害人共同责任的适用提供了具体的判断标准。英美刑法的被害人共同责任原理对我国司法实践具有重要的借鉴价值。     

Corporations as Moral Agents: Trade-Offs in Criminal Liability and Human Rights for Corporations

This article argues that a common way of defending corporate criminal liability creates a dilemma: it provides a strong justification for giving human rights to corporations. This result follows from approaches to punishment and human rights which predicate each on the status of moral agency. In short, if corporations are moral agents in a sufficient sense to attract criminal liability, they are eligible holders of human rights. The article also discusses the doctrinal application of this philosophical claim. Drawing on US jurisprudence, it illustrates how the European Court of Human Rights might deploy corporate moral agency as a theoretical foundation for its otherwise weakly-reasoned attribution of human rights to corporations. If proponents of corporate criminal liability are dissatisfied with these conclusions, they face difficult policy trade-offs: they must abandon the doctrine, or adopt alternative approaches to punishment or human rights.     

我国刑事赔偿制度归责原则反思

对刑事赔偿的归责原则,我国有学者主张适用过错责任原则,有学者主张适用违法责任原则,还有学者主张适用结果责任原则,等等。这些原则在解决应否赔偿的问题上都存在难以克服的缺陷。之所以如此,主要是因为刑事赔偿制度与一般侵权赔偿制度有重大区别,刑事赔偿程序由国家向受害者支付赔偿费用的程序以及追偿程序两大程序构成,这两大程序应适用不同的归责原则:前一程序应适用结果责任原则,后一程序应适用过错责任原则。我国国家赔偿法对刑事赔偿归责原则的规定存在严重缺陷,应当进行彻底重构。