The National Judiciary—Sword of European Court of Justice Rulings: The Example of the Kohll/Decker Jurisprudence

The role of the national judiciary in enforcing EC law, and particularly European Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings, has been largely neglected by empirical legal and political science research. Existing research has categorised the role of the national judiciary as either shielding national legislation from the ECJ or as serving as a ‘sword’ to foster integration and to force change on reluctant governments. This article sides with the second assumption and attempts to empirically assess it using the example of the patient mobility jurisprudence by the ECJ, the so‐called Kohll/Decker jurisprudence. The three case studies on France, the UK and Germany show that national courts played an important role in overcoming the resistance against this jurisprudence: via a multiplication of national court cases that contradicted domestic legislation they forced the legislator to end judicial uncertainty.     

Levels of Generality in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice

The level of generality or of abstraction used to describe a precedent, a right, or the legislative intent behind a statutory provision or constituent purpose behind a constitutional provision can have a decisive impact on the outcome of a case. Characterising it in narrow terms has the effect of reducing the scope of decision of a judgment; conversely, a broader characterisation provides more leeway for a judge in a case to encompass its facts within the precedent, right or purpose in issue. The issue raised by the level of generality problem is the extent to which courts have a discretion or freedom of manoeuvre as to the level of generality they decide upon, and thus whether generality and abstraction are manipulable in the hands of judges and are not really predetermined by the legal sources in question or an established judicial method of interpretation. Uncontrolled judicial discretion of this kind is problematic from the point of view of the rule of law and democracy, especially when adjudication concerns constitutional provisions, the equivalent in the EU being interpretation by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of the EU Treaties; reversal of ECJ interpretation through Treaty amendment is particularly difficult to achieve because it requires unanimous coordination by the Member States. This article examines two alternative ways of determining the correct or appropriate level of generality issue in ECJ interpetation, coherence or the legal traditions of the Member States, and argues in favour of the latter as a less subjective method. Application of the two alternative approaches is tested in two areas of EU law, state liability and criminal law.     

Independence of the Court of Justice of the European Union: Unchecked Member States power after the Sharpston Affair

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the apex of the EU legal order, and is the supreme arbiter of EU law. For decades, it has delivered judgments, collectively shaping European integration and ‘integration through law’. It has undoubtedly been an authoritative leader in entrenching a European judicial culture, and has benefited from the cardinal principle of judicial independence enshrined in the EU Treaties, which in turn, it has insisted on being upheld as regards national courts. Questions have rarely arisen, however, about judicial independence of the CJEU. The Sharpston Affair of 2020–2021 opened the door to questioning such judicial independence. Is the CJEU at the mercy of the Member States? If so, what are the consequences for the EU legal order? This article reflects on the judicial independence of the CJEU, and offers reflections on how it can be preserved in the future.     

From Marx to Market: Lawyers,European Law,and the Contentious Transformation of the Port of Genoa

What happens when international courts are asked to tackle local political controversies and their judgments subsequently spark contentious resistance? In the European Union (EU), scholars have posited that the politicization of the often‐liberalizing rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) provokes Euroscepticism and noncompliance. In contrast, I argue that contentious politics may also produce permissive conditions for activist “Eurolawyers” to promote awareness of EU law and mobilize support for liberalization. To unpack this claim, I conduct an intensive case study of perhaps the most explosive controversy in Italy to generate litigation before the ECJ: The 1991 “Port of Genoa” case, where the public monopoly rights of a centuries‐old dockworkers' union were challenged. Leveraging interviews, court and newspaper records, public opinion data, and litigation statistics, I trace how—despite dockworkers' vigorous resistance—a pair of entrepreneurial lawyers liberalized Italy's largest port by combining strategic litigation with a public relations campaign to mobilize a compliance constituency. I conclude with insights the case study offers into the contemporary politics of transnational governance.     

How Bureaucracies Listen to Courts: Bureaucratized Calculations and European Law

The European Court of Justice, and courts in general, were key actors in the creation of the European Union (EU). However, they cannot change major policy without political supporters to lobby and litigate for implementation. We argue that part of the resolution of this apparent paradox comes from complementing existing work on the activities of EU courts and litigants with a focus on a third actor: implementing bureaucracies, whose effect on law and politics has not been a focus of studies of EU legal development. Their calculations about whether to pay attention, lobby, and comply shape the impact of the law. Those calculations are variable and patterned; when and how bureaucracies listen to courts varies in predictable ways. We find evidence for this proposition in the case of EU health care services law, both in the secondary literature and in empirical studies of France and Spain.     

A Political Economy Perspective of Judicial Review in the European Union: Judicial Appointments Rule, Accessibility and Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice

The paper examines the benefits the sovereign member states of the EU expect to derive by granting the European Court of Justice the power to review the collective policy making decisions of the EU legislative bodies. Using the methodology of constitutional political economy it investigates the one-country one-judge rule of judicial appointments in the ECJ, the restrictions imposed on litigants to access the ECJ and the limits on the jurisdiction of the ECJ to review EU legislation. It also analyses how the presence of judicial review affects the size of the policy measures taken by the policy makers.     

Italian Courts,the ECJ and Transfers of Undertakings: A Multi-Speed Dialogue?

The paper seeks to analyse certain paradigmatic cases of dialogue—or, indeed, non-dialogue—between national judges and the ECJ, though within the (still possibly emblematic) limits of a focus on the law on the transfer of undertakings. The analysis is less concerned with portraying the detailed impact of the ECJ's decisions on the domestic legal order, and is focused more upon the 'modality' of the dialogue to date carried out between Italian and European judges. The logic, which guides this dialogue (or, the lack of its evolution), furnishes us with a better understanding of the production, circulation and impact of ECJ jurisprudence. This dialogue seems to be characterised, by non-uniform, or multi-speed, developments. On the one hand, Article 177 references have been concentrated around the theme of undertakings in critical difficulties or subject to a creditors' arrangement procedure. In this area, the Italian courts have engaged in explicit dialogue with the ECJ and have made the greatest effort to read—not without some technical-juridical struggle—the national norm in the light of the provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive and its interpretation by the ECJ. By contrast, however, with regard to other specific issues (in particular, those concerning subcontracting) it is apparent that not only were the Italian courts (and the Corte di Cassazione in particular) loathe to enter into direct dialogue with the ECJ, but also that the ECJ's jurisprudence, built up through dialogue with other national courts, was not even consulted in an effort to guarantee an interpretation of national norms, in conformity with Community law.     

The European Emissions Trading Scheme Case Law

Within European climate change and energy policy, the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) occupies a prominent role. This article considers the developing case law of the European courts on the EU ETS. Specific attention is paid to the role of the different actors within the EU ETS and the impact that their applications to the courts may have on the further development of the EU ETS. Moreover, the continuing lack of standing of private parties in EU ETS cases is analysed in light of demands for legal certainty within a developing economic market.     

The Impact of Training and Language Competence on Judicial Application of EU Law in Hungary

The aim of this research is to identify the role that training in EU law and in a foreign language play in the use of EU law by Hungarian judges in domestic proceedings. Judges in the new Member States face the problems of no or inadequate official EU translations of relevant EU law or case‐law. The need to compare the meaning of other language versions therefore comes into play in order that the judges comply with the requirements of Union loyalty in the Treaty on European Union: Hungarian judges are shown to exhibit certain creative responses to these challenges. The approach to the research is based on an examination of the institutional framework for judicial training, a selection of pertinent case‐law of the Hungarian courts as well as interviews with a number of judges involved in the application of EU law in their courts.     

Why Do the European Court of Justice Judges Need Legal Concepts?

The article considers the reasons why the European Court of Justice (ECJ) judges need legal concepts when they pronounce their judgments. It points out that the ECJ as a law‐interpreting and an ipso facto law‐making court needs legal concepts to communicate results of its interpretative and law‐making enterprise. The article also shows how in the context of Article 234 EC preliminary ruling procedure legal concepts become useful tools of portraying ECJ judgments as mere products of interpretation and not as the results of subsuming the facts of the case into a legal provision. It is by means of application of legal concepts, that the ECJ judges are able to justify that they are not overstepping the mandate they have been entrusted with. In the same time the use of legal concepts enables them to engage in dialogue with national judges, who seek guidance as to the content of EC law rules, and to maintain a strong doctrine of precedent. Most importantly, however, the use of concepts promotes coherence which, the article maintains, is the primary source of Community law's authority, and thus constitutes the foundational technique of persuading the relevant audience that Community law is indeed a legal system.     

Why fairness cannot be automated: Bridging the gap between EU non-discrimination law and AI

In recent years a substantial literature has emerged concerning bias, discrimination, and fairness in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning. Connecting this work to existing legal non-discrimination frameworks is essential to create tools and methods that are practically useful across divergent legal regimes. While much work has been undertaken from an American legal perspective, comparatively little has mapped the effects and requirements of EU law. This Article addresses this critical gap between legal, technical, and organisational notions of algorithmic fairness. Through analysis of EU non-discrimination law and jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and national courts, we identify a critical incompatibility between European notions of discrimination and existing work on algorithmic and automated fairness. A clear gap exists between statistical measures of fairness as embedded in myriad fairness toolkits and governance mechanisms and the context-sensitive, often intuitive and ambiguous discrimination metrics and evidential requirements used by the ECJ; we refer to this approach as “contextual equality.”This Article makes three contributions. First, we review the evidential requirements to bring a claim under EU non-discrimination law. Due to the disparate nature of algorithmic and human discrimination, the EU's current requirements are too contextual, reliant on intuition, and open to judicial interpretation to be automated. Many of the concepts fundamental to bringing a claim, such as the composition of the disadvantaged and advantaged group, the severity and type of harm suffered, and requirements for the relevance and admissibility of evidence, require normative or political choices to be made by the judiciary on a case-by-case basis. We show that automating fairness or non-discrimination in Europe may be impossible because the law, by design, does not provide a static or homogenous framework suited to testing for discrimination in AI systems.Second, we show how the legal protection offered by non-discrimination law is challenged when AI, not humans, discriminate. Humans discriminate due to negative attitudes (e.g. stereotypes, prejudice) and unintentional biases (e.g. organisational practices or internalised stereotypes) which can act as a signal to victims that discrimination has occurred. Equivalent signalling mechanisms and agency do not exist in algorithmic systems. Compared to traditional forms of discrimination, automated discrimination is more abstract and unintuitive, subtle, intangible, and difficult to detect. The increasing use of algorithms disrupts traditional legal remedies and procedures for detection, investigation, prevention, and correction of discrimination which have predominantly relied upon intuition. Consistent assessment procedures that define a common standard for statistical evidence to detect and assess prima facie automated discrimination are urgently needed to support judges, regulators, system controllers and developers, and claimants.Finally, we examine how existing work on fairness in machine learning lines up with procedures for assessing cases under EU non-discrimination law. A ‘gold standard’ for assessment of prima facie discrimination has been advanced by the European Court of Justice but not yet translated into standard assessment procedures for automated discrimination. We propose ‘conditional demographic disparity’ (CDD) as a standard baseline statistical measurement that aligns with the Court's ‘gold standard’. Establishing a standard set of statistical evidence for automated discrimination cases can help ensure consistent procedures for assessment, but not judicial interpretation, of cases involving AI and automated systems. Through this proposal for procedural regularity in the identification and assessment of automated discrimination, we clarify how to build considerations of fairness into automated systems as far as possible while still respecting and enabling the contextual approach to judicial interpretation practiced under EU non-discrimination law.     

Challenging EU constitutional law: The Italian Constitutional Court's new stance on direct effect and the preliminary reference procedure

This article seeks to examine the relationship between EU law and the Italian legal order in light of the recent Italian Constitutional Court (ICC)’s jurisprudence attempting to redefine EU core principles. When fundamental rights are at stake, three assumptions are challenged: the determination of direct effect shall be a prerogative of the ECJ; EU directly effective provisions entail the disapplication of conflicting national law; judges have the discretion to refer preliminary references to the ECJ where a clarification on EU law is needed. The contribution argues that the judicial search for a balance between sovereignty and supranationality is undermined by the ICC's new resistance to the well‐established EU jurisprudence. In that respect, the paper posits that the ICC's activism is the result of an unjustified ‘argumentative self‐restraint’ of the ECJ vis‐à‐vis the evolution of EU foundational principles.     

Pluralism,Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine

In this article it will be argued that good use of the instrument of deference might help the EU courts to deal with the situation of pluralism that is currently visible in the European legal order. By means of deferential judicial review, the EU courts can pay due respect to national constitutional traditions and to national legislative and policy choices, thus preventing situations of real conflict. In addition, deference enables the EU courts to take into account the intricacies related to judicial review of norms drafted by co‐equal institutions or by national elected bodies. Although the EU courts already make use of some form of deferential review, they may use the instrument in a clearer and more structured manner. As a basis for the development of a European ‘doctrine of deference’, a comparison will be made with the margin of appreciation doctrine devised by the European Court of Human Rights. Although this doctrine is certainly not fault‐free, it offers a number of advantages in terms of clarity and controllability. If improved and adapted on the basis of theoretical notions of procedural democracy, the doctrine might be put to good use by the EU courts.     

EU constitutionalisation revisited: Redressing a central assumption in European studies

The constitutionalisation of the European Union has since the early 1990s become a truism in European studies. This article revisits the constitutionalisation theory drawing on the insights from emerging historical research and new strands of political science research. We find that the conventional constitutional narrative is less convincing when confronted with the new evidence from historical and political science research. New historical research show that Member State governments, administrations and courts have generally been rather reluctant to embrace the constitutional project of the ECJ. Furthermore, at the level of European politics, the ECJ and its case law have far from judicialized European decision‐making to the extent often claimed. Concluding, we reject the notion that the ECJ has successfully constitutionalised the EU, emphasising instead the inherent tensions in the process, which continue to complicate the efficiency of European law.     

The highest Dutch courts and the preliminary ruling procedure: Critically obedient interlocutors of the Court of Justice

Little is known about the motives of national courts to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) or their satisfaction with and implementation of answers. This article aims to fill this empirical gap on the basis of an analysis of judgments complemented with interviews with judges of the highest courts in the Netherlands. This article shows that judges extensively use the procedure and follow its outcome almost without exception, despite some dissatisfaction. This discontent has surprisingly not affected the courts' willingness to refer in future. The findings also downplay the bureaucratic politics and judicial empowerment theses emphasising strategic motives to refer. Instead, legal‐formalist considerations and the desire to contribute to the development of EU law explain most of the references of the Dutch Supreme Court. The decision (not) to refer of the three highest administrative courts is primarily based on practical and pragmatic considerations.     

International Arbitration and Judicial Politics in Authoritarian States

This article uses the case of Sudan to show how authoritarian regimes benefit from embracing international arbitration, allowing them to maintain domestic control and attract foreign investment. International arbitration ensures that foreign‐investment disputes are resolved outside of domestic purview, obviating the need for nondemocratic states to create independent courts. Research on judicial politics in authoritarian regimes has largely overlooked those private and extra‐judicial pathways—international arbitration tribunals—that illiberal regimes have been taking. Similarly, research in international commercial law has neglected domestic politics, overlooking arbitration's consequences for domestic stakeholders. Promoting international arbitration without paying heed to its side effects can unwittingly help illiberal regimes, particularly in weak states, to continue to repress their judiciaries and curtail the development of domestic legal institutions and the rule of law.     

'Solange, chapter 3': Constitutional Courts in Central Europe—Democracy—European Union

Abstract: Soon after the accession of eight post‐communist states from Central and Eastern Europe to the EU, the constitutional courts of some of these countries questioned the principle of supremacy of EU law over national constitutional systems, on the basis of their being the guardians of national standards of protection of human rights and of democratic principles. In doing so, they entered into the well‐known pattern of behaviour favoured by a number of constitutional courts of the ‘older Europe’, which is called a ‘Solange story’ for the purposes of this article. But this resistance is ridden with paradoxes, the most important of which is a democracy paradox: while accession to the EU was supposed to be the most stable guarantee for human rights and democracy in post‐communist states, how can the supremacy of EU law be now resisted on these very grounds? It is argued that the sources of these constitutional courts’ adherence to the ‘Solange’ pattern are primarily domestic, and that it is a way of strengthening their position vis‐à‐vis other national political actors, especially at a time when the role and independence of those courts face serious domestic challenges.     

Domestic judicial defiance and the authority of international legal regimes

Tensions and occasional overt defiance of international courts suggest that compliance with international regimes is not a self-evident choice for domestic judges. I develop a formal theory of domestic judicial defiance in which domestic and supranational judges vie for jurisprudential authority in a non-hierarchical setting. The model emphasises the role of domestic non-compliance costs and power asymmetries in determining the conduct of domestic and international judges. I argue that the EU represents a special case of a particularly effective international regime. Weak domestic courts have little to gain from an escalated conflict with the European court of Justice. But even domestic judicial superpowers like the German Federal Constitutional Court have strong incentives to seek mutual accommodation with European judges. The analysis also yields new insights into concepts, such as “judicial dialogue” and “constitutional pluralism” that have featured prominently in the legal literature, and suggests new hypotheses for empirical research.     

Legal Cultures in the European Union

The introductory part of the essay deals with the notion of legal culture and its categories. Later, the author sets forth the characteristics of the common law and the Roman- German legal cultures, including the legal families within them. He also touches upon the tendencies of the development of the German legal and political culture. With respect to the integration of the legal systems into the EU, the author argues as an advocate of convergence. Both basic legal cultures are being modified as, besides statutory law, judicial law becomes significant in the continental legal systems and statutory law complements case law in the common law systems. As to the integration of the Hungarian legal culture into the EU, the essay points to two principal considerations. On the one hand, when working on making our legal culture "euro-conform", we must not forget about maintaining our own legal culture. On the other hand, the Hungarian legal culture can contribute to the development of the legal system of the EU, e. g. with some of the regulations of our statute on the ethnic minorities. At the end, the author shows that the efficacy of the European law is heavily dependant upon the national legal systems.     

The European Court of Human Rights,Amicus Curiae,and Violence against Women

Are international courts and advocacy group legal mobilization shaping human rights politics? This question poses a theoretical and empirical challenge to state dominated understandings of international litigation. This article theorizes the interaction between advocacy groups and the European Court of Human Rights and the role this participation plays in the enforcement and development of human rights. The analyses examine institutional factors shaping broad trends in mobilization complemented by two in depth studies examining a single mode of participation, amicus curiae and a single area of law, violence against women. The data identify the critical role standing rules, court review powers and group expertise play in transnational rights mobilization and development. The findings bring into question dominant understandings of international law and contribute to a more complex understanding of law in a global age where international courts and societal actors are shaping the direction of rights protection.