加强政府执行力建设视域下的政府重塑

加强政府执行力建设对政府重塑提出新的要求.在加强政府执行力建设视域下,政府的重塑主要包括政府在治理思想、组织架构、监控体制、利益机制、机关文化等方面的重塑.     

建设服务型政府背景下的政府执行力研究

在建设服务型政府的过程中不断提升政府自身执行力的积极性与信念;在提升政府执行力的同时朝着建立服务型政府的宗旨前进。当前我国政府执行力的不足已经严重影响我国服务型政府的建设,因而,必须加快提升政府执行力的步伐,为我国服务型政府的建设奠定一个坚实的基础。并且在服务型政府的建设过程中,积极培育提升政府执行力的内在动力,使得这两者产生一个良性的互动,最后能够在政府执行力完善的基础上构建出一个真正为人民服务的服务型政府。     

责任政府视域下的政府执行力建设研究

责任政府的构建与政府执行力的建设紧密相关.一方面,政府执行力是责任政府构建的重要条件,另一方面,责任政府是政府执行力建设的理念指导.在构建责任政府的过程中,我国政府执行力的建设存在着权责分配、绩效评估、责任监督及行政问责等主要问题,应从优化政府职能分配,凸出政府执行的责任体系；建立绩效评估机制,彰显责任政府的价值取向；完善责任监督机制,提高政府执行的整体效能；健全行政问责机制,约束和规范政府权力行使等四个方面探索当前政府执行力建设的现实路径.     

论政府执行力及其组织构建

政府执行力是政府组织不可忽视的核心要素,决定着政府执行有关政策决策时能力的高低。构建政府执行力,必须要注意培育政府执行主体的执行力素质,优化政府的组织架构及运行机制,并建立规范有效的执行流程,同时,还要制定科学严格的执行监控手段。     

政府过程视角下的我国政府职能转变

构建社会主义和谐社会离不开我国政府全面履行其职能行使,然而我国政府职能行使方面还存在着诸多的不和谐。鉴于此,在介绍政府职能的基础上,从政府过程即从政府的实际运行状况和工作程序决策过程、执行过程、监督与反馈过程探析政府运行过程中存在的问题,提出几点建议如下:重塑执行主体的价值观;重塑政府的组织机构,推动政府执行力的建设;改进执行方式,优化执行行为;建设责任政府,加强执行力监督力度。     

提升地方政府政策执行力的路径选择--基于制度创新角度的探析

相对而言,我国地方政府组织在政策执行过程中的执行力还比较滞后,这与地方政府组织的资源短缺、执行主体素质不高、执行机制不合理等因素有关。要提升地方政府组织的执行力,必须大力推进政府制度创新,包括重塑政府组织架构,推进政府人事管理制度的创新,建立完善统筹各方的政府利益整合机制,同时必须健全政府的执行监控机制,培育异于官僚文化的新型政府执行力文化,等。     

政府公信力与地方政府能力建设研究

政府能力政府诚信与政府公信力之间存在相互促进、相互影响的关系。政府诚信是政府公信力的基础和源泉。诚信的政府将获得更大的公众信任,而政府公信力的提高则有助于进一步加强政府的执政能力。对正处于社会转型期的中国地方政府来说,提高政府公信力,加强地方政府能力建设,树立廉洁、有效、公正的政府形象,是落实科学发展观、构建和谐社会的重要途径。     

政府执行力:价值分析、制约因素、提升路径

执行力是政府工作的生命力,也是执政党执政能力的具体体现和内在要求。近年来,虽然我国各级政府在加强执行力建设方面成效很大,但政府执行力弱化现象依然不同程度的存在着,新时期提升政府执行力依然紧迫而艰巨。本文首先阐述了政府执行力的重要价值,接着剖析了制约政府执行力的五大因素,进而从六个方面指出政府执行力的提升路径。     

我国政府诚信缺失原因探析及其重塑对策

政府行为对整个社会诚信体系具有基础性、决定性、导向性作用。诚信是政府存在的根本,政府诚信是社会诚信的基础。在当前我国社会发生重大转型和社会矛盾多发时期,政府诚信建设显得尤其重要。但是,当前我国政府的诚信遭遇了重大缺失,使政府在人民心目中的形象受到重大影响。我们应该分析其中的原因,并努力探讨重塑的政策。     

政府执行力与政府问责制

从政府对执政党、国家权力机关、国家司法机关等公共权力主体承担责任的角度，把政府执行力划分为政治执行力、法律执行力、行政执行力。由于中国国情的复杂性和各地区、各部门政府工作千差万别，政府执行活动中具有一般管理执行力不同的特点。中国政府执行不力的问题和原因是十分复杂的，可以从实行政治问责制、法律问责制、行政问责制、道德问责制四个方面寻找提高政府执行力的有效途径。     

Implementing the Chief Financial Officers Act and the Government Performance and Results Act in the Federal Government

The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 and the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, along with other legislation passed by Congress, are stimulating major financial management reform in the federal government. This article evaluates reform implementation against nine criteria developed in previous research on this topic. The criteria are accounting system adequacy, congressional intent, ability of Congress to use financial statement data, executive branch implementation incentives, capability of the Office of Management and Budget, utility of financial statements for decision making, use of performance measures in budgeting, coordination of federal organizations charged with implementation responsibility, and executive and congressional support for reform.     

Divided Government and the Fragmentation of American Law

We investigate institutional explanations for Congress's choice to fragment statutory frameworks for policy implementation. We argue that divided party government, which fuels legislative‐executive conflict over control of the bureaucracy, motivates Congress to fragment implementation power as a strategy to enhance its control over implementation. We develop a novel measure of fragmentation in policy implementation, collect data on it over the period 1947–2008, and test hypotheses linking separation‐of‐powers structures to legislative design of fragmented implementation power. We find that divided party government is powerfully associated with fragmentation in policy implementation, and that this association contributed to the long‐run growth of fragmentation in the postwar United States. We further find that legislative coalitions are more likely to fragment implementation power in the face of greater uncertainty about remaining in the majority.     

The Job of Government: Interweaving Public Functions and Private Hands

Lively and sometimes raucous debate about the job of government has increasingly engulfed American politics. Much of that debate has swirled around government's size, with conservatives arguing the case for shrinking government and liberals fighting to grow it. In reality, however, neither of these debates engages the critical underlying trend: the increasing interweaving of governmental functions deeply into every fiber of the nongovernmental sectors. Many reforms have sought to rein in government's power, but none has engaged the fundamental interweaving of policy implementation, and, not surprisingly, most have failed. Indeed, many have eroded the public's trust in the governmental institutions on which they depend. This process raises fundamental challenges for defining government's core role, for building the capacity to govern effectively, and for enhancing the accountability of governmental programs. Many of government's administrative tools are a poor match for the governance problems they seek to solve.     

When Government Becomes the Principal Philanthropist: The Effects of Public Funding on Patterns of Nonprofit Governance

This study uses board governance as an analytical lens for exploring the effects of government funding on the representational capacities of nonprofit organizations. A typology of governance patterns is first developed that captures the board's strength relative to the chief executive and its representation of community interests. Using this typology and employing multinomial logit analyses of survey data from a sample of urban charitable organizations, the study tests how nonprofit governance is mediated by levels of government funding. Controlling for other relevant environmental and institutional factors, reliance on government funding decreases the likelihood that nonprofit organizations will develop strong, representative boards.

In recent years, government has emerged in the United States as a major "philanthropist," the major philanthropist in a number of the principal, traditional areas of philanthropy.     —Filer Commission (Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs 1975, 89)

     

The Tides of Reform Revisited: Patterns in Making Government Work, 1945–2002

The past six decades have witnessed acceleration in both the number and variety of major administrative reform statutes enacted by Congress. This increase can be explained partly by the increased involvement of Congress, a parallel decrease in activity and resistance by the presidency, and heightened public distrust toward government. At least part of the variation in the tides or philosophies of reform involves a "field of dreams" effect in which the creation of new governmental structure during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s generated increased interest in process reforms. However, part of the acceleration and variety of reform appears to be related to the lack of hard evidence of what actually works in improving government performance. Measured by federal employees' perceptions of organizational performance, what matters most is not whether organizations were reformed in the past, but whether organizations need reform in the future and can provide essential resources for achieving their mission.     

Executive power and policy‐making patterns in France: Gauging the impact of fifth republic institutions

This article attempts to gauge the impact that the institutions of the Fifth Republic have had on governmental behaviour and patterns of policy‐making in France. It is argued that the institutional changes introduced in 1958 have produced profound effects largely in line with the founders' intentions. The enhancement of executive power has produced strong governments capable of dominating the legislative process even in face of the most adverse political contingencies. However, the extraordinary powers of the executive have also generated some consequences unintended by the founders. The strong government system, designed to cure the malaise of the Fourth Republic, has combined with the nature of the party system to produce a distinctive Fifth Republic malaise that has proven most difficult to cure.     

Less Government, More Secrecy: Reinvention and the Weakening of Freedom of Information Law

Many critics have suggested that worldwide efforts to reinvent government could also weaken democratic control over public institutions, but few have considered how attempts to implement the "new paradigm" in public management might affect a widely used instrument for promoting accountability: freedom of information law (FOI). FOI laws give citizens and nongovernmental organizations the right of access to government information. However, recent Canadian experience shows that reinvention can weaken FOI laws in three ways. First, attempts to reduce "nonessential" spending may cause delays in handling FOI requests and weaken mechanisms for ensuring compliance. Second, governmental functions may be transferred to private contractors and not-for-profit organizations that are not required to comply with FOI laws. Third, governments' attempts to sell information and increase FOI fees may create new economic barriers to openness. Thus, restructuring provides an opportunity for political executives, public servants, and some well-organized business interests to weaken oversight mechanisms and increase their own autonomy within the policy process.     

政府声誉、政府能力与非政府组织对政府的信任

非政府组织对政府部门的信任非常重要,政府声誉和政府能力是其重要影响因素.为了揭示政府声誉和政府能力对政府信任的影响,作者以非政府组织的项目负责人和志愿者为抽样对象,以非政府组织与政府部门的关系为背景,通过对政府声誉、政府能力与信任之间的相关分析和回归分析,分析了政府声誉、政府能力对政府信任的影响.研究表明,政府声誉、政府能力对政府信任产生正向影响,政府能力比政府声誉对政府信任的影响更加明显.因此,能否树立良好的声誉、培养较高的能力对政府部门获得非政府组织的信任与支持具有十分重要的现实意义.当然,影响非政府组织对政府部门信任的因素还包括非政府组织特征、制度特征等;研究模型可以进一步扩展,更全面地考察非政府组织与政府部门间的信任形成机制.     

The Executive Budget in the Federal Government: The First Century and Beyond

This article reviews the history of executive budgeting in the United States a century after President William Howard Taft's Economy and Efficiency Commission proposed an executive budget. This history, the authors argue, does not suggest that giving more budget power to the president will improve budget outcomes. Instead, what is needed is more cooperation between the branches of government and a better‐educated public—goals that were shared by budget reformers when the Taft report was published.     

政府创新：社会资本视角

社会资本理论是研究政府与公民、民主与信任等之间关系的一种新范式。布迪厄从微观层面上将社会资本概括为一种资源集合;科尔曼从中观层面上将社会资本概括为一种社会结构;帕特南从宏观层面上将社会资本概括为一种价值规范。从本质上讲,政府创新是一个政府与社会互动的过程,与社会资本之间存在内在的结构性关联。社会资本是政府创新的基本变量,其中的信任因素是政府创新合法性的重要来源,支持信念因素是政府创新的基本条件,参与网络因素是政府创新的重要基础。在社会资本视角下进行政府创新的途径在于加强社会制度建设,实现传统社会资本的现代转型;支持公民参与网络建设,培育公共精神和发展基层民主;培育第三部门力量,以转变政府职能和增强政府能力。