New Approaches to Information Security

The potential for change is increasing rapidly in the 21 st century, especially in the information and communication technology （ICT） field. Innovations in ICT are constantly making new breakthroughs and all kinds of technologies, applications and services are being interwoven. Inevitably, the broad application of new technologies provides cyber attackers more tools and opportunities to launch attacks. Old information security^1 policies are facing new challenges, emerging threats and unsolved risks. Finding effective solutions to cyber threats has become an urgent task for the international community.     

Developed States’ Vulnerability to Economic Disruption Online

Much of the literature on cyberspace and national security has backed away from the idea that cyberwar presents an imminent threat in world politics. However, there remains great concern about the potential for broad-scoped economic disruption prosecuted through digital means. How vulnerable are developed states to cyber economic warfare? Could either a concentrated cyber economic warfare initiative or a scalable disruption effect prove crippling on a large scale? And, most importantly, what are the implications for state policy and international interactions? This article contends that large, advanced industrial states are only superficially more vulnerable to disruption than are other types of systems.     

The Cyber Threat to Nuclear Stability

The thesis of this article is that cyber war technologies are spilling over into precision strike and nuclear mission areas. The result will transform deterrence and arms race stability and lead to other significant changes. The driver behind this is a combination of long standing problems with mobile missiles along with new technologies not usually factored into strategic assessments: big data analytics, computer vision, and related information systems. When combined with drones and precision strike, the hunt for mobile missiles is becoming faster, cheaper, and better. The implications of this finding vary by country, but will shape major power nuclear modernization, crisis stability among secondary powers, and conventional attack of nuclear deterrents.     

The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace

What are the dynamics of coercion in cyberspace? Can states use cyber means as independent tools of coercion to influence the behavior of adversaries? This article critically assesses traditional coercion theory in light of cyberspace's emergence as a domain in which states use force, or its threat, to achieve political objectives. First, we review the core tenets of coercion theory and identify the requisites of successful coercion: clearly communicated threats; a cost–benefit calculus; credibility; and reassurance. We subsequently explore the extent to which each of these is feasible for or applicable to the cyber domain, highlighting how the dynamics of coercion in cyberspace mimic versus diverge from traditional domains of warfare. We demonstrate that cyber power alone has limited effectiveness as a tool of coercion, although it has significant utility when coupled with other elements of national power. Second, this article assesses the viability and effectiveness of six prominent warfighting strategies in the traditional coercion literature as applied to the cyber domain: attrition, denial, decapitation, intimidation, punishment, and risk. We conclude that, based on the current technological state of the field, states are only likely to achieve desired objectives employing attrition, denial, or decapitation strategies. Our analysis also has unique implications for the conduct of warfare in cyberspace. Perhaps counterintuitively, the obstacles to coercion that our analysis identifies may prompt states to reevaluate norms against targeting civilian infrastructure.     

中美舆论战与中国的国际传播

美国政府视中国为首要战略竞争对手,并进行遏制打压,激起中国的强烈反对,而舆论战是中美博弈的重要组成部分。中美两国舆论战涵盖的议题广泛,影响波及全球,并发展到意识形态对抗和互相驱逐媒体从业人员的地步。中美双方的舆论攻势和各自国家的政治制度、社会形态的特点息息相关,其阶段性效果与中美既有的国际影响力相匹配。在美国对华大打舆论战的情况下,中国在西方发达国家的形象受损,但在国内极大地凝聚了人心、提振了士气。未来,美国可能仿效针对苏联和俄罗斯的做法,将舆论战更多地和心理战、政治战相结合,以服务其遏制中国的目标。为增强自身的国际传播力,更好地服务与美国的舆论战,中国需要维护好政治安全,提高话语和叙事能力及舆论反击效果,将传统媒体和新兴媒体相融合,并将发展中国家作为国际传播的重点,以逐步形成同我国综合国力和国际地位相匹配的国际话语权。     

Chinese warfare and politics in the ancient East Asian international system,CA. 2700 B.C. to 722 B.C.

Ancient East Asia is the second oldest “protobellic area” and pristine state system of international relations within the global international system, after West Asia (ancient Near East). In a previous study Cioffi‐Revilla and Lai (1995) reported the first findings on the origins and evolution of war and politics in ancient China (Legendary, Xia [Hsia], Shang, and Western Zhou [Chou] periods), ca. 2700 B.C to 722 B.C In this paper we make public an expanded data set (N = 104 cases, 12 variables; version 2.0), explaining our sources, measurements, and data quality control procedures. The new data set will permit investigators to test hypotheses about warfare distributions, ethnic and protracted conflicts, time series, periodicity, system dynamics, and structural relationships (e.g., war‐polarity theories). This new long‐range data set should also promote a new stage in comparative analyses of the universal and particular properties of warfare and international systems, both cross‐polity and longitudinally.     

第二次世界大战后武力使用规范的演进

在国际法体系中,武装冲突法可谓编纂得最为完备的一个分支。经过数百年的积累和铺垫,第二次世界大战后武力使用规范逐渐发展成为完整的规范体系并呈现出四大特征:即为了适应国际关系的新变化武装冲突法扩大了适用范围;使用核武器是否合法成为国际法的重要问题;出现了在武装冲突中"反向"使用武力以达到实现和平目的的新方式——联合国维持和平行动以及在武装冲突中出现了大量作为作战手段而使用的性暴力行为等。然而进入21世纪以后,武装冲突的形态与样式均发生了重大变化,一方面,以无人机、自主作战机器人、纳米生物武器和网络战为代表的新型作战手段方法层出不穷;另一方面,非国家行为体在武装冲突中使用武力的情况有所增加,更出现了私人军事安保公司等法律地位在国际法上尚处于空白的交战主体。以朝核危机为标志,核武器对于国际和平与安全的巨大的潜在甚至是现实的威胁再次凸显,迅速成为国际政治和国际法中的热点核心议题。值得注意的是,即使武装冲突法的基本原则依然相对稳定,但是不断出现的新作战手段和方法,仍然给国际法和国际安全提出了一系列亟须应对的新挑战。     

美国《网络空间国际战略》评析

在信息化时代,网络空间承载着国家政治、经济、文化和军事发展与安全的重荷。网络空间存在的黑客攻击、网络犯罪和网络恐怖主义事件层出不穷,因此网络空间安全已上升到国家安全战略的层面,美国政府于2011年5月16日发布的《网络空间国际战略》引起世界各国瞩目。美国《网络空间国际战略》以"共同创造繁荣、安全、开放的网络世界"为基本宗旨,以"基本自由、隐私和信息流动自由"为核心原则,从经济、网络安全、司法、军事、网络管理、国际发展、网络自由等诸方面为美国未来网络安全战略的发展指明了方向。《网络空间国际战略》的出台表明美国政府已将网络安全提升到国际战略的新高度,它隐含着美国谋求网络空间霸权的战略目标,具有引领国际战略新变革和引发网络空间价值观冲突的现实战略效能,它对中美关系的影响和中国的应对之策也是值得认真分析和思考的。     

Why States No Longer Declare War

Why have states stopped issuing declarations of war? Declaring war was a norm of international politics for millennia, but now appears to have exited states’ behavioral repertoires. I argue that the proliferation of codified jus in bello, the law of war governing belligerent conduct, has created disincentives for states to issue formal declarations of war. The increasing number of codified international laws that govern belligerent conduct during warfare has made complying with the laws of war extremely costly. One way for states to limit these costs is to avoid admitting they are in a formal state of war by refraining from declaring war. I test this claim, as well as others, using an original data set. I also discuss several cases of nineteenth and twentieth century wars that illustrate the logic of this argument.     

Books

This paper deals with the relationship between communication, politics and warfare. Communication is frequently regarded as the solution to all problems and it is often said we only need to communicate more to prevent conflict. The aim is to give an overview of opinions to indicate that communication is used not only as an instrument for seeking peace, but also as an offensive (and defensive) instrument in politics and warfare; also that politics without communication cannot exist and that politics and warfare are closely related. Clausewitz's dictum that warfare is the continuation of politics through other means has been extended by Communism to mean that peace is the continuation of war. Only if the reciprocal relationship between communication, politics and warfare is taken into consideration, can communication be used as an instrument to provide peace in the age of the delicate balance of nuclear terror and international terrorism.     

A social theory of war: Clausewitz and war reconsidered

This article presents a new theory of war that is grounded in the insights of Clausewitz on the social nature of conflict. Clausewitz had argued that war is a political process; he therefore distinguished between ‘war’—understood in political terms—and warfare—understood as fighting. He then created a typology covering a spectrum of war ranging from total to limited, the political stakes of a conflict determining where it would fall on the spectrum. I develop and modify this basic framework by arguing that the social organization of the actors has a determining role in predicting the stakes of war. I then show how this framework helps us understand some key problems in the political science literature on war and conflict. I attempt to show two main things: (1) that there are different types of wars (and that these differences are not necessarily related to the standing of the actors, i.e. the presence or absence of sovereignty); and (2) that how war and warfare are related is more complicated than previously understood and that this has implications for the political science literature on order, conflict and violence.     

Prelude to war: Incidence,escalation and intervention in international disputes, 1900–1976

The study provides an overview of a set of data describing the incidence and character of serious international disputes in the twentieth century. The principal findings reported include: Average annual incidence of serious international disputes has risen more than fourfold between 1900 and 1976. The underlying cause of this increase seems to be simply the increased size of the international system. The relative likelihood with which a serious dispute culminates in war is 1 in 9. However, there are definite differences in this relative frequency. Disputes involving major powers escalate to war approximately 1 in 5 times. Disputes involving only minor powers culminate in war with a likelihood of 1 in 20. Intervention in ongoing disputes increases the chance of war. The character of intervention has changed throughout the century with initiators less able to attract support and the targets of threat and force more able to do so.     

Damned If You Do,Damned If You Don't: Performative Power and the Strategy of Conventional and Nuclear Defusing

This article seeks to initiate a new round of strategic intellectual innovation in an era when threats posed by non-state terrorist organizations and their state supporters do not resemble Cold War threats. Based on an interpretative sociological reading of the concepts of power, security, and rationality, it argues that a “damned if you do, damned if you don't” dilemma is to the post-Cold War era what the danger of surprise attack or unintended nuclear war was to the Cold War: the defining structural threat of international politics. The dilemma leaves states confronting asymmetrical warfare with the choice of reacting with force to a terrorist act or practicing appeasement. Neither approach, however, can achieve the goal of putting an end to terrorism. Deterrence sustains the dilemma by providing a rationale for why force should be used and why self-restraint is irrational. This article proposes a third option, defusing, which may be accomplished by denial (preventing provocateurs from dragging states into the use of force) and restructuration (transforming the structure and rules of the situation). Defusing relies on “performative power”—the capacity to project a dramatic and credible performance on the world stage and to decouple social actors, their audiences, and their most deeply held strategic beliefs. The force of the argument is illustrated by examples from the global “war on terror,” the 2006 Lebanon War, the 2008–09 operation “Cast Lead” in Gaza, and the Iranian nuclear crisis.     

国际安全视域下的网络文化与网络空间软实力

网络文化不是纯粹的文化问题和文化现象,而是与安全具有广泛的内在联系。在网络空间本身已经全球化的时代,有必要从国际安全的视角审视网络文化。理想的网络文化是一个能够维系自身运转、净化和完善的体系,具有三个与安全相关的功能:传递功能(以信息技术实力确保信息文化流动的顺畅和安全)、纠正功能(纠正错误信息和越轨行为)和塑造功能(塑造观念、行为方式和组织方式)。这三个功能分别对应三种类型的国家软实力:第一,以信息传播和文化内容为基础的网络空间软实力,主要是指信息传播实力和网络文化产品的吸引力。第二,以外交劝说和外交质量为基础的网络空间软实力,即运用传统外交和公共外交等方式纠正有危害性的信息和越轨行为的能力。第三,以国家利益和国际道义为基础的网络空间软实力,指建构国家文化、国家形象和国际声誉的能力。网络空间软实力是数字化时代国家综合国力的重要组成部分,也将成为未来国力竞争的焦点领域。     

冷战后世界秩序的变化与重构

冷战结束后,世界秩序发生重大变化。新的世界大战打不起来,但是,局部战争和地区冲突持续不断,国际恐怖主义成为新的安全威胁,美国的新干涉主义政策成为新的战争形式。两大意识形态对抗支配国际关系的时代已经结束,国家利益重新置于外交政策的首要地位。经济全球化加深了国际相互依存关系,扩大了寻求共同利益和国际合作的基础,也加剧了国际竞争和冲突。世界格局多极化是历史发展的大趋势,在多极均衡基础上构建世界新秩序是现实的选择。     

Forging the Future of American Security with a Total Force Strategy

An intense debate now rages concerning whether the Army should be preparing and organizing to conduct more ambiguous, irregular operations or focus on maintaining its well honed edge in high-intensity warfare. The terms of the debate are clearly affected by the fact that United States is currently embroiled in perilous counterinsurgency and other irregular operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Should the Army recalibrate itself to wage counterinsurgency and other irregular operations more effectively, or does it need to keep doing what it does best with an eye to future conventional warfare? Given the impossibility of accurately predicting the character of future conflict, it is necessary for the Army to strike a balance between the extremes. But for the Army to effectively implement a policy of “balance,” it must be prepared to dramatically change the way it organizes itself and drop its opposition to specializing its forces for irregular and conventional warfare, respectively. The approach that the Army should take should be based upon a Total Force construct. By utilizing the entire Total Force portfolio, it should be possible to better optimize the mix of ground units prepared for conventional war, irregular war or peace operations to avoid a mis-match between national security strategy and military force. In this manner, it may be possible to stake our claim on the hard won lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, yet hedge against the unknowable future.     

Pioneers of peace research: II. Quincy Wright: Apostle of law

This is an interpretative review of Quincy Wright's A Study of War. In his anthropological and historical surveys, Wright traced warfare from the animals to the atomic age, including primitive warfare, civilized warfare, and modern warfare. These surveys suggested that war was primarily a function of civilization and imperialism. In order to control war, the conditions of peace have to be established. This means creating a new world order oriented toward justice and welfare rather than wealth and power. This is the task of world law, but the law cannot be effective without world acceptance of justice and welfare as standards of human behavior. A sense of world citizenship is required to support the law in its efforts to achieve justice, maintain order, and administer welfare. It would seem that something like world welfare is required to control world warfare.     

China's New Multi-Faceted Maritime Strategy

As trade-driven growth and prosperity redefine both the Chinese economy and the global competitive landscape, U.S. policy makers increasingly must ponder whether the Chinese leadership will seek new options and capabilities to protect its far-reaching oceanic lifelines. As imported oil and raw minerals power the Chinese juggernaut, much of these flows traverse the Strait of Malacca and other littorals where there is little current Chinese capability to project power. In recent years, there is an ongoing debate among Chinese military circles regarding the feasibility of constructing a blue-water fleet that could change the balance of power in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. U.S. policy makers watch with increasing unease as a new generation of technically-savvy navy officers forcefully argue for a forward-looking maritime strategic posture that extends beyond the East and South China Seas. In addition, recent Chinese space-based and cyber warfare technology initatives bear watching as Beijing seeks to nullify key U.S. advantages in C4SRI using a high-tech variant of “asymmetric warfare.” Although it is unclear what direction future Chinese maritime strategy and doctrine will take, U.S. policy makers need to remain vigilant about rising Chinese maritime ambitions and capabilities in the future.     

Affecting trust: Terrorism,internet and offensive information warfare

The national security consequences of the potential use of the Internet by terrorist organizations have attracted the interest of many academics and government and intelligence officials. The goal of this article is to provide a new explanatory angle concerning the possible targets of terrorists’ offensive information warfare (OIW) operations. It argues that these organizations may prove more valuable and effective to undermine on‐line activities of leading electronic commerce sites than to target elements of the critical national information infrastructure. These offensive actions, in fact, would directly impact one of the explanatory elements for the Internet's success: users’ perception of its trustworthiness. Before tackling its arguments, the article provides a definition of offensive information warfare. Then, it investigates how terrorist organizations would formulate their operational style concerning offensive information warfare. The stage is then set to define the central argument of the article by drawing from studies carried out in the areas of information security, international management and electronic commerce. The article concludes with a set of policy recommendations to counter these potential threats and thus make the Internet a safer communication instrument for economic, commercial and social development.     

China, Nuclear Security and Terrorism: Implications for the United States

This article outlines Chinese strategic nuclear forces and the Chinese philosophical approach to nuclear security. It then focuses on the domestic conditions in China which could precipitate vulnerabilities to its nuclear forces. From information about internal security conditions in China, specific internal threats to Chinese nuclear security will be derived. Based on these threats, several outsider and insider scenarios will be outlined involving a variety of terrorist or terrorist related behaviors. These notional scenarios will include everything from overrun or attack, to diversion, to cyber terrorism, to sabotage. The article will then cover what these scenarios and the possible Chinese reaction to them may mean for the security, military and diplomatic strategies of the United States.