Enduring trade disputes: Disguised protectionism and duration and recurrence of international trade disputes

Why do some WTO trade disputes endure and recur while others do not? States have difficulty resolving trade conflicts when they involve certain types of trade-restrictive domestic regulations. While such regulations vary in their extent of legitimacy—fulfilling non-trade domestic regulatory objectives and availability of less trade-restrictive options—complainant states cannot always distinguish legitimate barriers from illegitimate ones. In such scenarios of disguised protectionism, which I argue is most prevalent with policies involving WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement, disputants confront difficulties concluding their disputes. Disputes last longer and are more likely to recur. I test the argument against a data set of WTO disputes structured in an innovative manner—one that links together related and recurring disputes into single conflicts. Both an event history analysis of conflict duration and a count analysis of conflict recurrence using this data strongly support this argument.     

Why do states join US-led military coalitions?: The compulsion of the coalition's missions and legitimacy

Why do states join US-led military coalitions? The war/dispute-diffusionliterature suggests that opportunity and willingness are crucialdeterminants of coalition participation (Siverson and Starr, 1990,1991). A state joins a coalition if it has a strong interestin war and enough capability to send armed forces abroad. Alliancestudies connect coalition participation problems with the reliabilityof allied countries (Leeds, 2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004).These studies seem to provide a fairly good picture on the question;however, they are not free of problems. In particular, theystudy only coalitions for interstate war and militarized disputesbut ignore coalitions for other purposes. Coalitions can beformed for military operations other than war (Kober, 2002).There are coalitions for humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping,and even for the evacuation of noncombatants. This article showshow difference in operation-types and collective legitimacyaffect the decision of a state to participate in US-led coalitions.A coalition with United Nations' authorization may appear tobe a legitimate international ‘police’ act and attractmore partner states. A coalition for intervention into domesticaffairs may be less attractive to possible participants becauseof the violation of the noninterference norm of internationallaw. Statistical analysis on United States coalition partnersfrom 1950 to 1999 suggests that how and for what purposes coalitionsare formed cannot be overlooked. Coalition participation isnot fully explained by the existing perspectives found in war/dispute-diffusionliterature and alliance studies, and there is a need to invoke‘the compulsion of the coalition's missions and legitimacy’. Received for publication November 16, 2005. Accepted for publication April 20, 2006.     

联合阵线与美国军事干涉

作为国际体系中的唯一超级大国,美国是冷战后海外用兵最为频繁、进行军事干涉行动次数最多的国家。研究者们通常认为,美国的军事干涉在决策和实施上具有很强的单边主义色彩,其突出特征是动辄使用或威胁使用武力,在决定使用武力时一意孤行,时常将自身意志凌驾于联合国和国际法之上。通过考察冷战后美国在伊拉克战争、阿富汗战争、利比亚战争等重大军事干涉行动中的选择可以发现,尽管美国在使用武力的决策上较少受到国际社会的有效约束,但它在军事干涉行动中既不是纯粹依靠自身力量单干,也不是依靠其缔造的多边或双边军事同盟,而是经常性地采取联合阵线的方式执行军事打击和战后维稳行动。联合阵线的目标确定性及手段灵活性为美国主导军事干涉行动提供了便利,而规避集体行动的困境、让伙伴承担军事行动的负担、为干涉行动寻找合法性以及减少美国的投入和损失等考量,也使得美国具有招募多国参与其军事行动的强烈动机。由于当前国际体系结构的制约,不少国家倾向于加入美国的军事干涉联合阵线,以便在美国主导的等级体系中获取安全保障和经济利益。     

Inequality Amid Equality: Military Capabilities and Conflict Behavior in Balanced Dyads

Studies of power parity and conflict implicitly assume all balanced dyads are created equal. However, variation exists within the capabilities of the states in these particular dyads. I address the question of what affects the likelihood of conflict onset within relatively balanced dyads. I argue uncertainty—in particular the uncertainty of the expected costs of conflict—determines the likelihood of conflict among these dyads. More uncertainty of costs means a greater likelihood of miscalculation leading to bargaining errors. First, I argue as an opponent’s capabilities increase, uncertainty of costs increase and the likelihood of conflict increases. Second, military action serves a purpose in bargaining and can help reduce uncertainty by signaling a state’s willingness to inflict and endure costs in order to gain a better settlement. Third, information transmission is likely to be effective only when states have the capability to inflict significant costs. As such, while greater capabilities will lead to a high likelihood of conflict onset, they also lead to a reduced likelihood of conflict escalation. The testing of nondirected dyads from 1946 to 2001 supports the theory’s implications.     

The changing character of EUFOR Althea: power politics or learning?

States have different strategic cultures when it comes to legitimating the use of military force and its relation with other foreign policy instruments. However, increasingly, military operations are conducted in multilateral forums; EU military operations are one of the most notable examples of this development. While some claim that these operations reflect power relations between nations with different strategic cultures, others argue that these common missions involve states in a process of collective learning and convergence of interests. Drawing upon an advocacy coalition approach, this paper confronts the competing hypotheses in the case of European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), as the EU’s longest running military operation (since 2004). On the basis of policy documents and semi-structured interviews with policymakers and politicians, this paper concludes that the evolution of EUFOR Althea has been primarily the result of the power politics of different coalitions, but there have also been a few instances of learning.     

Conservative Leaders,Coalition, and Britain’s Decision for War in 1914

Conservative leaders may have had a decisive impact on the decision by the Liberal government to enter the Great War in August 1914. In a seminal article of 1975, Keith Wilson argued that their readiness to fight “cut the ground … from beneath the feet of the non-interventionists” in the Cabinet. Those ministers who had hitherto opposed war now recognised that continued divisions could bring the government’s collapse, in which case the Unionists, probably in a coalition with pro-war Liberals, would take office and enter the conflict anyway. Since Wilson’s essay, important light has focussed on Unionist thinking by works that look at the July Crisis as part of a longer party history. This analysis provides a detailed investigation of the actions of Unionist leaders in the days immediately leading to war. It resolves some of the main contradictions in the primary evidence, argues that the possibility of a coalition was very real and demonstrates that one key player—the first lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill—subsequently tried, with some success, to disguise his activities.     

How the ‘entry’ defines the ‘exit’: contradictions between the political and military strategies adopted in 2001 and how they have deleteriously affected the longer-term possibilities for stabilisation in Afghanistan

Focusing on the period 2001–2003, the paper discusses how the Western military intervention in Afghanistan changed power structures early on, undermining the political settlement in the long term and culminating in the present electoral crisis. Key concepts, a theoretical framework and the initial military approach (including how the initial military strategy undermined an indigenous solution for toppling the Taliban) are outlined and literature focused on hybrid governance and ‘legitimacy’ as an important but overlooked facet of peace-building is presented. Examples of ‘lessons learned’ in relation to the failure to engage with traditional forms of governance–early on in the Afghan conflict—are set out. The objective is to show that the military strategy adopted in 2001–2002 had adverse long-term consequences that were hard to reverse later on (e.g. by shifting the goalposts of military activity to, for example, a counter-insurgency strategy from 2005 onwards). This paper does not aim to resolve these paradoxes in the Afghan context going forward but offers implicit recommendations based on ‘lessons learned’.     

Trade Interdependence and the Use of Force: Do Issues Matter?

In this project, we investigate the relationship between the use of military force and trade interdependence, suggesting that the influence of trade on militarized conflict varies based on the issue under dispute. For some issues, trade is likely to attenuate the chances that states escalate a dispute to the use of military force, while for others trade can intensify disputes so that military conflict is more likely. Specifically, we hypothesize that greater trade interdependence decreases the probability of military conflict over realpolitik issues like territory. On the other hand, greater trade interdependence increases the probability that states use military force when the issue under dispute concerns the regime, policies, and conditions in the target. To test our hypotheses, we employ new data on dyadic uses of force from the International Military Intervention data set that records the initiator’s reason(s) for using force against the target. The statistical tests support our hypotheses; trade decreases the use of force against a target for territorial and military/diplomatic reasons, which is consistent with arguments from the liberal paradigm. However, trade interdependence increases the use of force for humanitarian and economic reasons as well as to affect the regime or policy of the target. Thus, our study improves upon current research about the relationship between economic interdependence and foreign policy by specifying a conditional relationship based on the issues under contention.     

Third-Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946–2000

Past studies regarding the success and/or failure of conflict management activities have brought about a wide range of results. In this paper we attempt to gain more definitive conclusions about effectiveness by accomplishing two tasks. First, using a basic theoretical framework we identify expectations of efficacy as they relate to differences between states, coalitions, and IGOs. Second, we also examine the utility of different conflict management techniques in an effort to place in greater perspective the effectiveness of mediation, the most utilized technique of third party intermediaries. Using a new dataset on third-party intermediary behavior in militarized disputes from 1946 to 2000, we find that while all conflict managers are useful in assisting belligerents in reaching a negotiated settlement, IGOs are the most effective. Additionally, while mediation is an effective technique to produce settlements, military intermediary actions, such as peacekeeping, are much more useful.     

The size principle and the strategic basis of an alliance: Formalizing intuitions

At the end of the Cold War, attention is keenly turned towards predicting alliance behavior in the international system. As such the lessons from past history are important in helping us guide our expectations. One recent lesson, Schweller (1993), argued that the strategic basis of a coalition was decisive in determining the size of coalitions; offensive coalitions would be minimum winning while defensive coalitions would be maximal. We show that by formalizing in game theoretic terms what ‘seems reasonable,’ in fact does not yield these predictions. We find no support for the strategic basis of a coalition being determinate in predicting the size of a coalition. As such, formalizing the intuitions from the lessons of the past help guide us in our search for usable lessons in alliance formation.     

Business engagement in violence prevention and peace-building: the case of Kenya

Kenyan business was important in mitigating episodes of election violence in 2007–2008 and 2013. This article finds that this role was motivated by the ethical and moral commitments of key business leaders to further peace in times of violence; and by interests in preventing future economic loss. However, by adopting a lens that situates business roles in violence prevention and peace-building within Kenya’s conflict systems and political economy, the article finds a paradox: this lens confirms the Kenyan ‘success story’ with respect to specific violent episodes; but it also reveals a much more limited role for business in transforming the underlying sources of conflict; especially when these are congruent with key business fundamentals connected to land ownership, property rights, export-oriented production or services, or a ‘limited’ access order. Overall, the article highlights that business should leverage its comparative advantages within broader multi-stakeholder coalitions, especially in terms of its ability to influence political leaders, entry-points for informal dialogue to diffuse crises and capital to support peace-building initiatives.     

Russia’s Policy towards the Middle East: The Case of Yemen

ABSTRACT

Yemen occupies a peripheral place in Russian foreign policy for three reasons: lack of serious economic interest, the illusory potential of strengthening the military presence there and recognition of Saudi Arabia’s role in the Yemeni conflict. However, a deepening of the split within the Arab coalition in Yemen, primarily between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, has not only forced the Russian authorities to seek a balance between Yemeni actors, but also made Russia part of the so-called ‘Yemeni triangle’ alongside the two GCC countries. Russian involvement in the Yemeni crisis is constrained by its economic weakness and prioritisation of Russia-Gulf relations more broadly.     

Fuel to the Fire: Natural Disasters and the Duration of Civil Conflict

Do natural disasters prolong civil conflict? Or are disasters more likely to encourage peace as hostilities diminish when confronting shared hardship or as shifts in the balance of power between insurgents and the state hasten cessation? To address these questions, this study performs an event history analysis of disasters’ impact on the duration of 224 armed intrastate conflicts occurring in 86 states between 1946 and 2005. I contend that natural disasters increase conflict duration by decreasing the state’s capacity to suppress insurgency, while reinforcing insurgent groups’ ability to evade capture and avoid defeat. First, disasters’ economic impact coupled with state financial outlays for disaster relief and reconstruction, reduce resources available for counterinsurgency and nation building in conflict zones. Second, the military’s role in administering humanitarian assistance can reduce the availability of troops and military hardware for counterinsurgency, prompt temporary ceasefires with insurgents, or both. Third, natural disasters can cause infrastructural damages that disproportionately hinder the state’s capacity to execute counterinsurgency missions, thereby making insurgent forces more difficult to capture and overcome. The combination of these dynamics should encourage longer conflicts in states with higher incidence of disaster. Empirical evidence strongly supports this contention, indicating that states with greater disaster vulnerability fight longer wars.     

Playing Their Cards Right: Ethnic Parties and Government Coalitions in Postcommunist Europe

This article seeks to identify the determinants of ethnic parties’ access to coalition governments in Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia between 1990 and 2013. We conducted a cross-national and longitudinal analysis in which we took into account all the elections in which the ethnic parties gained parliamentary representation. With 21 cases over two decades—with the party at the election being the unit of analysis—and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as the method of analysis, this study concludes that the pivotal position is important for access to government coalitions, while organizational change and government incumbency have a limited explanatory power.     

We Always Fight the Last War? Prior Experiences in Counterinsurgency and Conventional Warfare and War Outcomes

Does previous experience with conventional warfare harm a military fighting an insurgency? Or, conversely, does prior experience with a counterinsurgency lower a military’s likelihood for winning a conventional interstate war? Whereas firepower, maneuver, and associated tactics are essential for conventional warfare, counterinsurgency requires restrictions on firepower and effective policing in order to “win hearts and minds.” These competing requirements for military preparedness for conventional warfare and counterinsurgency have been extensively debated. However, the consequences of fighting counterinsurgency on a state’s readiness for fighting conventional wars (and vice versa) have been unexplored. We examine the relationship between past experiences with one type of conflict and war outcomes of the other type of conflict through a quantitative analysis of all wars that ended between 1838 and 2005. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that past experiences with either counterinsurgency or conventional warfare have little association with future success in war, conventional or not.     

‘No‐party’ politics and local democracy in Africa: Rawlings’ Ghana in the 1990s and the ‘Ugandan model’

Ghana's decentralised form of administration run by elected District Assemblies was created in 1989 by Jerry Rawlings’ military government. As in Uganda under Museveni's National Resistance Council regime, it was inspired by populist theories of participatory, community‐led democracy which idealised the consensual character of ‘traditional’ village life and rejected the relevance of political parties. The Assemblies remain by law ‘no‐party’ institutions, notwithstanding Ghana's transition to multi‐party constitutional democracy in 1992. Their performance since 1989 is examined in the light of the question: to what extent can the Ugandan ‘no‐party’ model continue within a context of party competition, given that it assumes the all‐inclusive and non‐conflictual character of community politics? The conclusion is that the contradictions between the no‐party consensual model, de facto ruling party domination and the reality of local conflict have created significant difficulties for the Assembly system. Participation has declined and conflict‐resolution been made more difficult, whilst the legitimacy and transparency of resource decisions have been undermined.     

From Warfare to Imagefare: How States Should Manage Asymmetric Conflicts With Extensive Media Coverage

Conflicts in the 21st century differ from past conflicts based on two central factors: the level of asymmetry and disparity between the actors taking part in the conflict and the amount of foreign media coverage that a conflict receives. This article aims to develop a new theoretical perspective on the implications of these two factors on how the involved states manage a conflict. Most actors in current conflicts have vast levels of disparity and receive extensive media coverage; events in those conflicts are referred to as occurrences in the “information space” because a conflict's borders are anywhere people can receive information about it. “Imagefare”—the use of images as a guiding principle or a substitute for traditional military means to achieve political objectives—is argued to be the main tool for better facing adversaries in the information space.     

With Friends Like These: Brinkmanship and Chain-Ganging in Russia's Near Abroad

Unrecognized statelets may be forming in the Eastern Donbas region of Ukraine under the aegis of Russian protection—a “frozen conflict.” Georgia's past provides a useful cautionary tale in reference to Ukraine's probable future. The very same conceptual debates that are currently underway in the West with respect to Ukraine—“credibility of great-power security guarantees versus chain-ganging”—have, over the past twenty years, generated policies that facilitated the rise of political coalitions within Georgia that prefer war with Russia to any other outcome.     

Going on the Run: What Drives Military Desertion in Civil War?

Under which circumstances do soldiers and officers desert in a violent domestic conflict? This article studies individual military insubordination in the Syrian civil war, drawing on interviews with deserters from the Syrian army now based in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. A plausibility probe of existing explanations reveals that desertion opportunities originating in conflict events and the presence of safe-havens fail to explain individual deserters' decision making. Accounting for socio-psychological factors—moral grievances and fear—generates more promising results for an inquiry into the conditions under which military personnel desert. While moral concerns with continued military service contribute to accumulating grievances among military members engaged in the civil war, fear—that is, soldiers' concerns for their own safety—is a more effective triggering cause of desertion. The article presents a theory-generating case study on the causes of military insubordination and disintegration during violent conflict.     

The Baltic predicament in the shadow of Russia’s war in Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has once again reinvigorated the debate about the likelihood of conflict spreading into NATO’s frontline states, namely the Baltic republics. This article argues that somewhat paradoxically, the Baltics currently find themselves in both the best of times and the worst of times. On the one hand, with each “turn of the screw”—Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014 and 2022—Moscow has ensured a greater allied presence across the Baltics. Still, despite this and Russia’s substantial losses incurred in the war, the Baltic lawmakers will not write off Russia as a military threat any time soon.