反垄断法上的卡特尔宽大制度

宽大制度是各国发现并查处卡特尔案件的主要途径,我国也规定了相应的制度,但需要进一步完善,尤其是在以下几个方面增强明确性:首先,需要对不同的宽大措施分别规定明确的证据质量标准与告发时间标准,以使告发者准确预知其告发行为能否获得宽大,以及获得何种程度的宽大;其次,为鼓励卡特尔参与人争先告发,须对宽大的人数与宽大的幅度进行科学设计;第三,应要求告发者在案件查处全过程中始终密切配合,作为给予宽大的条件;第四,为吸引卡特尔当事人进行告发,还必须为其提供必要的保护,防止其所提供的证据被用于追究其民事责任。     

我国的反卡特尔法

我国的反卡特尔法沈敏荣“卡特尔”通过组织，以私人规制市场为基本目的，因此必然限制竞争。在所有对竞争的限制和歪曲的行为中，“卡特尔”是最严重背离市场经济规律的。由于“卡特尔”对市场竞争的巨大危害，市场经济国家都对之加以禁止，我国也不例外，如我国禁止企业...     

价格卡特尔与消费者保护

价格卡特尔作为一种广泛存在的限制竞争行为,一直是各国反垄断法规的重点。价格卡特尔不仅严重限制了市场的竞争秩序,更严重地损害了消费者的合法权益。本文试图从消费者权益保护的角度浅谈对价格卡特尔的规制,以期待立法能切实保护消费者的合法权益。     

卡特尔与正当协调的判断标准分析

卡特尔规制是各国反垄断法规制的主要内容之一。在反垄断执法中，如果对市场中所有协调行为均予以违法论处显然不符合竞争政策与公共政策的要求，同时也不能真正有效地制止卡特尔行为。因此，有必要对市场中的卡特尔与正当的协调行为进行有效区分。本文研究、探讨了美欧日卡特尔与正当协调行为的判断标准，以期对完善我国的判断标准提供借鉴。     

论核心卡特尔中的宽恕制度及我国《反垄断法》对其规制和完善

核心卡特尔通过相同的定价、一致的行动、固定的份额来获取高额的利润,给竞争带来重大的危害,但是其隐蔽性强,难以为执法机关所侦破.宽恕制度,通过豁免卡特尔协议成员的方式以鼓励其对卡特尔协议的披露,成为西方国家打击卡特尔的重要武器.我国<反垄断法>虽对宽恕制度做了规制,但尚且不足.仍待完善.     

卡特尔的反垄断法刑事化制度理论研究

在反垄断法规范的限制竞争行为中,卡特尔行为是最具危害性的。从整体上讲,各国对卡特尔行为都进行了规制,具体的制裁措施,主要包括民事制裁、行政制裁和刑事制裁三种,而以行政制裁为主。其中行政制裁措施大致有:责令停止违法行为、没收违法所得、处以罚     

联邦德国卡特尔局法律考察纪实

为了借鉴外国市场立法方面的经验,加速我国市场规则的建立和完善,我们受国家有关部门派遣赴联邦德国卡特尔局作了法律考察.联邦德国卡特尔局是隶属于德国经济部的经济监督部门,它有依法调查并制止各种限制竞争的行为,维护市场正常的竞争秩序,是联邦德国重要的竞争法执法机关. 联邦德国的竞争法律制度,建立于第二次世界大战后所实行的“社会市场经济”之上,并为其发展服务.所谓“社会市场经济”,用西方经济学的解释,是“根据市场经济规律进行的,并以社会因素作为补充和社会保障为特征的经济制度”.其主张是尽可能让市场力量来自行调节经济活动,同时由国家进行必要的干预.社会市场经济主张最大限度地适用“竞争原则”.德国人认为,竞争是社会市场经济的本质特征.没有竞争,市场就没有活力,生     

欧盟国家援助法律制度简析以及对我国的启示

现如今市场经济在世界各国经济活动以及全球经济贸易活动中扮演着重要的角色,但是市场经济本身却具有不可避免的缺陷,这时候就需要国家强大的经济职能。而本文的主题"国家援助"就是国家经济职能的一种,这也成为国家推动市场优势地位的主要力量。由一国政府以产业政策为名义所推行的包括补贴在内的各项援助措施即为国家援助,这种方式对市场地位的稳定与维持有着比企业合并与卡特尔等因素更快、更直接的左右。但是,这种方式同时也带来了一系列问题,正如达摩克里斯之剑,如果不加规范而被滥用,很可能成为国家保护本国产品,破坏自由市场竞争的工具,所以制定相关的国家援助法律制度至关重要。欧盟作为全球最大的区域性政治经济组织为此作出了积极而富有成效的努力。     

中德竞争法律制度比较研究

中德竞争法律制度比较研究●林燕平一、引言现代竞争法是从１８９０年美国《谢尔曼法》的制定开始的。随着市场经济被大多数国家所接受，各国的竞争法律制度也相继建立和完善，主要体现在反垄断法和反不正当竞争法两方面。作为市场经济的基石，竞争法对市场经济的运行具有...     

全球化时代下美国的反托拉斯对外政策及其影响

反垄断法在现代市场经济国家的法律体系中占有极其重要的地位。它被誉为＂自由企业的大宪章＂或＂经济宪法＂,是各国维护自由而公平竞争的经济秩序,促进创新、提高经济效率,并最终增进消费者福利的重要法律。反垄断政策,则是政府管理国家微观经济活动的一种手段,它通过制定和实施影响垄断和市场势力的政策,打击、遏制垄断行为,保障市场主体的有序竞争,以达到提高经济效率,增加消费者福利的目的。20世纪90年代以来,随着经济全球化的加速发展,美国对其反垄断对外政策进行了调整,扩展了国内法的域外效力,打击了国家卡特尔、开展了国际合作,取得了明显的效果。该政策对世界各国的反垄断立法和政策的制定实施产生了重大的影响。     

TRIGGERING INSPECTIONS EX OFFICIO: MOVING BEYOND A PASSIVE EU CARTEL POLICY

The implementation of leniency programs is considered a successboth at a EU Community level and in individual member states.The paper discusses the value of ex officio investigations forcartel detection in light of leniency and complaint-based cases.Are ex officio investigations still needed? Should a competitionauthority concentrate its scarce resources exclusively on theprosecution of leniency or complaint-based cases or follow aproactive market monitoring policy? It is argued that investigationstriggered ex officio are an important complementary enforcementtool to the other passive instruments available to a competitionauthority. A bottom-up methodology for triggering inspectionsbased on economic criteria is presented allowing for a moreproactive cartel policy.     

反垄断宽恕政策的理论分析与实证考察

宽恕政策是卡特尔执法的有效政策工具，它有利于破坏卡特尔的稳定性，有利于提高卡特尔的执法效率。设计合理的规则是宽恕政策有效发挥作用的基础，具体、确定、透明是宽恕政策的基本要求。宽恕政策的实施效果与卡特尔的立法、执法状况密切相关，严厉的法律制裁、坚定的执法态度和有力的执法措施能够有效促进宽恕政策的实施。为了加强卡特尔执法，我国反垄断执法机构应当根据《反垄断法》的有关规定尽快出台宽恕政策。     

Gender dynamics in the sentencing of white-collar offenders

Theory and empirical research often have agreed that female and white-collar offenders benefit from leniency at the sentencing stage of criminal justice system processing. An untested research question emerging from these distinct bodies of literature is whether the greatest leniency is afforded to female white-collar offenders. We investigate the individual and interactive influences of gender and white-collar conviction on judicial leniency by analyzing Florida sentencing guidelines data from 1994 to 2004 using multinomial logistic regression to model the decision to incarcerate nonviolent economic offenders in jail or prison rather than sentence them to community control. Results indicate that female street offenders sentenced by male judges receive the most lenient sentences, while male offenders are punished the harshest regardless of the gender of the sentencing judge or type of crime. Theoretical and policy implications of the findings are discussed in terms of focal concerns, familial paternalism, and attributional perspectives on judicial decision-making.     

On the rationale of leniency programs: a game-theoretical analysis

In order to enhance the enforcement of Antitrust Law, leniency policies were introduced in nearly all industrialized countries. These programs aim at deterring and eliminating cartels. In this paper we analyze the rationale of the current European and German leniency regulation. We challenge the contemporary view that the standard leniency privilege is incentive-compatible with respect to its aim to enhance competition. Instead, we argue for it to be used as a preemptive strike against competitors under circumstances where cartels become unstable. This implies a tightening of markets in subsequent periods and, thus, a potential reduction in competition intensity. Given strategic reasoning by agents, the principal witness may assure an economically privileged position in the future. This consequence might not be intended by the bonus regulations. Nevertheless if the leniency policies lead to more competition in the market the results should be welcomed by the national cartel offices. We give anecdotal evidence of the German cement case and base our arguments on a game-theoretical model.

Examining the prevalence and correlates of a ‘senior citizen discount’ in US federal courts

Few studies focus on age as a factor influencing judicial decision-making, in spite of the widespread use of age as a control variable. Although the limited research to have done so is inconsistent, most scholars agree that age may be race- and/or gender-graded in a manner that produces more severe sentences for certain race–gender–age combinations, especially for young males who are Black or Latino. Less consensus exists with regard to whether older defendants are granted more leniency in the sentencing process and, if so, if the effects of older age are also race- and/or gender-graded. The present study examines this question by examining data from the United States Sentencing Commission. The data presented reveal three noteworthy findings. First, a ‘senior citizen discount’ exists insofar as judges afford more leniency in sentencing to older offenders than their younger counterparts. Second, compared to older males, older females were treated with greater leniency by judges. Finally, whereas Latinos 60 and over were treated with greater severity at the stage of incarceration compared to similarly situated Whites, Blacks received shorter sentence lengths on average. These results are analyzed within the framework of the focal concerns perspective.     

Judges’ sentencing decisions with older offenders

Older offenders tend to be treated with more leniency in the criminal justice system. A number of studies show that older offenders are less likely to be incarcerated, and when they are incarcerated, are more likely to receive shorter sentences. However, to date, no research has directly examined why such leniency occurs. This study asked U.S. state trial court judges to reflect on their sentencing practices with older offenders and to rate the factors considered most important when sentencing this population. Responses were received from 212 judges. Only 31% of judges acknowledged treating older offenders with greater leniency. These judges also indicated that they predominantly rely on legal factors when making decisions about sentencing with older offenders rather than factors specifically associated with age. Only cognitive impairment was identified by judges as one of the five most important factors to consider when sentencing older offenders. These results are discussed in terms of judges’ awareness of how they weigh information to make legal decisions. The influence of judges’ age and attitudes about aging on sentencing decisions are also explored.     

反垄断从宽处理制度及其中国化

反垄断从宽处理制度旨在减免公法责任以吸引卡特尔成员主动投案并揭发他人的违法事实,是国际上通行的一种发现和打击卡特尔的有效机制。从宽处理制度分为多种类型,其共同的先决条件有三个,即:提出申请、提供有效信息、完全配合反垄断执法机构的查处。中国具有与该制度相契合的传统法律土壤,也具备建构该制度的现实法律依据。但是,我国反垄断法律体系内部的冲突、执法权归属的模糊、行政法律责任的薄弱与缺失等因素,使得该制度在中国的实施面临隐忧。     

认罪认罚案件上诉问题探讨

认罪认罚案件上诉权的设置存在多元价值冲突的情形,基于公正价值与效率价值的平衡需要,应当明确赋予认罪认罚案件被告人上诉权。在上诉权的设置上,应当对适用速裁程序审理的认罪认罚案件被告人的上诉权进行限制,要求速裁案件被告人上诉必须有正当理由,而认罪认罚案件适用其他程序审理的则无需附加理由。速裁案件被告人上诉的正当理由主要包括:定罪问题,主要包括被告人一审程序中的认罪是非自愿的以及一审判决作出后出现影响定罪的新事实、新证据等,量刑问题以及重大程序违法问题。为保障认罪认罚案件被告人上诉权的行使,应当要求被告人上诉向二审法院提出申请、二审法院对被告人的申请应当迅速及时审查;同时,二审法院在审理案件时应当遵循重点审查原则和上诉不加刑原则;采取措施限制检察机关提起"技术性抗诉"。     

Ready or not? A systematic review of case studies using data-driven approaches to detect real-world antitrust violations

Cartels and other anti-competitive behaviour by companies have a tremendously negative impact on the economy and, ultimately, on consumers. To detect such anti-competitive behaviour, competition authorities need reliable tools. Recently, new data-driven approaches have started to emerge in the area of computational antitrust that can complement already established tools, such as leniency programs. Our systematic review of case studies shows how data-driven approaches can be used to detect real-world antitrust violations. Relying on statistical analysis or machine learning, ever more sophisticated methods have been developed and applied to real-world scenarios to identify whether an antitrust infringement has taken place. Our review suggests that the approaches already applied in case studies have become more complex and more sophisticated over time, and may also be transferrable to further types of cases. While computational tools may not yet be ready to take over antitrust enforcement, they are ready to be employed more fully.     

Why Retributivists Should Endorse Leniency in Punishment

This paper develops a retributivist argument for leniency in punishment. It argues that even retributivists who defend desert-based punishment have a reason, internal to their view, to prefer more lenient over more severe punishments when there are doubts concerning how much punishment an offender deserves. This is because retributivists should take an asymmetrical view to underpunishment and overpunishment, and because the likelihood of overpunishment goes up with the severity of punishment. The radicalness of the ensuing leniency depends on the strength of the asymmetry in value between underpunishment and overpunishment.