浅议涉外网络名誉侵权案件的管辖权问题

涉外网络名誉侵权行为的实施地不易确定,损害结果地为数众多,传统民事管辖权的规则面临挑战,目前国际上在理论和司法实践中存在着不同的观点和做法。我国立法也没有明确的规定。针对网络名誉侵权行为的特点,网络名誉侵权案件应由侵权行为地法院或被告住所地法院管辖,侵权行为地包括实施被诉侵权行为的网络服务器、计算机终端等设备所在地和受害人受损害的结果地,损害结果地是指诽谤言论的传播地,同时又是原告的住所地或居所地或工商营业所所在地或法人的营业地,如果侵权行为地和损害结果地不一致,由原告选择管辖法院。     

Homosexuality as Defamation: A Proposal for the Use of the “Right-Thinking Minds” Approach in the Development of Modern Jurisprudence

False imputations of homosexuality have long been considered by courts to be defamatory per se, but many jurisdictions are beginning to revisit the issues surrounding homosexuality and defamation in the wake of a national debate over gay rights. This article examines whether courts should abandon false imputations of homosexuality as per se defamation and concludes that, at a minimum such statements should no longer be defamatory per se and further provides courts with a framework to go a step further and hold that such statements hold no defamatory meaning.     

From gatekeepers to publishers: Liability of internet intermediaries in India for hosting defamatory content

This article aims to analyse the liability of Internet intermediaries in India for hosting defamatory content. In the absence of any statutory law relating to online defamation, the courts in India have had to rely upon comparable developments in the United Kingdom to define the contours of liability of the intermediaries for facilitating the publication of defamatory content on the Internet. However, affixing liability on intermediaries in the absence of similar statutory immunities provided to them under the UK law may prove prejudicial to the intermediaries. Therefore, this article argues that India should enact a comprehensive law to statutorily limit the grounds on which liability may be imposed on Internet intermediaries for hosting online defamatory content. This article further argues that India should adopt and codify the ‘notice and notice plus’ approach to intermediary liability as it ensures that intermediaries are not held liable as publishers for hosting the defamatory content, but in the meantime are also encouraged to take active steps to ensure effective justice to the victims of online defamation.     

The Reader of Defamatory Texts

In many, especially English, defamation cases,the court often speaks of ``the average reader',``the reasonable reader' or similar concepts,which does not refer to any flesh-and-bloodreader of the defamatory text, but is a type ofconstruct of what the court thinks would be thenormal reaction of a person to an allegedlydefamatory text. This concept is compared to asimilar phenomenon found in literary theory inthe persona of the implied reader, created bythe (implied) author as having a given set ofvalues which will lead to an appreciativeinterpretation of the literary work. The papercompares the parallel concepts in the twofields.     

Defamation in cyberspace: A Japanese perspective

The aim of this paper is two-fold: first, to introduce how Japanese law and its jurisprudence have dealt with the case of on-line defamation, which is arguably one of the most acute problems in modern society, and second, to critically examine the efficacy of such an approach. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in on-line defamation (as oppose to off-line defamation) will be introduced as an exemplar of the way Japanese law and its jurisprudence have dealt with such an acute problem. A first step will be to provide, by way of background, a brief overview of how defamation in a conventional sense has been treated by the Japanese legal system. The second step will be to outline how the Japanese jurisdiction has dealt with on-line defamation, that is to say, to what extent the Japanese court regulates on-line defamatory comments made by the ordinary people. A third step will be to examine the efficacy of such an approach, and the final step will be to examine whether the UK court can learn a lesson from the Japanese jurisdiction. The author will draw upon Japanese jurisprudence, in order to consider whether a valuable lesson might be offered to the UK jurisdiction.     

“Error But Without Malice” in Defamation of Public Officials: The Value of Free Expression in International Human Rights Law

Government officials in various parts of the world use defamation to silence critics, but defamation liability may curtail freedom of expression on topics of public interest and undermine human rights generally. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees freedom of expression unless a state can show need to protect individual reputation and acts proportionally. In its adjudication of complaints for violations of Article 19, and in its General Comment 34, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has crafted the principle that defamation liability may not be imposed if an erroneous statement about a public official was made in “error but without malice.” Although soft law, General Comment 34 represents the committee's most compelling articulation of the values animating freedom of expression in international human rights law, and chief among the values is the role played by free expression to promote realization of all human rights.     

Winners and losers and Why: A Study of Defamation litigation

This article summarizes the results of a study of 534 reported defamation cases decided over a period beginning in 1976 and ending just before the Hutchinson and Wolston decisions of mid-1979. A major aspect of the study was the comparison of media and nonmedia defamation cases, which appear quite different. Each case was studied to identify, among other things, the plaintiff and the defendant, the statement that provoked the suit, the context of that statement, the role of state and federal law in resolving the case, and the procedural stages at which each case was resolved. A follow-up study to identify changes since Hutchinson and Wolston is in progress.     

The online defamation maze: are we finding a way out?

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the efficacy of the first decision that explored online defamation (as opposed to offline defamation) delivered by the Supreme Court of Japan. A discussion of the future implications of the case is then undertaken. The paper supports the First Instance (the Tokyo District Court) decision and its approach, and argues that such an approach might have provided greater implications for the future. The author also argues that the Tokyo District Court seems to have taken a more reflective view on the fluidity of online defamation and the nature of the online environment, and shows a degree of willingness to accept and incorporate such a nature. The author concludes that the Tokyo District Court's approach, although it could be seen as rather radical and extreme, seems to be more persuasive than that of the Supreme Court. It also submits that the court might have brought a more balanced and healthy outcome for the beneficiaries, including not only the claimants, the defendants, but also society as a whole. It is the case that innocent internet users can potentially be both the passive and active recipients of the information (i.e. comments posted on webpage). Before a detailed analysis and examination of the case is undertaken, a brief outline of how Japanese law and its jurisprudence have dealt with the traditional form of defamation (i.e. offline defamation) is provided as background.     

过错与抗辩：以名誉权侵权为重点

不法性不应作为一般侵权行为的构成要件,而应由过错要件吸收。过错本质上为主观范畴,但其衡量标准可以客观化。言论自由与名誉权同属宪法规定的基本权,法律应慎重处理二者冲突的情形。名誉权侵权中应区分不同的行为人主体和被报道对象而作具体分析。其中,过错具有独特含义:就故意而言,应指言论发表人对该言论的虚假性明知或对其真假完全的漠不关心;就过失而言,应指言论发表人未尽一般理性人的注意义务。行为人享有除真实性抗辩外的多种无过错抗辩。     

Necessity, Moral Liability, and Defensive Harm

A person who is liable to defensive harm has forfeited his rights against the imposition of the harm, and so is not wronged if that harm is imposed. A number of philosophers, most notably Jeff McMahan, argue for an instrumental account of liability, whereby a person is liable to defensive harm when he is either morally or culpably responsible for an unjust threat of harm to others, and when the imposition of defensive harm is necessary to avert the threatened unjust harm. Others may favour a purely noninstrumental account of liability: one that looks only to the past behaviour of the potentially liable person. We argue that both views are vulnerable to serious objections. Instead we develop and defend a new view of liability to defensive harm: the pluralist account. The pluralist account states that liability to defensive harm has at least two bases. First, if an attacker is morally or culpably responsible for an unjust attack then he has forfeited what we call his agency right, and in doing so he has made himself partially liable to defensive harm. Whether the attacker is fully liable to defensive harm depends, however, on whether the imposition of defensive harm would infringe a different right held by the attacker: his humanitarian right. Humanitarian rights are rights to be provided with urgently needed resources or to be protected from serious harms when others can do so at reasonably low cost. We argue the pluralist account avoids the objections to which the instrumental and noninstrumental views are vulnerable, coheres with our intuitive reactions in a wide range of cases, and sheds new light on the way different rights combine to determine a person??s liability to suffer harm.     

Hegel and Hobbes on Institutions and Collective Actions

Abstract. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is usually, and rightly, considered the foremost representative of the organistic conception of society. It is only natural to think that his view has nothing in common with the kind of individualistic outlook that dominates our legal and political thinking, and that I myself have tried to defend. I try to show why certain insights of Hegel are potentially important even for individualistic legal and political theories. First, I explicate some of the problems he struggled with, and compare his views with those of Thomas Hobbes. Next, I try to link his views to the modern theories of institutions and of collective action. The antidemocratic ideology expressed in the main works of Hobbes and Hegel is clearly outmoded. Nevertheless, in their criticism of popular sovereignty, they posed some important questions. First, how do collectives like the People exist? Second, what do we mean by saying that collectives perform actions? It seems that, in order to perform an action, an entity ought to possess will. But what does it mean that a collective has a will?     

论互联网时代诽谤罪的公诉范围

我国刑法对诽谤罪采取自诉为主、公诉为补充的双轨制模式。由于刑法但书“严重危害社会秩序和国家利益”的公诉依据具有模糊性,同时司法解释本身缺乏解释力和可操作性,存在同义解释、近义解释等问题,加剧了公诉诽谤罪和其他罪名之间的冲突和竞合,特别是当被害人为地方领导干部时,诽谤罪的公诉权在实务中存在被滥用风险,部分限制公诉权的要件在实务中被淡化甚至忽略。从相对狭义的角度看,“严重危害社会秩序和国家利益”只有在行为人对侵犯个体法益具备主观故意,但对侵犯社会法益或国家法益不具备主观故意(或无法证明其具备故意)的情形下,才有其独特的法律适用价值并不与刑法其他罪名相冲突。为妥善处理和平衡诽谤犯罪中惩治犯罪和保障人权的关系,适应互联网时代的内外部变化,建议通过修改我国刑法,将诽谤罪区分为情节不严重、情节严重、情节特别严重的三种形态,为充分保障宪法权利,情节不严重的不作为犯罪处罚;为充分保障自诉权,情节严重的为绝对告诉乃论;为依法惩治犯罪,对符合特定形式要件和实质要件,情节特别严重的诽谤犯罪可以依法公诉,以维护网络信息秩序。     

Representation and Waldron's Objection to Judicial Review

Jeremy Waldron objects to judicial review of legislation onthe ground that it effectively accords the views of a few judges‘superior voting weight’ to those of ordinary citizens.This objection overlooks that representative government doesthe same. This article explores the concept of political representationand argues that delegates may be institutionally bound to heedthe convictions of their constituents, but they are not theirproxies. Rather, they are best viewed as their trustees. Theyought to decide according to what they think is in their constituents’interest. In this sense, a strong element of independent judgmentis involved in their institutional role. So, if we have no problemwith assigning their views superior voting weight, it shouldnot be thought particularly objectionable to give judges thesame power. What is more, once we acknowledge the independencethey enjoy, the question arises whether and by what institutionalmeans we ought to constrain and check their power. The judiciaryis well suited effectively to carry out this supervisory function,because it is immune from political pressure by the legislaturethat would reduce it to its instrument. Hence, in some casesthe institution of judicial review is morally justified.     

雾里看花:自然人破产之争

是否规定自然人破产,是破产立法过程中争论的一个焦点问题.支持论的各种观点缺乏社会性关注,带有很大程度的臆断性;批判论的分析思路值得肯定但缺乏充分性.自然人具有破产能力属于一个自然法则,但这并不意味着我国现阶段有必要选择自然人制度.是否引进,是一个社会政策性的而不是一个法律技术性的问题.就目前社会经济文化法制条件看,我国还不适宜规定自然人破产特别是消费者破产制度.     

Forfeiture Theory and Symmetrical Attackers

This article defends the following thesis: The Problem of Symmetrical Attackers does not falsify forfeiture theory. The theory asserts that except in the case where violence is necessary to avoid a catastrophe, only those who forfeit their rights are liable for defensive violence. The problem arises from the following sort of case, the Symmetrical Attacker Case, in which Al and Bob are doppelgangers. They both mistakenly but justifiably think that the other is about to attack them. They both respond with violence that is necessary and that they think is necessary to prevent the attack. The problem is that one person forfeits his right if and only if the second does not and that it appears to be impossible for both or neither to forfeit. The article argues that the forfeiture theory is not falsified by this problem because the problem is equally damaging to every plausible theory of permissible defensive violence.     

英国2013诽谤法对ISP的最新规定及对我国的启示

2013年英国颁布了诽谤法修正案,其第5条对ISP进行了有针对性的立法,以ISP是否对发布的内容有影响或控制为标准,将ISP分为两类,并适用不同的责任构成,将通知即删除原则成文化,同时制定了明确的适用的规则。其总体方向是在坚持传统的基础上,确保法律与时俱进并且适用;在平衡言论自由与名誉权的基础上,寻求在最大程度上保护ISP而不是承担责任。英国2013诽谤法使我们从现实合理性方面审视我国网络诽谤立法及ISP现状,据此提出《侵权责任法》第36条第3款的修改意见及我国将来的网络诽谤立法或司法适用的一些基本原则。     

Motion to strike claim dismissed in HIV defamation suit

On 23 April 2001, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice issued the first Canadian ruling on the issue of whether words inputing that a person is HIV-positive or has AIDS can be the basis of a defamation action per se, in the case of Serdar v Metroland Printing, Publishing and Distributing Ltd.     

量刑规范化与法官量刑自由裁量权的衡平

法官量刑自由裁量权的存在对量刑规范化的实现是必不可少的.在我国目前情况下,我们对法官量刑自由裁量权的存在应持有限度的认可的态度,不提倡法官量刑自由裁量权的过度行使.可以考虑从量刑理由的阐述、量刑基准点的确立和量刑刑事判例的角度对法官量刑自由裁量权的行使进行制约.     

从善意取得和表见代理制度谈另一种法律思维方式

关于善意取得的性质,有原始取得和继受取得之争。因为继受取得是基于他人既存的权利而取得物权,而善意取得中处分人欠缺处分权,以至处分人当然不享有物权,因而原始取得说成为通说。但是,原始取得说强调的是事实上是否有处分权,而笔者认为,不妨直接由第三人的视角定性善意取得为继受取得,补足处分权,因为是否存在处分权这一事实一开始对于第三人而言就是不存在的,是事后才了解的,而事后的了解是没有即时的法律意义的。本文以定性善意取得为起点,结合表见代理,对传统上纯粹由事实层面分析问题的思路提出质疑,并提出从另一个角度来思考问题的模式。