David Dyzenhaus and the Holy Grail

Abstract
In his book Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems David Dyzenhaus aims to provide a cogent refutation of legal positivism, and thus to settle a very old dispute in jurisprudence. His claim is that the consequences for practice and for morality if judges adopt positivist ideas in a wicked legal system are unacceptable. He discusses the South African legal system as a case in point. I argue that this claim is not secured. Dyzenhaus has three arguments for his view. The first is that positivism cannot account for legal principles, and legal principles are the key source of morally acceptable adjudication. I show that his argument does not go through for sophisticated positivist accounts of "principles" such as those of J. Raz and D. N. MacCormick. Dyzenhaus's second argument claims to find a pragmatic contradiction in positivism, between the belief in judicial discretion and the belief in a commitment to legislative sources as binding fact. I argue that there is no such commitment in a form that supports Dyzenhaus's theory. His final argument is that wicked legal systems are contrary to the very idea of law and legality. I argue that a strong doctrine of deference to legislative authority cannot be bad in itself: It can only be bad relative to a certain content to legislation. Thus Dyzenhaus's claim begs the question against positivism.     

Dialogue with Dictators: Judicial Resistance in Argentina and Brazil

Throughout the world, judges are often asked to implement the repressive measures of authoritarian rulers. Which conception of legal interpretation and judicial role, if any, make judges more likely to resist such pressures? That question, central to Anglo-American jurisprudence since the Hart-Fuller debate, is addressed by examining recent military rule in Argentina and Brazil. In Argentina, judges were sympathetic to military rule and so criticized its “excesses” in the jurisprudential terms favored by the juntas: positivism and legal realism. Brazilian judges, by contrast, were largely unsympathetic to military rule, and so couched their criticism in terms of natural law, in order to raise larger questions and reach a broader public. Empirical study of the cases and conceptual analysis of existing theories both reveal that no view of legal interpretation inherently disposes its adherents to either accept or repudiate repressive law. Contingent political circtrmstances—the rulers’favored form of legal rhetoric, and the degree to which judges accept the need for a period of extra-constitutional rule—determine which legal theory fosters most resistance. But since most authoritarian rulers nominally affirm their constitutional predecessors’positive law and are often unwilling to codify publicly their most repressive policies, strict literalism usually offers the most congenial idiom for judicial resistance to such regimes.     

The Various Relations between Law and Morality in Contemporary Legal Philosophy

This paper is intended to be a summary of the author's views on the relationship between law and morality worked out over the past three decades in jurisprudence. The paper preliminarily clarifies the matter by isolating some lines of cleavage separating different questions askable about this relationship. With this done, the author argues for two theses. One, that judges are obligated to use morality in their decisions in particular cases; and two, that the morality judges are obligated to use in their judicial reasonings, is best seen as the natural lawyer sees it, namely, as being part of the law that obligates judges in their role as judges. The author not only believes these theses to be true; he also thinks that these theses are practically important, in that their acceptance by judges (and by the legal culture that reinforces judges) makes for better judging.     

浅析法律论证理论视域中的民事诉讼理论——以阿列克西理论为切入点的分析

籍由阿列克西"实践正确性的程序理论",程序理念的进化和程序性的技术客观上有助于个案评价的理性辨别、判断和选择,并能够对判决的形成过程施加理性的控制。因此在法律论证理论的视域中,通过对我国民事诉讼理论、程序架构、以及具体程序运作的分析,尝试为程序取向的判决正当化机制提供新的解释路径。     

On the Frontlines: Making Decisions in Chinese Civil Environmental Lawsuits

This article looks at forty-two decisions in civil pollution cases in China as a window onto judges' political logic and the accompanying implications for environmental enforcement. The starting point is a typology of judicial decision making in one-party states based on two dimensions of decisions: the degree of legal formality (e.g., how closely judges adhere to the letter of the law) and individual autonomy (e.g., judges' power to make decisions in individual cases). Mapping pollution decisions onto this typology highlights shifting judicial strategy. While Chinese judges typically comply with instructions when the political pressure is dialed up, a combination of shifting incentives, uncertainty about the law, and political ambiguity can also allow de facto discretion in low-profile, run-of-the-mill cases. Everyday cases tend to cluster under the rubric of "rough justice" in which judges weigh competing political priorities and aim for a livable compromise that dents but upholds the status quo. This sample of cases also shows judges occasionally innovating at the margins by offering new legal interpretations or validating new types of claims. Although Chinese courts remain weak tools for environmental protection, limited innovation suggests that they can help nudge along local incremental social change.     

法律原则适用与程序制度保障——以民事法为中心的分析

法律原则因为没有明确、具体的事实构成要件和法律效果而无法像法律规则那样为当事人提供行为准则,为法官提供裁判根据。适用法律原则处理个案纠纷就是法官以自己所“造”之法进行司法裁判,其适用困境的实质在于,以立法机关制定的(成文)法律规则为中心运行的司法制度(尤其是司法程序)难以为法官行使自由裁量权提供有效的正当性论证。在实体法、法律适用技术的范围内,以构建适用条件、适用规则,完善适用方法等方式来破解此困境,作用极为有限。重构司法程序制度,使当事人、社会能够以恰当的方式参与到具体的裁判过程以制约法官的裁量权,或许是解决此难题的可能途径。     

权利冲突的司法化解

法定权利之间的冲突并非一个伪命题,其在司法实践中颇为常见。受到立法者的有限理性、社会的变动性以及法律语言的模糊性等多重因素的影响,某些情形下权利的边界未被立法者清晰界定,并由此引发法定权利之间的冲突。权利冲突的实质是利益冲突和价值冲突。权利冲突的存在导致了法律适用的难题,法官需要借助个案中的法益衡量来确定权利边界并进而化解权利冲突。法官在进行法益衡量时,可以参考权利位阶来作出判断,然而权利位阶秩序缺乏整体确定性,仅有有限的参考价值,因此法益衡量还需诉诸比例原则。比例原则包括适当性原则、必要性原则和狭义的比例原则三项子原则。比例原则能够指引法官对权利作客观和理性的衡量,最大限度地缩小法官的裁量余地。鉴于个案中的法益衡量具有决策性质,法官必须在司法能动主义与司法克制主义之间维持恰当的平衡,在解决权利冲突时不能逾越司法的限度。     

The Legitimacy of Law: A Response to Critics*

Abstract
In this paper, the author responds to the claim that his critique of legal positivism, based on an account of adjudication in South Ahica, misses its target because it ignores, first, the positivist thesis of judicial discretion and, secondly, the fact that positivism offers no account of judicial obligation. He argues that these theses expose a tension in positivism between its commitments to liberal individualism and to the supremacy of positive law, a tension which can be resolved only by situating positivism in its true context, the Hobbesian argument for the legitimacy of law. Following Dworkin, he advocates the practice-oriented common law tradition, one that makes the legitimacy of law a matter of standards already implicit in law which are best revealed in adjudication.     

Judges as satisficers: a law and economics perspective on judicial liability

If judges are guardians of the law, who is to protect the individual member of society from the occasional corrupt, malicious, or reckless judge? The aim of this paper is to provide an answer to the last part of this question, focusing more heavily on cases of negligently inflicted harm. Departing from Simon’s bounded rationality and influenced by other constructs in behavioral law and economics, we view judges as satisficers who make decisions within real-world constraints, such as imperfect information and uncertainty, cognitive limitations and erroneous information. Judges are limited by the commonly observed barriers to the decision making process. Because their goal is not to optimize but to render opinions that are merely satisfactory, they often act as poor agents of their principals’ interests. In this light, it becomes clearer why judges tend to engage in behavior that is “improper”, especially under the circumstances of the currently overloaded judicial caseloads. We first address the differences in judges’ roles in Anglo-American and Continental legal systems. We then present our simple model for judicial misbehavior based on an understanding of judges as “satisficers”. Next we discuss the particularities of judicial errors and introduce a realistic and viable construct of “inexcusable judicial error”. On this basis we evaluate the impact of various incentive schemes on judicial behavior, focusing on the civil liability of judges. We conclude that civil liability for grave judicial errors is the most adequate remedy.     

The Impact of Judicial Opinion Language on the Transmission of Federal Circuit Court Precedents

Why do some federal circuit court precedents transmit across circuits when others do not? Does judicial opinion language influence which cases are more likely to transmit? Previous research on the transmission of precedents has focused primarily on attributes of the circuits or judges who wrote the decisions, without considering whether opinion language also influences citations. This study hypothesizes that precedents are more likely to transmit to other circuits when judges communicate their importance using features of opinion language such as the legal grounding, the amount of supporting evidence, and the decision to file a per curiam opinion. The results indicate that opinion language does influence the transmission of precedents, which suggests that judges who care about policy and are willing to take affirmative steps to encourage citations can use opinion language to enhance their impact.     

法律语言的模糊性及准确运用

根据传统的范畴理论,法律表达应符合准确性这一基本要求,故追求准确为立法语言和司法语言的目标之一。但是,由于对事物的界定模糊不清以及人类的认知能力有限,法律语言尤其是立法语言中常使用模糊词语,有助于增强语言表达的效率及保护当事人权利,但也会带来诸如过分扩大法官自由裁量权等不利后果。对于法律语言的模糊性,可借助内外部指导、司法判决以及相关语境而使之明确化,从而有效地限制法官的自由裁量权过分膨胀。     

Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution

It is common in the legal academy to describe judicial decisiontrends leading to new common law rules as resulting from consciousjudicial effort. Evolutionary models of litigation, in contrast,treat common law as resulting from pressure applied by litigants.One apparent difficulty in the theory of litigation is explaininghow trends in judicial decisions favoring one litigant, andbiasing the legal standard, could occur. This article presentsa model in which an apparent bias in the legal standard canoccur in the absence of any effort toward this end on the partof judges. Trends can develop favoring the better-informed litigantwhose case is also meritorious. Although the model does notsuggest an unambiguous trend toward efficient legal rules, itdoes show how private information from litigants becomes embodiedin common law, an important part of the theory of efficientlegal rules.     

法律的不确定性与法治的可能性

法律的不确定性并不意味着法律合法性的丧失和法治理想破灭。法律体系必然包括不确定的法律。法律不确定性与法律的客观性是相容的。主流法律理论并不必然坚持法律的确定性立场,但是必然坚持法律的客观性立场。法治理念的经典阐述者富勒、拉兹和菲尼斯都强调法律的明确性、可预测性和稳定性。他们都没有把法律的确定性列为法治的要件。法律的不确定性意味着法官在疑难案件中需要行使自由裁量权并创制新的法律。只要不确定的司法判决具有合法性、客观性和可预测性,即使法律是不确定的,法治理想的实现也是可能的。     

Judges Taken Too Seriously: Professor Dworkin's Views on Jurisprudence*

Abstract. The author analyses Ronald Dworkin's ideas about legal theory and legal philosophy, with particular regard to metatheoretical and methodological problems. He focuses on the questions of the function and the object of jurisprudence, and on those of the content and method of argumentation of jurisprudence. According to the author, Dworkin's theory is a normative theory, an ideology referred to the judicial practice. Although judges really make law, one can deny that they do. This strategy is the one judges traditionally employ when they say that they are merely applying the law-giver's intentions or fundamental principles that existed long before the case they have to decide. It is that discourse, not rights, that Dworkin takes seriously.     

Paradoxes of proof and punishment: Psychological pitfalls in judicial decision making

Purpose . This study focuses on two psychological mechanisms that may inadvertently affect judges' decisions on proof of guilt and on punishment. It involves mechanisms that are clearly in conflict with formal judicial doctrine. One hypothesis, the conviction paradox, asserts that, faced with very serious offences, a judge's standard of proof will be lower than for less serious, but otherwise comparable, offences. A second hypothesis, compensatory punishment, asserts that in cases with relatively weak evidence, judges who nevertheless render a guilty verdict will be inclined to compensate their initial doubt on the matter of guilt by meting out a less severe sentence. Method . The hypotheses are evaluated in an experiment with Dutch judges and justices who serve in criminal courts. This was done using fictitious but highly realistic dossiers of criminal cases. Results . Neither of the two hypotheses was supported in the present study. Conclusions . Findings are discussed in relation to their implications for theory development and future research in the area of legal decision making.     

On universal relevance in legal reasoning

The purpose of this essay is to defend a claim that a certain consideration, which I call unworkability, is universally and necessarily relevant to legal reasoning. By that I mean that it is a consideration that must carry legal weight in the justification of some judicial decisions in every legal system in which (1) all disputed matters of law can be adjudicated, and (2) all judicial decisions are to be legally justified. Unworkability's necessary relevance has important implications for a theory of relevance presented by Rolf Sartorius. On this theory, nearly all considerations that are relevant to a judicial decision are supplied by legal principles embedded in the legal rules and decisions, or by extralegal principles dependent, in some way, on the legal principles. (The exceptions to the embedding thesis that Sartorius would, no doubt, recognize are elaborated in the text but can be set aside here.) But there are possible legal systems which do not contain an embedded legal principle concerning unworkability; and nonetheless, unworkability is relevant to judicial reasoning in those systems. Hence, a theory of relevance that relies on principles embedded in the content of rules is too simplistic. Some substantive considerations are relevant for other reasons.     

Movement Litigation and Unilateral Disarmament: Abortion and the Right to Die

Detractors have long criticized the use of courts to achieve social change because judicial victories tend to provoke counterproductive political backlashes. Backlash arguments typically assert or imply that if movement litigators had relied on democratic rather than judicial politics, their policy victories would have been better insulated from opposition. We argue that these accounts wrongly assume that the unilateral decision by a group of movement advocates to eschew litigation will lead to a reduced role for courts in resolving the relevant policy and political conflicts. To the contrary, such decisions will often result in a policy field with judges every bit as active, but with the legal challenges initiated and framed by the advocates' opponents. We document this claim and explore its implications for constitutional politics via a counterfactual thought experiment rooted in historical case studies of litigation involving abortion and the right to die.     

Definitions of the Family as an Impetus for Legal Change in Custody Decision Making: Suggestions from an Empirical Case Study

Legal scholars and social scientists are increasingly calling on legislators, lawyers, and judges to recognize and embrace expanding definitions of the family. Implicit in such calls is the expectation that legal recognition of expanding definitions of the family will protect children's attachment relationships with adults, irrespective of their biological ties to those adults. Through a detailed, historical examination of custody decisions in disputes between biological and nonbiological parents in the state of Iowa, this research suggests that judicial recognition of more expansive definitions may not result in decisions that protect children's attachment relationships. This is true because the legal impact of family definitions appears to be contingent upon cultural and political factors that may undermine the expected effects of changing definitions. This research also suggests that judicial recognition of children's rights may be the most apt way to promote legal changes that will protect children's attachment relationships.     

Identifying the determinants of aggregate judicial performance: taxpayers’ money well spent?

There have been a sizeable number of studies trying to identify the determinants of judicial performance on the country level. Such a design is appropriate to identify underperforming individual judges or underperforming courts or court districts. However, it is not appropriate to identify institutions conducive to judicial performance. A dataset produced by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice contains very detailed information on the judicial systems of the 47 member countries of the Council of Europe. Drawing on robust regressions and using an objective variable, we find that (1) resolution rates are not a function of per capita income. In other words: poor countries can also afford them. (2) Countries belonging to the French legal tradition enjoy relatively lower resolution rates. (3) Resolution rates are negatively—and very robustly—correlated with court budget. As such, a higher budget will not “buy” more court decisions. (4) Resolution rates are never positively correlated with the presence of judicial councils. (5) Mandatory training for judges is correlated with higher resolution rates. Drawing on the subjectively perceived efficiency of the judiciary as the dependent variable we find that (6) countries belonging to both the French and the socialist legal tradition are less efficient and that (7) judicial councils are also negatively correlated with our measure of judicial efficiency, in other words: countries that do not have them should not introduce them.     

Risks of Criminal Victimization in Contemporary Urban China: An Application of Lifestyle/Routine Activities Theory

The philosophical underpinnings of youth courts rest on the notion that youths are less culpable and more reformable than adults. Some scholars argue that, ideally, when sentencing youth crime, judges should engage youthful offenders in moral communication to elicit change. But do they? What more generally do judges say to the youths? This paper analyzes the frequency and content of judicial censure and moral communication in the sentencing of youth sex offenders. Drawing on the sentencing remarks for 55 sexual violence cases, we examine the ways in which judges interact with youths and censure the offenses, and what, if any, normative guidance they give concerning gender, sexuality, and violence. We found that in most but not all cases, the judges censured the offending as both a moral and legal wrong. However, they spent more time discussing a youth’s future than past behavior, as they sought to elicit change. The judges did not degrade or exclude the offenders; rather, they addressed them in a spirit of reintegration, as worthy individuals with future potential. Although the judges set norms of appropriate sexual behavior to the youths when the offense victims were children, they did not always do so when victims were female peers. In this Youth Court, “real rape” was sexual offending by a youth against a child under 12 years of age. By contrast, in about one‐fifth of cases, all of which occurred against a female peer, the offending was censured only as a legal wrong (a “pseudo censure”) and less likely subject to judicial norm setting.