宪法“人格尊严”条款的规范地位之辨

规范地位是指某一条款在基本权利内部乃至宪法规范体系中的效力,取决于该条款在特定宪法秩序中的法律属性。尊严条款因其法理基础、宪法文本表述及宪法解释实践的差异在各国宪法上享有不同的地位,归纳起来可分为宪法原则、基础价值、规定功能的宪法概念。我国宪法第38条人格尊严的哲学基础不同于其他国家的人是目的、人格发展、交往理论,而是着重于个人的名誉与荣誉保护;宪法文本表述并非人的尊严、人性尊严,而是人格尊严,且该条既未规定在总纲中,亦未置于"公民的基本权利和义务"一章之首,即使与"国家尊重与保护人权"一款结合起来阅读,亦无法取得与其它国家宪法上的规范地位。人格尊严在我国宪法上属于独立条款,也是公民的一项基本权利,具有具体的法律内容,在宪法解释过程中可作为规范与特定宪法事实相涵摄,证明公民的人格尊严受到了侵犯。     

作为基本权利的人格尊严及其规范意涵——以“卖淫女示众事件”为例

人格尊严早已入宪,成为中国宪法上的基本权利,但其对政府行为的规制功能远未显现出来。结合深圳"卖淫女示众事件",基于规范法学的立场,通过阐释我国《宪法》第38条的意旨与内涵——作为基本权利的人格尊严(一般人格权)所具有的规范功能,归纳出宪法上人格权保护体系之逻辑结构,即规定"人格尊严(一般人格权)+某些具体人格权"应成为宪法对人格权进行调整的模式,以期对学界在此问题上存在的一些歧见予以澄清。     

Protecting mental health clients' dignity — The importance of legal control

Protecting human beings' dignity is a fundamental value underlying the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as several recommendations and conventions derived from this, among them the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), a declaration that also takes precedence over Norwegian legislation. Still, clients' stories inform us that their dignity is not always protected in the mental health service systems.The aim of the study has been to investigate violations of dignity considered from the clients' points of view, and to suggest actions that may ensure that practice is brought in line with human rights values.The method used has been a qualitative content analysis of 335 client narratives.The conclusion is that mental health clients experience infringements that cannot be explained without reference to their status as clients in a system which, based on judgments from medical experts, has a legitimate right to ignore clients' voices as well as their fundamental human rights. The main focus of this discussion is the role of the ECHR and the European Court of Human Rights as instruments for protecting mental health clients' human rights. To bring about changes, recommendations and practices should be harmonized with the new UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006). Under this convention, the European Court of Human Rights has support for the application of the ECHR without exemptions for special groups of people.     

人权的内核——兼论“以人为本”的宪法涵义

宪法上基本权利的保障有其基础理论和核心内容,西方实证宪法和宪政理论都肯定“人的尊严”构成了人权的内核。人的尊严是人权宪法保障的哲学依据,是人权生长的原点,是对基本权利限制的限制。“国家尊重和保障人权”是一种规范性表述,而非描述性表述,其中蕴含着一定的价值判断,表明“以人为本”已经从实证法形式上升为国家理念,构成了我国宪政制度建构的根本,是借鉴世界其他国家宪政和人权理论与制度的坚固基础。     

Still in Deficit: Rights,Regulation, and Democracy in the EU1

Abstract: Critics of the EU's democratic deficit standardly attribute the problem to either sociocultural reasons, principally the lack of a demos and public sphere, or institutional factors, notably the lack of electoral accountability because of the limited ability of the European Parliament to legislate and control the executive powers of the Commission and the Council of Ministers. Recently two groups of theorists have argued neither deficit need prove problematic. The first group adopts a rights‐based view of democracy and claims that a European consensus on rights, as represented by the Charter of Fundamental European Rights, can offer the basis of citizen allegiance to EU wide democracy, thereby overcoming the demos deficit. The second group adopts a public‐interest view of democracy and argues that so long as delegated authorities enact policies that are ‘for’ the people, then the absence of institutional forms that facilitate democracy ‘by’ the people are likewise unnecessary—indeed, in certain areas they may be positively harmful. This article argues that both views are normatively and empirically flawed. This is because there is no consensus on rights or the public interest apart from the majority view of a demos secured through parliamentary institutions. To the extent that these remain absent at the EU level, a democratic deficit continues to exist.     

The prohibition to abuse one's human rights: A theory

Supporters of communism, national socialism and radical Islamism, but also people who incite racial hatred or deny the Holocaust, see their rights severely curtailed by the abuse clause of Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights. To make sense of this provision, this paper first introduces the distinction between abusable and non‐abusable rights in order to delimit the scope of Article 17. Then, this paper suggests a “test” to spot instances of abuse of human rights by borrowing the concept of performative self‐contradiction from speech act theory. Article 17 is reconceptualised as dealing with conduct that self‐contradictorily uses rights but simultaneously denies their very idea. In this way, it becomes possible to make sense of and to unify the disparate case law that Article 17 has generated so far: it equally targets political human rights abuse, attacking liberal democracy in general; and exclusionary human rights abuse, attacking the rights of other people.     

The General Provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides the Union with a 'more evident' (as the European Council of Cologne asked for) framework of protection of the individuals before the public authorities within the European context, after more than thirty years (since the Stauder Case ) of full confidence in the leading role played by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. This new normative catalogue of fundamental rights (included the so called 'aspirational fundamental rights') implies one more instrument of protection which has to find its own place with regard to the protection afforded by the national Constitutions and the international agreements on human rights, particularly the European Convention on Human Rights, which are already a privileged source of inspiration for Court of Justice of the European Communities. It is the main objective of the General Provisions of the Charter to clarify which is that place and the relationship with those other levels of protection as managed by their supreme interpreters (i.e., the Constitutional—or Supreme—Courts of the Member States of the Union and the European Court of Human Rights).     

德沃金个人主义权利观的论述逻辑及其反思

德沃金的权利理论是一种个人主义权利观,"诠释"与"人性尊严"是其中的两个关键词。"诠释"确定了权利的表现形式,权利表现为一种个体性的诠释实践;"人性尊严"则赋予权利以价值,权利的价值在于它承认与尊重每一个人的内在价值与责任。《认真对待权利》、《法律帝国》与《刺猬正义》这三部著作代表了德沃金权利理论的三个发展阶段,权利的个人主义观念在此过程中得以形成与完善。该权利观虽然极为精致且具有说服力,但并非理解权利的唯一可能路径。     

The treatment of prisoners: International standards and case law

Objective. In some countries questions are asked about the extent to which human rights should be applied to those who have been detained in prison, particularly if they have been convicted of a criminal offence. However, the international human rights treaties and instruments are quite clear that detained persons are entitled to all human rights that are not expressly removed by the fact of their detention. Method. This article describes in detail what these standards are and how they apply to imprisonment. It also considers how these issues have been interpreted judicially by the European Court of Human Rights and the lessons to be learned from its increasing body of case law. Conclusion. All those who are involved in the management of prisons or who deal in any way with prisoners must always bear in mind ‘the inherent dignity of the human person’. This obligation applies particularly to psychologists and others who develop programmes and other activities aimed at influencing the future behaviour of prisoners.     

The Principle of Proportionality: Summary and Consensus in the 6th International Conference on Human Rights Protection Under Pandemic Prevention and Control,Beijing (China) 2020

Against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic and China’s regularized pandemic prevention and control, leading legal scholars from China, North America, and Eurasia participated in The 6th International Conference on Human Rights Protection under Pandemic Prevention and Control. Participants engaged in fruitful discussions on the normative necessity and practical relevance of the principle of proportionality in justifying their current governments’ anti-pandemic measures. Focusing on pandemic-related human rights conditions and rule of law challenges in global contexts, this article summarizes the participating scholars’ speeches through the integrated lens of human rights and the jurisprudence of health law in the COVID-19 containment phase. Speeches can be divided into six topical dimensions, involving normative utility, governance logic, reasonable limits, constitutional criteria, viable approaches, and post-pandemic challenges with respect to the principle of proportionality. To provide a more policy-relevant and theoretically sound framework for a community of common health for mankind, this article succinctly concludes with a series of overlapping consensus on the application of the principle of proportionality in the fight against the pandemic. This consensus, tentatively named the “Renmin Human Rights Consensus,” builds on five interrelated elements and generates five human rights assertions and a series of specific principles of health law.     

Human Dignity as a Form of Life: Notes on Its Foundations and Meaning in Institutional Morality

In normative terms, human dignity usually implies two consequences: (a) human beings cannot be treated in some particular ways due to their condition as humans; and (b) some forms of life do not correspond to the ideal life of our community. This study consists in discussing the meaning of this idea of human dignity in contrast to the concept of humiliation in the context of institutional, i.e. political and legal, rights. Two concepts of human dignity will be discussed. The first absolute/necessary and formal/transcendental concept implies the proposition “because human beings have dignity, the following cluster of rights is valid”. Conversely, the second contingent and material concept corresponds to the thought “for being able to live in dignity, we must respect the following rights”. This paper claims that human dignity should be understood as the right to be protected from humiliation. Humiliation is the situation of incapacity or absence of self-determination.

     

‘Notice and staydown’ and social media: amending Article 13 of the Proposed Directive on Copyright

ABSTRACT

This paper critically assesses the compatibility of content recognition and filtering technology or so-called notice and staydown approach with the right of social network platforms and users to a fair trial, privacy and freedom of expression under Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) (ECHR). The analysis draws on Article 13 of the European Commission’s proposal for a Directive on Copyright, the case-law of the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Court and academic literature. It argues that the adoption of content recognition and filtering technology could pose a threat to social network platforms and user human rights. It considers the compliance of ‘notice and staydown’ with the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) three-part, non-cumulative test, to determine whether a ‘notice and staydown’ approach is, firstly, ‘in accordance with the law’, secondly, pursues one or more legitimate aims included in Article 8(2) and 10(2) ECHR and thirdly, is ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’. It concludes that ‘notice and staydown’ could infringe part one and part three of the ECtHR test as well as the ECtHR principle of equality of arms, thereby violating the rights of social network platforms and users under Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the Convention.     

A Gramscian Approach to Studying the Judicial Decision-Making Process

This paper applies a Gramscian analytical framework to scrutinise the judicial decision-making process. Based on two distinct research projects, the article explores how, on one hand judges in criminal courts can be identified as part of the bureaucratic machinery of the state, as ‘technicians of repression’; whereas, on the other hand, human rights judges can be distinguished as providing ‘moral and intellectual leadership’ in their production and reproduction of certain values. Some of the key questions this article seeks to answer are: What is the role of hegemony in the judicial decision-making process? To what extent are legal actors both ‘technicians of repression’ and ‘moral and intellectual leaders’? This paper uses examples from empirical research conducted at courts in Argentina and at the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights to identify and explore this dual role of judges as both repressive technicians and moral and intellectual leaders in neo-liberal capitalist societies.     

The Child in European Human Rights Law

This article examines the category of ‘the child’ in European human rights law, based on an analysis of the child‐related jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. It argues that a full account of legal selfhood is constructed through the notion of ‘the child’ in this jurisprudence. The two notions – of ‘the child’ and ‘the self’ – are, from the outset, mutually dependent. The conceptualisation of ‘the child’ in human rights law is underpinned by an account of the self as originating in another and childhood is cast as enabling self‐understanding by making possible the formation of a narrative about the self. The vision of ‘the self’ that emerges is one of ‘the narrative self’, and I assess the implications of this both for the idea of childhood in which this narrative originates and for the vision of the human condition that is expressed in European human rights law more broadly.     

Taking fundamental rights seriously in the Digital Services Act's platform liability regime

This article highlights how the EU fundamental rights framework should inform the liability regime of platforms foreseen in secondary EU law, in particular with regard to the reform of the E-commerce directive by the Digital Services Act. In order to identify all possible tensions between the liability regime of platforms on the one hand, and fundamental rights on the other hand, and in order to contribute to a well-balanced and proportionate European legal instrument, this article addresses these potential conflicts from the standpoint of users (those who share content and those who access it), platforms, regulators and other stakeholders involved. Section 2 delves into the intricate landscape of online intermediary liability, interrogating how the E-Commerce Directive and the emerging Digital Services Act grapple with the delicate equilibrium between shielding intermediaries and upholding the competing rights of other stakeholders. The article then navigates in Section 3 the fraught terrain of fundamental rights as articulated by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) under the aegis of the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter. This section poses an urgent inquiry: can the DSA's foundational principles reconcile these legal frameworks in a manner that fuels democracy rather than stifles it through inadvertent censorship? Section 4 then delves into the intricate relationship between fundamental rights and the DSA reform. This section conducts a comprehensive analysis of the key provisions of the DSA, emphasising how they underscore the importance of fundamental rights. In addition to mapping out the strengths of the framework the section also identifies existing limitations within the DSA and suggests potential pathways for further refinement and improvement. This article concludes by outlining key avenues for achieving a balanced and fundamental rights-compliant regulatory framework for platform liability within the EU.     

Pre-Trial Defence Rights and the Fair Use of Eyewitness Identification Procedures

This paper sets out the normative basis of a claim to procedural rights concerning the fair use of eyewitness identification procedures. It is argued that there are two aspects to suspects' procedural rights. The first aims to secure an opportunity for the suspect to participate in procedures where doing so might result in exculpatory evidence (a participatory right). The second is the state's obligation to take reasonable measures to prevent wrongful conviction on the basis of mistaken identification by providing the suspect with a satisfactory degree of procedural accuracy (a protective right). This normative analysis provides the basis of a claim that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides a suspect with similar rights. The final part of the paper considers whether domestic procedure is compatible with these putative rights, and whether it could be said to provide an effective remedy if they were to be breached.     

Citizenship and Unauthorised Migration: a Dialectical Relationship

The relationship between citizenship and immigration law is often conceived as a conceptual dichotomy in which the former functions as the rhetorical domain of inclusion while immigration law does the dirty work of detention, deportation and snooping into peoples’ lives in order to uphold the inclusive values of the internal domain. States however employ a variety of practices of immigration control that infringe citizens’ rights and produce lasting dilatory effects on citizenship itself. Focusing on two specific case studies – racial profiling in identity checks carried out for immigration purposes and the standards of interpretation developed by the European Court of Human Rights in regard to the right to family life in expulsion cases – this article argues that current practices of immigration control result in a transformation of citizenship along racialised lines, which hollows citizenship's normative core of equality and liberty.     

论欧洲人权机构对人身自由与安全权的保护

人身自由与安全权是一项重要的基本人权,同时也是实现其他权利的基础.作为<世界人权宣言>发表后诞生的第一个区域性人权保护组织,欧洲人权机构通过其丰富的判例对"人身自由"与"人身安全"内涵作出界定,确立了人身自由与安全权保护的一系列标准,并注重对被依法剥夺人身自由者所享有的权利的保护,但是,欧洲人权机构在保护人身自由与安全权方面存在人权委员会与人权法院对个案的决定相互矛盾的问题,欧洲人权法院对个别案件作出的判决也存在对公约的规定适用不当和对该项权利保护乏力的问题.     

Inhuman and Degrading Punishment,Dignity, and the Limits of Retribution

The recent judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Vinter and others v United Kingdom provides a much needed clarification of the parameters of the prohibition on inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as it applies to whole life orders of imprisonment under mandatory life sentences – essentially, life imprisonment without parole. The Grand Chamber's judgment refines Strasbourg doctrine on life imprisonment and the prospect of release and illuminates key principles concerning inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the ECHR. This article considers the judgment's profound significance in relation to both human rights and penology.     

An Equality and Human Rights Commission Worthy of the Name

The Human Rights Act 1998 came fully into force on 2 October 2000, enabling the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to be relied on directly in our domestic courts.¹ The Act lacked provision for a Human Rights Commission to advise and assist alleged victims in bringing proceedings for breaches of Convention rights, to research, intervene in court proceedings, and promote a culture of human rights, although such a Commission had been created for Northern Ireland. A White Paper has now been issued outlining plans for a Commission for Equality and Human Rights. This paper considers the future role and potential impact of the Commission and highlights opportunities that have been missed since October 2000 in its absence. We focus on its human rights aspects and summarize key conditions for the new Commission's success.