村庄体制内精英的策略选择

1998年颁布的《村民委员会组织法》规定,村民委员会是自治组织,而在实际运作中却受到国家权力强有力的制约,导致了法律赋予的理想角色与现实扮演的角色的模糊冲突,为村庄体制内精英提供了一个自由政治空间。本文提出政治自由空间概念,运用动机—行为—结果的分析方法分析体制内精英的五种策略选择及其相应的结果,并且对于如何压缩自由政治空间提出了对策。     

村庄精英权力再生产:动力、策略及其效应

村庄精英的权力再生产问题是观察与理解中国村庄治理的一个重要视角。村庄精英的权力再生产行为具有三重动力,即客观环境的机遇与压力、利益驱动的"理性人"特征、权力自身维持与强化的本能。村庄精英权力再生产的策略选择比较复杂,可以从村庄体制内精英与村庄体制外精英的两个角度进行分析。村庄精英的权力再生产对于村庄权力结构、村民自治制度与村庄秩序构建,都具有一定的影响效应。     

直选历练之后的村委会选举研究——以江西省T县20个村为例

在经历了直选的历练后,按理村庄社会对村委会选举的积极性应该更高了,但是,现实情况却相反,不少村庄的第二次选举却不如第一次了,而且这种现象具有一定的普遍性,究其原因,主要有两个方面:一是民选村官的村庄治理欠佳影响了村庄社会的选举态度,二是乡镇政府对选举的指导和监督方面比第一次更不足了。     

论精英治理及其终结

人类的社会治理现象一直表现为一种精英治理的状况.自然精英的治理属于人类最古老的治理;在整个农业社会的历史阶段基本上是由身份精英担负着社会治理的使命.在近代以来的工业社会中,自然精英与身份精英都退出了历史舞台,取而代之的是技术专家群体担负起了社会治理的任务,他们属于技术精英.技术精英的出现是社会治理专门化、科学化和技术化的产物.技术精英是在官僚制组织结构中开展其社会治理活动的,他们治理社会的依据是一种系统化了的而又分门别类的规则体系.现在,人类社会正处在一个历史性的转型过程中,治理者与被治理者之间的界线正在消融,一种合作治理的局面正在出现,它将意味着人类最终结束精英治理的历史,只有这时,真正民主的社会才会到来.     

实证分析:制度认同与程序歧见的交织

人民代表大会制度是我国人民实现在国家政治生活中当家做主的根本政治制度,选举人大代表既是人民代表大会制度的重要构成内容,也是人民代表大会制度运行的基础性程序和环节.然而,从我们的实际调查情况来看①,人们对我国人大代表选举制度的认同存在一定分歧,对选举活动的参加也不够积极.针对问题的原因,亟待进一步完善选举制度.     

从选举争讼看民主发展

选举的自由与公正是民主发展的基石.近年来,随着世界各国选举活动的日益频繁,各种各样的选举争讼也接踵而至.各国的选举争讼解决机制虽形式各异,但在保障民主政治的良性运转方面却殊途同归.选举争讼从表面上看似乎是民主发展的不和谐音符,实质上却折射出一国的政治生态与法治状况.与西方国家相比,我国的选举争讼解决机制尚有很大欠缺,其完善与健全的问题也越来越紧迫.     

乡村治理视域下村选举机制障碍及对策探讨

村选举与农民的政治、经济利益息息相关,对于促进农村地方经济社会发展和民主政治建设具有重要意义。其中凸显出的问题恰恰是中国社会主义民主进程中最迫切需要解决的问题。文章通过对中部地区J省若干村选举的个案考察,认为村级选举中表现出两种障碍性因素值得关注:一是内在的投票惯性心理促发的村民理性投票的实践困难;二是外在的体制惰性形成的利益共同体阻碍了村庄精英的正常循环,从而使得村级选举缺乏必要的开放性和包容性。当前应该从民主政治理念的引导、民主政治实践的规范化与公开化、农村公共领域的培育等几个方面,着力促进村级选举和农村民主政治的良性发展。     

福建省村委会选举的问题及对策

民主选举是村民自治的前提和基础。村委会选举作为我国最大的基层民主选举,开创了我国民主选举的先河。继续做好村委会选举的对策:(1)加大普法力度,提高村民民主与法制意识;(2)大力发展农村经济,增加农民收入,减少农民因谋取眼前利益而参选的行为;(3)健全和完善村民委员会选举的法律法规,保障村委会选举有法可依;(4)加大对选举的监督力度,使选举更加透明化;(5)实行公开演讲制度,避免村民投票的盲目性。     

支配与依附:村庄主从权力结构研究——基于村庄精英角色的分析

村庄精英与村庄权力结构一直是农村研究的热点。以往研究认为,后公社制度导致体制外精英的再次出现,并与体制内精英竞争权力,从而在整体上形成村庄二元权力结构。苏北L村庄案例显示,随着市场化的深入和政府政策的变化,村庄精英组织人特征趋于弱化,自利人特征趋于强化,他们从自我利益出发建立了精英利益网络,并以核心者为中心构成主从二元结构。村民的原子化和村庄关系的日益疏离是这一权力结构运行的条件。根据村庄经济结构和宗族现状的不同,又可将主从二元结构模式分为行政主导型和操纵型两类。     

熊彼特精英民主理论及其对我国民主政治建设的启示

熊彼特的精英民主理论深受古典混合政体理论、现代精英理论和韦伯领袖民主理论的影响,同时立足西方政治实践,将民主重新解读为领导者的"竞争性选举",从而实现精英政治与民主制度紧密结合。从理论层面,熊彼特分别对之前的民主和精英理论做出了批判和修正,并提出了四个民主成功的条件;从政治实践层面,解决了传统精英理论无法解决的代表性问题。因而它得到了许多西方政治学家的认同。但必须指出,精英民主的实质是一套固定的制度安排,它抹杀了民主实践的多样性。社会主义民主建设必须结合自身的特点,坚持人民政治协商制度,实现对资本主义民主竞争性选举的超越。     

Is anyone listening? Mass and elite opinion cueing in the EU

The paper analyses the connections between elite and mass opinion in the European Union. It considers both the ways in which mass publics use heuristics supplied by political elites to form their EU opinions, and the ways in which political elites respond to the opinions of the mass publics they represent. The paper employs data from simultaneously-conducted elite and mass surveys carried out in sixteen European countries in 2007. The results show that masses and elites in Europe do appear to take cues from one another in forming their EU opinions. Political elites base their individual-level opinions on the average position taken by their respective (national) party supporters. Mass respondents base their opinions on the average position taken by elite members of the (national) party with which they identify.     

Predispositions and the Political Behavior of American Economic Elites: Evidence from Technology Entrepreneurs

Economic elites regularly seek to exert political influence. But what policies do they support? Many accounts implicitly assume economic elites are homogeneous and that increases in their political power will increase inequality. We shed new light on heterogeneity in economic elites' political preferences, arguing that economic elites from an industry can share distinctive preferences due in part to sharing distinctive predispositions. Consequently, how increases in economic elites' influence affect inequality depends on which industry's elites are gaining influence and which policy issues are at stake. We demonstrate our argument with four original surveys, including the two largest political surveys of American economic elites to date: one of technology entrepreneurs—whose influence is burgeoning—and another of campaign donors. We show that technology entrepreneurs support liberal redistributive, social, and globalistic policies but conservative regulatory policies—a bundle of preferences rare among other economic elites. These differences appear to arise partly from their distinctive predispositions.     

Collective Resistance under Authoritarianism: Elite–Mass Strategies in an Experimental Game

We create a collective resistance game in which elites control the distribution of resources if the masses are compliant. However, if the masses unanimously protest elite allocations, they can capture a greater share of resources for themselves. We study how Chinese villagers, randomly assigned to the role of elites and masses, play this game in repeated interactions under varying information conditions. We find significant variation in the extent to which participants gave weight in their decisions to (1) the amount of the elite allocation and (2) their beliefs about the likely choices of fellow group members. Many individuals made their decisions based primarily on the size of the elite allocation, choosing to protest if the elite offer fell below some threshold level. Only a small proportion of the respondents were attuned consistently to the behavioral intentions of fellow group members in deciding whether to protest the elite allocation. This heterogeneity of preferences among participants has significant implications for their prospects of achieving and sustaining collective action. Knowledge of the amount of resources controlled by elites at the start of the game affected mass calculations of the fairness of distributions and increased the frequency of mass protests. However, the elites exploited the decision rule of many mass members by buying off those individuals with the lowest thresholds, thus preempting or dissolving collective action. This research sheds light on elite–mass interactions under authoritarianism, and in particular on contentious politics in contemporary China.     

Partisan Elites as Culprits? How Party Cues Shape Partisan Perceptual Gaps

Partisanship often colors how citizens perceive real‐world conditions. For example, an oft‐documented finding is that citizens tend to view the state of the national economy more positively if their party holds office. These partisan perceptual gaps are usually taken as a result of citizens' own motivated reasoning to defend their party identity. However, little is known about the extent to which perceptual gaps are shaped by one of the most important forces in politics: partisan elites. With two studies focusing on perceptions of the economy—a quasi‐experimental panel study and a randomized experiment—we show how partisan perceptual differences are substantially affected by messages coming from party elites. These findings imply that partisan elites are more influential on, and more responsible for, partisan perceptual differences than previous studies have revealed.     

中国的精英决策模式及发展趋势

概述了西方精英模式的基本观点,论述了中国公共决策模式为精英模式的理论依据与现实依据,分析了改革开放前中国精英决策模式的构成是政治权力精英主导的决策模式,具体表现为政治权力精英与一般政治精英的合作决策模式。阐述了改革开放后中国精英决策模式演变的过程,指出随着社会精英的崛起,中国精英决策模式逐渐向政治精英与知识精英、经济精英合作的模式演变。并从多角度比较分析了中国精英决策模式与西方国家精英决策模式的区别:指出我国的精英构成、社会精英的实际政治地位与西方国家的精英构成及社会精英的实际政治地位存在差异;我国精英决策不只代表精英的观点,也反映人民的声音;我国的经济精英影响政策的能力远逊于西方国家的经济精英;我国政治精英与知识精英的合作决策不同于西方国家的精英合作决策。分析了中国精英决策模式的优缺点,指出了中国决策模式的发展趋势是精英决策与大众民主的调和。     

An Elite Theory of Political Consulting and Its Implications for U.S. House Election Competition

Does the hiring of political consultants make election races more competitive? If so, why? Most scholars of political consulting argue their expertise enhances competition; I argue that consultant reputation also boosts competition. Many political consultants are part of the Washington establishment, which notices their association with candidates. In particular, congressional candidates of the out party, especially challengers, have an incentive to hire the most reputable consultants to signal to political elites their viability. I demonstrate a positive empirical relationship between out-party candidates hiring top consultants (compared to less reputable ones) and how competitive their race is perceived by elites. These findings and theoretical insight provide a basis for understanding the high costs of political consultants and their impact on election outcomes.     

Social Upheaval and Transformation of Elite Structures: The Case of Finland

The purpose of this study is to ascertain how certain important changes in Finnish society in the 1990s altered the national elite structures and affected democracy. We examine how the patterns of recruitment, interaction and cohesiveness among the elites changed in the period 1991–2001. The data for the study were drawn mainly from postal surveys conducted among the elites and a sample of the population in 1991 and 2001. The first research task was to establish how recruitment to various elites has altered in terms of social stratification and education. The second was to analyse changes in patterns of interaction between various elites as far as physical contacts and attitudes were concerned. The third was to study the relationship between the elites and the general population on the basis of attitudinal affinity. The conclusions were based on theoretical models characterising various elite structures and their interconnections with democracy. The concept of a responsive elite is developed on the grounds of the theory of democratic elitism. The changes in the Finnish elite structure have meant a passage towards an inclusive structure compatible with democracy rather than towards an exclusive elite configuration. Finnish elites have become more open and more diverse.     

The face of the party? Leader personalization in British campaigns

The personal characteristics of political elites play an important role in British elections. While the personalization of the media’s election coverage has been the subject of much debate, we know less about the conditions under which voters receive personalized messages directly from elites during the campaign. In this paper, we use a new dataset that includes more than 3300 local communications from the 2015 general election to explore variation in the personalization of campaign messaging. We find that there is systemic variation in terms of where photographs of party leaders are included in election communications, which provides further evidence that campaign messages are deployed strategically to portray the candidate – and their party – in the best possible light.     

How European Integration Changes National Parties: Evidence from a 15-Country Study

This article examines the impact of European integration on the balance of power within national political parties. It does this by drawing on the results of a survey of key actors in up to 55 parties in the 15 pre-2004 enlargement member states. The analyses show that, when they are involved in EU-level decision-making, party elites are relatively powerful vis-à-vis their national parties and that in a number of instances their intra-party power has also increased over time. National parties have, to some extent, attempted to constrain their elites but appear to be fighting a losing battle. Although there are some minor differences by country and by party, the empowerment of party elites is a general phenomenon. This research provides an empirical dimension to the existing research on the Europeanisation of national political parties and presents an important substantiation of the widely discussed democratic deficit that exists within the EU system of governance.     

Protest Voting in Austria, Denmark, and Norway

The article, in part, aims to provide a framework for analysis of the concept of ‘protest voting’. It addresses two empirical questions by use of this framework. First, which parties benefit from protest voting? Second, what are the main objects of political protest which these voters direct their grievances at? Do they protest against the political system, the political elites, or merely certain policies? The empirical analysis, which is based on data from Austria, Denmark, and Norway, suggests that parties that are in opposition, and that have no immediate chance of gaining a government position, are the ones that benefit from protest voting. Political elites are the most common objects of political protest in these countries.