Agency,Authority, and the Logic of Mutual Recognition

The “Cartesian” model of the rational subject is central to the political philosophy of Hobbes and Locke and is “transcendentally” affirmed in Kant's account of ethics and legality. An influential body of Hegelian inspired critique has suggested, however, that the dialectical deficiencies of the dominant models of Liberalism in late modernity inhere in this “atomistic” or “self‐supporting” characterisation of the individual. The “atomistic” perspective appears as an obstacle not only to the coherent articulation of the compatibility of liberty and equality, but also to the attempt to express the mutuality of recognition between agents that might offer a genuinely communal conception of constitution and subject. Employing as a frame of reference Alan Brudner's analysis of these issues in his comprehensive Constitutional Goods (Brudner 2004) it is argued that legal and political theory might usefully adopt an understanding of Hegel's notion of “recognition” (Anerkennung) in this regard without drastic phenomenological reconstruction of the Cartesian or Kantian subject.     

On the Puzzle Surrounding Hans Kelsen's Basic Norm

Whereas fundamental norms in the juridico‐philosophical tradition serve to impose constraints, Kelsen's fundamental norm—or basic norm (Grundnorm)—purports to establish the normativist character of the law. But how is the basic norm itself established? Kelsen himself rules out the appeals that are familiar from the tradition—the appeal to fact, and to morality. What remains is a Kantian argument. I introduce and briefly evaluate the Kantian and neo‐Kantian positions, as applied to Kelsen's theory. The distinction between the two positions, I argue, is reflected in an ambiguity in the use of the term “regressive.”     

Very Long Engagements: The Persistent Authority of Bridewealth in a Post‐Apartheid South African Community

This article examines the persistent authority of lobola, the customary practice for forming marriages in many South African communities. South African marriage rates have sharply fallen, and many blame this on economic challenges completing lobola. Using in‐depth, qualitative research from a village in KwaZulu‐Natal, where lobola demands are the country's highest and marriage rates its lowest, I argue that lobola's authority survives because lay actors have innovated new approaches for pursuing emerging desires for marriage via lobola. I argue that dyadic narratives of marriage increasingly circulate alongside “traditional” extended‐family narratives, especially among the young women who strongly support lobola while yearning for gender‐egalitarian marriages. My argument synthesizes actor‐oriented analyses of legal pluralism with Ewick and Silbey's theorization of lay actors’ role in producing legality to illuminate how lay actors contribute not only to the form and content of different legal systems, but also to the reach of their authority.     

Positivism,Legal Validity,and the Separation of Law and Morals

The essay discusses the import of the separability thesis both for legal positivism and for contemporary legal practice. First, the place of the separability thesis in legal positivism will be explored, distinguishing between “standard positivism” and “post‐Hartian positivism.” Then I will consider various kinds of relations between law and morality that are worthy of jurisprudential interest, and explore, from a positivist point of view, what kind of relations between law and morality must be rejected, what kind of such relations should be taken into account, and what kind of such relations are indeed of no import at all. The upshot of this analysis consists in highlighting the distinction between two different dimensions of legal validity (formal validity and material validity respectively), and in pointing out that the positivist separability thesis can apply to formal validity only. On the other hand, when the ascertainment of material validity is at stake, some form of moral reasoning may well be involved (here and now, it is necessarily involved). The essay concludes with some brief remarks on the persisting importance of the positivist jurisprudential project.     

“Native Courts” and the Limits of the Law in Colonial Sudan: Ambiguity as Strategy

This article offers a way of thinking about colonial‐era legal reform that departs from traditional narratives by highlighting the importance of legal ambiguity in state building projects. Following the establishment of “Native Administration” in the Sudan in the early 1920s, the British colonial government conferred expansive judicial and administrative powers on tribal sheikhs and nazirs (chiefs), while at the same time discouraging many attempts to formalize or standardize those powers, preferring instead that they remain informal and undefined. This policy, which I term “strategic ambiguity,” emerged out of a belief that tribal leaders would be more effective if they possessed maximum discretion and judicial flexibility, even though the result was a colonial government woefully ill‐informed about much of its own judicial system. These findings point to a way of thinking about colonial‐era legal reform in which governmental ignorance was actually productive of sovereignty, and not an obstacle to it.     

Concretized Norm and Sanction qua Fact in the Vienna School's Stufenbaulehre

At the bottom level of the hierarchical structure (Stufenbau) of the legal system, the transition from “ought” to “is” has not been given its due. I argue that an additional level, that of fully concretized norms, belongs in the hierarchy. This sheds light on precisely where and how the transition from “ought” to “is” takes place. Whereas the fully concretized norm marks the bottom level in the hierarchy of norms, the coercive act or sanction qua fact is not found in the hierarchy, contrary to what Adolf Julius Merkl and Hans Kelsen would have us believe.     

Toward a New Legal History of Capitalism and Unfree Labor: Law,Slavery, and Emancipation in the American Marketplace

New work on the “history of capitalism” reveals how the personal freedom enjoyed by people living within the liberal capitalist mainstream is often purchased by coerced labor at the social margins. Walter Johnson's book River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom makes this argument with force, utilizing the concept of “slave racial capitalism” to suggest how race‐based slavery constituted a necessary component of early American economic expansion. Using Johnson's framework as a starting point, this essay argues that the legal institutions of property and contract, institutions underwriting a genuinely “slave racial capitalist” regime, also contained certain subversive possibilities within themselves, eventually challenging unfree labor as a modality of rule within the modernizing United States.     

Traditional Local Justice,Women’s Rights,and the Rule of Law: A Pluralistic Framework

The paper focuses on the application of a particular conception of the rule of law to situations characterized by traditional local justice and legal pluralism. While in the twentieth century international rule‐of‐law programmes were directed almost exclusively at state legal system, they have recently begun to take into account traditional local justice, namely, those institutions which in many world regions represent the main form of effective justice. Starting with a review of the positive and negative aspects of traditional local justice from a rule‐of‐law perspective, the paper underlines the widespread lack of protection of human rights, particularly of women’s rights. Discussing vertical rule‐of‐law functions in contexts of legal pluralism the paper stresses the advantages of an approach to the promotion of the rule of law based on mutual recognition and influence between different legal authorities and sources. It is argued that this “interactive” approach appears best suited to the complex frameworks of relations that characterize present‐day systems of deep legal pluralism. Finally, the paper underlines the correspondence between this approach and a conception of the rule of law as an ideal framework of plural interactions characterized by the limits imposed on the law by the law itself, and it discusses its advantages from the perspective of human rights and women’s rights promotion.     

Climate Change Litigation,Obsession and Expertise: Reflecting on the Scholarly Response to Massachusetts v. EPA

Climate change litigation is an obsessive preoccupation for many legal scholars. Three different “narratives” can be identified for why scholars find such litigation important to study: litigation is a response to institutional failure, legal reasoning holds authority, and litigation is a forum for the co‐production of facts and social orders. The nature and consequences of these narratives are considered in the context of the first U.S. Supreme Court “climate change” case—Massachusetts v. EPA (2007). This analysis has implications for both how scholars understand their expertise in this area, and how they should foster it.     

The Force of International Law: Lawyers' Diplomacy on the International Scene in the 1920s

Where does international law (IL) draw its authority from a still weakly institutionalized international scene deprived of the warrants of a state? To address this classical debate, the article draws from a case study on the social and professional structure of the “international legal community” as it emerged during the 1920s as part of the rise of multilateralism and international organizations. It focuses on the “situation of the international lawyers” of the time, starting with the multiple and often antagonistic roles they play (as legal advisers, scholars, judges, diplomats, politicians, etc.) and the variety of interests and causes they defend (states, international organizations, professional interests, etc.) in international politics. It argues this heteronomy of international lawyers helps understand the autonomization of international law. Far from being opposed to one another it has often been assumed—realism and idealism, national loyalty and international loyalty, political logic and learned logic—actually gain when analyzed as various modes of affirming a single cause—that of an international rule of law. This attention given to the “situation of international lawyers” and to the way they manage their various allegiances also accounts for the particular vision of the “International” and of “Law and Politics” relationships that are encapsulated in this emerging international corpus juris.     

法律与逻辑——对法律与逻辑关系的一种全面解读

本文主要对法律与逻辑关系进行了全面的探讨。对逻辑学和法学之间交叉性的一些问题进行了回顾和总结。首先,探讨了什么是“法律逻辑”,并重点介绍了我国学者较陌生的“规范逻辑”,将两者进行了比较;其次,对法理学和逻辑学都关心的“法律推理”问题进行了探讨,比较了“法律推理”和“司法推理”两者的异同,以及两大法系“法律推理”的特点和差异;最后,对饱受批判的“法律形式主义”进行了研究,指出应当辩证地看待“法律形式主义”的功与过。最后,作者结合我国的实际,认为:我们不能借口反对“法律形式主义”而忽视和否定逻辑在法律领域中的作用。     

Rules as Icons: Wittgenstein's Paradox and the Law

In this paper Section 1 distinguishes between two modes of interpreting legal rules: rehearsal and discourse, arguing that the former takes priority over the latter in law, as in many other contexts. Section 2 offers two arguments that following a legal rule in the rehearsing mode presents a riddle. The first argument develops from law, and submits that legal rules do not tell us anything, because they are tautological. The second one develops from philosophy (Wittgenstein's later works), confronting us with the paradox that incompatible courses of action may be derived from any rule. My solution presents a theory of rules as icons (Section 3 ). I use “icon” rather than “picture,” partly to avoid confusion with what is known among philosophers as “the picture theory of meaning.” Interpretation in the rehearsing mode hinges on imagination: imagining oneself in the space of reasons for action rather than reasoning oneself. In this act of imagination, we project ourselves into the rule in ways that are similar to the way we grasp the sense of paintings, music, stories, or poems. Finally (Section 4 ) I will defend the position that my view solves the puzzles in the second section, by arguing (a) that it is a better account of what Wittgenstein wrote than two competing theories (intuitionism and conventionalism), and (b) that it provides a more satisfactory account of how lawyers deal with legal rules in actual practice.     

Alexy's Thesis of the Necessary Connection between Law and Morality

This paper criticizes Alexy's argument on the necessary connection between law and morality. First of all, the author discusses some aspects of the notion of the claim to correctness. Basically, it is highly doubtful that all legal authorities share the same idea of moral correctness. Secondly, the author argues that the claim to correctness is not a defining characteristic of the concepts of “legal norm” and “legal system”. Hence, the thesis of a necessary connection between law and morality based on such claim cannot be accepted. 1 Abstract by Antonino Rotolo.
     

The Ethics of Corporate Legal Strategy: A Response to Professor Mayer

In this issue of the American Business Law Journal, Professor Don Mayer continues an important conversation regarding the ethics of corporate legal strategy. 1 Addressing several of my published works, Mayer offers two primary criticisms: (1) the works are too sanguine with regard to the appropriate scope of the strategic decision to “breach‐and‐pay,” and (2) the works offer too little guidance for the well‐intentioned corporate executive. In this response, I briefly restate my views, address Mayer's two criticisms, and offer concluding remarks.     

Merger—the name of the FE game

In the Australian legal environment today the overwhelming importance of laws made by Parliament is obvious, yet many first year law programmes pay insufficient attention to the coordinated teaching of statutory interpretation (SI). This project formed part of a collaborative initiative between an educational developer and the coordinator of legal research methods (LRM) to introduce statutory interpretation into a first year unit of study. Our study used a qualitative research framework – a questionnaire was administered to students at two intervals throughout the first semester. In Week 3, 160 students participated in the questionnaire and at Week 4, a keystone module on statutory interpretation using a building block approach was introduced in LRM. Since the nature of assessment in LRM is largely reflection, this unit lent itself well to investigating the language and literacy challenges of statutory interpretation, in particular, to students monitoring their own progress in this regard. The overall aim of the project was to establish a framework for students to build on their knowledge and understanding of statutory interpretation throughout their undergraduate studies, and in the interests of improved learning and teaching outcomes, for staff to be able to document the changes in student thinking. This paper focuses on the preliminary stage of our investigation into the language and literacy challenges involved in introducing statutory interpretation into a first year unit of study.

I know of only one authority which might justify the suggested method of construction. “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master – that’s all.”

(Alice Through the Looking Glass, c. vi.)

After all this long discussion, the question is whether the words “If a man has” can mean “If a man thinks he has.” I am of opinion that they cannot, and that the case should be decided accordingly.

(Lord Atkin in Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206)