被告人认罪案件处理程序的比较法考察

英国、美国、法国、日本和俄罗斯等国都对被告人认罪案件规定了特殊的处理程序。这些国家的被告人认罪案件处理程序在具有简化诉讼程序、强调被告人认罪的自愿性等共同特征的同时，在适用的案件范围和被告人认罪的效果等方面存在一定的差异。我国于2003年确立了被告人认罪案件的处理程序。但我国的被告人认罪案件处理程序在程序保障、适用范围等方面尚需要继续研究。     

论被告人认罪诉讼程序的完善

被告人认罪作为一种具有程序意义的法律行为,可以对诉讼程序产生影响,合理构建被告人认罪诉讼程序,有利于诉讼公正与诉讼效率两大价值目标的实现。本文首先分析了我国被告人认罪处理程序的现状,然后针对被告人认罪程序存在的缺陷提出了完善建议。     

“被告人认罪案件”简易审中应注意的问题

在提高效率成为当代刑事诉讼改革重点的今天,简易程序的多样化或多元化已成为世界刑事诉讼改革中一项共同关注和研究的课题。我国继刑事诉讼法中规定简易程序之后,2003年3日14日,最高法、最高检和司法部又在总结各地庭审改革经验的基础上联合下发了《关于适用普通程序审理“被告人认罪案件”的若干意见(试行)》(以下简称《意见》),形成了简易程序与“被告人认罪案件”简易审程序并存的简易程序审理模式。“被告人认罪案件”简易审程序在庭审程序设计上较普通程序简化且有相关法律的明确规定,在性质功能和价值取向等方面也与传统的简易程序并…     

认罪案件处理程序研究 以北京市海淀区人民检察院办案实践为视角

所谓认罪,是指被告人对所指控的基本犯罪事实无异议。认罪可能发生在侦查、审查起诉和审判各个诉讼阶段。普通程序简化审和简易程序是审理被告人认罪案件的两种程序。本文以北京市海淀区人民检察院办理的被告人认罪案件为研究对象,对认     

认罪认罚案件上诉问题探讨

认罪认罚案件上诉权的设置存在多元价值冲突的情形,基于公正价值与效率价值的平衡需要,应当明确赋予认罪认罚案件被告人上诉权。在上诉权的设置上,应当对适用速裁程序审理的认罪认罚案件被告人的上诉权进行限制,要求速裁案件被告人上诉必须有正当理由,而认罪认罚案件适用其他程序审理的则无需附加理由。速裁案件被告人上诉的正当理由主要包括:定罪问题,主要包括被告人一审程序中的认罪是非自愿的以及一审判决作出后出现影响定罪的新事实、新证据等,量刑问题以及重大程序违法问题。为保障认罪认罚案件被告人上诉权的行使,应当要求被告人上诉向二审法院提出申请、二审法院对被告人的申请应当迅速及时审查;同时,二审法院在审理案件时应当遵循重点审查原则和上诉不加刑原则;采取措施限制检察机关提起"技术性抗诉"。     

立足国情 促进被告人认罪轻罪案件程序改革 认罪轻罪案件程序改革国际研讨会综述

根据我国刑事诉讼法的规定,被告人认罪的轻罪案件可以适用简易审程序审理,但是,目前我国法律关于简易程序的规定尚不完善,因此,如何借鉴国外立法和司法经验,对我国被告人认罪的轻罪案件的办理程序进行改革,成为理论界和实务部门     

重罪简易程序研究——以《若干意见(试行)》为考察对象

《关于适用普通程序审理“被告人认罪案件”的若干意见(试行)》的颁布和施行,使得对被告人认罪案件能够适用较普通程序更简化的程序审理。从各级人民法院适用该意见审理被告人认罪的重罪案件的现状来看,该意见中的一些条文还是存在诸多缺陷的。为进一步提高司法效率和节省司法资源,我国有必要在此基础上设立重罪简易程序,作为《中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法》规定的简易程序的补充。     

被告人认罪案件程序改革的基本方向

我国被告人认罪案件程序改革的基本制度设计:在审查起诉阶段,首先进行证据开示,然后进入对被告人的问罪程序。这里会出现两种可能:一是被告人认罪的,则适用简易程序,如果是事实清楚,证     

中美认罪协商制度之比较

认罪协商在我国主要体现在认罪认罚从宽制度中,在美国主要蕴含在辩诉交易中。中美认罪协商制度在价值追求、自愿性保障和被害人利益保护方面具有相似性,但在协商主体、协商内容、协商效力、证明标准、撤回认罪以及被告人上诉权等方面存在差异。我国可以从适度降低认罪认罚案件的证明标准、明确撤回认罪的法律规定和适度限制被告人的上诉权等方面,借鉴美国辩诉交易的有益经验,进一步完善我国的认罪认罚从宽制度。     

认罪认罚后被告人反悔应对机制研究

司法实践中,认罪认罚后被告人反悔存在一审审理过程中反悔和一审判决后反悔上诉两种情形。对于认罪认罚后被告人反悔上诉的案件,各地检察机关在是否同步提起抗诉方面差异较大。反悔权是认罪认罚后被告人应有的诉讼权利。检察机关应从强化对检察官办理认罪认罚案件的监督管理、建立证据开示制度、实行认罪认罚协商过程同步录音录像、规范认罪认罚案件抗诉权行使等方面着力构建认罪认罚后被告人反悔的预防机制。法院应着力构建认罪认罚后被告人反悔的处理机制:对被告人在一审审理过程中反悔的,一审法院应对反悔理由进行实质性审查;对被告人在一审判决后反悔上诉的,二审法院应区分不同类型处理。     

Certainty of punishment and sentence mitigation in plea behavior

Mitigation of sentence severity has been cited as a primary factor underlying defendant decisions to plead guilty. It has been studied extensively and it has been assumed, but rarely examined, that few defendants plead guilty in the absence of significant benefits. This paper examines the relationship between sentence benefits and plea behavior. A crime-specific analysis reveals that some defendants frequently plead guilty in the relative absence of significant benefits; conversely, others plead not guilty even though significant benefits are available for guilty pleaders. Applying several decision theory constructs to justice system processing, the defendant's desire to reduce uncertainty is discussed and offered as a tentative explanation for the phenomenon of pleading guilty in the relative absence of significant benefits.     

刑事訴訟法三人談: 認罪認罰從寬制度中的刑事辯護

2019年10月24日,最高人民檢察院聯合最高人民法院、公安部、國家安全部、司法部共同發佈《關於適用認罪認罰從寬制度的指導意見》,對認罪認罰從寬制度的適用作出具體規定,確保這一制度正確有效實施.認罪認罰從寬制度是刑事訴訟法修改後確立的一項重要制度,通過對認罪認罰的犯罪嫌疑人、被告人依法給予程序上從簡或者實體上從寬的處理,實現有效懲治犯罪、強化人權司法保障、提升訴訟效率等目的.     

被告人不认罪案件量刑程序的理想模式

被告人不认罪案件的量刑程序如何设计是当前量刑规范化改革试点过程中一个争议较大的问题,在司法理论和实践中有两种不同的模式——相对独立的量刑程序模式和隔离的量刑程序模式。量刑规范化改革的目的在于使量刑过程程序化、公开化,从而实现量刑公正,达到罪责刑相适应的要求。针对被告人不认罪案件,建立理想的量刑程序模式,将定罪程序与量刑程序有效地分隔开来,有利于达到量刑规范化改革的目的。     

Race and the probability of pleading guilty

The legal ramifications of pleading guilty and findings of an interdependence between pleading guilty and sentence severity suggest that the guilty plea decision is a significent turning point in case processing. The present research examines the variables affecting the probability of pleading guilty. The first analysis involves estimating a single probit equation of main effects of variables previously found to be related to pleading guilty. A second analysis is conducted estimating the same equation separately for black defendants and white defendants. Findings from the first part of the analysis indicate that physical evidence, number of charges, and confessing to the crime during police/prosecutor interrogation increase the probability of pleading guilty, whereas the number of witnesses, use of a weapon, and offenses carrying a minimum penalty of 5 years in custody with no maximum prison term decrease the probability of pleading guilty. Findings from the second analysis indicate that the effect of marital status, prior record of felony convictions, type of counsel, number of charges, and use of a weapon on the probability of pleading guilty varies by defendant's race. The research concludes by offering several competing explanations of these findings in hope of stimulating further research on the variables affecting the route of case disposition in felony processing.     

Limitations on the ability to negotiate justice: attorney perspectives on guilt,innocence, and legal advice in the current plea system

In the American criminal justice system the vast majority of criminal convictions occur as the result of guilty pleas, often made as a result of plea bargains, rather than jury trials. The incentives offered in exchange for guilty pleas mean that both innocent and guilty defendants plead guilty. We investigate the role of attorneys in this context, through interviews with criminal defense attorneys. We examine defense attorney perspectives on the extent to which innocent defendants are (and should be) pleading guilty in the current legal framework and investigate their views of their own role in this complex system. We also use a hypothetical case to probe the ways in which defense attorneys consider guilt or innocence when providing advice on pleas. Results indicate that attorney advice is influenced by guilt or innocence, but also that attorneys are limited in the extent to which they can negotiate justice for their clients in a system in which uncertainty and large discrepancies between outcomes of guilty pleas and conviction at trial can make it a sensible option to plead guilty even when innocent. Results also suggest conflicting opinions over the role of the attorney in the plea-bargaining process.     

认罪认罚从宽制度的体系性反思与建构

虽然认罪认罚从宽制度是在我国《刑事诉讼法》中得以正式确立的,但《刑事诉讼法》中涉及此制度的具体规定又都是操作层面的。据此,认罪认罚从宽制度的合理性并不能得以阐释。而依据我国《刑法》,对认罪认罚从宽制度的合理性则可以从形式逻辑、实质逻辑以及价值理念三个维度予以充分证成。由此可知,认罪认罚从宽制度本质上系《刑法》中的一种刑罚裁量制度,认罪认罚本质上是法定的从宽量刑情节。在定罪层面,犯罪嫌疑人、被告人只需自愿承认不法事实系其所为,即构成"认罪",而无需准确评价自身行为的法律性质并准确识别具体罪名;在量刑层面,"认罚"考察的重点是犯罪嫌疑人、被告人的悔罪态度和悔罪表现。应当通过刑法立法的方式将认罪认罚从宽制度与自首制度、坦白制度部分重叠地整合在一起,以避免"概念混同""重复评价"的错误倾向。     

Defendants pleading insanity: an analysis of outcome

The authors examined the cohort of all defendants pleading not guilty by reason of insanity over a 12-month period in Baltimore City's superior trial court. During that time, 143 of the 11,497 defendants indicted (1.2%) pled not criminally responsible. Fourteen of those defendants (10%) were subsequently found not guilty by reason of insanity. The authors found marked agreement between the prosecution and defense with only two cases leading to full trials where the issue of insanity was argued. The evaluating physician's opinion as to criminal responsibility and Axis I diagnosis, and the most serious underlying charge discriminated between those defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity and those defendants found guilty or not guilty by the court. Other demographic factors such as age, number of dependents, educational level, severity of illness, and criminal background did not discriminate between the two groups.     

认罪认罚阶梯式从宽量刑精准化研究——兼评《关于适用认罪认罚从宽制度的指导意见》

《关于适用认罪认罚从宽制度的指导意见》细化了认罪认罚的从宽规则,肯定了阶梯式从宽量刑的指导思想,但其在从宽量刑精细化方面仍有不足。认罪认罚客观上存在一个与教育改善难易度和办案价值量相对应的阶梯式等级体系。在设定认罪认罚阶梯式从宽量刑幅度时,应当以教育改善的难易度、办案价值量两个因素为主线。根据教育改善难易度的大小,可以将认罪认罚划分为自首型、坦白型、功利型三个类别;根据办案价值量的大小,可以将认罪认罚划分为三个价值级别。根据认罪认罚的"三个类别"和"三个级别"之间的组合,认罪认罚形成九梯度的等级体系。九梯度的等级体系,最高从宽幅度可以减少基准刑的70%至免除处罚,最低从宽幅度可以减少基准刑的5%以下。     

To Waive or Not to Waive: The Right to Trial and Plea Bargaining

Criminal defendants in many countries are faced with a dilemma: If they waive their right to trial and plead guilty, they typically receive charge or sentence reductions in exchange for having done so. If they exercise their right to trial and are found guilty, they often receive stiffer sanctions than if they had pled guilty. I characterize the former as ‘waiver rewards’ and the latter as ‘non-waiver penalties.’ After clarifying the two and considering the relation between them, I briefly explicate the grounds for a moral right to trial. I then assess the defensibility of such rewards and penalties. In addition to considering whether waiver rewards and non-waiver penalties serve the aims of legal punishment, I address the three main arguments for permitting them. The first suggests that defendants willing to plead display more remorse for their crimes and thus are deserving of lighter sentences. The second defends waiver rewards and non-waiver penalties in cases where prosecutors are alleged to know that defendants are guilty but face problems establishing their guilt at trial. The third holds that guilty defendants who are willing to plead conserve scarce state resources and should be rewarded for it, whereas those unwilling to plead squander such resources and should be penalized accordingly. I contend that none of these arguments provides persuasive grounds for waiver rewards or non-waiver penalties, even on the assumption that we can distinguish those defendants who should waive their right to trial from those who should not. This conclusion presents a fundamental challenge to contemporary plea bargaining practices.

Constrained Waiver of Trial Rights? Incentives to Plead Guilty and the Right to a Fair Trial

This article develops an interpretative framework to examine when incentives to plead guilty should be found to constrain defendant choice to waive fair trial rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. This framework is informed by existing jurisprudence, specifically the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Natsvlishvili and Togonidze v. Georgia and Deweer v. Belgium, and socio‐legal literature. According to the framework, an incentive to plead guilty should be found to violate fair trial rights where it makes it unreasonable to expect defendants to exercise their right to a full trial, is independent of the projected outcome at trial, and causes the defendant to plead guilty. An empirical analysis of guilty‐plea practice in England and Wales informed by this new framework identifies problematic incentives and suggests such incentives may disproportionately influence vulnerable defendants.