"峰会年"看澜湄地区制度竞合

澜沧江—湄公河地区合作制度之间的竞争与合作正在日益复杂化。2018年作为"峰会年",可以为评估该地区的制度竞合提供有效的视角。通过提出参与成员是否具有排他性、主导成员是否为同类型国家、议题领域是否重叠、合作内容是否涉及"高级政治"、目标原则是否具有外向性这5个维度的指标进行系统评估,并对中国、日本、越南和泰国四个关键国家的互动进行案例分析,文章发现,澜湄地区合作制度之间的竞争被夸大了;澜湄合作与日本—湄公河合作互为主要的竞争对象,但前者是被动跟随而非主动挑起竞争;柬老越发展三角、柬老缅越合作与伊洛瓦底江—湄南河—湄公河三河流域经济合作战略也相互竞争,但后者正在取得优势;澜湄合作与大湄公河次区域经济合作、湄公河委员会之间不会出现"制度达尔文主义"。     

中国—东盟共建“一带一路”的理念与实践——基于关系性合作的视角

东盟是中国推进“一带一路”建设的优先方向和重要伙伴。世界政治的关系理论能够为理解中国—东盟共建“一带一路”的合作逻辑提供一种新的思路。在关系性合作的视角下,关系因素建构了中国与东盟共建“一带一路”的合作基础和条件。通过对中国—东盟间政治、安全、经济关系网络的分析可知,中国与东盟及东盟国家的关系基础赋予中国—东盟显著的关系亲密度优势,为其合作进程提供了充分的保障。在中国—东盟关系网络的复合结构下,中国与东盟在各领域的关系水平决定了双方合作的空间,中国与东盟各国在关系网络中的不同位置也决定了合作条件的差异性。中国—东盟的关系基础使双方得以在理念层面相互融合,基于东盟地区合作的本土理念以及中国的国际发展合作理念建立起深厚的共识,共同推动“一带一路”合作的具体实践。在高质量共建“一带一路”的进程中,中国与东盟需进一步强化中国—东盟关系的韧性与弹性,提升双方的关系水平;同时,也需不断巩固理念共识,通过实践完善双方的合作模式,使“一带一路”建设成为中国—东盟关系性合作的持久动力。     

从"上海五国"到上海合作组织

在过去的10年里,中俄关系排除意识形态分歧而达到了几个世纪来的最好时期,为“上海五国”—上海合作组织进程奠定了基础。这一进程的发展取得了丰硕的成果,在历史上首次使中国、俄罗斯、中亚国家结合在一个多边的地区安全经济合作机制内,而中俄关系的发展又对这一机制     

亚欧会议对中国、欧盟、东盟关系的影响分析

亚欧会议促进了中、欧、东盟在全球性和地区性问题上的多边协调和务实合作,推动了中国—欧盟、中国—东盟、欧盟—东盟双边关系发展。中欧对亚欧合作的重视以及亚欧经济关系的重要性增强是亚欧会议对中、欧、东盟关系产生积极作用的主要原因。但由于亚欧会议缺乏合作机制,东盟借助亚欧会议推行大国平衡战略以及欧盟同亚洲国家的价值观有差异,亚欧会议在推动中、欧、东盟关系发展问题上有较大的局限性。中国应加强中、欧、东盟关系,为中国成为世界大国打下基础。     

中国—东盟区域、次区域合作机制与合作模式创新

梳理中国—东盟区域、次区域合作机制与合作模式,可以发现中国—东盟合作机制与合作模式创新具有以下特点:发展导向与规则创立相结合;软硬结合、灵活有效;智库探索与政府决策相结合;互学互鉴与取长补短相结合;地方探索与顶层设计相结合;现有机制与创新机制相结合。但也存在诸多问题:理论层面研究不够,缺乏理论指导;制度化建设不够,有效性不足;机制叠床架屋,协调性不够;政治互信欠缺,发展动力不足等。中国需要加强区域秩序与区域治理的理论研究,提出中国—东盟区域、次区域合作机制的理论建构;承担提供区域与次区域"公共产品"的主要责任;促进中国—东盟区域合作机制的整合与升级,提升制度化水平;充分发挥智库和地方政府构建次区域合作机制的积极性与主动性;积极探索中国—东盟次区域合作发展模式,实现效益最大化。     

“第三届中国—中东欧国家高级别智库研讨会暨‘中国—中东欧国家智库交流与合作网络’揭牌仪式”会议综述

正2015年12月16日,由中国社会科学院、中国—中东欧国家合作秘书处、中国国际问题基金会联合主办的"第三届中国—中东欧国家高级别智库研讨会暨‘中国—中东欧国家智库交流与合作网络’揭牌仪式"在北京钓鱼台国宾馆召开。来自中东欧国家数十个智库机构、国内数十家科研单位、国内多个部委的学者、官员以及中东欧国家前政要和驻华使馆人员共约200多人参加了此次研讨会。一大会开幕式领导人致辞     

非传统安全与中国—东南亚国家的安全关系——以澜沧江—湄公河次区域水资源开发问题为例

本文论述澜沧江—湄公河次区域水资源的开发既有利于中国与东南亚国家的合作安全,但又会引发利益冲突,这一问题的安全化有其必然性和必要性。安全化是各方利益相互博弈以达成妥协的过程,也是一种合作安全的社会建构过程。通过安全化,在横向关系上,澜沧江—湄公河次区域的国家彼此间展开利益的讨价还价而逐渐达成妥协与合作;在纵向关系上,社会群体和个人的权益得到国家的关注。但本文也同时指出,非传统安全问题如澜沧江—湄公河次区域的水资源开发争端最终走向去安全化也是一个必不可少的过程,它与安全化过程构成一个问题的两个方面。     

东亚合作与中国的战略利益

东盟和中日韩的“1 0 + 3”经济技术合作框架和中国—东盟自由贸易区建设对于东亚区域合作具有里程碑意义。东亚合作为中国提供了多方面的战略机遇 ,积极参与和推动东亚合作符合中国的长期战略利益     

上海合作组织扩员后的发展战略及中国的作为——基于SWOT方法的分析视角

上海合作组织扩员后的发展战略应作为指引其未来走向的规划,这一规划对于增强其制度引领能力、推进安全与经济合作、参与全球治理具有关键作用。SWOT模型为分析上海合作组织扩员后的发展战略提供了适宜的方法。通过分析发现,上海合作组织扩员后可以采取劣势—机会战略,即借助有利的外部环境,弥补自身的劣势,实现组织更为良性的发展。随着印度与巴基斯坦的加入,上海合作组织实现了由传统的陆地型区域组织向海陆兼备型区域组织的转变,这为该地区国家的发展战略与中国提出的"一带一路"倡议的对接创造了条件。具体而言,中国应借助中俄印三国互动机制,深化能源、经济和安全领域的合作,缓解因扩员对上海合作组织造成的冲击;同时,以"一带一盟"战略对接为切入点,将合作成果惠及中亚及周边地区,并将上海合作组织打造成丝绸之路经济带与中巴经济走廊、孟中印缅经济走廊对接与合作的中枢。     

区域经济一体化进程中的中国与东盟文化合作:发展、特点及前瞻

在区域经济一体化深度推进的同时,中国与东盟的国际文化合作也快速拓展。从国际文化交流、文化贸易及文化产业国际合作等三个层面与双边和多边两方面来分析,可将其发展历程分为1991—2000年的奠基与2001年以来的制度化合作两个时期。笔者通过研究发现,尽管双方文化合作呈加快势头,但主要文化产品贸易份额仍偏低,整体上处于初级阶段;在动因及效果方面呈现政府主导、经济推动、网状关联、空间集中等特点。鉴于人文合作对自由贸易区建设等经贸合作具有促进作用,同时区域经济一体化亦需要国际文化合作,国际合作进程中文化与经济呈一体化趋势,故中国—东盟区域文化合作应进一步增强。     

2002年东亚经济的前景

2001年世界各地经济大多陷入或迈向衰退,东亚各地除中国、越南等外亦陷于深度的衰退与停滞之中.2002年下半年或晚些时候,随着美国经济逐步走向复苏,亚洲各地经济亦将逐步恢复与反弹.然而由于美国资讯科技投资过度,"后遗症"的化解尚需时日,使得东亚各地今后必须更多地依靠内部需求,自力自强,加强合作,步向经济稳定增长的轨道.     

2002年亚太地区形势讨论会在京举行

20 0 2年 1 2月 2 6日 ,中国社会科学院亚太研究所 2 0 0 2年亚太地区形势讨论会在北京举行。来自各研究机构及政府部门的 4 0余位专家学者参加了会议。与会的专家学者们对亚太地区政治经济形势进行了回顾与展望 ,并就一些地区的热点问题进行了深入的讨论。关于地区经济形势 ,学者们认为亚太地区的经济形势总体较好。尽管在亚太地区经济中占比重最大、影响面最广的美国经济持续波动 ,第二大经济体日本的经济处于停滞状态 ,但在高速发展的中国经济的带动下 ,亚太地区的经济复苏趋势仍较为明显。学者们认为 2 0 0 3年的国际形势虽存在一些不稳…     

美国的农村金融体制及借鉴意义

本文对美国农村金融体制进行考察,对其农村金融组织体系及配套的扶持政策进行评介,并通过与中国农村金融的比较,指出中国农村金融体制改革应积极发挥市场机制的导向作用,建立农村资金良性循环机制,同时政府应承担主导作用,建立多层次、全方位的农村金融体制。     

The Nakba in Palestinian Memory in Israel

Changes in the international, regional and domestic arenas in the late 1990s resulted in discursive change with regard to interpretation of the Al Nakba in the political and civil societies of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Apart from fuelling a discursive challenge to the Israeli dominant discourse about the 1948 events, this reinterpretation allowed the Palestinian Arab citizens to discuss the historical roots of the problems they experienced within the Israeli political and civil societal spheres. This article analyses the nature and significance of discursive change of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel on the Nakba by referring to its impact on their identity politics as well as their political and civil societal activities.     

Islam in Mali in the neoliberal era

If before 11 September 2001, many praised Mali as a model ofdemocracy, secularism and toleration, many have now begun toexpress concern about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism inMali. I consider a number of recent public debates in Mali overmorality, so-called women’s issues, and the proposed changesin the Family Code and show how the perspectives of many Malianson these issues are not new but rather relate to longstandingand ongoing debates about Islam, secularism, politics, moralityand law. What is new is the way in which some Muslim religiousleaders have been articulating their complaints and criticisms.Since the guarantee of the freedom of expression and associationin the early 1990s, there has been a proliferation of independentnewspapers and private radio stations and new Islamic associationswith a coterie of increasingly media-savvy activists. I explorehow some Muslim activists have used such outlets to articulatethe concerns of some ordinary Malians, who face the contradictionsof living as modern Muslim citizens in a modernizing and secularizingstate where, in this age of neoliberal governmentality, theallegedly un-Islamic seems to be always just around the corner. Portions of the paper have been presented at the workshop, ‘Islam,Society and State in West Africa’, Rutgers University,New Brunswick, 29 March 2003; at the symposium, ‘Constructionand Dissemination of Islamic Knowledge in Africa’, IndianaUniversity, Bloomington, 19 April 2003; and at the conference,‘Governance and Insecurity in West Africa’, NorthwesternUniversity, 13–15 November 2003; and at UniversitätBayreuth. ^1. United States Agency for International Development, ‘Assistanceenvironment’, in USAID MALI: Country Strategic Plan 2003–2012(USAID, Bamako, Mali, 2002), p. 11. ^2. Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘The political scene’,in EIU Country Report: Mali (EIU, London, March 2002), p. 47. ^3. See Joshua Muravchik, ‘Freedom and the Arab world’,The Weekly Standard, 31 December 2001. ^4. ‘Overview’. USAID MALI: Country Strategic Plan 2003–2012(USAID, Bamako, Mali, 2002), p. 18. Such sentiments were alsoexpressed in journalistic accounts published shortly after 11September 2001. See, for example, Douglas Farah, ‘Mali’sMuslim clerics send troubling message: fragile democracy seenas vulnerable to extremism’, Washington Post, 30 September2001, p. A24; Kader Konaté, ‘Mali. Le danger islamiste’,Le Continent, 14 September 2001, p. 1. ^5. See Joan Baxter, ‘Challenging tradition’, BBC Focuson Africa Magazine, January-March 2002, pp. 48–50. Otherexamples include Nicolas Colombant, ‘Mali’s Muslimssteer back to spiritual roots’, Christian Science Monitor,26 February 2002, p. 8. ^6. These included various Western media outlets and several Maliannewspapers. ^7. James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, ‘Spatializing states:toward an ethnography of neoliberal governmentality’,American Ethnologist 29, 4 (2002), pp. 981–1002. ^8. For critical perspectives on the fashionable civil society approachto ‘good governance’ in Africa, see John L. Comaroffand Jean Comaroff (eds), Civil Society and the Political Imaginationin Africa (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1999);Béatrice Hibou and Richard Banégas, ‘Civilsociety and the public space in Africa’, CODESRIA Bulletin1 (2000), pp. 39–47. ^9. For example, Sunjata, the mythical founder of the medieval Malianempire, Mansa Musa, the Muslim rulers of Macina (r. nineteenthcentury), al-Hajj Umar Tall (d. nineteenth century), the Kuntashaykhs of the Timbuktu region, and Shaykh Hamallah (d. twentiethcentury), to name only some of the most prominent. ^10. For an example of how such ‘orthodoxy’ changes overtime and space in Mali, see Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Muslimproselytization as purification: religious pluralism and conflictin contemporary Mali’ in Abdallah A. An-Na’im (ed.),Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa (Orbis,Maryknoll, NY, 1999), pp. 228–45. ^11. Two studies that have received quite a bit of attention areAnna L. Tsing, In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginalityin an out-of-the-way place (Princeton University Press, Princeton,NJ, 1993); Charles Piot, Remotely Global: Village modernityin West Africa (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1999). ^12. See Gregory Starrett, ‘The political economy of religiouscommodities in Cairo’, American Anthropologist 97, 1 (1995),pp. 51–68. ^13. On these developments, see Robert Launay and Benjamin F. Soares,‘The formation of an "Islamic sphere" in French colonialWest Africa’, Economy and Society, 28, 4 (1999), pp. 497–519;Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Islam and public piety in Mali’,in Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (eds), Public Islamand the Common Good (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2004);Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy: History andauthority in a Malian town (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburghand the University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2005). ^14. Malians with access to satellite television have a wider arrayof choices, which are hard to quantify. ^15. Some of the themes in this section are treated at greater lengthin my book, Islam and the Prayer Economy. ^16. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, NJ, 1993). ^17. See Seydina Oumar Diarra, ‘Haut Conseil Islamique du Mali’,Info-Matin, 18 January 2002, p. 5. ^18. Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy, p. 212. Seealso David Robinson, Paths of Accommodation: Muslim societiesand French colonial authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920(Ohio University Press, Athens, OA, 2000); David Robinson andJean-Louis Triaud (eds), Le temps des marabouts: Itinéraireset stratégies islamiques en Afrique occidentale françaisev.1880–1960 (Karthala, Paris, 1997). ^19. Many Malians also regularly apply diverse principles from ‘custom’,which is often referred to as laada (from the Arabic) in theregion’s vernaculars. ^20. For one example, see Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Notes on theanthropological study of Islam and Muslim societies in Africa’,Culture and Religion, 1, 2 (2000), pp. 277–85. ^21. Ahmad Uthman Bah, Diya’ al-ghasaq manzuma nasihat al-shabab(Matba’at al-najah al-jadida, Casablanca, Morocco, 1992). ^22. See, for example, Amadou Tall, Dimensions de l’Islam (DarEl Fikr, Beirut, Lebanon, 1995–1996). ^23. On Haïdara and his career, see Soares, ‘Islam andpublic piety’ and Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy.Cf. Dorothea Schulz, ‘"Charisma and Brotherhood" revisited’,Journal of Religion in Africa, 33 (2003), pp. 146–71. ^24. See Louis Brenner, Controlling Knowledge: Religion, power andschooling in a West African Muslim society (Indiana UniversityPress, Bloomington, IL, 2001). ^25. Cf. Olivier Roy (trans. C. Volk), The Failure of Political Islam(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994); Olivier Roy, GlobalizedIslam (Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 2004). ^26. Cf. Armando Salvatore, ‘Social differentiation, moralauthority and public Islam in Egypt: the case of Mustafa Mahmud’,Anthropology Today, 6, 2 (2000), pp. 12–15. ^27. For a discussion of Haïdara and his association’srelation to Sufism and Sufi orders, see Soares, Islam and thePrayer Economy. ^28. This was also a topic of discussion in some print media. See,for example, Cheick Sidya Diombana, ‘La jeunesse et lafoi en l’Islam’, La Roue, 25 October–3 November1993, p. 5. ^29. I am grateful to Roman Loimeier for making his copy of thissign available to me. ^30. See, for example, ‘Déclaration finale des associationsislamiques du Mali concernant les valeurs islamiques et àpropos du programme d’action de Beijing rélatifaux droits des femmes’, La Roue, 22–31 January 1996,pp. 3–5. ^31. For a discussion of some of the controversy around excision,see Bettina Shell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’in Africa: Culture, controversy, and change (Lynne Rienner,Boulder, Colorado, 2000). For campaigns against excision inMali, see Claudie Gosselin, ‘Handing over the knife: Numuwomen and the campaign against excision in Mali’, in BettinaShell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’in Africa, pp. 193–214; Jean Sanou, ‘Lutte contreles mutilations génitales feminines’, Le Soudanais,22 November 2000, p. 3; Yousouf Camara, ‘Réligionet excision’, Le Tambour, 22 June 2001, p. 3; MamadouBlodin Sissok, ‘Religion et excision. Quand les chrétienss’engagent contre les mutilations génitales féminines’,Info-Matin, 29 June 2001, p. 8. ^32. See, for example, Mady M. Dembélé, ‘L’excisionest un poids des traditions, elle n’a rien de religieux’,Les Echos, 18 July 2001, p. 5. ^33. See C.H. Sylla, ‘Interview exclusive. Le Présidentdu Collectif des islamistes parle’, Le Républicain,16 May 2001, pp. 1, 4–5; Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘L’excisionau Mali. La position des musulmans’, Nouvel Horizon, 30January 2001, p. 5; Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘Interdire l’excisionest une atteinte grave’, Le Républicain, 31 January2001, p. 5. ^34. ‘Brèves’, Le Politicien Musulman, 18 March–18April 2002, p. 8. ^35. Leaflets produced and distributed by AISLAM (Association islamiquedu salut) in the author’s possession. ^36. See Mamadou Keïta, ‘Les imams à l’affûtdes jouisseurs’, Nouvel Horizon, 23 November 1998, p.4. ^37. Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘Boycottons "Miss Cedeao" ’, NouvelHorizon, 16 October 1998. See also Mamadou Keïta, ‘MissCedeao’, Nouvel Horizon, 2 November 1998, p. 5. ^38. Yoro Sow, ‘Incertitudes pour la tenue du Congrèsdes homosexuels’, Sud Info, 8 December 1999, p. 4. ^39. However, some prominent Muslim religious leaders, most notablyChérif Haïdara, would eventually take positionsin support of condom use. See Benjamin Soares, ‘Mali:Im Visier der Islamismus-Fahnder’, INAMO 41 (2005), pp.16–18. ^40. Talal Asad, ‘Religion, nation-state, secularism’,in Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (eds), Nation andReligion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, NJ, 1999), p. 191. ^41. Djibril Traoré, ‘El Hadji Mahmoud Dicko,’Le National, 2 October 2000, p. 5. ^42. El Hadj Mahmoud Dicko, ‘Declaration du Collectif des associationsislamiques du Mali’, Info-Matin, 7 May 2001, p. 7. Seealso El Hadj Mahmoud Dicko, ‘Déclaration’,Le Républicain, 4 May 2001, p. 7; Amara Diapy Diawara,‘Meeting du Collectif des associations musulmanes du Mali’,Info-Matin, 13 February 2001, pp. 4–5. ^43. See, for example, Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity (Routledge,New York, NY, 1993); Homi Bhabha, ‘Of mimicry and man’,in The Location of Culture (Routledge, New York, NY, 1994),pp. 85–92. ^44. On this heightened sense, see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori,Muslim Politics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ,1996). For Malian press coverage of the OCI meeting, see, forexample, ‘Organisation de la Conférence islamique.Le monde musulman’, Liberté, 3 July 2001, p. 4. ^45. See the extensive coverage of the meeting in a special editionof Le Continent, 2 February 2001. ^46. For a discussion of some of the proposed reforms and specificcontroversies, cf. Benjamin F. Soares, ‘The attempt toreform family law in Mali’, in Margot Badran (ed.), Genderand Islam in Africa (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, forthcoming);Dorothea E. Schulz, ‘Political factions, ideological fictions:the controversy over family law reform in democratic Mali’,Islamic Law and Society, 10, 1 (2003), pp. 132–64. ^47. Birama Fall, ‘Islam et politique. La colère desislamistes contre le pouvoir’, Le Républicain,23 April 2001, p. 1; Belco Tamboura, ‘Le front religieux,un front de plus pour Konaré’, L’Observateur,14 June 2001, p. 6. ^48. C. H. Sylla, ‘Code de la famille et excision. La dernièrevictoire des islamistes sur Alpha’, Le Républicain,10 June 2002, p. 5. ^49. See Christian Coulon, Le marabout et le prince: Islam et pouvoirau Sénégal (Pédone, Paris, France, 1981). ^50. Boukary Daou, ‘Code de la famille et excision. Les musulmansdisent non à Alpha’, Le Républicain, 5 June2002, p. 1. ^51. Cf. Michael Bratton, Massa Coulibaly, and Fabiana Machado, ‘Popularviews of the legitimacy of the state in Mali’, CanadianJournal of African Studies 36, 2 (2002), pp. 197–238;Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes and E. Gyimah-Boadi, Public Opinion,Democracy and Market Reform in Africa (Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, 2005).     

近年越南的外商投资

受亚洲金融危机的影响,越南外商投资减少.由于越南政府调整了外资政策,外资出现回升势头,投资来源结构、投资产业结构也发生了变化.估计今明两年越南外商投资会继续增长.     

2002年东亚经济回顾

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