泰国立宪君主政治权威兴衰的过程、原因与趋势

本文采用“政治体制-社会结构-经济形态”层级式互动框架,对泰国立宪君主政治权威兴衰的过程、原因与趋势进行了分析。指出,泰国立宪君主政治权威的发展变化,主要取决于跨越式发展进程中结构性失衡引起的新旧利益集团的政治权力竞争与妥协。20世纪60年代以来,泰国立宪君主政治权威复兴的根本原因在于军人集团与王室-保皇派从冲突到结盟的政治关系转变。从长期来看,新资本集团的政治崛起将使得王室-保皇派再次被边缘化。     

推力与拉力:菲律宾人移民海外的动因初探

基于推拉理论及弗雷特·李的人口迁移理论对影响菲律宾人移民海外的因素进行探讨,本文认为菲律宾人移民海外主要由菲律宾国内的政治、经济、社会、家庭等环境中的"推力"和移入地的劳动力市场需求、政治自由度和福利制度等环境中的"拉力"共同形塑而成的。     

The Clash of Civilizations and Resolutions

The clash of civilizations is essentially the conflict among individuals from different civilizations. Individuals struggle for access to survival resources, and the scarcity of resources is the fundamental issue. When it becomes difficult to access resources alone, individuals tend to organize themselves in certain ways, and civilization could be one of these ways. However, the conflicts among different civilizations do not arise as easily as Huntington imagines, and the existence of buffer zones between civilizations is one of the factors that constrain conflict. Buffer zones appear with the emergence of civilization boundaries and are clearly visible in macro-and micro- cross-sections. The buffer zones are the concrete expression of knowledge shared by civilizations, and their formation is driven by many factors, such as economy and trade, cultural exchange, interracial neighborhoods, mixed marriages and so on.     

Triadic Deterrence: Coercing Strength,Beaten by Weakness

Triadic deterrence is the situation when one state uses threats and/or punishments against another state to coerce it to prevent non-state actors from conducting attacks from its territory. Under what conditions is triadic deterrence successful? Some attribute outcomes to the balance of power between states. By contrast, we argue that the complex asymmetrical structure of this conflict requires attention to the targeted regime's relationship to its own society. The stronger the targeted regime, the more likely deterrent action will prove effective. Moving against non-state actors requires institutional capacity, domestic legitimacy, and territorial control, which only strong regimes are able to furnish. Whereas strong regimes can act to uphold raison d’état, weak regimes lack the political tools and incentives to undertake controversial decisions and enforce them. We illustrate this argument through analysis of between- and within-case variation in Israel's attempts to deter Palestinian groups operating from Egypt between 1949 and 1979, and from Syria since 1963.     

The Downside of Decentralization: Armed Clientelism in Colombia

In recent years, decentralization and regional autonomy measures have figured prominently in negotiations designed to end some of the world's most important conflicts, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan. Reforms that shift powers to subnational units deserve the attention of those who are trying to promote security via institutional design, but the risks associated with these territorial reforms are considerable. When political and economic resources are transferred to subnational governments in the attempt to create meaningful access to the political system for former combatants, the great risk is that these same resources can be used to finance a continuation of the armed struggle instead. In response to the popularity of territorial reforms in many post-conflict settings, this paper sounds a cautionary note by evaluating the negative impact of decentralization on security in Colombia, site of Latin America's longest and deadliest armed conflict. After analyzing the design decisions of reformers who hoped that decentralization would help end the conflict, I argue that decentralization in fact financed the expansion of armed clientelism by illegal groups on both the left and right. Thanks to the weakness of the police in much of the national territory, guerrillas and paramilitaries have been able to use decentralized resources to destabilize the state, limiting even further its monopoly over the use of force and creating what are in effect parallel states on the left and right.     

Conflict-generated diasporas and transnational politics in Ethiopia

Diaspora groups link processes of globalisation and transnational migration to homeland politics and conflicts. In some cases, diaspora groups produced by a specific set of traumatic memories create ‘conflict-generated diasporas’ that sustain and often amplify their strong sense of symbolic attachment to the homeland. Conflict-generated diasporas tend to be less willing to compromise and therefore reinforce and exacerbate the protractedness of homeland conflicts. Economists have focused on the links between remittances and civil war. Beyond resources, however, conflict-generated diasporas frequently have a prominent role in framing conflict issues and defining what is politically acceptable. Diaspora groups created by conflict and sustained by traumatic memories tend to compromise less and therefore reinforce and exacerbate the protracted nature of conflicts. The 2005 political opening and subsequent crackdown in Ethiopia illustrates how this diaspora shaped recent political developments and points to broader patterns of transnational linkages among diasporas and homeland political processes.     

Conflict dynamics in post-2011 Libya: a political economy perspective

After the fall of the Qadhafi regime Libya has become a theatre of conflict and violence. In the midst of the vacuum left by the sudden collapse of the old regime, various groups have come to contest their role in a new Libya. Illicit trafficking and the exploitation of oil resources have contributed to this struggle by empowering certain actors over others and by exhausting the capacity of the state. This article investigates the derailing of the Libyan transition and the opening of a new phase of conflict from a political economy perspective. It engages with key arguments developed in the literature on the economic causes of war and shows that the conflict in Libya challenges some of their conclusions. The establishment of areas of de facto sovereignty—warlordism—suggests two key factors explaining the discrepancy between theoretical arguments and empirical evidence: the problematic and contested definition of state and non-state actors in Libya; and an emerging political economy which is best described as an overproduction of governance rather than a lack of it.     

Geographic Opportunity and Neomalthusian Willingness: Boundaries,Shared Rivers,and Conflict

International conflict has been analyzed extensively through the framework of opportunity and willingness. Opportunity has mainly been operationalized as physical proximity. Willingness has been measured in a number of ways, and remains a somewhat more elusive concept. Several scholars have called for boundary length to represent opportunity. Heeding such calls, Harvey Starr has used GIS methods to generate boundary length for 1993 and has found it to be associated with increased propensity to conflict. A number of his measures of willingness were not. Using a new and much more extensive dataset on boundary length for the entire Correlates of War period, this article finds very different results. We study the relationship with shared rivers and water scarcity as measures of neomalthusian factors in willingness over a 110-year period. The results indicate that the neomalthusian factors are significant although not dramatic in their effects. Boundary length, while associated with conflict in a bivariate analysis, fades into insignificance when the neomalthusian willingness measures are introduced.     

Political Repression,Democratization and Civil Conflict in Post-Independence Algeria

This article applies the inverted U-shape theory to Algeria's experience with political repression, democratization and civil conflict. It aims to provide insights into Algeria that other theoretical approaches, such as the clash of civilization, do not. The main findings point to the central role of economic dissatisfaction in promoting political change (democratization) as well as political instability (armed conflict).     

U.S Domestic Regulation of Global Conflict Resources

The violent conflicts in developing countries during the 1990s too often were blamed on rebel groups fighting for natural resource loot. Yet, the natural resources do not cause conflict, which is often rooted in deep-seated and historically contingent sets of grievances. For this reason, we should not expect regulations to end conflict or consolidate peace. Rather, we must look for opportunities for reconciliation, cooperation and confidence building, as well as greater inclusion of individuals and communities in decisions about natural resources.     

新加坡的中国新移民形象：当地的视野与政策的考量

本文首先介绍上世纪90年代后新加坡人口结构之改变,接着分析本地新加坡人对中国新移民的看法,然后讨论新加坡移民政策的出发点,即从控制新移民涌人到整合团结现有移民。本文认为,同宗同族的民族观和共同文化源流在塑造新加坡人对新移民的看法时作用甚微,政治上和经济上的实用主义才是影响公众对新移民的态度和政策抉择的最重要因素。在这一大框架之下,公共外交能够对中国人、华人新移民和中国国家的国际形象改变发挥一定的积极作用。     

Kantian Liberalism, Regime Type, and Military Resource Allocation: Do Democracies Spend Less?

In this paper, we evaluate the liberal claim that democratic states devote fewer resources to their militaries. Low military spending is thought to avert conflict spirals and release more resources to fund domestic programs. While prominent in many liberal international relations theories, most notably in Immanuel Kant's, this proposition has received little empirical scrutiny. Using several indicators of military resource allocation and data on a wide range of states since 1816, we find empirical support for the liberal argument, although regime type is not necessarily the strongest influence on military resource allocation.     

东北地区引进外资的区位优势分析

振兴东北老工业基地的重要手段之一是利用外资解决企业资金不足的问题。区位优势是东道国能直接影响跨国公司直接投资的唯一因素。吸引外资首先应明确了解本地区的区位优势与劣势,才能扬长避短,实现目标。东北地区地理位置优越,自然资源丰富,工业基础雄厚,人力资源质量高,市场增长潜力大,优惠政策吸引强。这些区位优势对吸引外资发挥了重要作用。但是东北地区的市场经营环境差,民营经济没有得到充分发展,对引进外资产生了不利影响。政府职能不明确,服务意识差、工作效率低、缺少透明度等问题急待解决。另外,为避免东北地区内部引资竞争,应加强区域合作,深化产业分工,以实现产业一体化。     

Discrimination and ethnic conflict: a dyadic analysis of politically-excluded groups in sub-Saharan Africa

ABSTRACT

The literature on political exclusion and conflict tends to treat grievance-based mechanisms with broad-brush strokes and does not differentiate between types of political exclusion. This study disaggregates politically-excluded groups into two subgroups: groups that experience political discrimination from the state, and groups without political power that are not explicitly discriminated against. We posit that discriminated groups are more likely to experience grievances and therefore are more prone to conflict than excluded groups that are not actively discriminated against. We further posit that the effect of discrimination on conflict is moderated by interactions with economic inequalities and the share of elites. Using dyadic data for 155 ethnic groups in 28 Sub-Saharan African countries, we find that among politically-excluded groups it is indeed discriminated groups that are responsible for most of the association between political exclusion and conflict. Groups that face active, intentional, and targeted discrimination by the state are significantly more likely to be involved in conflict than excluded groups who do not face this explicit form of discrimination. Additionally, we find that discriminated groups who also experience economic inequalities are less likely to engage in conflict, whilst an increased presence of elites within discriminated groups can precipitate the chances of conflict.     

Political party formation by former armed opposition groups after civil war

ABSTRACT

Under what conditions are rebel groups successfully incorporated into democratic politics when civil war ends? Using an original cross-national, longitudinal dataset, we examine political party formation by armed opposition groups over a 20-year period, from 1990 to 2009. We find that former armed opposition groups form parties in more than half of our observations. A rebel group’s pre-war political experience, characteristics of the war and how it ended outweigh factors such as the country’s political and economic traits and history. We advance a theoretical framework based on rebel leaders’ expectations of success in post-war politics, and we argue that high rates of party formation by former armed opposition groups are likely a reflection of democratic weakness rather than democratic robustness in countries emerging from conflict.     

Domestic political conflict,issue areas,and some dimensions of foreign policy behavior other than conflict∗

This paper examines the seemingly complex linkage between domestic political conflict and external behavior by broadening our consideration of foreign policy behavior. Underlying this analysis is a view that there are elements of both assertiveness and caution in the political use of foreign policy by domestically threatened leaders. They act assertively to divert attention away from domestic issues and enhance the image of their regime, but at the same time they are likely to show some restraint in order to avoid costly military and economic reactions by foreign actors. It is hypothesized that domestic conflict affects the degree of independence, commitment, and intensity in a nation's foreign policy behavior, but no so much its foreign conflict. Supplementing this, the mediating role of another foreign policy property, substantive issue area, is examined as a means of identifying conditions under which the impact of internal unrest would be greatest. The results of the analysis are mixed, but they do lend credibility to the idea that domestic conflict is related to multiple dimensions of foreign policy. More broadly, they suggest that governments employ different foreign policy strategies in coping with different types of domestic political conflict.     

Human securitization of water? A case study of the Indus Waters Basin

In the large and growing literature on hydropolitics, insecurity generated through water-related conflicts is most often conceptualized under a model of economic resource scarcity. Conflict is generally reduced to the question of who has water, who needs water and thus what cost, in economic, political or military terms, is appropriate to acquiring access to water. This article argues that while such analyses effectively chart the central resource-strategic relations involved in the geopolitics of water, they nonetheless disregard the deeper biological and cultural (that is social, ethnic, religious) significance of water in any water conflict. Such analyses, it claims, are too strongly linked to the traditional (as opposed to human) security discourse and therefore run the risk of misdiagnosing the complexity of the water resource challenge. To respond to this challenge the article will develop a human security ‘metrics’ for analysing water-based conflicts in human security terms. It will then compare an analysis of the Indus Waters Treaty based upon the human security approach with an analysis based on a ‘traditional’ security assessment of the treaty in order to assess the viability of the two approaches. Finally, the article will link the comparative assessments back to the water wars literature, drawing conclusions about its strengths and weaknesses and the possibility of a synthesis of traditional and human security in the analysis of water conflict.     

Institutional Similarity and Interstate Conflict

This paper makes two arguments. First, the political and economic institutions of a state affect that state's foreign policy preferences. Second, dyads with similar political and economic institutions are less likely to experience conflict than other types of dyads. After developing the logic of these arguments, I create measures of political and economic institutional similarity and test the hypotheses against the empirical record. The empirical analysis supports the argument that dyadic institutional similarity reduces the likelihood of conflict. The most noteworthy finding is that economic institutional similarity, even when the political institutions in a dyad are dissimilar, reduces the likelihood of militarized conflict.     

“Survival Mode”: Rebel Resilience and the Lord’s Resistance Army

ABSTRACT

To date, scholarly work on armed groups has seldom considered the notion of rebel resilience, or the factors that enable these groups to survive despite time, military pressure, and the myriad contingent events of civil war. In an effort to develop an explanatory framework for resilience as a distinct outcome of civil war and rebellion, this article examines the conditions under which the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has persisted for nearly three decades. Based on fieldwork and original research, the article explains the LRA’s resilience in light of the group’s organizational structure and resource self-sufficiency, which have been well suited for the borderlands of East and Central Africa. The LRA is a key case of rebel resilience. It is important because it sheds light on the organizational foundations of armed groups, the relationship between resources and rebellion, and the broader study of conflict duration and termination. Understanding the sources of the LRA’s resilience can inform efforts to end such insurgencies.     

Reply to pluchinsky and rapoport comments

The on-going Kashmir conflict has metamorphosed into a formidable insurgency that has attracted extremist groups fromPakistan and elements of Al-Qaeda. Given Al-Qaeda's modus operandi as an international network based on already existing domestic extremist groups, this article argues for the resolution of the India-Pakistan Kashmir conflict as an avenue for shrinking the constituency of both Kashmiri domestic extremist groups and, by extension, that of Al-Qaeda's. Feasible options for resolutions are analyzed and an alternative proposition is suggested. An unresolved, or inadequately resolved, conflict is expected to lead the Kashmiri insurgency on a trajectory directed at the Pakistani government, possibly leading to that country's fragmentation and the subsequent expansion of Al-Qaeda's operational base. It is thus argued that the resolution of the Kashmir conflict be viewed as an integral component of the broader U.S. ‘war on terrorism’ and should compromise of delicate American diplomatic involvement in the India-Pakistan dialogue over Kashmir.